Alan Blinder and Mark Watson:
Presidents and the U.S. Economy: An Econometric Exploration, by Alan S. Blinder and Mark W. Watson, NBER Working Paper No. 20324 [open link]: The U.S. economy has grown faster—and scored higher on many other macroeconomic metrics—when the President of the United States is a Democrat rather than a Republican. For many measures, including real GDP growth (on which we concentrate), the performance gap is both large and statistically significant, despite the fact that postwar history includes only 16 complete presidential terms. This paper asks why. The answer is not found in technical time series matters (such as differential trends or mean reversion), nor in systematically more expansionary monetary or fiscal policy under Democrats. Rather, it appears that the Democratic edge stems mainly from more benign oil shocks, superior TFP performance, a more favorable international environment, and perhaps more optimistic consumer expectations about the near-term future. Many other potential explanations are examined but fail to explain the partisan growth gap.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, July 28, 2014 at 07:50 AM in Academic Papers, Econometrics, Economics, Politics |
Congress should do something about "ever-more-aggressive corporate tax avoidance":
Corporate Artful Dodgers, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: In recent decisions, the conservative majority on the Supreme Court has made clear its view that corporations are people, with all the attendant rights. ...
There is, however, one big difference between corporate persons and the likes of you and me: On current trends, we’re heading toward a world in which only the human people pay taxes.
We’re not quite there yet: The federal government still gets a tenth of its revenue from corporate profits taxation. But it used to get a lot more — a third of revenue came from profits taxes in the early 1950s... Part of the decline since then reflects a fall in the tax rate, but mainly it reflects ever-more-aggressive corporate tax avoidance — avoidance that politicians have done little to prevent.
Which brings us to the tax-avoidance strategy du jour: “inversion.” This refers to a legal maneuver in which a company declares that its U.S. operations are owned by its foreign subsidiary, not the other way around, and uses this role reversal to shift reported profits out of American jurisdiction to someplace with a lower tax rate.
The most important thing to understand about inversion is that it does not in any meaningful sense involve American business “moving overseas.” ... All they’re doing is dodging taxes on those profits.
And Congress could crack down on this tax dodge...
Opponents of a crackdown on inversion typically argue that instead of closing loopholes we should reform the whole system by which we tax profits, and maybe stop taxing profits altogether. They also tend to argue that taxing corporate profits hurts investment and job creation. But these are very bad arguments against ending the practice of inversion. ...
As for reforming the system: Yes, that would be a good idea. But..., there are big debates about the shape of reform, debates that would take years to resolve... Why let corporations avoid paying their fair share for years, while we wait for the logjam to break?
Finally, none of this has anything to do with investment and job creation. If and when Walgreen changes its “citizenship,” it will get to keep more of its profits — but it will have no incentive to invest those extra profits in its U.S. operations.
So this should be easy. By all means let’s have a debate about how and how much to tax profits. Meanwhile, however, let’s close this outrageous loophole.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, July 28, 2014 at 12:24 AM in Economics, Politics, Taxes |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, July 28, 2014 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
I have said this before. But I seem to need to say it again…
The very intelligent and thoughtful David Beckworth, Simon Wren-Lewis, and Nick Rowe are agreeing on New Keynesian-Market Monetarist monetary-fiscal convergence. Underpinning all of their analyses there seems to me to be the assumption that all aggregate demand shortfalls spring from the same deep market failures. And I think that that is wrong. ...[continue]...
Posted by Mark Thoma on Sunday, July 27, 2014 at 10:15 AM in Economics, Macroeconomics |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Sunday, July 27, 2014 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
Uwe E. Reinhardt:
The Illogic of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, by Uwe E. Reinhardt, NY Times: ... Persuaded by both theory and empirical research, most economists believe that employer-based health insurance... ostensibly paid by employers ... is recovered from employees through commensurate reductions in take-home pay.
Evidently the majority of Supreme Court justices who just ruled in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby case do not buy the economists’ theory. These justices seem to believe that the owners of “closely held” business firms buy health insurance for their employees out of the kindness of their hearts and with the owners’ money. On that belief, they accord these owners the right to impose some of their ... religious beliefs ... on their employee’s health insurance. ...
The Supreme Court’s ruling may prompt Americans to re-examine whether the traditional, employment-based health insurance ... is really the ideal platform for health insurance coverage in the 21st century. The public health insurance exchanges established under the Affordable Care Act are likely to nibble away at this system....
In the meantime, the case should help puncture the illusion that employer-provided health insurance is an unearned gift bestowed on them by the owners and paid with the owners’ money, giving those owners the moral right to dictate the nature of that gift.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Saturday, July 26, 2014 at 10:52 AM in Economics, Health Care |
Why are so many of the rich and powerful so callous and indifferent to the struggles of those who aren't so fortunate?:
Are the Rich Coldhearted?, by Michael Inzlicht and Sukhvinder Obhi, NY Times: ... Can people in high positions of power — presidents, bosses, celebrities, even dominant spouses — easily empathize with those beneath them?
Psychological research suggests the answer is no. ...
Why does power leave people seemingly coldhearted? Some, like the Princeton psychologist Susan Fiske, have suggested that powerful people don’t attend well to others around them because they don’t need them in order to access important resources; as powerful people, they already have plentiful access to those.
We suggest a different, albeit complementary, reason from cognitive neuroscience. On the basis of a study we recently published with the researcher Jeremy Hogeveen, in the Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, we contend that when people experience power, their brains fundamentally change how sensitive they are to the actions of others. ...
Does this mean that the powerful are heartless beings incapable of empathy? Hardly..., the bad news is that the powerful are, by default and at a neurological level, simply not motivated to care. But the good news is that they are, in theory, redeemable.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Saturday, July 26, 2014 at 10:52 AM in Economics, Income Distribution, Politics, Social Insurance |
Here are the myths described by Vivien Labaton:
1. The pay gap is closing rapidly. ...
2. Women earn less because they work in industries that pay less. ...
3. Women earn less because they don’t negotiate well. ...
4. Women earn less because mothers choose to work less. ...
5. To close the pay gap, we should focus on deterring discrimination. ...
Posted by Mark Thoma on Saturday, July 26, 2014 at 09:53 AM in Economics |
Larry Summers on why he supports (conditionally) the Export-Import bank (from a longer interview):
Danny Vinik: I want to turn to your op-ed in the Financial Times on July 6 on the U.S. global stance on economic issues. In particular, you expressed support for the Export-Import bank and said that eliminating it would be an act of unilateral disarmament. Can you explain that?
Larry Summers: Probably at this moment, the greatest threat to open market capitalism comes from state-driven mercantilism capitalism, often carried on by authoritarian governments. They do not seek a level playing field. They seek a playing field that is tilted in their favor through the use of a variety of kinds of subsidized credits. The best and most credible way of deterring and limiting that behavior is to have a capacity to respond so that it does not produce commercial advantages. That’s what the Ex-Im bank enables us to do.
