How Fragile is China?

More on China's development troubles:

In rural China, a time bomb is ticking, by Joshua Muldavin, International Herald Tribune: The recent police killing in China's Guangdong Province of as many as 20 villagers who were protesting the government's seizure of land for a power plant is symptomatic of an emerging pattern of rural unrest that challenges the very legitimacy of the Chinese state... China's fabulous growth since the 1980s was achieved through environmental destruction and social and economic polarization which now threaten its continuation. ... While rural strife is not new - in 1994, I witnessed thousands of peasants in Henan Province fight a local government militia over unpopular taxation and state policies - its scope and frequency have increased greatly. ... In 2004, according to official estimates, there were 74,000 uprisings throughout the country ...

Peasant land loss is a time bomb for the state. While avoiding full land privatization and, until recently, massive landlessness of the rural majority, Beijing still allows unregulated rural land development for new industries and infrastructure. Land seized from peasants reduces their minimal subsistence base, leaving them with what is called "two-mouth" lands insufficient to feed most families, thus forcing members of many households to join China's 200 million migrants in search of work across the country. In many areas..., some households have lost even these small subsistence lands, swelling the ranks of China's landless peasants, who number a staggering 70 million according to official estimates. ...

The Chinese state is very clear on the rural roots of the 1949 revolution, ones emanating from massive inequality and social insecurity. But there is a new clarity now for peasants and rural workers, who have seen the state increasingly side with the newly rich over the past two decades... This harks back to the period prior to China's 1949 revolution when enormous numbers of landless peasants formed the core of the largely rural movement led by Mao and others. Following their victory, it was the redistribution of land to the poorest peasants that gave the Communist Party its greatest enduring legitimacy in rural areas. It is the loss of this legitimacy that lies at the heart of the most recent strife.

Beijing could use the violence in Guangdong as an opportunity to address the structural roots of the larger unrest... Instead the state is opting to characterize the killings as the mistake of an overly zealous local police officer rather than a systematic attempt to contain rural discontent by any means. The dilemma for China is not a public relations one... Unless overall policies are altered to address the needs of China's vulnerable rural majority, Beijing will surely face more protracted and violent challenges from the victims of the country's development "success."

This reminds me of the enclosure movement in England:

Enclosure (also historically inclosure) is the process of subdivision of common land for individual ownership. There were two main processes of enclosure in England. One was the division of the large open fields which had been common in some areas of the country into individually managed plots of land, usually hedged and known at the time as "severals". All of the strips of land in these open fields had been privately owned, but communually ploughed ... and open to communal grazing after the harvest or in fallow years. ...[M]edieval manors usually had two to three large open fields, so that crops could be rotated. In the process of enclosure, these were consolidated and divided into severals, to be individually managed. ...

The second process of enclosure was the division and privatisation of common fens and marshes, moors and other "wastes" (in the original sense of "uninhabited places"). These enclosures created new private plots... The second form of enclosure affected particularly those areas, such as the North, the far south west and unique regions such as the East Anglian Fens, where grazing had been plentiful on otherwise marginal lands, such as marshes and moors. Access to these common resources was an essential part of the economic life in these strongly pastoral regions. In the Fens, large riots broke out both in the seventeenth century, when attempts to drain the peat and silt marshes were combined with proposals to also partially enclose them.

From as early as the 12th century, some open fields in Britain were being enclosed into individually owned fields. In Great Britain, the process sped up during the 15th and 16th centuries as sheep farming grew more profitable. In the 16th and early 17th centuries, the practice of enclosure was denounced by the Church and the government, particularly depopulating enclosure, and legislation was drawn up against it. However, the tide of elite opinion began to turn towards support for enclosure, and rate of enclosure increased in the seventeenth century. ... Sir Thomas More, in his 1516 work Utopia suggests that the practice of enclosure is responsible for some of the social problems affecting England at the time ... By the end of the 19th century the process of enclosure was largely complete.

Many believe the enclosure movement was an essential factor in England's industrialization and the emergence of capitalism as it helped to create a class of citizens with nothing but their labor to sell in order to survive, though there were many other factors such as the decline of guilds that were important as well.

As adults often forget their own foibles in childhood as they discipline their children, I think we often forget that we went through difficult growing pains much like those that China is experiencing. For example, we too were willing to trade environmental degradation for growth in our younger development years, and England and other European countries made the same choice as capitalism was emerging, perhaps to a much larger extent than China has. Awful working conditions, worker riots, and so on are in our past as well and we should be careful about insisting that other countries do better than we were able to do when confronted with similar economic development issues. I am not defending or excusing any of these practices, not at all, and we should continue to pressure China to do better, but remembering and acknowledging our own past as we do so could help us deliver the message in a way that is more likely to get a positive reception.

