- 7 Tips for Interpreting Macroeconomic Data - Jason Furman
- Liberals Compete for the Soul of Economics - Noah Smith
- Ideas, Interests, and the Challenge for Progressives - The Baseline Scenario
- Large Scale Central Bank Asset Purchases, Versus Supply - Brad Setser
- Pedagogy and Scholarship in a Post-Crisis World - Daniel Tarullo
- I Paid $2,500 for a ‘Hamilton’ Ticket. I’m Happy About It. - Greg Mankiw
- Has Macroeconomic Policy Been Different Since the Crisis? - David Beckworth
- Secular stagnation, bubbles, fiscal policy, and the contraceptive pill - VoxEU
- Will the US Become a Nation of Renters? - Tim Taylor
- What the Fed Really Needs to Know - Narayana Kocherlakota
- The freedom-hating right - Stumbling and Mumbling
- Power and progress - Bank Underground
Saturday, October 22, 2016
Friday, October 21, 2016
Neoliberalism and austerity: I like to treat neoliberalism not as some kind of coherent political philosophy, but more as a set of interconnected ideas that have become commonplace in much of our discourse. That the private sector entrepreneur is the wealth creator, and the state typically just gets in their way. That what is good for business is good for the economy, even when it increases monopoly power or involves rent seeking. Interference in business or the market, by governments or unions, is always bad. And so on. ...
I do not think austerity could have happened on the scale that it did without this dominance of this neoliberal ethos. Mark Blyth has described austerity as the biggest bait and switch in history. It took two forms. In one the financial crisis, caused by an under regulated financial sector lending too much, led to bank bailouts that increased public sector debt. This leads to an outcry about public debt, rather than the financial sector. In the other the financial crisis causes a deep recession which - as it always does - creates a large budget deficit. Spending like drunken sailors goes the cry, we must have austerity now.
In both cases the nature of what was going on was pretty obvious to anyone who bothered to find out the facts. That so few did so, which meant that the media largely went with the austerity narrative, can be partly explained by a neoliberal ethos. Having spent years seeing the big banks lauded as wealth creating titans, it was difficult for many to comprehend that their basic business model was fundamentally flawed and required a huge implicit state subsidy. On the other hand they found it much easier to imagine that past minor indiscretions by governments were the cause of a full blown debt crisis. ...
While in this sense austerity might have been a useful distraction from the problems with neoliberalism made clear by the financial crisis, I think a more important political motive was that it appeared to enable the more rapid accomplishment of a key neoliberal goal: shrinking the state. It is no coincidence that austerity typically involved cuts in spending rather than higher taxes... In that sense too austerity goes naturally with neoliberalism. ...
An interesting question is whether the same applies to right wing governments in the UK and US that used immigration/race as a tactic for winning power. We now know for sure, with both Brexit and Trump, how destructive and dangerous that tactic can be. As even the neoliberal fantasists who voted Leave are finding out, Brexit is a major setback for neoliberalism. Not only is it directly bad for business, it involves (for both trade and migration) a large increase in bureaucratic interference in market processes. To the extent she wants to take us back to the 1950s, Theresa May’s brand of conservatism may be very different from Margaret Thatcher’s neoliberal philosophy.
"Maybe Mrs. Clinton is winning because she possesses some fundamental political strengths":
Why Hillary Wins, by Paul Krugman, NY Times: Hillary Clinton is a terrible candidate. Hey, that’s what pundits have been saying ever since this endless campaign began. You have to go back to Al Gore in 2000 to find a politician who faced as much jeering from the news media...
Strange to say, however, Mrs. Clinton won the Democratic nomination fairly easily, and now, having pummeled her opponent in three successive debates, is an overwhelming favorite to win in November, probably by a wide margin. How is that possible?
The usual suspects are already coalescing around an answer..., she just got lucky. If only the Republicans hadn’t nominated Donald Trump, the story goes, she’d be losing badly.
But here’s a contrarian thought: Maybe Mrs. Clinton is winning because she possesses some fundamental political strengths — strengths that fall into many pundits’ blind spots. ...
When political commentators praise political talent, what they seem to have in mind is the ability of a candidate to match one of a very limited set of archetypes: the heroic leader, the back-slapping regular guy you’d like to have a beer with, the soaring orator. Mrs. Clinton is none of these things...
Yet the person tens of millions of viewers saw in this fall’s debates was hugely impressive all the same: self-possessed, almost preternaturally calm under pressure, deeply prepared, clearly in command of policy issues. ...
Oh, and the strengths she showed in the debates are also strengths that would serve her well as president. ... And maybe ordinary citizens noticed the same thing; maybe obvious competence and poise in stressful situations can add up to a kind of star quality, even if it doesn’t fit conventional notions of charisma.
Furthermore, there’s one thing Mrs. Clinton brought to this campaign that no establishment Republican could have matched: She truly cares about her signature issues, and believes in the solutions she’s pushing.
I know, we’re supposed to see her as coldly ambitious and calculating, and on some issues — like macroeconomics — she does sound a bit bloodless, even when she clearly understands the subject and is talking good sense. But when she’s talking about women’s rights, or racial injustice, or support for families, her commitment, even passion, are obvious. She’s genuine, in a way nobody in the other party can be.
So let’s dispel with this fiction that Hillary Clinton is only where she is through a random stroke of good luck. She’s a formidable figure, and has been all along.
- 250 years of the bond-equity correlation - Bank Underground
- Arnold Harberger: Is Growth Yeast or Mushrooms? - Tim Taylor
- What’s Blocking Gender Equality? - Tyson and Klugman
- The upside of relative decline - Stumbling and Mumbling
- Wikipedia and Political Discourse: The New Hope? - Digitopoly
- Joint Rulemaking Aims to Green the Trucking Industry - RegBlog
- How worrisome is the decline in labor mobility? - CBS News
- How import competition from China helped fuel the credit bubble - VoxEU
- What's going on in your brain? - Jayson Lusk
Thursday, October 20, 2016
A Tale of Two Stagnations: The term "secular stagnation," coined by economists in the 1930s and recently popularized by Larry Summers, has become a catch-all description for long-term economic pessimism. But it's gotten confused with a very different idea -- the technological stagnation hypothesis, proposed by economist Robert Gordon (and by Bloomberg View's Tyler Cowen). These are two very different ideas. Both would lead to slow growth in the long term, but they imply different causes and different remedies. ...
- Fiscal Foolishness (at the Debate) - Paul Krugman
- It’s a war of ideas, not of interests - Dani Rodrik
- Africa's prospects for enjoying a demographic dividend - VoxEU
- Looking for Local Labor Market Effects of NAFTA - RESTAT
- Income distribution and aggregate saving - VoxEU
- Challenges for Monetary Policy in Advanced Economies - PIIE
- Do economists have physics envy? (Part 2) - Noahpinion
- Here’s What Economists Don’t Understand About Race - INET
- Five principles to follow for a new fiscal policy - Jason Furman
- In defence of Bank independence - Stumbling and Mumbling
- Limited Attention and Inflation Expectations of Households - Fed Notes
- What Differentiates White-Collar Criminals? - ProMarket
- News, entertainment and Trump - mainly macro
- The P/E Ratio and the Gordon Growth Model - EconoSpeak
- How Do the French Do it? - Tim Taylor
- The Encryption Wars - RegBlog
Wednesday, October 19, 2016
No, U.S. Manufacturing Isn't Really Booming:...[Is]American manufacturing .. in decline? An answer frequently offered by wonky economics journalists is that, no, U.S. manufacturing output has actually kept growing. ...