There are some who believe that it is good for everybody globally to subsidize exports. I’m not among them. I’m in favor of negotiations that would move towards a system where you didn’t have every country racing to compete with subsidies. But unilaterally renouncing our subsidies would be a source of great satisfaction in important parts of the world with which we compete and I do not think would be a productive way to bring about a more rules-based system.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Saturday, July 26, 2014 at 08:58 AM
Posted by Mark Thoma on Saturday, July 26, 2014 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
In case you missed this in today's links, it's worth noting explicitly:
Devolution Number Nine, by MaxSpeak: Rep. Paul Ryan (R-Crazy) has a new plan to fight poverty..., the common theme throughout the report is to convert Federal programs into block grants. A block grant is a fixed pot of money provided to a state or local government for broadly-defined purposes. Ryan’s report is at pains to assert that the conversion would not entail spending cuts. This could not be further from the truth.
The story goes back to the days of Richard Nixon. I told it here. ... The short version is that a program or programs converted to a block grant is being set up to wither away. Block grants are designed through formulas to grow slowly or not at all, despite the likelihood that whatever the included programs were aimed at typically costs more to deal with every year. There are also two malignant political dynamics at work. One is that ... block grants transfer control to state governments. They have the fun of spending the money, Congress has the fun of raising the taxes to pay for it. The other is that the more vague — “flexible” — the purposes of the grant, the less focused is its political support. ...
The transfer of program responsibility from the Federal government to the states is known as devolution. It is the standard way of attacking domestic spending for social purposes, going back to Richard Nixon’s dismantling of the original, more interesting War on Poverty launched by Lyndon Johnson. ...
Posted by Mark Thoma on Friday, July 25, 2014 at 10:10 AM in Economics, Politics, Social Insurance |
How ignoring climate change could sink the U.S. economy, by Robert E. Rubin: ...When it comes to the economy, much of the debate about climate change ... is framed as a trade-off between environmental protection and economic prosperity. Many people argue that moving away from fossil fuels and reducing carbon emissions will impede economic growth, hurt business and hamper job creation.
But from an economic perspective, that’s precisely the wrong way to look at it. The real question should be: What is the cost of inaction? In my view — and in the view of a growing group of business people, economists, and other financial and market experts — the cost of inaction over the long term is far greater than the cost of action.
I recently participated in a bipartisan effort to measure the economic risks of unchecked climate change in the United States. We commissioned an independent analysis, led by a highly respected group of economists and climate scientists, and our inaugural report, “Risky Business,” was released in June. The report’s conclusions demonstrated the ... U.S. economy faces enormous risks from unmitigated climate change. ...
We do not face a choice between protecting our environment or protecting our economy. We face a choice between protecting our economy by protecting our environment — or allowing environmental havoc to create economic havoc. ...
Posted by Mark Thoma on Friday, July 25, 2014 at 08:28 AM in Economics, Environment, Market Failure |
Beware of "anti-government propaganda":
Left Coast Rising, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: The states, Justice Brandeis famously pointed out, are the laboratories of democracy. And it’s still true. For example, one reason we knew or should have known that Obamacare was workable was the post-2006 success of Romneycare in Massachusetts. More recently, Kansas went all-in on supply-side economics, slashing taxes on the affluent in the belief that this would spark a huge boom; the boom didn’t happen, but the budget deficit exploded, offering an object lesson to those willing to learn from experience.
And there’s an even bigger if less drastic experiment under way in the opposite direction. California has long suffered from political paralysis, with budget rules that allowed an increasingly extreme Republican minority to hamstring a Democratic majority; when the state’s housing bubble burst, it plunged into fiscal crisis. In 2012, however, Democratic dominance finally became strong enough to overcome the paralysis, and Gov. Jerry Brown was able to push through a modestly liberal agenda of higher taxes, spending increases and a rise in the minimum wage. California also moved enthusiastically to implement Obamacare.
I guess we’re not in Kansas anymore. (Sorry, I couldn’t help myself.)
Needless to say, conservatives predicted doom. A representative reaction: Daniel J. Mitchell of the Cato Institute declared that by voting for Proposition 30, which authorized those tax increases, “the looters and moochers of the Golden State” (yes, they really do think they’re living in an Ayn Rand novel) were committing “economic suicide.” ...
What has actually happened? There is ... no sign of the promised catastrophe. If tax increases are causing a major flight of jobs from California, you can’t see it in the job numbers. Employment is up 3.6 percent in the past 18 months, compared with a national average of 2.8 percent...
And, yes, the budget is back in surplus.
Has there been any soul-searching among the prophets of California doom, asking why they were so wrong? Not that I’m aware of. ...
So what do we learn from the California comeback? Mainly, that you should take anti-government propaganda with large helpings of salt. Tax increases aren’t economic suicide; sometimes they’re a useful way to pay for things we need. Government programs, like Obamacare, can work if the people running them want them to work, and if they aren’t sabotaged from the right. In other words, California’s success is a demonstration that the extremist ideology still dominating much of American politics is nonsense.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Friday, July 25, 2014 at 12:24 AM in Economics, Politics |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Friday, July 25, 2014 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
Me, at MoneyWatch:
Should the Fed have to play by a rule?: What if the U.S. Federal Reserve Board had to implement monetary policy according to a specific rule that would require specific policy actions depending on the circumstances?
That's the intent of a bill Republicans in the House of Representatives recently proposed. The Federal Reserve Accountability and Transparency Act would force the Fed's conduct of monetary policy to follow a prescribed rule...
Economists have long debated whether specific rules are better than giving central bankers the discretion to set monetary policy as they see fit. Here are the arguments for and against policy rules, and a compromise position that many economists advocate. ...
Posted by Mark Thoma on Thursday, July 24, 2014 at 08:37 AM in Economics, Monetary Policy |
Meritocracy won’t happen: the problem’s with the ‘ocracy’, by Andrew Gelman, Monkey Cage: I’ve written about this before but I think the topic is worth returning to, because it comes up a lot in our political discourse.
For example, consider this recent post by Robert Reich (link from Mark Thoma):
The “self-made” man or woman, the symbol of American meritocracy, is disappearing. Six of today’s ten wealthiest Americans are heirs to prominent fortunes. . . . We don’t have to sit by and watch our meritocracy be replaced by a permanent aristocracy . . .
I don’t disagree with Reich on the data..., the data seem to support Reich’s point that lots of rich people come from rich families.
But I want to dispute Reich’s other statement, which is that this is somehow contrary to the spirit of “meritocracy.”
I claim the opposite: that inherited privilege is an intrinsic and central aspect of meritocracy. ...
