Paul Krugman in Money Talks: Denial and Deception

Here's Paul Krugman in Money Talks with a blast from the past, and a thought about the present. Krugman asks "Why now? Why has the question of whether we were misled into war sprung into the forefront of our political debate, more than two years after it became clear that there were no W.M.D.?":

Denial and Deception, Revisited, by Paul Krugman, NY Times: I’m trying not to write too much about the Iraq war these days. It’s an issue I’m passionate about, and there was a long time when I felt I had to speak out, even though I have no special expertise in national security, because it seemed that so few people in major news organizations were willing to say the obvious. But now there are many voices talking about how we got into this disastrous war and how we might get out, so by and large it makes sense for me to focus more on the economic issues The Times originally hired me to cover.

There is one question about Iraq, however, on which I think I can shed some light: Why now? Why has the question of whether we were misled into war sprung into the forefront of our political debate, more than two years after it became clear that there were no W.M.D.? Part of the answer is that some new information has emerged about how the White House misrepresented the intelligence it had. But the truth is that by the summer of 2003 there was ample evidence that the administration had deliberately misled the public to promote a war it wanted.

So why didn’t the public read and hear more about this evidence until very recently? The answer, I’m afraid, is that the polls led the discussion, rather than following it. With some honorable exceptions, politicians and the news media weren’t willing to take the issue on until President Bush had already been politically wounded by the failure of his Social Security plans and his hapless response to Hurricane Katrina – and a majority of the public had already come to the conclusion that we were misled into war.

And I’m sorry to say that I saw it coming. What follows is a column I published in The Times on June 24, 2003, under the headline “Denial and Deception.” I think the piece speaks for itself.

DENIAL AND DECEPTION (June 24, 2003): Politics is full of ironies. On the White House Web site, George W. Bush's speech from Oct. 7, 2002 — in which he made the case for war with Iraq – bears the headline ''Denial and Deception.'' Indeed.

There is no longer any serious doubt that Bush administration officials deceived us into war. The key question now is why so many influential people are in denial, unwilling to admit the obvious.

About the deception: Leaks from professional intelligence analysts, who are furious over the way their work was abused, have given us a far more complete picture of how America went to war. Thanks to reporting by my colleague Nicholas Kristof, other reports in The New York Times and The Washington Post, and a magisterial article by John Judis and Spencer Ackerman in The New Republic, we now know that top officials, including Mr. Bush, sought to convey an impression about the Iraqi threat that was not supported by actual intelligence reports.

In particular, there was never any evidence linking Saddam Hussein to Al Qaeda; yet administration officials repeatedly suggested the existence of a link. Supposed evidence of an active Iraqi nuclear program was thoroughly debunked by the administration's own experts; yet administration officials continued to cite that evidence and warn of Iraq's nuclear threat.

And yet the political and media establishment is in denial, finding excuses for the administration's efforts to mislead both Congress and the public.

For example, some commentators have suggested that Mr. Bush should be let off the hook as long as there is some interpretation of his prewar statements that is technically true. Really? We're not talking about a business dispute that hinges on the fine print of the contract; we're talking about the most solemn decision a nation can make. If Mr. Bush's speeches gave the nation a misleading impression about the case for war, close textual analysis showing that he didn't literally say what he seemed to be saying is no excuse. On the contrary, it suggests that he knew that his case couldn't stand close scrutiny.

Consider, for example, what Mr. Bush said in his ''denial and deception'' speech about the supposed Saddam-Osama link: that there were ''high-level contacts that go back a decade.'' In fact, intelligence agencies knew of tentative contacts between Saddam and an infant Al Qaeda in the early 1990's, but found no good evidence of a continuing relationship. So Mr. Bush made what sounded like an assertion of an ongoing relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda, but phrased it cagily – suggesting that he or his speechwriter knew full well that his case was shaky.

Other commentators suggest that Mr. Bush may have sincerely believed, despite the lack of evidence, that Saddam was working with Osama and developing nuclear weapons. Actually, that's unlikely: why did he use such evasive wording if he didn't know that he was improving on the truth? In any case, however, somebody was at fault. If top administration officials somehow failed to apprise Mr. Bush of intelligence reports refuting key pieces of his case against Iraq, they weren't doing their jobs. And Mr. Bush should be the first person to demand their resignations.

So why are so many people making excuses for Mr. Bush and his officials?

Part of the answer, of course, is raw partisanship. One important difference between our current scandal and the Watergate affair is that it's almost impossible now to imagine a Republican senator asking, ''What did the president know, and when did he know it?''

But even people who aren't partisan Republicans shy away from confronting the administration's dishonest case for war, because they don't want to face the implications.

After all, suppose that a politician – or a journalist – admits to himself that Mr. Bush bamboozled the nation into war. Well, launching a war on false pretenses is, to say the least, a breach of trust. So if you admit to yourself that such a thing happened, you have a moral obligation to demand accountability – and to do so not only in the face of a powerful, ruthless political machine but in the face of a country not yet ready to believe that its leaders have exploited 9/11 for political gain. It's a scary prospect.

Yet if we can't find people willing to take the risk – to face the truth and act on it – what will happen to our democracy?

Comments

[Bruce Webb]

Krugman gets it, again. There was a self-reinforcing narrative reverberating between politicians and the media in 2003 and 2004: you don't move against a "popular war-time President". Hence the incessant (and continuing) attempts to argue for a move to Bush-Lite. This played its way out in full ferocity in the blog wars and in the Dean campaign, trying to make your way against the tide was almost impossible. Except where it wasn't.

You can speak Truth to Power and Bush's approval numbers always showed that. An examination of the graph at the ever invaluable Prof Pollkatz Bush Approval shows that steady exposure to Bush causes his numbers to drop. There are three identifiable spikes (I dubbed them the Commander in Chief moments) : 9/11, the Fall of the Statue, and the Capture of Saddam and then steady erosion. And the spikes had less effect each time. Now there was a flat period from roughly March to November 2004, explained in my view by some combination of $200 million in campaign spending by Bush early, Swift Boating of Kerry, and Kerry not putting enough distance between him and Bush on the conduct of the war. But no matter after the election the corrosive effect of Bush on his numbers began again.

Pollkatz allowed me to keep my sanity. You can give credits to blogs or not but the numbers clearly show that the more you know Bush (as opposed to rallying around the Commander in Chief) the more you disapprove. And this has been true from day one.

[hirvi]

"I felt I had to speak out, even though I have no special expertise in national security, because it seemed that so few people in major news organizations were willing to say the obvious"

It was indeed obvious, and Krugman is right to say it. He could also say the Administration was crude, which it was. How could the orchestration NOT have been clear, with all the key figures of the Administration emphasising 'Weapons of mass destruction' as often as possible, and at every public appearance, saying it extra slowly so no one could misunderstand? - and over a period of months.

These is truly the crudest disinformation method. Why were so many fooled by it? 9/11-trauma?

[anne]

Where Franklin Roosevelt continually soothed our fear during the Depression and through the War, and in so doing may have actually emboldened dissent, though conditions were entierly severe, this Administration seems to have emphasized our fears and fear makes dissent especially difficult.

[anne]

Discussions of threats and dangers in the press surely added to our unease or fear, and we do not think clearly when fearful. We needed to be calmed, but by who?

[anne]

Though it may be that I am terribly unrealistic, and though I can entertain all sorts of fears, I was never fearful for this country. I wished us to move far more cautiously early on.

[slink]

fooled???

who honestly was fooled ????

not anyone with an ounce of background
and a pinch of scepticism

these high steppin' media and demo types
were poll panicked
which is not excusable ...at all