There's a catch, though. As economist Susan N. Houseman of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research ... points out, about half of the growth in U.S. manufacturing output since 1997 has been in just one sector: computer and electronics manufacturing.
If it weren't for computers and electronics (which includes semiconductors), manufacturing output would still be well below its 2008 peak and only 21 percent higher than in 1997...
The ... way those computers-and-electronics numbers are arrived at is worthy of a closer look. ... Without adjusting for deflation, value added in computer and electronics manufacturing is up 45 percent since 1997. With the adjustments, it's up 699 percent! What's happening here is that the Bureau of Economic Analysis has been trying to account for vast improvements in ... quality... Writes Houseman:Such quality adjustment ... can make the numbers difficult to interpret..., figures that exclude this industry ... arguably provide a clearer picture of trends in manufacturing output.
As it stands now, those trends don't look impressive. U.S. manufacturing output has held up a lot better than manufacturing employment. But it definitely isn't booming.
Ben Bernanke and Peter Olson:
Are Americans better off than they were a decade or two ago?: Economically speaking, are we better off than we were ten years ago? Twenty years ago? When asked such questions, Americans seem undecided, almost schizophrenic, with large majorities saying the country is heading “in the wrong direction,” even as they tell pollsters that they are optimistic about their personal financial situations and the medium-term economic outlook.
In their thirst for evidence on this issue, commentators seized on the recent report by the Bureau of the Census, which found that real median household income rose by 5.2 percent in 2015, as showing that “the middle class has finally gotten a raise.” Unfortunately, that conclusion puts too much weight on a useful, but flawed and incomplete, statistic. Among the more significant problems with the Census’s measure are that: 1) it excludes taxes, transfers, and non-monetary compensation like employer-provided health insurance; and 2) it is based on surveys rather than more-complete tax and administrative data, with the result that it has been surprisingly inconsistent with the official national income numbers in recent years. Even if precisely measured, data on income exclude important determinants of economic well-being, such as the hours of work needed to earn that income.
While thinking about the question, we came across a recently published article by Charles Jones and Peter Klenow, which proposes an interesting new measure of economic welfare. While by no means perfect, it is considerably more comprehensive than median income, taking into account not only growth in per capita consumption but also changes in working time, life expectancy, and inequality. Moreover, as the authors demonstrate, it can be used to assess economic performance both across countries and over time. In this post we’ll report some of their results, and extend part of their analysis (which ends before the Great Recession) through 2015.
The bottom line: According to this metric, Americans enjoy a high level of economic welfare relative to most other countries, and the level of Americans’ well-being has continued to improve over the past few decades despite the severe disruptions of the last one. However, the rate of improvement has slowed noticeably in recent years, consistent with the growing sense of dissatisfaction evident in polls and politics. ...
- The stock market looks cheap - Antonio Fatas
- Sorry, Trump, Fed Policy Actually Favors You - Tyler Cowen
- Central banking and Bitcoin: Not yet a threat - VoxEU
- How Housing Discrimination Happened - National Geographic
- Large Scale Central Bank Asset Purchases, by Currency - Brad Setser
- Giving Every Child a Monthly Check for an Even Start - New York Times
- A Response to Noah Smith's Critique About the Future of Economics - Evonomics
- Why estimates of the trade effects of the Eurozone vary so much - VoxEU
- The Home-Sharing Industry Attempts to Fight Off Regulators - RegBlog
- An Econ Test Question We Shouldn't Get Wrong - Noah Smith
- Financial Conditions and Monetary Policy Shocks - FRB Chicago
- We Can Fix Corporate Taxes - The New York Times
- Unemployment Risk and Unions - macroblog
- Monetary Science Fiction - Nick Rowe
- Global Debt Hits All-Time High - Tim Taylor
- Structure and Superstructure - Baseline Scenario
- Sterling's effects - Stumbling and Mumbling
Tuesday, October 18, 2016
Yellen poses important post-Great Recession macroeconomic questions: Last week at a Federal Reserve Bank of Boston conference, Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen gave a speech on macroeconomics research in the wake of the Great Recession. She ... lists four areas for research, but let’s look more closely at the first two groups of questions that she elevates.
The first is the influence of aggregate demand on aggregate supply. As Yellen notes, the traditional way of thinking about this relationship would be that demand, a short-run phenomenon, has no significant effect of aggregate supply, which determines long-run economic growth. The potential growth rate of an economy is determined by aggregate supply...
Yellen points to research that increasingly finds so called hysteresis effects in the macroeconomy. Hysteresis, a term borrowed from physics, is the idea that short-run shocks to the economy can alter its long-term trend. One example of hysteresis is workers who lose jobs in recessions and then aren’t drawn back into the labor market bur rather are permanently locked out... Interesting new research argues that hysteresis may affect not just the labor supply but also the rate of productivity growth.
If hysteresis is prevalent in the economy, then U.S. policymakers need to rethink their fiscal and monetary policy priorities. The effects of hysteresis may mean that economic recoveries need to run longer and hotter than previous thought in order to get workers back into the labor market or allow other resources to get back into full use.
The other set of open research questions that Yellen raises is the influence of “heterogeneity” on aggregate demand. In many models of the macroeconomy, households are characterized by a representative agent... In short, they are assumed to be homogeneous. As Yellen notes in her speech, overall home equity remained positive after the bursting of the housing bubble, so a representative agent would have maintained positive equity in their home.
Yet a wealth of research in the wake of the Great Recession finds that millions of households whose mortgages were “underwater” and didn’t have positive wealth—a big reason for the severity of the downturn. Ignoring this heterogeneity in the housing market and its effects on economic inequality seems like something modern macroeconomics needs to resolve. Economists are increasingly moving in this direction, but even more movement would very helpful.
Yellen raises other areas of inquiry in her speech, including better understanding how the financial system is linked to the real economy and how the dynamics of inflation are determined. ... As Paul Krugman has noted several times over the past several years, the Great Recession doesn’t seem to have provoked the same rethink of macroeconomics compared to the Great Depression, which ushered in Keynesianism, and the stagflation of the 1970s, which led to the ascendance of new classical economics. The U.S. economy is similarly dealing with a “new normal.” Macroeconomics needs to respond this reality.
Are Yellen and Fischer Really Worlds Apart?, by Tim Duy: This from Bloomberg surprised me:
Michael Gapen, chief U.S. economist at Barclays Plc in New York, said Fischer’s comments “reflect an ongoing divergence of opinion” at the central bank. Fischer “doesn’t see much room for running the economy hot” while Yellen’s views “seem to provide a wide-open door to do that. You have a chair and a vice chair who see policy differently right now,” he said.
I don't think there exists a yawning gap between Federal Reserve Vice-Chair Fischer and Federal Reserve Vice Chair Yellen. The perception of this gap stems in part from what I think was an aggressive reading of Yellen's speech last week. The line in question:
If we assume that hysteresis is in fact present to some degree after deep recessions, the natural next question is to ask whether it might be possible to reverse these adverse supply-side effects by temporarily running a "high-pressure economy," with robust aggregate demand and a tight labor market.
Is this a call for a "high-pressure economy"? My interpretation is somewhat more muted. Note that this was posed as a potential research question, along with three others, that macroeconomists should pursue in the wake of the Great Recession:
The Influence of Demand on Aggregate Supply
The first question I would like to pose concerns the distinction between aggregate supply and aggregate demand: Are there circumstances in which changes in aggregate demand can have an appreciable, persistent effect on aggregate supply?