Posted by Mark Thoma on Thursday, July 24, 2014 at 08:27 AM in Economics, Income Distribution |
Is this why prices are sticky?:
Sticky prices and behavioural indifference curves, by John Komlos, Vox EU: Many quantities fail to respond smoothly to price changes. This column stresses that the ‘endowment effect’ – a well-known behavioral economics concept – implies kinks in indifference curves at the current consumption bundle price. Such kinks may account for the stickiness of prices, wages, and interest rates.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Thursday, July 24, 2014 at 08:20 AM in Economics |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Thursday, July 24, 2014 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
From James Choi:
Why the Third Pounder hamburger failed: One of the most vivid arithmetic failings displayed by Americans occurred in the early 1980s, when the A&W restaurant chain released a new hamburger to rival the McDonald’s Quarter Pounder. With a third-pound of beef, the A&W burger had more meat than the Quarter Pounder; in taste tests, customers preferred A&W’s burger. And it was less expensive. A lavish A&W television and radio marketing campaign cited these benefits. Yet instead of leaping at the great value, customers snubbed it. Only when the company held customer focus groups did it become clear why. The Third Pounder presented the American public with a test in fractions. And we failed. Misunderstanding the value of one-third, customers believed they were being overcharged. Why, they asked the researchers, should they pay the same amount for a third of a pound of meat as they did for a quarter-pound of meat at McDonald’s. The “4” in “¼,” larger than the “3” in “⅓,” led them astray. --Elizabeth Green, NYT Magazine, on losing money by overestimating the American public's intelligence.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, July 23, 2014 at 08:25 AM in Economics |
Another false alarm on US inflation?, by Gavyn Davies: There have been a few false alarms about a possible upsurge in inflation in the US in the past few years... There is an entrenched belief among some observers that the huge rise in central bank balance sheets must eventually leak into consumer prices, and they have not been deterred by the lack of evidence in their favour so far.
Another such scare has been brewing recently. ... As so often in the past, this happened because of temporary spikes in commodity prices, especially oil. But these have usually been reversed before a generalised inflation process has been triggered. ....
It now seems probable that part of the recent jump in core inflation was just a random fluctuation in the data. There have been suggestions that seasonal adjustment may have been awry in the spring.
But the main reason for the lack of concern is that wage pressures in the economy have remained stable, on virtually all the relevant measures. ...
On today’s evidence, there has been yet another false alarm on US inflation.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, July 23, 2014 at 08:04 AM in Economics, Inflation |
The discussion continues:
Wall Street Skips Economics Class, by Noah Smith: If you care at all about what academic macroeconomists are cooking up (or if you do any macro investing), you might want to check out the latest economics blog discussion about the big change that happened in the late '70s and early '80s. Here’s a post by the University of Chicago economist John Cochrane, and here’s one by Oxford’s Simon Wren-Lewis that includes links to most of the other contributions.
In case you don’t know the background, here’s the short version...
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, July 23, 2014 at 08:04 AM in Economics, Macroeconomics, Methodology |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, July 23, 2014 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
Running late today -- two very quick ones. First, from Scientific American:
Will Automation Take Our Jobs?: Last fall economist Carl Benedikt Frey and information engineer Michael A. Osborne, both at the University of Oxford, published a study estimating the probability that 702 occupations would soon be computerized out of existence. Their findings were startling. Advances in ... technologies could, they argued, put 47 percent of American jobs at high risk of being automated in the years ahead. Loan officers, tax preparers, cashiers, locomotive engineers, paralegals, roofers, taxi drivers and even animal breeders are all in danger of going the way of the switchboard operator.
Whether or not you buy Frey and Osborne's analysis, it is undeniable that something strange is happening in the U.S. labor market. Since the end of the Great Recession, job creation has not kept up with population growth. Corporate profits have doubled since 2000, yet median household income (adjusted for inflation) dropped from $55,986 to $51,017. ... Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee ... call this divergence the “great decoupling.” In their view, presented in their recent book The Second Machine Age, it is a historic shift. ...
The Next Wave of Technology?, by Tim Taylor: Many discussions of "technology" and how it will affect jobs and the economy have a tendency to discuss technology as if it is one-dimensional, which is of course an extreme oversimplification. Erik Brynjolfsson, Andrew McAfee, and Michael Spence offer some informed speculation on how they see the course of technology evolving in "New World Order: Labor, Capital, and Ideas in the Power Law Economy," which appears in the July/August 2014 issue of Foreign Affairs (available free, although you may need to register).
Up until now, they argue, the main force of information and communications technology has been to tie the global economy together, so that production could be moved to where it was most cost-effective. ...
But looking ahead, they argue that the next wave of technology will not be about relocating production around the globe, but changing the nature of production--and in particular, automating more and more of it. If the previous wave of technology made workers in high-income countries like the U.S. feel that their jobs were being outsourced to China, the next wave is going to make those low-skill workers in repetitive jobs--whether in China or anywhere else--feel that their jobs are being outsources to robots. ...
If this prediction holds true, what does this mean for the future of jobs and the economy?
1) Outsourcing would become much less common. ...
2) For low-income and middle-income countries like China..., their jobs and workforce would experience a dislocating wave of change.
3) Some kinds of physical capital are going to plummet in price, like robots, 3D printing, and artificial intelligence...
4) So..., who does well in this future economy? For high-income countries like the United States, Brynjolfsson, McAfee, and Spence emphasize that the greatest rewards will go to "people who create new ideas and innovations," in what they refer to as a wave of "superstar-based technical change." ...
This final forecast seems overly grim to me. While I can easily believe that the new waves of technology will continue to create superstar earners, it seems plausible to me that the spread and prevalence of many different new kinds of technology offers opportunities to the typical worker, too. After all, new ideas and innovations, and the process of bringing them to the market, are often the result of a team process--and even being a mid-level but contributing player on such teams, or a key supplier to such teams, can be well-rewarded in the market. More broadly, the question for the workplace of the future is to think about jobs where labor can be a powerful complement to new technologies, and then for the education and training system, employers, and employees to get the skills they need for such jobs. If you would like a little more speculation, one of my early posts on this blog, back on July 25, 2011, was a discussion of "Where Will America's Future Jobs Come From?"
Posted by Mark Thoma on Tuesday, July 22, 2014 at 08:22 AM in Economics, Technology, Unemployment |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Tuesday, July 22, 2014 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
Via the SF Fed:
The Wage Growth Gap for Recent College Grads, by Bart Hobijn and Leila Bengali, FRBSF Economic Letter: Starting wages of recent college graduates have essentially been flat since the onset of the Great Recession in 2007. Median weekly earnings for full-time workers who graduated from college in the year just before the recession, between May 2006 and April 2007, were $653. Over the 12 months ending in April 2014, the earnings of recent college graduates had risen to $692 a week, only 6% higher than seven years ago.
The lackluster increases in starting wages for college graduates stand in stark contrast to growth in median weekly earnings for all full-time workers. These earnings have increased 15% from $678 in 2007 to $780 in 2014. This has created a substantial gap between wage growth for new college graduates and workers overall.
In this Economic Letter we put the wage growth gap in a historical context and consider what is at its heart. In particular, we find that the gap does not reflect a switch in the types of jobs that college graduates are able to find. Rather we find that wage growth has been weak across a wide range of occupations for this group of employees, a result of the lingering weak labor market recovery. ...
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, July 21, 2014 at 11:58 AM in Economics, Universities |
Cecchetti & Schoenholtz:
... A well-functioning financial system is based on trust. Widespread belief in honesty and integrity are essential for intermediation. That is, when we make a bank deposit, purchase a share of stock or a bond, we need to believe that terms of the agreement are being accurately represented. Yes, the value of the stock can go up and down, but when you think you buy an equity share, you really do own it. Fraud can undermine confidence, and the result will be less saving, less investment, less wealth and less income.