Comments

[camille roy]

What I find particularly troublesome about this perspective (to wit, 'don't beat up on the poor Chinese govt, because dark periods in Western history parallel their abuses') is that it rests on a very questionable assumption.

That assumption is that these abuses are part of their long march towards representative democracy, transparency, and the rule of law. It is *because* this trajectory is *assumed* that we are told to lay off from any criticisms, and assured that moving our manufacturing (and increasingly, service) economy to their shores will all work out in some hypothetical long run.

Pshaw! This reminds me of the neo-cons fantasies of Switzerland when they looked at Saddam's Iraq. Show me where in Chinese history you have a solid basis for such democratization fantasies. Supplement economic analysis with serious history and political analysis. Otherwise, I see the wishful thinking of CEO's and their apologists as motive for what is really a justification of their huge profits, even as the wages of western workers stagnate or fall.

Meanwhile, China's 'contradictions' (deaths, imprisonment, etc) grow worse and worse, as this article shows.

[Mark Thoma]

I acknowledge the political points you are making. I meant to say criticize away - keep the pressure on - but deliver the message in a way that avoids having it rejected purely because of how it is delivered. I think saying "I faced that problem too and made bad choices - here's a better path to consider and why" is more likely to be received and acted upon than a message that says "You're an idiot if you don't do x, y, or z" or a message that is purely critical.

Thinking more (too late now - it's posted...), I am of two minds on this. We have shot protesters too - I remeber Kent state e.g., labor riots around the turn of last century are another example, - so on the one hand we can't act as though we never do such things. But to treat political regimes that have done terrible things respectfully as a means of getting them to change, or to equate the two governments, seems wrong too ( though equating China today with governments at the time of enclosure in England is less of a stretch perhaps).

It's a hard question I think - how to treat a regime you want to change. Do you shun them, put trade embargoes or less favored nation clauses in place, etc. and cause them to withdraw and become worse, more defensive, more determined to show they can do it their way, etc., or do you try the more friendly approach of allowing them in, showing respect if not approval, and hoping you can bring about change that way.

I don't know the answer for sure. A little of both perhaps, but I lean towards the more friendly approach when possible.

Mostly, though, I just found the development parallels interesting...

[dryfly]

History is interesting for sure... one small point to consider why this time it is different. The New World.

One could argue that democracy rose more easily in Europe (especially England) because countries had a place to overflow to... much to the chagrin of the Cherokee, Axtecs, Incas, Lakota, Navaho, aborigines, Maori, etc.

So where do the Chinese overflow to? Tibet, Mongolia, Siberia, Mars?

Without that pressure blow-off option the China transformation is likely to be far nastier and more aggressively contested then what happened in Europe.

[anne]

Nice post as usual :) But as to how fragile is China, the answer is not at all. As to how to deal with China, the answer is at least the same way we deal with France. This is not the China of the Boxer Rebellion, this is a China that is secure and immensely influential on its own and entirely necessary as a friend for us beyond economics. The violence in Guangdong Province was of course tragic but an exceptional and isolated incident that the Chinese leadership will try to be sure is not repeated. The rural problems are real, but the leadership knows China's rural history well and knows its importance and has shown repeatedly it is capable of reacting to social problems.

[A Chinese in U.S.]

My parents are retired professionals who worked in State-owned Enterprise all their life. I have never heard so much complain from them about the social injustice (which including the the corruption, the fact that coal accidents happen so often while the owners of the coal mines are so wealthy, the doctors no long command people's respect as the life saver, but are dispised as the the money sucker...). They are furious because they see everywhere in the society there is no way to appeal to justice.

when people like them are so furious, I think there is something quite wrong in the society. I don't know where CHina is going: I also hope that the people, the government, the new wealthy-class (closely related to the government) would find a way to peacefully solve the problems and the country learn to share the benefit of th growth so that the vocalno would not erupt and distroy everything...

I do agree it is a pain of growing, some time when I listened to my parents complians, I feel that they are sufferring because they lived through two worlds: they sacrificed in the first planned economy world, a world where it is almost impossible to become super wealthy at the expense of the blood of the workers, and after retiring, they don't benefit from the market economy world, a world where a few people get immensely rich through no obviouse reasons... Many people feel the same, and they are angry, and it is dangerous...

But is can be solved, it is not too late to try: the pressure does not come from outside, the pressure is all within the country.

[Mark Thoma]

Thank you.