My second question asks whether individual differences within broad groups of actors in the economy can influence aggregate economic outcomes--in particular, what effect does such heterogeneity have on aggregate demand?
Financial Linkages to the Real Economy
My third question concerns a key issue for monetary policy and macroeconomics that is less directly addressed by this conference: How does the financial sector interact with the broader economy?
My fourth question goes to the heart of monetary policy: What determines inflation?
She does not actually say that the Fed should run a high pressure economy. Nor should this be seen as a defense of current policy because this is decidedly not a high pressure economy. Instead, Yellen argues we need more research on the topic to understand the costs and benefits of such a policy approach:
More research is needed, however, to better understand the influence of movements in aggregate demand on aggregate supply. From a policy perspective, we of course need to bear in mind that an accommodative monetary stance, if maintained too long, could have costs that exceed the benefits by increasing the risk of financial instability or undermining price stability. More generally, the benefits and potential costs of pursuing such a strategy remain hard to quantify, and other policies might be better suited to address damage to the supply side of the economy.
Now, to be sure, she is willing to delay rate hikes to explore the possibility of drawing more supply from the labor market. From the press conference:
But with labor market slack being taken up at a somewhat slower pace than in previous years, scope for some further improvement in the labor market remaining, and inflation continuing to run below our 2 percent target, we chose to wait for further evidence of continued progress toward our objectives.
Does this mean the economy is a running at a high pressure? Later in the conference:
And that is some news that we’ve received in recent months, that the labor market does have that potential to have people come back in without the unemployment rate coming down. So we’re not seeing strong pressures on utilization suggesting overheating, and my assessment would be, based on this evidence, that the economy has a little more room to run than might have been previously thought.
One reason Yellen is willing to delay rate hikes is because the economy is not overheating. Again, this is not a high pressure economy - and if it was, she would not be so willing to delay rate hikes. Indeed, willingness to accept a high pressure economy suggests that Yellen has abandoned preemptive policy. But:
So I think the notion that monetary policy operates with long and variable lags—that statement is due to Milton Friedman, and it is one of the essential things to understand about monetary policy, and it has not fundamentally changed at all. And that is why I believe we have to be forward looking, and I’m not in favor of a “whites of their eyes” sort of approach. We need to operate based on forecasts.
Compare this with Fischer, via the same Bloomberg story:
“If you go below the full employment rate, or peoples’ estimates of full employment, by a couple of tenths of percentage points, I don’t think there’s any danger in that,” Fischer said Monday in response to questions at an Economic Club of New York lunch. “But saying we should keep going until the inflation rate shows us we’re wrong, then you’re going to change too late.”
Then, back to Yellen:
One is the risk that the economy runs too hot, that unemploy—the labor market tightens too much, that unemployment falls to a very low level, that we need to tighten policy in a less gradual way than would be ideal, and in the course of doing that, because that is a very difficult thing to accomplish, to gently create a bit more slack in the labor market, we could cause a recession in the process.
So you get the idea. There is nothing here to suggest that Yellen looks to generate a high pressure economy. She holds the commonly held view within the Fed that policy makers need to prevent the unemployment rate from sinking too low because they cannot just nudge the rate higher. If anything, with the unemployment rate dancing on the edge of Fed estimates of the natural rate, she would almost certainly react to an acceleration in activity with an acceleration in the pace of rate hikes. So too would Fischer. But with growth around 2 percent per tracking estimates, labor force participation rising to meet job growth, and inflation below target, we do not have a high pressure economy and hence the need for immediate rate hikes dissipates. Yellen will let it play out a bit longer. But if the labor force participation rate stalls out and unemployment starts heading back down, Yellen would become nervous that the Fed is poised to fall behind the curve.
Bottom Line: The key debate within the Fed at the moment centers around the need for preemptive rate hikes. The hawks prefer more preemption, the doves favor less. Federal Reserve Lael Brainard pulled the FOMC to the dovish camp, primarily through her influence at Constitution Ave. Yellen is probably somewhat more sympathetic to Brainard than Fischer, but as I said last week, Fischer has moved substantially in Brainard's direction. It is really the presidents that are on the hawkish side of the aisle. There just isn't that much space between Yellen and Fischer at the moment.
- Distrust of Data - Paul Krugman
- Inequality - Brad DeLong
- Current View of the Economy- FRBSF
- The economics and politics of refugee migration - VoxEU
- The Meaning of Open Trade and Open Borders - The New Yorker
- Rewriting the textbook: covered interest parity - Cecchetti & Schoenholtz
- Consequences of Rising Income Inequality - FRBSF Economic Letter
- Why Are Interest Rates So Low? Causes and Implications - Stanley Fischer
- China: Too Much Investment, But Also Way Too Much Savings - Brad Setser
- Economic Anxiety and the Limits of Data Journalism - Baseline Scenario
- Public Housing Isn't Wasted on the Poor - Noah Smith
- David Sloan Wilson's econ critique - Noahpinion
- Macro Musings Podcast: Izabella Kaminska - David Beckworth
- Economic insecurity rises around childbirth - Equitable Growth
- Attorneys General—the New Special Interests Battlefield - ProMarket
- The Chimera of Stock-Market Short-Termism - Mark Roe
- Q. and A. With Eric Rosengren: The Danger of Low Unemployment - NYTimes
- Election angst - interfluidity
- Simpson’s Paradox - Marc Bellemare
- Structural Reforms and Greece - mainly macro
Monday, October 17, 2016
How Clones Can Experience Unequal Economic Outcomes: A certain amount of economic inequality is just luck. At the extreme, some people win the lottery, and others don't. But there is also the potential for more subtle kinds of luck, like two equally talented entrepreneurs, where one business happens to take off while the other doesn't. Or two equally talented workers who go to work for similar-looking companies, but one company takes off while the other craters. Richard Freeman discusses the research literature on why this final example might be significant enough to play a role in overall economic inequality in the US in his essay, "A Tale of Two Clones: A New Perspective on Inequality," just published by the Third Way think tank. Freeman sets the stage like this (footnotes omitted):
"[C]onsider two indistinguishable workers, you and your clone. By definition, you/clone have the same gender, ethnicity, years of schooling, family background, skills, etc. In 2006 you/clone graduated with identical academic records from the same university and obtained identical job offers from Facebook and MySpace. Not knowing any more about the future than the analysts who valued Facebook and MySpace roughly equally in the mid-2000s, you/clone flipped coins to decide which offer to accept: heads – Facebook; tails – MySpace. Clone’s coin came up heads. Yours came up tails. Ten years later, Clone is in the catbird’s seat in the job market — high pay, stock options, a secure future. You struggle. Back to university? Send job search letters to close friends? Ask distant acquaintances to help? The you/clone thought experiment may seem extreme, but recent research that I have conducted with colleagues finds that the earnings of workers with near-clone similarity in attributes diverged so much by the place they worked that rising inequality in pay among employers has become the major factor in the trend rise in inequality. ... The labor market has been dominated by economic forces that pull the wages of firms further apart from each other, motivating our analysis of the role of employers in increasing inequality."
In other words, a lot of inequality is about where you work. The rise in equality is linked to differences across what firms are paying employees who appear to be similarly qualified. As Freeman acknowledges, this argument that this is a quantitatively important cause of rising inequality isn't ironclad at this point, but it's highly suggested in several ways of looking at the data: Freeman writes:
"This implies that 86% ... of the trend increase in inequality [from 1977-2009] occurs among people with measurably the same skills, whereas just 14% of the trend increase comes from changes in earnings among workers with different skills. The big surprise in the exhibit is that the inequality of average earnings among establishments increased by the same 0.147 points [measuring variance of natural log of earnings, a standard measure of inequality of earnings] as did inequality among workers with the same characteristics. This suggests that all of the increase in inequality among similar workers comes from the increase in earnings at their workplaces."