Unfortunately, in a complex financial system, the possibilities for fraud are numerous and the incidence frequent. Most cases are smaller and more mundane than Madoff or Ponzi. But they are remarkably common even today, despite enormous public efforts to prevent or expose them. One website devoted to tracking financial frauds in the United States lists 67 Ponzi schemes worth an estimated $3 billion in 2013 alone. ...
See also: Four years after passage, House keeps trying to kill Dodd-Frank.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, July 21, 2014 at 08:28 AM in Economics, Financial System, Politics, Regulation |
"We don’t have a debt crisis, and never did":
The Fiscal Fizzle, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: For much of the past five years readers of the political and economic news were left in little doubt that budget deficits and rising debt were the most important issue facing America. Serious people constantly issued dire warnings that the United States risked turning into another Greece ...
I’m not sure whether most readers realize just how thoroughly the great fiscal panic has fizzled...
In short, the debt apocalypse has been called off.
Wait — what about the risk of a crisis of confidence? There have been many warnings that such a crisis was imminent, some of them coupled with surprisingly frank admissions of disappointment that it hadn’t happened yet. For example, Alan Greenspan warned of the “Greece analogy,” and declared that it was “regrettable” that U.S. interest rates and inflation hadn’t yet soared.
But that was more than four years ago, and both inflation and interest rates remain low. Maybe the United States, which among other things borrows in its own currency and therefore can’t run out of cash, isn’t much like Greece after all.
In fact, even within Europe the severity of the debt crisis diminished rapidly once the European Central Bank began doing its job, making it clear that it would do “whatever it takes” to avoid cash crises in nations that have given up their own currencies and adopted the euro. Did you know that Italy, which remains deep in debt and suffers much more from the burden of an aging population than we do, can now borrow long term at an interest rate of only 2.78 percent? Did you know that France, which is the subject of constant negative reporting, pays only 1.57 percent?
So we don’t have a debt crisis, and never did. Why did everyone important seem to think otherwise?
To be fair, there has been some real good news about the long-run fiscal prospect, mainly from health care. But it’s hard to escape the sense that debt panic was promoted because it served a political purpose — that many people were pushing the notion of a debt crisis as a way to attack Social Security and Medicare. And they did immense damage along the way, diverting the nation’s attention from its real problems — crippling unemployment, deteriorating infrastructure and more — for years on end.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, July 21, 2014 at 12:33 AM in Budget Deficit, Economics |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, July 21, 2014 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
Tyler Cowen on global inequality: Tyler Cowen sounds a bit like Voltaire's Pangloss when he argues, as the New York Times headline puts it, that we are living "all in all, [in] a more egalitarian world" (link). Cowen acknowledges what most people concerned about inequalities believe: "the problem [of inequality] has become more acute within most individual nations"; but he shrugs this off by saying that "income inequality for the world as a whole has been falling for most of the last 20 years." The implication is that we should not be concerned about the first fact because of the encouraging trend in the second fact.
Cowen bases his case on what seems on its face paradoxical but is in fact correct: it is possible for a set of 100 countries to each experience increasing income inequality and yet the aggregate of those populations to experience falling inequality. And this is precisely what he thinks is happening. Incomes in (some of) the poorest countries are rising, and the gap between the top and the bottom has fallen. So the gap between the richest and the poorest citizens of planet Earth has declined. The economic growth in developing countries in the past twenty years, principally China, has led to rapid per capita growth in several of those countries. This helps the distribution of income globally -- even as it worsens China's income distribution.
But this isn't what most people are concerned about when they express criticisms of rising inequalities, either nationally or internationally. They are concerned about the fact that our economies have very systematically increased the percentage of income and wealth flowing to the top 1, 5, and 10 percent, while allowing the bottom 40% to stagnate. And this concentration of wealth and income is widespread across the globe. (Branko Milanovic does a nice job of analyzing the different meanings we might attach to "global inequality" in this World Bank working paper; link.)
This rising income inequality is a profound problem for many reasons. First, it means that the quality of life for the poorest 40% of each economy's population is significantly lower than it could and should be, given the level of wealth of the societies in which they live. That is a bad thing in and of itself. Second, the relative poverty of this sizable portion of society places a burden on future economic growth. If the poorest 40% are poorly educated, poorly housed, and poorly served by healthcare, then they will be less productive than they have the capacity to be, and future society will be the poorer for it. Third, this rising inequality is further a problem because it undermines the perceived legitimacy of our economic system. Widening inequalities have given rise to a widespread perception that these growing inequalities are unfair and unjustified. This is a political problem of the first magnitude. Our democracy depends on a shared conviction of the basic fairness of our institutions. (Kate Pickett and Richard Wilkinson also argue that inequality has negative effects on the social wellbeing of whole societies; link.)
The seeming paradox raised here can be easily clarified by separating two distinct issues. One is the issue of income distribution within an integrated national economy -- the United States, Denmark, Brazil, China. And the second is the issue of extreme inequalities of per capita GDP across national economies -- the poverty of nations like Nigeria, Honduras, and Bangladesh compared to rich countries like Sweden, Germany, or Canada. Both are important issues; but they are different issues that should not be conflated. It is misleading to judge that global inequality is falling by looking only at the rank-ordered distribution of income across the world's 7 billion citizens. This decline follows from the moderate success achieved in the past fifteen years in ameliorating global poverty -- a Millenium Development Goal (link). But it is at least as relevant to base our answer to the question about the trend of global inequalities by looking at the average trend across the world's domestic economies; and this trend is unambiguously upward.
Here is a pair of graphs from The Economist that address both topics (reproduced at the XrayDelta blog here). The left panel demonstrates the trend that Cowen is highlighting. The global Gini coefficient has indeed leveled off in the past 40 years. The right panel indicates rising inequalities in US, Britain, Germany, France, and Sweden. As the second panel documents, the distribution of income within a sample set of national economies has dramatically worsened since 1980. So global inequalities are both improving and worsening -- depending on how we disaggregate the question.
The global Gini approach is intended to capture income inequalities across the world's citizens, not across the world's countries. Essentially this means estimating a rank-order of the incomes of all the world's citizens, and estimating the Lorenz distribution this creates.
We get a very different picture if we consider what has happened with inequalities within each of the world's national economies. Here is a graph compiled by Branko Milanovic that represents the average Gini coefficient for countries over time (link):
This graph makes the crucial point: inequalities within nations have increased dramatically across the globe since 1980, from an average Gini coefficient of about .45 to an average of .54 in 2000 (and apparently still rising). And this is the most important point: each of these countries is suffering the social disadvantages that go along with the fact of rising inequalities. So we could use the Milanovic graph to reach exactly the opposite conclusion from the one that Cowen reaches: in fact, global inequalities have worsened dramatically since 1980.