[camille roy]

We (the U.S.) had awful worker conditions and democracy at the same time. We had environmental devastation plus the rule of law. It is these latter institutions of civic society which support the building of social consensus and problem solving in the long run.

Can China, without democratic institutions, avoid staggering into breakdown and catastrophe? Certainly the environmental signs are not good. A society with multiple power centers (arguably China has that) including democratic representation (which it does not) can develop solutions in which all those who have a stake obtain some benefit. I don't see any signs of meaningful democratization. This makes the likelihood of catastrophe higher.

I am not sure there is a means of politically pressuring China to become more democratic. I think this is a sign of the virus of global corporatism undermining governmental institutions more than anything else.

[anne]

Interesting comments on a critically important matter :)

[Tom]

I have a feeling I can only lower the average quality of comment, but here goes anyway.

I have a problem with this "we" business, both in reference to the historical UK and USA. When you say "we" about Britain during during the industrial revolution, do you mean "we the landowners" or "we the government" or "we the Chartists" or "we the Tolpuddle martyrs"? There is a tendency in economic history (speaking authoritatively from my position of vast ignorance) to assume everything is the result of either policy or markets, but social activism and protest movements have played a historical role too of course.

The protestors in China would seem to be in the same position as some of those in Britain during the enclosure movement. Providing them with publicity and other forms of support would surely be identification with one version of our historical "us" rather than the opposite.

[anne]

Tom

'The protestors in China would seem to be in the same position as some of those in Britain during the enclosure movement. Providing them with publicity and other forms of support would surely be identification with one version of our historical "us" rather than the opposite.'

Perfectly argued :) That we readily know of local social problems through China is in itself promising, and goes beyond the revolution in communications, for a generation ago we would not have known.

[dylan]

Sorry Anne, but to call the problems in Guangdong covered by the Western news media "isolated" or "unusual" is absurd. In rural China such events (usually without the use of automatic weapons but rather iron bars, knives, etc used by police or thugs) are all too common. The Communist Party admits the number of "mass incidents" rose to 74,000 last year from 10,000 a decade ago. And that is with China's fabled 9 percent annual GDP growth. You may believe that China's leaders have everything under control, but they do not share your confidence. Read anything by Hu Jintao or Wen Jiabao.

[Joseph Wang]

The analogy between Chinese land tenure and the enclosure movement is pretty apt, which is why I think it is a bad idea to solve the current problems with privatization.

One thing that the current Chinese system does encourage is "mass action." If the village government moves land out of production, then everyone in the village is impacted, which results in a likely riot if the compensation isn't good enough. If you switch to private estates, then the local power elites can pick off the land plots one by one.... Which is sort of what happened in England.

The basic problem is that local governments are bankrupt. They have no taxing authority, and nothing to tax. Land sales are about the only way local governments can raise money. What I think will solve the problem is to have more of local government functions funded by the central government, and at the same time change the rules so that peasants get more compensation for land sales.

I don't think that the system is particularly fragile. If you look at what people are angry about, its generally about things that are fixable, and that are being fixed.

Also, I do think that there is something particular about Guangdong that caused the very violent clashes last year. One thing about Guangdong is that because it is a rich province there is more money involved in these disputes.

The other thing is that I do get the sense that the Guangdong provincial government has been particularly incompetent. Guangdong seemed to handle these sorts of things much more badly than Zhejiang.

[a]

Joe Wang wrote:
"What I think will solve the problem is to have more of local government functions funded by the central government, and at the same time change the rules so that peasants get more compensation for land sales."

I have to argue that this happenned in the three gorges mass migration project. The local governments got central government fund to relocate the peasants. The result is high level of local discontent. Last time I visited, the tour guide was complaining openly to the tourists.

I am not sure privatization is the right way either. But I can assure that even though the GuangDong incidencets made into international news, it is by no means the worst cases. In lots of places where the news light does not reach, it is only worse.

I think the main issue is the corruption of the local governments. If you have seen a movie "Xin Tian You" (http://ent.sina.com.cn/m/c/f/xinty/index.html).

[anne]

http://www.longmarchspace.com/images/hechi/index-e.htm

"Xin Tian You"
Nice :)

[a]

Yes, Anne, Xin Tian You is the name of a form of folk art where people make up verses along singing. It is romantic. But also, today, most of the people living in that area (along the Yellow river, the river that symbolizes Chinese culture and tradition) are among the poorest in the country... The movie I mentioned was based on one county official who tried his best to correct cases of decades of wrong... Althoug it paints the story of one good officials, it also tells the stories of half a dozen peasant families and the immense in-justice they endured under varioud governments...

The party released the movie in 2004 as part of a big anti-corruption compaign. But it is only a sign of how bad things are...