Or here is a figure suggesting a linkage from firm earnings to individual inequality of earnings. The blue line shows the change in individual earnings along the income distribution from 1992-2007. As one would expect, given the rise in inequality, those in the bottom percentiles of the income distribution do worse, while those in the top percentiles of the income distribution do better. But now, notice that the blue line for individual earnings almost matches the orange line for firm earnings. That is, there has also been widening inequality in firm earnings, with those at the bottom of the earnings distribution also seeing a decline from 1992-2007 and those at the top seeing an increase. Freeman also offers evidence that those who stayed at firms have seen their earnings change with the fortunes of the firm--thus contributing to overall inequality. As he writes; "In sum, changes in the distribution of earnings among establishments affect the change in earnings along the entire earnings distribution and the increased advantage of top earners compared to other workers."
What makes it possible for successful firms to pay workers more? The answer must be rooted in higher productivity for those firms. Indeed, productivity seems to be diverging across firms, too.
Indeed, as Freeman emphasizes, this figure shows that the equality of revenue per worker--a rough measure of productivity at the firm level--is diverging faster than inequality of wages across firms. Moreover, Freeman argues that a similar pattern of productivity divergence across firms is happening within each sector of the economy.
Freeman's evidence is consistent with some other studies. For example, last year I pointed to an OECD report on The Future of Productivity, which argued that while cutting-edge frontier firms continue to see strong increases in productivity, the reason for slower overall rates of productivity is that other firms aren't keeping up.
Thinking about inequality between similar workers may alter how one thinks about public policies related to underlying determinants of inequality. For example, it may be important to think about how productivity gains diffuse across industries and how that process may have changed. I suspect there is also some element of geographical separation here, where firms in certain areas are seeing faster productivity and wage increases, and so thinking about mobility of people and firms across geographic areas may be important, too.
"Why does the modern right hate America?":
Their Dark Fantasies, by Paul Krugman, NY Times: I’m a baby boomer, which means that I’m old enough to remember conservatives yelling “America — love it or leave it!” at people on the left who criticized racism and inequality. But that was a long time ago. These days, disdain for America — the America that actually exists, not an imaginary “real America” in which minorities and women know their place — is concentrated on the right..., you increasingly find prominent figures describing our society as a nightmarish dystopia.
This is obviously true for Donald Trump... In his vision of America — clearly derived largely from white supremacist and neo-Nazi sources — crime is running wild, inner cities are war zones, and hordes of violent immigrants are pouring across our open border. In reality, murder is at a historic low, we’re seeing a major urban revival and net immigration from Mexico is negative. But I’m only saying that because I’m part of the conspiracy.
Meanwhile, you find almost equally dark visions, just as much at odds with reality, among establishment Republicans, people like Paul Ryan...
...consider the portrait of America Mr. Ryan painted last week, in a speech to the College Republicans. For it was, in its own way, as out of touch with reality as the ranting of Donald Trump (whom Mr. Ryan never mentioned).
...Mr. Ryan claimed to be describing the future — what will happen if Hillary Clinton wins... According to him, it’s very grim. There will, he said, be “a gloom and grayness to things,” ruled by a “cold and unfeeling bureaucracy.” We will become a place “where passion — the very stuff of life itself — is extinguished.” And this is the kind of America Mrs. Clinton “will stop at nothing to have.”
...We have many problems, but we’re hardly living in a miasma of despair. ...Mr. Ryan’s vision of America looks nothing like reality. It is, however, completely familiar to anyone who read Ayn Rand’s “Atlas Shrugged” as a teenager. ...
So why does the modern right hate America? There’s not much overlap in substance between Mr. Trump’s fear-mongering and Mr. Ryan’s, but there’s a clear alignment of interests. The people Mr. Trump represents want to suppress and disenfranchise you-know-who; the big-money interests that support Ryan-style conservatism want to privatize and generally dismantle the social safety net, and they’re willing to do whatever it takes to get there.
The big question is whether trash-talking America can actually be a winning political strategy. We’ll soon find out.
- Why distrust data? - macromom
- Will Brexit cause a sterling crisis? - Gavyn Davies
- Independence at the CFPB and the Fed - Carola Binder
- Machine Learning vs. Econometrics, III - No Hesitations
- Reclaiming ''Neoliberal'' - Stumbling and Mumbling
- Toxic Politics Versus Better Economics - Mohamed El-Erian
- The Effects of Mergers on Market Power and Efficiency - Blonigen and Pierce
- Always Higher Wages? Efficiency Wage Theory at Wal-Mart - EconoSpeak
- Persistently low rates and monetary transmission- VoxEU
- Labor Recovery and the Productivity Slowdown - Dietrich Vollrath
- The Tax Code for the Ultra-Rich vs. the One for Everyone Else - James kwak
- A Drop-Out from One Venue Drops in on Another - Economic Principals
- Donald Trump and the Political Economy of Real Estate Tax - ProMarket
- Chinese Exports and Imports Are Growing in 2016 (In Real Terms) - Brad Setser
- Why the Economy Doesn’t Roar Anymore - WSJ
Saturday, October 15, 2016
- How Trump Happened - Joseph E. Stiglitz
- No Time for Trade Fundamentalism - Dani Rodrik
- Macroeconomic Research After the Crisis - Janet Yellen
- Did Macroeconomic Policy Play a Different Role in the Recovery? - Brad DeLong
- Cumulative U.S. Trade Deficits Resulting in Net Profits for the US - macroblog
- Splitting out Emerging Economies Changes the Picture on Trade - Brad Setser
- Piecing together recent Canadian economic history - Stephen Gordon
- Japan’s temporary overshoot attempt - longandvariable
- The Economics of Noncognitive Skills - Tim Taylor
- Capitalism & loneliness - Stumbling and Mumbling
- Brexit and Sterling - mainly macro
Friday, October 14, 2016
What’s Behind a Rise in Ethnic Nationalism? Maybe the Economy: Global economic weakness and a rise in inequality appear to be causing a disturbing growth in ethnic nationalism. ...
In the United States, despite his attempts to woo minority voters, Donald J. Trump appears to derive support from such sentiment. In Moscow, Vladimir V. Putin has used Russian nationalist sentiment to inspire many of his countrymen. And we see growing ethnic political parties inspired by national identity in countless other countries.
It is natural to ask whether something so broad might have a common cause, other than the obvious circumstantial causes like the gradual fading of memories about the horrors of ethnic conflict in World War II or the rise in this century of forms of violent ethnic terrorism.
Economics is my specialty, and I think economic factors may explain at least part of the trend. ...
The presidential race may be all but over, but many others are not -- your vote still matters:
The Clinton Agenda, by Paul Krugman, NY Times: It ain’t over until the portly gentleman screams, but it is ... highly likely that Hillary Clinton will win this election...
But what will our first female president actually be able to accomplish? That depends...
Consider, first, the effects of a minimal victory: Mrs. Clinton becomes president, but Republicans hold on to both houses of Congress.
Such a victory wouldn’t be meaningless. It would avert the nightmare of a Trump presidency, and it would also block the radical tax-cutting, privatizing agenda that Paul Ryan ... has made clear he will steamroll through if Mr. Trump somehow wins. But it would leave little room for positive action.
Things will be quite different if Democrats retake the Senate. ...