Thomas Piketty's name does not occur once in Cowen's short piece; and yet his economic arguments about capitalism and inequality in Capital in the Twenty-First Century are surely part of the the Cowen's impetus in writing this piece. Ironically, Piketty's findings corroborate one part of Cowen's point -- the global convergence of inequalities. Two French economists, François Bourguignon and Christian Morrisson, made a substantial effort to measure historical Gini coefficients for the world's population as a whole (link). Their work is incorporated into Piketty's own conclusions and is included on Piketty's website. Here is Piketty's summary graph of global inequalities since 1700 -- which makes the point of convergence between developed countries and developing countries more clearly than Cowen himself:
So what about China? What role does the world's largest economy (by population) play in the topic of global economic inequalities? China's per capita income has increased by roughly 10% annually during that period; as a population it is no longer a low-income economy. But most development economists who study China would agree that China's rapid growth since 1980 has sharply increased inequalities in that country (link, link). Urban and coastal populations have gained much more rapidly than the 45% or so of the population (500 million people) still living in backward rural areas. A recent estimate found that the Gini coefficient for China has increased from .30 to .45 since 1980 (link). So China's rapid economic growth has been a major component of the trend Cowan highlights: the rising level of incomes in previously poor countries. At the same time, this process of growth has been accompanied by rising levels of inequalities within China that are a source of serious concern for Chinese policy makers.
Here are charts documenting the rise of income inequalities in China from the 2005 China Human Development Report (link):
So rising global income inequality is not a minor issue to be brushed aside with a change of topic. Rather, it is a key issue for the economic and political futures of countries throughout the world, including Canada, Great Britain, the United States, Germany, Egypt, China, India, and Brazil. And if you don't think that economic inequalities have the potential for creating political unrest, you haven't paid attention to recent events in Egypt, Brazil, the UK, France, Sweden, and Tunisia.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Sunday, July 20, 2014 at 02:07 PM in Economics, Income Distribution |
This article, by David Cay Johnston, is getting a surprising number of retweets:
State’s job growth defies predictions after tax increases, by David Cay Johnston, The Bee: Dire predictions about jobs being destroyed spread across California in 2012 as voters debated whether to enact the sales and, for those near the top of the income ladder, stiff income tax increases in Proposition 30. Million-dollar-plus earners face a 3 percentage-point increase on each additional dollar.
“It hurts small business and kills jobs,” warned the Sacramento Taxpayers Association, the National Federation of Independent Business/California, and Joel Fox, president of the Small Business Action Committee.
So what happened after voters approved the tax increases, which took effect at the start of 2013?
Last year California added 410,418 jobs, an increase of 2.8 percent over 2012, significantly better than the 1.8 percent national increase in jobs. ...
Posted by Mark Thoma on Sunday, July 20, 2014 at 10:21 AM in Economics, Taxes, Unemployment |
Why not worker control?: "Workplace autonomy plays an important causal role in determining well-being" conclude Alex Coad and Martin Binder in a new paper. This is consistent with research by Alois Stutzer which shows that procedural utility matters; people care not just about outcomes but about having control, which is why the self-employed tend to be happier than employees.
This implies that a government that is concerned to increase happiness - as David Cameron claims to be - should have as one of its aims a rise in worker control of the workplace.
This is especially the case because research shows that the cliche is true - a happy worker really is a productive worker. For this reason, it shouldn't be a surprise that there's a large (pdf) body of research which shows that worker coops can be at least as productive and successful as hierarchical firms. ...[examples]...
Greater worker control, therefore, might increase well-being directly and also raise productivity. Which poses the question: why, then, is it so firmly off of the political agenda? It's not because it's a loony lefty policy. ... Nor do I think it good enough to claim that there's no voter demand...
Instead, I suspect there are other answers to my question. ... As Pablo Torija Jimenez has shown, "democratic" politics now serves the interests of the very rich. And these benefit from managerialist control of workplaces even if most of the rest of us do not.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Sunday, July 20, 2014 at 08:46 AM
Posted by Mark Thoma on Sunday, July 20, 2014 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
Is Choosing to Believe in Economic Models a Rational Expected-Utility Decision Theory Thing?: I have always understood expected-utility decision theory to be normative, not positive: it is how people ought to behave if they want to achieve their goals in risky environments, not how people do behave. One of the chief purposes of teaching expected-utility decision theory is in fact to make people aware that they really should be risk neutral over small gambles where they do know the probabilities--that they will be happier and achieve more of their goals in the long run if they in fact do so. ...[continue]...
Here's the bottom line:
(6) Given that people aren't rational Bayesian expected utility-theory decision makers, what do economists think that they are doing modeling markets as if they are populated by agents who are? Here there are, I think, three answers:
Most economists are clueless, and have not thought about these issues at all.
Some economists think that we have developed cognitive institutions and routines in organizations that make organizations expected-utility-theory decision makers even though the individuals in utility theory are not. (Yeah, right: I find this very amusing too.)
Some economists admit that the failure of individuals to follow expected-utility decision theory and our inability to build institutions that properly compensate for our cognitive biases (cough, actively-managed mutual funds, anyone?) are one of the major sources of market failure in the world today--for one thing, they blow the efficient market hypothesis in finance sky-high.
The fact that so few economists are in the third camp--and that any economists are in the second camp--makes me agree 100% with Andrew Gelman's strictures on economics as akin to Ptolemaic astronomy, in which the fundamentals of the model are "not [first-order] approximations to something real, they’re just fictions..."
Posted by Mark Thoma on Saturday, July 19, 2014 at 10:01 AM in Economics, Methodology |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Saturday, July 19, 2014 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
Joseph Stiglitz Hails New BRICS Bank Challenging U.S.-Dominated World Bank & IMF
Transcript - Part 1
Joseph Stiglitz on TPP, Cracking Down on Corporate Tax Dodgers
Transcript - Part 2
Posted by Mark Thoma on Friday, July 18, 2014 at 11:22 AM in Economics, International Finance, International Trade, Taxes, Video |
Did the Banks Have to Commit Fraud?: Floyd Norris has an interesting piece discussing Citigroup's $7 billion settlement for misrepresenting the quality of the mortgages in the mortgage backed securities it marketed in the housing bubble. Norris notes that the bank had consultants who warned that many of the mortgages did not meet its standards and therefore should not have been included the securities.
Towards the end of the piece Norris comments:
"And it may well be true that actions like Citigroup’s were necessary for any bank that wanted to stay in what then appeared to be a highly profitable business. Imagine for a minute what would have happened in 2006 if Citigroup had listened to its consultants and canceled the offerings. To the mortgage companies making the loans, that might have simply marked Citigroup as uncooperative. The business would have gone to less scrupulous competitors."
This raises the question of what purpose is served by this sort of settlement. Undoubtedly Norris' statement is true. However, the market dynamic might be different if this settlement were different.
Based on the information Norris presents here, Citigroup's top management essentially knew that the bank was engaging in large-scale fraud by passing along billions of dollars worth of bad mortgages. If these people were now facing years of prison as a result of criminal prosecution then it may well affect how bank executives think about these situations in the future. While it will always be true that they do not want to turn away business, they would probably rather sacrifice some of their yearly bonus than risk spending a decade of their life behind bars. The fear of prision may even deter less scrupulous competitors. In that case, securitizing fraudulent mortgages might have been a marginal activity of little consequence for the economy.