Now, even a Democratic Senate wouldn’t enable Mrs. Clinton to pass legislation in the face of an implacably obstructionist Republican majority in the House. It would, however, allow her to fill the Supreme Court seat left vacant by the death of Antonin Scalia.
Doing that would have huge consequences..., the most important ... the Clean Power Plan ... is currently on hold, thanks to a stay imposed by the Supreme Court. Democratic capture of the Senate would remove this roadblock. ... Quite simply, if Democrats take the Senate, we might take the minimum action needed to avoid catastrophe; if they don’t, we won’t.
What about the House? ... Until the last few days, the chances of flipping the House seemed low...
But a sufficiently big Clinton victory could change that, especially if suburban women desert a G.O.P. that has turned into the gropers-owned party. And that would let her pursue a much more expansive agenda.
There’s not much mystery about what that agenda would be. ... Broadly speaking, she would significantly strengthen the social safety net, especially for the very poor and children, with an emphasis on family-related issues like parental leave. Such programs would cost money...; she proposes, credibly, to raise that money with higher taxes on top incomes, so that the overall effect would be to reduce inequality.
Democratic control of the House would also open the door for large-scale infrastructure investment. ...
In any case, the bottom line is that if you’re thinking of staying home on Election Day because the outcome is assured, don’t. Barring the political equivalent of a meteor strike, Hillary Clinton will be our next president, but the size of her victory will determine what kind of president she can be.
- The Mathematics of Cake Cutting - Scientific American
- Fiscal crisis quantitative easing works in theory, too - Ricardo Reis
- Unemployment Insurance Extension Did Not Destroy Jobs - INET
- China September Exports: Not Quite as Bad as They Seem? - Brad Setser
- How closely related are the UK’s ‘twin’ deficits? - Bank Underground
- The great normalisation of global trade - VoxEU
- Did the Bank of England cause Brexit? - mainly macro
- Stephen Moore v. Donald Trump - EconoSpeak
- Snapshots of Global Poverty and Inequality - Tim Taylor
- Economics as literature - Chris Dillow
Thursday, October 13, 2016
How much bigger can the U.S. labor force get?: The U.S. labor market continues to recover from the still lingering effects of the Great Recession, but the question on the minds of many economists and analysts is how long can the healing continue? Or, in other words, has the U.S. economy hit “full employment”...? Understanding trends in the labor force participation rate is key for answering this question. ...
Views on labor force participation today vary on the extent to which structural forces or cyclical effects from the Great Recession of 2007-2009 are still affecting the participation rate. Many economists and analysts point to the role of structural forces or trends that long predate the Great Recession. But the long-term trend that gets cited the most is the aging of the working population as the Baby Boomer generation reaches retirement. The estimates on the effects of aging can vary quite a bit, but an estimate by the White House’s Council of Economic Advisers puts about half of the decline in participation from 2007 to 2014 into the “aging” category. When it comes to a policy response, it’s hard to change the age distribution of the population...
The importance of structural forces and demographics might give an impression that labor force participation or other trends are immutable and have to simply be endured. Regardless of how much slack remains in the labor market..., several structural factors can be addressed through policy actions.
Consider a new paper by Princeton University economist and former Council of Economic Advisers chairman Alan Krueger. The paper takes a direct look at the labor force participation rate and tries to understand what is depressing participation for men and women who are in prime working ages of 25 to 54. When it comes to prime-age men, health problems seem to be a huge barrier to labor market participation. According to the paper, almost 50 percent of men in this age group are taking medicine to control pain, and about 40 percent of this group say health issues are preventing them from taking a job. This is structural force that is not directly related to the Great Recession, but it certainly is amenable to a policy response.
As Krueger notes, such a trend means increased health insurance may help this trend or policymakers may want to look at pain-management interventions. When it comes to trends for prime-age women, there’s research pointing to the importance of family-friendly policies, or rather the lack thereof. ... Policies that help provide childcare and paid family and medical leave seem likely to help push back against these trends... And paid leave may also help male employment by allowing workers to take time off for their own health problems.
Of course, there is still the possibility that cyclical forces are pushing down the labor force participation rate. ... The only way we’ll really know is if policymakers, especially at the Federal Reserve, continue to be patient and help the current recovery continue.
- The Skills Delusion - Adair Turner
- Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee - FRB
- Bring the Fed’s Dead Meetings to Life - Narayana Kocherlakota
- Keynes: the partly-known Colossus of economics - OECD Insights
- Gasoline demand: More price responsive than you might have thought - VoxEU
- Using bibliometrics to gauge research quality - VoxEU
- A new exposition of assemblage theory - Understanding Society
- Capital Flows and Financial Crises - Capital Ebbs and Flows
- Are we Safer? The Case for Updating Bagehot (Tim Geithner) - IMF Videos
Wednesday, October 12, 2016
Me, at MoneyWatch:
Why this Nobel prize for economics is so well deserved: Most people have probably never even heard of “contract theory,” but that’s the specialty that has won Finland’s Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström this year’s Nobel prize in economics. And as the theory’s name implies, their work helps us understand the contractual relationships between, for example, workers and firms, shareholders and management, businesses and suppliers, and health insurance companies and their customers.
When should workers be paid a bonus based on performance? What’s the best way to structure the contract specifying the terms for paying a bonus? Should managers have stock options as part of their contracts, or is some other arrangement preferable? When should insurance companies require co-payments, and what’s the best co-pay schedule?
Here’s a way to think about contract theory. ...
What Is the New Normal for U.S. Growth?: Economic growth during the recovery has been slower on average than its trend from before the Great Recession, prompting policymakers to ask if there is a “new normal” for U.S. GDP growth.
This Economic Letter argues that the new normal pace for GDP growth, in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, might plausibly fall in the range of 1½ to 1¾%. This estimate is based on trends in demographics, education, and productivity. The aging and retirement of the baby boom generation is expected to hold down employment growth relative to population growth. Further, educational attainment has plateaued, reducing the contribution of labor quality to productivity growth. The slower forecast for overall GDP growth assumes that, apart from these effects, productivity growth is relatively normal, if modest—in line with its pace for most of the period since 1973.
Subdued growth in the labor force
In thinking about prospects for economic growth, it is necessary to distinguish between the labor force and the larger population. Both are expected to grow at a relatively subdued pace; however, because of the aging of the population, the labor force is likely to grow even more slowly than the overall population.
Figure 1 shows that growth in the labor force has varied substantially over time and has often diverged from overall population growth. In the 1950s and 1960s, population (yellow line) grew more rapidly than the working-age population ages 15 to 64 (blue line) or the labor force (red line). In contrast, in the 1970s and 1980s, the labor force grew much more rapidly than the population as the baby boom generation reached working age and as female labor force participation rose. Those drivers of labor force growth largely subsided by the early 1990s. Since then, the labor force, working-age population, and overall population have all seen slower growth rates. Labor force participation fell sharply during the Great Recession, which held down labor force growth. But labor force growth has since rebounded to roughly the pace of the working-age population.
Slowing growth in working-age population and labor force
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Census Bureau, Congressional Budget Office (labor force projections).
Future labor force growth is likely to remain low for a couple of reasons. First, as shown in Figure 1, the population is now growing relatively slowly, and census projections expect that slow pace to continue. Second, these projections also suggest the working-age population will grow more slowly than the overall population, reflecting the aging of baby boomers. Of course, some of those older individuals will continue to work. Hence, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects the labor force will grow about ½% per year (red dashed line) over the next decade—a little faster than the working-age population, but substantially slower than in the second half of the 20th century. I use their estimate as a basis for my assumption that hours worked will also grow at about ½% per year so that hours per worker do not change much.
Recent slow growth for productivity
Figure 2 shows growth in GDP per hour since 1947 broken into periods to reflect variation in productivity growth. This measure of productivity growth was very fast from 1947 to 1973 but much slower from 1973 to 1995. It returned to a fast pace from 1995 to 2004, but has slowed again since 2004. During the fast-growth periods, productivity growth averaged 2½ to 2¾%. During the slower periods, growth was only 1 to 1¼% and dropped dramatically lower in 2010–2015 (Fernald 2016 discusses this period).
Variation in productivity growth by trend period
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Figure 2 is consistent with the view that the history of productivity growth has shifted between normal periods and exceptional ones (Gordon 2016, Fernald 2015, and David and Wright 2003). Unusually influential innovations—such as the steam engine, electric dynamo, internal combustion engine, and microprocessor—typically lead to a host of complementary innovations that boost productivity growth broadly for a time.
For example, productivity growth was exceptional before 1973, reflecting gains associated with such developments as electricity, the telephone, the internal combustion engine, and the Interstate Highway System (Fernald 1999). Those exceptional gains ran their course by the early 1970s, and productivity growth receded to a normal, modest pace.
Starting around 1995, productivity growth was again exceptional for eight or nine years. Considerable research highlighted how businesses throughout the economy used information technology (IT) to transform what and how they produced. After 2004, the low-hanging fruit of IT had been plucked. Productivity growth returned to a more normal, modest, and incremental pace—similar to that in 1973–95.
The past and future of GDP growth
GDP growth is the sum of growth in worker hours and GDP per hour. The blue line in Figure 3 shows how GDP growth fluctuated on average for each period mentioned in Figure 2. Before 2005, GDP growth since World War II was typically 3 to 4%. The dashed lines in the figure show two projections for future GDP. The higher estimate assumes productivity growth will return to its 1973–95 pace in the long run, while hours grow at the ½% per year pace projected by the CBO. In this scenario, GDP growth would average about 1¾%.
GDP scenarios with low labor force growth
Note: Annual percent change averaged over periods from Figure 2.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and author’s calculations.
But productivity growth could easily be lower than in the 1973–95 period for two main reasons. First, productivity has grown a little more slowly from 2004–15 than in the 1973–95 period—and much more slowly since 2010 (Figure 2). Second, and perhaps more importantly, future educational attainment will add less to productivity growth. In recent decades, educational attainment of younger individuals has plateaued. This reduces productivity growth via increases in labor quality, which measures the combined contribution of education and experience. Labor quality has added about 0.4 percentage points to annual productivity growth since 1973. However, by early next decade, labor quality will contribute only about 0.10 to 0.20 percentage points to annual productivity growth (Bosler et al. 2016).
On its own, then, reduced labor quality growth suggests marking down productivity and GDP projections by at least two-tenths of a percentage point and possibly more. The lower dashed line in Figure 3 shows future GDP growth assuming that productivity growth net of labor quality grows at its 1973–95 pace, while labor quality grows at the slower pace of 0.2%. By this projection, GDP growth per hour would be only a little above 1½%.
At first glance, a pace of 1½ to 1¾% seems very low relative to history. But the main reason for the slow pace is demographics: Growth in the 1973–95 period would have been equally slow had hours grown only ½% per year. The red line shows how fast GDP would have grown in that scenario, holding productivity growth at its actual historical pace by period but using the slower pace of growth for hours that the CBO expects in the future. For example, in the 1973–95 period, GDP grew at nearly a 3% pace. But if hours had grown only ½% per year, then GDP growth would have been about 1¾%.
The major source of uncertainty about the future concerns productivity growth rather than demographics. Historically, changes in trend productivity growth have been unpredictable and large. Looking ahead, another wave of the IT revolution from machine learning and robots could boost productivity growth. Or, as Fernald and Jones (2014) suggest, the rise of China, India, and other countries as centers of frontier research might lead to more innovation. In such a case, as Fernald (2016) discusses, the forecast here could reflect an extended pause before the next wave of transformative productivity growth. But, until such a development occurs, the most likely outcome is a continuation of slow productivity growth.
Once the economy recovers fully from the Great Recession, GDP growth is likely to be well below historical norms, plausibly in the range of 1½ to 1¾% per year. The preferred point estimate in Fernald (2016), who examines these issues in even more detail, is for 1.6% GDP growth. This forecast is consistent with productivity growth net of labor quality returning over the coming decade to its average pace from 1973–95, which is a bit faster than its pace since 2004. In the past we have seen long periods with comparably modest productivity growth. But we have not experienced such modest productivity growth combined with the types of changes in demographics and labor quality that researchers are expecting.
This slower pace of growth has numerous implications. For workers, it means slow growth in average wages and living standards. For businesses, it implies relatively modest growth in sales. For policymakers, it suggests a low “speed limit” for the economy and relatively modest growth in tax revenue. It also suggests a lower equilibrium or neutral rate of interest (Williams 2016).
Boosting productivity growth above this modest pace will depend primarily on whether the private sector can find new and improved ways of doing business. Still, policy changes may help. For example, policies to improve education and lifelong learning can help raise labor quality and, thereby, labor productivity. Improving infrastructure can complement private activities. Finally, providing more public funding for research and development can make new innovations more likely in the future (Jones and Williams, 1998).
John Fernald is a senior research advisor in the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Bosler, Canyon, Mary C. Daly, John G. Fernald, and Bart Hobijn. 2016. “The Outlook for U.S. Labor-Quality Growth.” FRB San Francisco Working Paper 2016-14.
David, Paul, and Gavin Wright. 2003. “General Purpose Technologies and Productivity Surges: Historical Reflections on the Future of the ICT Revolution.” In The Economic Future in Historical Perspective, eds. Paul A. David and Mark Thomas. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fernald, John G. 1999. “Roads to Prosperity? Assessing the Link between Public Capital and Productivity.” American Economic Review 89(3), pp. 619–638.
Fernald, John G. 2016. “Reassessing Longer-Run U.S. Growth: How Low?” FRB San Francisco Working Paper 2016-18.
Fernald, John G., and Charles I. Jones. 2014. “The Future of U.S. Economic Growth.” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 104(5, May), pp. 44–49.
Gordon, Robert. 2016. The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Jones, Charles I., and John C. Williams. 1998. “Measuring the Social Return to R&D.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 113(4), pp. 1119–1135.
Williams, John C. 2016. “Monetary Policy in a Low R-star World.” FRBSF Economic Letter 2016-23 (August 15).
Opinions expressed in FRBSF Economic Letter do not necessarily reflect the views of the management of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
- Hysteresis and fiscal policy during the Global Crisis - Fatas and Summers
- It would be wrong to abandon the policy of negative rates - Ken Rogoff
- Kuroda Says Japanese Central Bank Will Ease Policy Again if Needed - NYTimes
- Trump's Tax Plan Is a Huge Windfall For the Wealthy - Kevin Drum
- On the ongoing demise of globalisation - FT Alphaville
- How the Fed Turns Good News Into Bad - Bloomberg View
- A Great Fight of Our Times - The New York Times
- 140 Years of Antitrust in Democratic and Republican Platforms - ProMarket
- The ACA is holding down costs and not killing jobs - Washington Post
- China’s September Reserves, and Q2 Balance of Payments - Brad Setser
- The Problem with Privilege - EconoSpeak
Tuesday, October 11, 2016
Ricardian Equivalence, benchmark models, and academics response to the financial crisis: In his further thoughts on DSGE models (or perhaps his response to those who took up his first thoughts), Olivier Blanchard says the following:“For conditional forecasting, i.e. to look for example at the effects of changes in policy, more structural models are needed, but they must fit the data closely and do not need to be religious about micro foundations.”