Citigroup's settlement will not change the tradeoffs from what Citigroup's top management saw in 2006. As a result, in the future bankers are likely to make the same decisions that they did in 2006.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Friday, July 18, 2014 at 08:58 AM in Economics, Financial System, Regulation |
Further thoughts on Phillips curves: In a post from a few days ago I looked at some recent evidence on Phillips curves, treating the Great Recession as a test case. I cast the discussion as a debate between rational and adaptive expectations. Neither is likely to be 100% right of course, but I suggested the evidence implied rational expectations were more right than adaptive. In this post I want to relate this to some other people’s work and discussion. (See also this post from Mark Thoma.) ...
The first issue is why look at just half a dozen years, in only a few countries. As I noted in the original post, when looking at CPI inflation there are many short term factors that may mislead. Another reason for excluding European countries which I did not mention is the impact of austerity driven higher VAT rates (and other similar taxes or administered prices), nicely documented by Klitgaard and Peck. Surely all this ‘noise’ is an excellent reason to look over a much longer time horizon?
One answer is given in this recent JEL paper by Mavroeidis, Plagborg-Møller and Stock. As Plagborg-Moller notes in an email to Mark Thoma: “Our meta-analysis finds that essentially any desired parameter estimates can be generated by some reasonable-sounding specification. That is, estimation of the NKPC is subject to enormous specification uncertainty. This is consistent with the range of estimates reported in the literature….traditional aggregate time series analysis is just not very informative about the nature of inflation dynamics.” This had been my reading based on work I’d seen.
This is often going to be the case with time series econometrics, particularly when key variables appear in the form of expectations. Faced with this, what economists often look for is some decisive and hopefully large event, where all the issues involving specification uncertainty can be sidelined or become second order. The Great Recession, for countries that did not suffer a second recession, might be just such an event. In earlier, milder recessions it was also much less clear what the monetary authority’s inflation target was (if it had one at all), and how credible it was. ...
I certainly agree with the claim that a "decisive and hopefully large event" is needed to empirically test econometric models since I've made the same point many times in the past. For example, "...the ability to choose one model over the other is not quite as hopeless as I’ve implied. New data and recent events like the Great Recession push these models into unchartered territory and provide a way to assess which model provides better predictions. However, because of our reliance on historical data this is a slow process – we have to wait for data to accumulate – and there’s no guarantee that once we are finally able to pit one model against the other we will be able to crown a winner. Both models could fail..."
Anyway...he goes on to discuss "How does what I did relate to recent discussions by Paul Krugman?," and concludes with:
My interpretation suggests that the New Keynesian Phillips curve is a more sensible place to start from than the adaptive expectations Friedman/Phelps version. As this is the view implicitly taken by most mainstream academic macroeconomics, but using a methodology that does not ensure congruence with the data, I think it is useful to point out when the mainstream does have empirical support. ...
Posted by Mark Thoma on Friday, July 18, 2014 at 08:21 AM in Econometrics, Economics, Macroeconomics |
What does "inflation addiction" tell us?:
Addicted to Inflation, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: The first step toward recovery is admitting that you have a problem. That goes for political movements as well as individuals. So I have some advice for so-called reform conservatives trying to rebuild the intellectual vitality of the right: You need to start by facing up to the fact that your movement is in the grip of some uncontrollable urges. In particular, it’s addicted to inflation — not the thing itself, but the claim that runaway inflation is either happening or about to happen. ...
Yet despite being consistently wrong for more than five years,... at best, the inflation-is-coming crowd admits that it hasn’t happened yet, but attributes the delay to unforeseeable circumstances. ... At worst, inflationistas resort to conspiracy theories: Inflation is already high, but the government is covering it up. The ... inflation conspiracy theorists have faced well-deserved ridicule even from fellow conservatives. Yet the conspiracy theory keeps resurfacing. It has, predictably, been rolled out to defend Mr. Santelli.
All of this is very frustrating to those reform conservatives. If you ask what new ideas they have to offer, they often mention “market monetarism,” which translates under current circumstances to the notion that the Fed should be doing more, not less. ... But this idea has achieved no traction at all with the rest of American conservatism, which is still obsessed with the phantom menace of runaway inflation.
And the roots of inflation addiction run deep. Reformers like to minimize the influence of libertarian fantasies — fantasies that invariably involve the notion that inflationary disaster looms unless we return to gold — on today’s conservative leaders. But to do that, you have to dismiss what these leaders have actually said. ...
More generally, modern American conservatism is deeply opposed to any form of government activism, and while monetary policy is sometimes treated as a technocratic affair, the truth is that printing dollars to fight a slump, or even to stabilize some broader definition of the money supply, is indeed an activist policy.
The point, then, is that inflation addiction is telling us something about the intellectual state of one side of our great national divide. The right’s obsessive focus on a problem we don’t have, its refusal to reconsider its premises despite overwhelming practical failure, tells you that we aren’t actually having any kind of rational debate. And that, in turn, bodes ill not just for would-be reformers, but for the nation.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Friday, July 18, 2014 at 12:24 AM in Economics, Inflation, Monetary Policy, Politics |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Friday, July 18, 2014 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
Do patents stifle cumulative innovation?: There has been a movement that began with the notion of the anti-commons that suggested that, whatever the other benefits and faults might be with the patent system, a fault that really matters for the operation of the system and for growth prospects (a la endogenous growth theory) is how patents might stifle cumulative or follow-on innovation. ...
The standard, informal theory of harm here is that follow-on innovators, feeling that they can’t easily deal with the patent holder on the pioneer innovation, decide that the risks are too high to invest and so opt not to do so. To be sure, this ‘hold-up’ concern is not good for anyone, including possibly the patent rights holder who loses the opportunity to earn licensing fees from applications of their knowledge. Suffice it to say, this has been a big feature of the movement against the current strength and, indeed, existence of the patent system.
One issue, however, was that the evidence on the impact of patents on cumulative innovation was weak. Mostly that was due to the problem of finding an environment where impact could be measured. ...
For this reason, all previous attempts concerned intermediate steps — most notably, the impact of patents on citations whether in publications or in patents. This includes work by Fiona Murray and Scott Stern, Heidi Williams and Alberto Galasso and Mark Schankerman. While there is some variation, this work showed, using various clever approaches, that patent protection (or other IP changes) might deter cumulative innovation upwards of 30%. That’s a big effect and a big concern even if the results were somewhat intermediate.
At the NBER Summer Institute a new paper by Bhaven Sampat and Heidi Williams (the same Williams from the previous paper) actually found a way to examine the impact of patents on follow-on innovations themselves. ... The ... paper presents pretty convincing evidence that you cannot reject zero as the likely prediction. That is, the effect patents on follow-on research appears to be non-existent. ...
Suffice it to say, while it is only a particular area, this is evidence enough that should cause many to identify and change their bias regarding the impact of patents on cumulative innovation. ...