He suggests that there is wide agreement about the above. I certainly agree, but I’m not sure most academic macroeconomists do. I think they might say that policy analysis done by academics should involve microfounded models. Microfounded models are, by definition, religious about microfoundations and do not fit the data closely. Academics are taught in grad school that all other models are flawed because of the Lucas critique, an argument which assumes that your microfounded model is correctly specified. ...
Let me be more specific. The core macromodel that many academics would write down involves two key behavioural relationships: a Phillips curve and an IS curve. The IS curve is purely forward looking: consumption depends on expected future consumption. It is derived from an infinitely lived representative consumer, which means Ricardian Equivalence holds in this model. As a result, in this benchmark model Ricardian Equivalence also holds. 
Ricardian Equivalence means that a bond financed tax cut (which will be followed by tax increases) has no impact on consumption or output. One stylised empirical fact that has been confirmed by study after study is that consumers do spend quite a large proportion of any tax cut. That they should do so is not some deep mystery, but may be traced back to the assumption that the intertemporal consumer is never credit constrained. In that particular sense academics’ core model does not fit Blanchard’s prescription that it should ‘“fit the data closely”.
Does this core model influence the way some academics think about policy? I have written how mainstream macroeconomics neglected before the financial crisis the importance that shifting credit conditions had on consumption, and speculated that this neglect owed something to the insistence on microfoundations. That links the methodology macroeconomists use, or more accurately their belief that other methodologies are unworthy, to policy failures (or at least inadequacy) associated with that crisis and its aftermath.
I wonder if the benchmark model also contributed to a resistance among many (not a majority, but a significant minority) to using fiscal stimulus when interest rates hit their lower bound. In the benchmark model increases in public spending still raise output, but some economists do worry about wasteful expenditures. For these economists tax cuts, particularly if aimed at those who are non-Ricardian, should be an attractive alternative means of stimulus, but if your benchmark model says they will have no effect, I wonder whether this (consciously or unconsciously) biases you against such measures.
In my view, the benchmark models that academic macroeconomists carry round in their head should be exactly the kind Blanchard describes: aggregate equations which are consistent with the data, and which may or may not be consistent with current microfoundations. They are the ‘useful models’ that Blanchard talked about... These core models should be under constant challenge from both partial equilibrium analysis, estimation in all its forms and analysis using microfoundations. But when push comes to shove, policy analysis should be done with models that are the best we have at meeting all those challenges, and not models with consistent microfoundations.
Notes on Brexit and the Pound: The much-hyped severe Brexit recession does not, so far, seem to be materializing – which really shouldn’t be that much of a surprise, because as I warned, the actual economic case for such a recession was surprisingly weak. (Ouch! I just pulled a muscle while patting myself on the back!) But we are seeing a large drop in the pound, which has steepened as it becomes likely that this will indeed be a very hard Brexit. How should we think about this?
Originally, stories about a pound plunge were tied to that recession prediction... But the demand collapse doesn’t seem to be happening. So what is the story?
For now, at least, I’m coming at it from the trade side – especially trade in financial services. It seems to me that one way to think about this is in terms of the “home market effect,” an old story in trade but one that only got formalized in 1980. ...
In Britain’s case,... financial services ... are subject to both internal and external economies of scale, which tends to concentrate them in a handful of huge financial centers around the world... But now we face the prospect of seriously increased transaction costs between Britain and the rest of Europe, which creates an incentive to move those services away from the smaller economy (Britain) and into the larger (Europe). Britain therefore needs a weaker currency to offset this adverse impact.
Does this make Britain poorer? Yes. It’s not just the efficiency effect of barriers to trade, there’s also a terms-of-trade effect as the real exchange rate depreciates.
But it’s important to be aware that not everyone in Britain is equally affected..., weakening helps British manufacturing – and, maybe, the incomes of people who live far from the City and still depend directly or indirectly on manufacturing for their incomes. It’s not completely incidental that these were the parts of England (not Scotland!) that voted for Brexit.
Is there a policy moral here? Basically it is that a weaker pound shouldn’t be viewed as an additional cost from Brexit, it’s just part of the adjustment. And it would be a big mistake to prop up the pound: old notions of an equilibrium exchange rate no longer apply.
- Economics Nobel 2016: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrom - Cheap Talk
- Nobel Prize 2016 Part I: Bengt Holmstrom - A Fine Theorem
- Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory - NobelPrize.org
- Oliver Hart, Nobel Laureate - - Marginal Revolution
- Bengt Holmström, Nobel Laureate - Marginal Revolution
- The Performance Pay Nobel - Marginal Revolution
- An Economics Nobel for Examining Reality - Noah Smith
- The Power of Convictions - ProMarket
- China’s SDR Distraction - Barry Eichengreen
- The case for an active fiscal policy - VoxEU
- Transformation of the US fiscal system in the 1930s - VoxEU
- Macro Musings Podcast: Claudio Borio - David Beckworth
- Machine Learning vs. Econometrics, II - No Hesitations
- A land built by economists? - The Enlightened Economist
- Clinton versus Trump on Financial Regulation - Cecchetti & Schoenholtz
- Why I’m relatively relaxed about robots - Bank Underground
Monday, October 10, 2016
"The Trump-Ailes axis of abuse":
Predators in Arms, by Paul Krugman, NY Times: As many people are pointing out, Republicans now trying to distance themselves from Donald Trump need to explain why The Tape was a breaking point, when so many previous incidents weren’t. ...
Meanwhile, the Trump-Ailes axis of abuse raises another question: Is sexual predation by senior political figures — which Mr. Ailes certainly was, even if he pretended to be in the journalism business — a partisan phenomenon?
Just to be clear, I’m not talking about bad behavior in general... Yes, Bill Clinton had affairs; but there’s a world of difference between consensual sex, however inappropriate, and abuse of power to force those less powerful to accept your urges. ...
Take, for example, what ... was happening politically in 2006..., it looked as if Republicans might retain control of Congress despite public revulsion at the Bush administration. But then came the Foley scandal: ...Representative Mark Foley, had been sending sexually explicit messages to pages, and his party had failed to take any action despite warnings..., the scandal seems to have ... led to a Democratic wave.
But think about how much bigger that wave might have been if voters had known ... that Dennis Hastert, who had been speaker of the House since 1999, himself had a long history of molesting teenage boys.
Why do all these stories involve Republicans? One answer may be structural. The G.O.P. is, or was until this election, a monolithic, hierarchical institution, in which powerful men could cover up their sins much better than they could in the far looser Democratic coalition.
There is also, I’d suggest, an underlying cynicism... We’re talking about a party that has long exploited white backlash to mobilize working-class voters, while enacting policies that actually hurt those voters but benefit the wealthy. Anyone participating in that scam ... has to have the sense that politics is a sphere in which you can get away with a lot if you have the right connections. ...
Assuming that Mr. Trump loses, many Republicans will try to pretend that he was a complete outlier, unrepresentative of the party. But he isn’t. He won the nomination fair and square, chosen by voters who had a pretty good idea of who he was. He had solid establishment support until very late in the game. And his vices are, dare we say, very much in line with his party’s recent tradition.
Mr. Trump, in other words, isn’t so much an anomaly as he is a pure distillation of his party’s modern essence.
Jobs Data Keeps Hawks Sidelined: Federal Reserve hawks face an array of labor market data that threatens a key pillar holding up their policy view. That pillar is the assertion that monthly nonfarm payroll growth over roughly 100k will soon force unemployment far below the natural rate, thus placing the US economy in grave danger from inflationary forces. By this view, the decline of unemployment long ago justified further rate hikes. Hawks failed to anticipate that the unemployment rate would flatten out at 5 percent despite steady payrolls growth. This outcome does not fit in their worldview. Fundamentally, they were supply-side pessimists. The recent strength in labor force growth suggests their pessimism was sorely misplaced and undermines their argument for immediate rate hikes. The key elements of the FOMC - the permanent voters - now stand as supply-side optimists and are prepared to hold rates at current levels through the next meeting, and perhaps even longer. A December rate hike is still not a foregone conclusion.
In recent speeches, Federal Reserve Chair Stanley Fischer appears to be now fully under the sway of Fed doves. Fischer's take on the employment report, from his speech this weekend:
Despite the strong job growth, the unemployment rate, at 5 percent in September, has essentially moved sideways this year as individuals have come back into the labor market in response to better employment opportunities and higher wages. As a consequence, the labor force participation rate has edged up against a backdrop of a declining longer-run trend owing to aging of the population. This increase is a very welcome development.
Four charts deserve attention here. First, "strong job growth:
Second, the unemployment rate has "moved sideways":
Third: "higher wages":
Fourth "labor force participation has edged up":
Overall, the October employment report justified the FOMC's decision to hold rates steady in September. The reasoning, according to Fischer:
But with labor market slack being taken up at a somewhat slower pace than in previous years, scope for some further improvement in the labor market remaining, and inflation continuing to run below our 2 percent target, we chose to wait for further evidence of continued progress toward our objectives.
The Fed sees that demand-side policy triggers a supply side response, and consequently does not want to risk leaving millions in the ranks of the unemployed (and remaining workers with sub-optimal wage growth) with a premature tightening of policy. Moreover, the lack of substantial inflationary pressures continues to the bedevil the hawks. As Fischer notes, inflation expectations remain in check, or, if they have moved, have drifted down. And while inflation has indeed edged up in recent months, it remains below target:
And I would argue that much of the rise in inflation was attributable to January's gain:
Fischer also undercuts the hawks' argument that preemptive hikes are necessary because without them the Fed will fall behind the curve:
But since monetary policy is only modestly accommodative, there appears little risk of falling behind the curve in the near future, and gradual increases in the federal funds rate will likely be sufficient to get monetary policy to a neutral stance over the next few years.
The key is that he sees policy as only modestly accommodative - a view that follows the Fed's epiphany on the persistence of a low natural rate of interest. Hence no massive catch-up would be needed even if future conditions require a faster pace of rate hikes.
I suspect that the hawks, now derailed by the employment data, will further pivot toward financial stability as they argue for a more rapid reduction of financial accommodation. Here too, however, Fischer is prepared to meet them head on. From last week:
Let me briefly mention a second reason for worrying about ultralow interest rates: The transition to a world with a very low natural rate of interest may hurt financial stability by causing investors to reach for yield, and some financial institutions will find it harder to be profitable. On the whole, however, the evidence to date does not point to notable risks to financial stability stemming from ultralow interest rates. For instance, the financial sector has appeared resilient to recent episodes of market stress, supported by strong capital and liquidity positions.
Overall, sounds to me that Fischer now embraces the intellectual framework pushed for over a year by his colleague, Federal Reserve Governor Lael Brainard. This likely is true also of all the permanent voting members. Within the context to the Board's current framework, the hawkish Fed president can do little more than squawk.
Bottom Line: A November rate hike remains dead. We have two labor reports until the December meeting. A continuation of recent trends would leave a rate hike at that meeting in doubt. Odds favor that meeting currently, but it is not a foregone conclusion. The doves are supply-side optimists. They want to let this rebound run for as long as possible. And remember, those closest to Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen are now those that inhabit the halls of Constitution Ave. Be wary of the words of hawkish Fed presidents; they have been very misleading this year.
- Voters sour on traditional economic policy - Larry Summers
- Very Serious People and the deficit - mainly macro
- The U.S. Economy and Monetary Policy - Stanley Fischer
- Paul Ryan Does Not Have a Better Way - EconoSpeak
- The costs of cascading trade protection - VoxEU
- Global growth solid at trend rates - Gavyn Davies
- When to distrust elites - Stumbling and Mumbling
- Heterogeneity and unemployment dynamics - VoxEU
- Volume and Information - John Cochrane
- Very Tough Work - Economic Principals
- Time for growth - VoxEU
Sunday, October 09, 2016
This is Not a Time for Political Neutrality: I have been writing essays at this blog for over seven years, and throughout that time, through perhaps 100 more-or-less-monthly essays, I have tried very hard to keep politics at bay, and to view each and every issue I discussed from a politically neutral, yet analytical economic perspective. But I find that I can no longer remain neutral.
Since before the summer, I had resolved to write today’s essay, but I decided to wait until one month before the November U.S. election to post it, simply because I thought this was the point in time when people would be paying most attention to the upcoming election but would not yet have completely made up their minds. In particular, I want to address this message to people who – like me – are political independents.
I have been teaching at Harvard for close to 30 years, and every year I take pride in the fact that at the conclusion of my 13-week course in environmental economics and policy, my students cannot say – on the basis of what I have said in lectures or what they have read in the assigned readings – whether I am a tree-hugging environmental advocate from the political left, or an industry apologist from the political right (actually, I am neither, although hostile voices in the blogosphere have sometimes wanted to peg me as being on the opposite of whatever extreme they occupy).
Likewise, I have remained bipartisan in politics, ever since I directed Project 88 more than 25 years ago for the bipartisan coalition of former Democratic Senator Timothy Wirth and the late Republican Senator John Heinz. Starting with the White House of President George H. W. Bush, and continuing with every administration – of both political parties – since then, I have worked on substantive matters of environmental and energy policy, in some cases closely and intensively, and in some cases indirectly and on the periphery.
Such professional bipartisanship and political neutrality have been important to me, and have been consistent with my voter registration, as I am officially registered as an independent (in Massachusetts, this goes by the designation of “unenrolled”).
So, over the years, I have voted for Democrats and I have voted for Republicans, for various offices ranging from the Mayor of my town to the President of my country. And in each and every one of those elections, although I preferred one of the two principal candidates (sometimes very strongly), in no case did I fear for the future of my community, my state, or my country if my candidate lost and the other candidate won.
This time is different. I fear for the United States and I fear for the world if Donald Trump is elected President. The time for my professional bipartisanship and political neutrality has ended – at least temporarily. And so I apologize to my readers for using this platform – An Economic View of the Environment – to express my broader, personal views on the upcoming election. This is a departure that I hope never again will be necessary. ...
Saturday, October 08, 2016
- Slower Pace of Job Growth Continues Into the Fall - Dean Baker
- September Employment Report - Calculated Risk
- How quantitative easing works - VoxEU
- The end of ‘QE infinity’? - Gavyn Davies
- How the Free Market Can Fight Poverty - The New York Times
- Inflation compensation and risk sentiment - Bank Underground
- Piketty’s housing capital results: New US facts - VoxEU
- Soybean-Adjusted U.S. Export Growth - Brad Setser
- Socializing investment - Stumbling and Mumbling
- Sorting Out the Patent Trolls - Tim Taylor
- Low Rates Are Here to Stay - Noah Smith