The original post has a much longer discussion of the theory and evidence.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Thursday, July 17, 2014 at 08:31 AM in Economics, Market Failure |
Cecchetti & Schoenholtz:
Debt, Great Recession and the Awful Recovery: ... In their new book, House of Debt, Atif Mian and Amir Sufi portray the income and wealth differences between borrowers and lenders as the key to the Great Recession and the Awful Recovery (our term). If, as they argue, the “debt overhang” story trumps the now-conventional narrative of a financial crisis-driven economic collapse, policymakers will also need to revise the tools they use to combat such deep slumps. ...
House of Debt is at its best in showing that: (1) a dramatic easing of credit conditions for low-quality borrowers fed the U.S. mortgage boom in the years before the Great Recession; (2) that boom was a major driver of the U.S. housing price bubble; and (3) leveraged housing losses diminished U.S. consumption and destroyed jobs.
The evidence for these propositions is carefully documented... The strong conclusion is that – as in many other asset bubbles across history and time – an extraordinary credit expansion stoked the boom and exacerbated the bust. Of that we can now be sure.
What is less clear is that these facts diminish the importance of the U.S. intermediation crisis as a trigger for both the Great Recession and the Awful Recovery..., while the U.S. recession started in the final quarter of 2007, it turned vicious only after the September 2008 failure of Lehman. ...
What about the remedy? Would greater debt forgiveness have limited the squeeze on households and reduced the pullback? Almost certainly. ...
The discussion about remedies to debt and leverage cycles is still in its infancy. House of Debt shows why that discussion is so important. Its contribution to understanding the Great Recession (and other big economic cycles) will influence analysts and policymakers for years, even those (like us) who give much greater weight to the role of banks and the financial crisis than the authors.
They also talk about the desirability of "new financial contracts that place the burden of bearing the risk of house price declines primarily on wealthy investors (rather than on borrowers) who can better afford it."
Posted by Mark Thoma on Thursday, July 17, 2014 at 08:16 AM in Economics, Financial System, Housing |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Thursday, July 17, 2014 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
The Rise of the Non-Working Rich: In a new Pew poll, more than three quarters of self-described conservatives believe “poor people have it easy because they can get government benefits without doing anything.” In reality, most of America’s poor work hard, often in two or more jobs.
The real non-workers are the wealthy who inherit their fortunes. And their ranks are growing. In fact, we’re on the cusp of the largest inter-generational wealth transfer in history. ...
The “self-made” man or woman, the symbol of American meritocracy, is disappearing. Six of today’s ten wealthiest Americans are heirs to prominent fortunes. ...
This is the dynastic form of wealth French economist Thomas Piketty warns about. ... What to do? First, restore the estate tax in full.
Second, eliminate the “stepped-up-basis on death” rule. This obscure tax provision allows heirs to avoid paying capital gains taxes... Such untaxed gains account for more than half of the value of estates worth more than $100 million, according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
Third, institute a wealth tax. ...
We don’t have to sit by and watch our meritocracy be replaced by a permanent aristocracy, and our democracy be undermined by dynastic wealth. We can and must take action — before it’s too late.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, July 16, 2014 at 08:21 AM in Economics, Income Distribution |
Double Irish Dutch Sandwich: Want a glimpse of how companies can shift their profits among countries in a way that reduces their tax liabilities? Here's the dreaded "Double Irish Dutch Sandwich" as described by the International Monetary Find in its October 2013 Fiscal Monitor. This schematic to show the flows of goods and services, payments, and intellectual property. An explanation from the IMF follows, with a few of my own thoughts. ...
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, July 16, 2014 at 08:21 AM in Economics, Taxes |
From the NY Fed's Liberty Street Economics blog:
Risk Aversion and the Natural Interest Rate, by Bianca De Paoli and Pawel Zabczyk: One way to assess the stance of monetary policy is to assert that there is a natural interest rate (NIR), defined as the rate consistent with output being at its potential. Broadly speaking, monetary policy can be seen as expansionary if the policy rate is below the NIR with the gap between the rates measuring the extent of the policy stimulus. Of course, there are many challenges in defining and measuring the NIR, with various factors driving its value over time. A key factor that needs to be considered is the effect of uncertainty and risk aversion on households’ savings decisions. Households’ tolerance for risk tends to be lower during downturns, putting upward pressure on precautionary savings, and thereby downward pressure on the natural interest rate. In addition, uncertainty dictates how much precautionary savings responds to changes in risk aversion. So policymakers need to be aware that rate moves to offset adverse economic conditions that are appropriate in tranquil times may not be sufficient in times of high uncertainty.
As nicely explained in an FRBSF Economic Letter, the NIR is unobservable, but can be tracked with a model that identifies the interest rate that would prevail when output is at its potential—or, absent cost shocks, at a level consistent with stable inflation. In a recent article, we describe the determinants of the natural rate of interest in a fairly standard economic model of the so-called New Keynesian (NK) variety. Our simple setup clearly doesn’t account for all factors driving the natural rate. For example, the closed-economy nature of the model excludes the possibility that global factors such as reserve purchases by foreign central banks or a significant increase in the global supply of savings could be pushing down the equilibrium interest rate. But our model does account for uncertainty and precautionary savings motives. The importance of both of these factors has been apparent during the recent recession, and both are typically ignored in the textbook NK model. Considering the ability of changes in risk aversion and uncertainty to affect the transmission mechanism of shocks and monetary policy allows our setup to clarify how these considerations affect the natural interest rate. ...
A recent IMF paper finds that two-fifths of the sharp increase in household saving rates between 2007 and 2009 can be attributed to the precautionary savings motive. An increase in precautionary savings is consistent with a lower natural interest rate. ...
What then is the policy implication of this insight? We argue that accounting for a cyclical change in precautionary savings points to a more accommodative stance during downturns by lowering the NIR. As negative shocks to demand are magnified by an increase in precautionary behavior, a larger policy rate response is required to curb deflationary pressures. Even negative supply shocks—which are generally inflationary—may be less so if they motivate people to save more for precautionary reasons. Accordingly, the policy rate that is consistent with stable prices ends up being lower when one takes into account that risk aversion falls during downturns.
By the same reasoning, this risk aversion propagation mechanism implies that the policy rate should be higher in boom periods when risk aversion is lower. To the extent that positive demand and supply shocks are relatively more inflationary if accompanied by a decrease in risk aversion, monetary policy needs to respond to these shocks more aggressively.
Policymakers should also be aware that changes in the NIR driven by precautionary savings are more dramatic in volatile times. And the arguments made here for the NIR hold for other approaches to measuring monetary policy. Namely, volatility needs to be accounted for when designing monetary policy rules as policy responses that are appropriate in relatively tranquil times may not be sufficient in times of high uncertainty.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, July 16, 2014 at 08:21 AM in Economics, Monetary Policy |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, July 16, 2014 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
Yellen Testimony, by Tim Duy: Fed Reserve Chair Janet Yellen testified before the Senate today, presenting remarks generally perceived as consistent with current expectations for a long period of fairly low interest rates. Binyamin Applebaum of the New York Times notes:
Ms. Yellen’s testimony is likely to reinforce a sense of complacency among investors who regard the Fed as convinced of its forecast and committed to its policy course. She reiterated the Fed’s view that the economy will continue to grow at a moderate pace, and that the Fed is in no hurry to start increasing short-term interest rates.
A key reason that Yellen is in no hurry to tighten is her clear belief that an accommodative monetary policy is warranted given the persistent damage done by the recession:
Although the economy continues to improve, the recovery is not yet complete. Even with the recent declines, the unemployment rate remains above Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) participants' estimates of its longer-run normal level. Labor force participation appears weaker than one would expect based on the aging of the population and the level of unemployment. These and other indications that significant slack remains in labor markets are corroborated by the continued slow pace of growth in most measures of hourly compensation.
Another reminder to watch compensation numbers. Without an acceleration in wage growth, sustained higher inflation is unlikely and hence the Fed sees little need to remove accommodation prior to reaching its policy objectives.
The only vaguely more hawkish tone was that identified by Applebaum:
But Ms. Yellen added that the Fed was ready to respond if it concluded that it had overestimated the slack in the labor market, a more substantial acknowledgment of the views of her critics than she has made in other recent remarks.
The exact quote:
Of course, the outlook for the economy and financial markets is never certain, and now is no exception. Therefore, the Committee's decisions about the path of the federal funds rate remain dependent on our assessment of incoming information and the implications for the economic outlook. If the labor market continues to improve more quickly than anticipated by the Committee, resulting in faster convergence toward our dual objectives, then increases in the federal funds rate target likely would occur sooner and be more rapid than currently envisioned. Conversely, if economic performance is disappointing, then the future path of interest rates likely would be more accommodative than currently anticipated.
Her choice of words is important here. Note that she does not say "If the labor market improves more quickly". Yellen says "continues to improve more quickly" which means that the economy is already converging towards the Fed's objective more quickly than anticipated by current forecasts. This is a point repeatedly made by St. Louis Federal Reserve President James Bullard in recent weeks. For example, via Bloomberg:
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President James Bullard said a rapid drop in joblessness will fuel inflation, bolstering his case for an interest-rate increase early next year.
“I think we are going to overshoot here on inflation,” Bullard said yesterday in a telephone interview from St. Louis. He predicted inflation of 2.4 percent at the end of 2015, “well above” the Fed’s 2 percent target.
“That is a break from where most of the committee seems to be, which is a very slow convergence of inflation to target,” he said in a reference to the policy-making Federal Open Market Committee.
With Yellen at least acknowledging this point, it brings into question whether or not the Fed should maintain its "considerable period" language:
The Committee continues to anticipate, based on its assessment of these factors, that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends...
Fed hawks, such as Philadelphia Federal Reserve President Charles Plosser, increasingly see the need to remove this language from the statement, and for some good reason. The Fed foresees ending asset purchases in October and can reasonably foresee raising interest rates in the first quarter given the trajectory of unemployment. Hence it is no longer clear that a "considerable period" between the end of asset purchases and the first rate hike remains a certainty.
To be sure, there will be resistance to changing the language now - the Fed will want to ensure that any change is interpreted as the result of a change in the outlook rather than a change in the reaction function. But the hawks will argue that the communications challenge is best handled by dropping the language sooner than later - later might appear like an abrupt change and be more difficult to distinguish from a shift in the reaction function. This I suspect is the next battlefield for policymakers.
Bottom Line: A generally dovish performance by Yellen today consistent with current expectations. But notice her acknowledgement of her critics, and watch for the "considerable period" debate to heat up as October approaches.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Tuesday, July 15, 2014 at 11:59 AM in Economics, Fed Watch, Monetary Policy |
I have a new column:
Improving Social Insurance Can Narrow the “Opportunity Gap”: The justification for social insurance programs that protect workers is usually based upon the fact that employment in capitalist economies is subject to substantial variation due to cyclical fluctuations and structural change. Economic systems such as socialism have much less variation in employment since everyone, pretty much, is guaranteed a job. But the growth rate of output in those systems is not as high as it is in capitalist economies, and that leads to a lower average standard of living.
Why not enjoy the benefits of a capitalist system while minimizing its costs through the use of social insurance programs that insulate workers from harm when they lose their jobs for one of these reasons? ...
We don’t do enough to insulate workers from the fluctuations in employment inherent in capitalist economies. ...
Doing more to help workers affected by economic downturns and structural change is not the only way in which social insurance could be improved. There other risks, in particular the risk of unequal opportunity, that are baked into capitalist systems. ...
Posted by Mark Thoma on Tuesday, July 15, 2014 at 07:50 AM in Economics, Income Distribution, Social Insurance |
Me, at MoneyWatch:
Can unemployment benefits raise joblessness?: Did the extension of unemployment compensation during the Great Recession cause joblessness to go up? ...
The latest research on this topic from Katharine Bradbury of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston ... finds that unemployment does go up when unemployment benefits are extended, but the question is why. Does it discourage workers from taking jobs, or discourage them from leaving the labor force?
Bradbury pointed out that the earlier research shows it's mostly the latter, that extending unemployment benefits causes workers to stay in the labor force longer before dropping out. No notable impact was found on their willingness to take available jobs. ...
Posted by Mark Thoma on Tuesday, July 15, 2014 at 07:50 AM in Economics, Social Insurance, Unemployment |
- Rick Santelli and Affinity Fraud - Paul Krugman
- Why Don’t Growth Economists Study Growth Anymore? - Growth Economics
- Intergenerational Redistribution in the Great Recession - Fed in Print
- Canada’s Central Banker Talks Housing Bubble, Missing Exports - WSJ
- ECB caught up in economists’ spat - Money Supply
- Why do unions bargain for health benefits? - Frances Woolley
- Housing, finance, and the macroeconomy - Updated Priors
- High Unemployment and Disinflation in the Euro Periphery - Liberty Street
- Claudio Borio (2012): The Financial Cycle and Macro - Brad DeLong
- Comprehensive gains-from-trade: Non-price factors - vox
- Investors beware: economists at large - FT.com
- Obamacare Must Fail - Paul Krugman
- How are macro methods evolving? - Noahpinion
- Should the Fed crash the economy now to prevent a crash later? - Noahpinion
- Main St., Wall St., Pennsylvania Ave., K St. - Tim Taylor
- The thoroughly modern macroeconomics of Stephen Williamson - MaxSpeak
- VIX: The only thing to fear is the lack of fear itself - Cecchetti & Schoenholtz
- Krugman vs Bank of England (QE bails out the rich) - Fresh economic thinking
- Blogs review: U.S. inflation and growth - Jérémie Cohen-Setton
- Calvo Pricing, Precautionary Saving and Financial Frictions - Angry Bear
- The Data Problem with the Natural Interest Rate - David Beckworth
- Comment on Del Negro, Giannoni & Schorfheide (2014) - Angry Bear
- Are Americans really exercising less? - Incidental Economist
- Why Government Fails, and How to Stop It - Brookings Institution
- Financial Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk: FR Y-15 - TripleCrisis
- IMF Touts Quantitative Easing Benefits for ECB - WSJ
- Health Care Hatred - Paul Krugman
- Bank Counterparties and Collateral Usage - FRBSF Economic Letter
- Unemployment, aggregate demand, and search/matching - Nick Rowe
Posted by Mark Thoma on Tuesday, July 15, 2014 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |