What's Our Next Move?

This is Richard Clarke, former national coordinator for security and counterterrorism and Steven Simon, former senior director for counterterrorism at the National Security Council warning that a war with Iran would be disastrous. There is also a second editorial noting the shift in foreign policy over the last four years from realists such as Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft who advocated balancing world stability and the promotion of democracy toward the Neo-Con idealists:

Op-Ed Contributors Bombs That Would Backfire By Richard Clarke and Steven Simon, Op-Ed, NY Times: ...We would like to believe that the administration is not intent on starting another war, because a conflict with Iran could be even more damaging to our interests than the current struggle in Iraq has been. A brief look at history shows why.

Reports by the journalist Seymour Hersh and others suggest that the United States is contemplating bombing a dozen or more nuclear sites, ..., scores of air bases, radar installations and land missiles would also be hit to suppress air defenses. Navy bases and coastal missile sites would be struck to prevent Iranian retaliation ... Iran's long-range missile installations could also be targets of the initial American air campaign.

These contingencies seem familiar to us because we faced a similar situation as National Security Council staff members in the mid-1990's. American frustrations with Iran were growing, and in early 1996 the House speaker, Newt Gingrich, publicly called for the overthrow of the Iranian government. He and the C.I.A. put together an $18 million package to undertake it.

The Iranian legislature responded with a $20 million initiative for its intelligence organizations to counter American influence in the region. Iranian agents began casing American embassies and other targets around the world. In June 1996, the ... covert-action arm of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, arranged the bombing of an apartment building used by our Air Force in ... Saudi Arabia, killing 19 Americans.

At that point, the Clinton administration and the Pentagon considered a bombing campaign. But after long debate, the highest levels of the military could not forecast a way in which things would end favorably for the United States.

While the full scope of what America did do remains classified, published reports suggest that the United States responded with a chilling threat to the Tehran government and conducted a global operation that immobilized Iran's intelligence service. Iranian terrorism against the United States ceased.

In essence, both sides looked down the road of conflict and chose to avoid further hostilities. ... Now, as in the mid-90's, any United States bombing campaign would simply begin a multi-move, escalatory process. Iran could respond three ways. First, it could attack Persian Gulf oil facilities and tankers — as it did in the mid-1980's — which could cause oil prices to spike above $80 dollars a barrel.

Second and more likely, Iran could use its terrorist network to strike American targets around the world, including inside the United States. Iran has forces at its command that are far superior to anything Al Qaeda was ever able to field. ... We might hope that Hezbollah, now a political party, would decide that it has too much to lose by joining a war against the United States. But this would be a dangerous bet.

Third, Iran is in a position to make our situation in Iraq far more difficult than it already is. The Badr Brigade and other Shiite militias in Iraq could launch a more deadly campaign against British and American troops. There is every reason to believe that Iran has such a retaliatory shock wave planned and ready.

No matter how Iran responded, the question that would face American planners would be, "What's our next move?" How do we achieve so-called escalation dominance, the condition in which the other side fears responding because they know that the next round of American attacks would be too lethal for the regime to survive?

Bloodied by Iranian retaliation, President Bush would most likely authorize wider and more intensive bombing. Non-military Iranian government targets would probably be struck in a vain hope that the Iranian people would seize the opportunity to overthrow the government. More likely, the American war against Iran would guarantee the regime decades more of control.

So how would bombing Iran serve American interests? In over a decade of looking at the question, no one has ever been able to provide a persuasive answer. The president assures us he will seek a diplomatic solution to the Iranian crisis. And there is a role for threats of force to back up diplomacy and help concentrate the minds of our allies. But the current level of activity in the Pentagon suggests more than just standard contingency planning or tactical saber-rattling.

The parallels to the run-up to to war with Iraq are all too striking: remember that in May 2002 President Bush declared that there was "no war plan on my desk" despite having actually spent months working on detailed plans for the Iraq invasion. Congress did not ask the hard questions then. It must not permit the administration to launch another war whose outcome cannot be known, or worse, known all too well.

Here is the commentary from the Financial Times on the shift from realism to idealism in our official foreign policy:

Curious disconnect in US foreign policy, by James Mann Commentary, Financial Times: ...In pursuit of President George W. Bush’s call for the spread of democracy around the world, the administration has explicitly repudiated the realist approach to foreign policy that once dominated the Republican party under Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft.

The latest sign was the statement by Condoleezza Rice, US secretary of state ... on her recent UK visit, that America had abandoned 60 years of trying to “buy stability at the expense of democracy” in the Middle East. The more significant indication was a little-noticed change in the administration’s view of the world, laid out in its new national security strategy last month.

For decades now, the Republicans have been divided into two camps on foreign policy. The first are realists, such as Nixon, Kissinger and Scowcroft, who emphasised national interests, not ideals; they stressed considerations such as the preservation of stability and the balance of power. Their opponents – today’s neo-conservatives, the Republican wing once led by Ronald Reagan – contend that the US should devote its foreign policy to combating tyranny.

In its first national security strategy in mid-2002, ... the administration summarised its policies with a key phrase: the US would seek ... a “balance of power that favours human freedom”. Those words represented a classic compromise – or call it a truce – between the party’s two warring wings: “balance of power” for the realists, “human freedom” for the neo-cons.

The 2002 document contained some far-reaching ideas about dealing with terrorism – including, most prominently, the call for pre-emptive military attack. Yet, outside the Middle East, the administration seemed to view the world in conventional Kissingerian terms: stability, national interests, balance of power. The 2002 strategy singled out China, Russia and India as three centres of global power.

The new national security strategy is strikingly different. The phrase “balance of power that favours human freedom” has been dropped. There is quite a bit about freedom and spreading democracy, but not about the realist concept of a balance of power. Gone is the section that four years ago grouped China, Russia and India as great powers. They are treated in the 2006 document as three countries among many. For the first time, the US seems to be saying its power is so great that there can be – and need be – no balance or stability.

What has happened in four years to change the administration’s view? One factor is certainly the aftermath of the Iraq war. After failing to find weapons of mass destruction there, the administration increasingly seized on the idea of democracy as the principal justification for the war. Since then, the idea of democracy promotion has become the guiding rationale for the administration’s foreign policy.

That means the Bush foreign policy team is now operating with a curious disjunction between its rhetoric and its personnel. When it comes to personnel, the neo-cons have clearly been in decline in Mr Bush’s second term. ...

But that is in the realm of personnel. On the underlying principles that guide US foreign policy, the neo-cons have the upper hand and the realists are in decline. To be sure, Ms Rice, Mr Hadley and other officials have tried hard to work more closely with Europe and avoid the assertive unilateralism of Mr Bush’s first term. But they now regularly espouse the ideas first put forward by the neo-cons. ...

Four years ago, such views were offered primarily by Mr Wolfowitz and other neo-cons; these days, the president and secretary of state are embracing them. Most significantly, the administration is no longer willing to commit itself to the same ideas for a balance of power and international stability that it embraced in 2002. That is a conceptual change of breathtaking magnitude.

Comments

[DevsAd]

Simple. Our next move is to get out. Maybe the UN will be willing to try and put Humpty-Dumpty back together again. Soon as someone has the courage to tell Bush he already fell off the fence.

[Movie Guy]

DevsAd,

So, that's your knowledge and expectation of existing U.S. strategies in the Middle East?

Cut and run?

Never happen.

[DevsAd]

Whatever credibility people like you once had, this adminstration squandered. It's gone. it's over.

Why should we listen? We shouldn't. All you militay guys go huddle in circle and pat yourselves on the back for the fine, fine job your expertise did.

Give us a break. Put your tail between your legs and go away like anyone with honor would. The ship is sinking captain, and you were one of the people telling us how to steer it.

The courageous thing is to stand up to you guys nd say no more. You had your chance, and it was a disawter.

So don't tell me about your expertise. All it did was kill a bunch of Americans. Now you want to kill more.

Bush took away your credibilty, get it? We trusted you guys and your expertise and that was a stupid thing to do.

Today is a day to celebrate new life, not promote more death. Take your war somewhere else,some other country. It's over for you guys, you just don't see it yet.

[calmo]

Simple, maybe in that other sense too. [Don't underestimate me --I haven't adopted the "clueless" strategy adopted by some.](They are way too quick for me --I have dozens of biases to kick around and ok, I fess up to enjoying nothing more than a little bias-kickin.)

Update: Wes Clarke joined the 6 retired generals in calling for Rummy's resignation. [Sure he's going to run as a Dem hopeful again and so how biased is that?](As soon as he gives us an indication that its Wolfie he wants in there we will know that his biases are worse than we imagined.)

We need a treaty, not a pull-out. Yes, our bargaining position is not admiral (~our way or we bomb the living daylights out of you) but we need to exercise some real foreign diplomacy here that we have seen wrt China (yeah that other axis of evil) [just more of a postponed axis of evil].
What did we do there that worked so much better despite China's real bombs, not forcasted ones, China's real military strength not imagined 40 Million recruits (ok, I haven't a clue with this number --you figure I should've Googled) [Do you always trust Google?]. We co-ventured.
We need some imagination to make sure the (US or Israeli) military doesn't light the whole place up. Iran, China and Russia are all countries on Rummy's adversarial list. Iran may not be the un-negotiable country that the military has painted for us in the interests of securing an ever greater share of the budget.
We should insist on supplying them with the nuclear power plants they are trying to build. (The ones that don't have that tendency to turn into bomb making facilities.) [In the card game (Bridge), we finesse the military card of ever-expanding military adventures.]

Wasn't that simple?

[Bruce Wilder]

I find it hard, at this point, to credit Bush with either an idea or an ideal. When I read the Clarke and Simon op ed, I was reminded what actual thinking sounds like: smart, well-informed people, trying hard to think realistically about ways, means and consequences.

Then, I think back on what we have had from Bush. Other than outright deception, it has consisted of a mish-mash of contradictory thoughts and guesses, an expectation of results and a vision drawn from the plot of a bad novel. I don't fault the neo-cons their idealism as much as I once faulted Henry Kissinger his callous realism. But, what has ailed the Bush Administration has not been neo-con idealism or Metternich-like realism, or even that there has been a clash within the Administration.

What troubles the Bush Administration in foreign policy has been the absence of a process of resolution, where real facts were dug out, and thinking refined. Instead of actual intelligence, whole groups were put to the task of manufacturing tendentious arguments.

I saw General Franks defending the planning process on the news. He's is such a useless tool. Of course, no interviewer takes him to task, or even seems to have read his book. But, Frank has described the planning, as it occurred one level up (from himself) in the Administration, where he was presenting, in a best-selling book, and, although he's not particularly harsh, it was not a flattering description. No one asked basic questions; conflicts and problems were not identified and resolved.

Just from the record of public events like Congressional testimony, one could catalogue dozens of examples of high officials saying contradictory things, which indicate that no policy process was underway to identify problems, allocate or apply resources rationally, let alone iron out differences of opinion.

This all goes to leadership, or the lack of leadership.

Personally, I am disappointed that the U.S. did not use its great power to strengthen international institutions or build a consensus among Great Powers at a time when none, but China, have significant territorial ambitions. Instead, Bush has created an Empire we cannot afford to keep or lose.

That takes a singular lack of insight and vision.

[Mark Thoma]

I'll toss this into the discussion - not quite enough for a post, but says that Iran isn't too worried about us:

Rafsanjani doubts US will 'risk war'
by Gareth Smyth
Published: April 17 2006 03:00 | Last updated: April 17 2006 03:00
Financial Times

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran's influential former president, said in Syria yesterday that the US was "incapable of taking a risk" of a war in the region without seriously discussing Iran's nuclear programme.

Mr Rafsanjani, who will also visit Kuwait, is rallying Arab support after Tehran said it had completed uranium enrichment at laboratory level.

Richard Lugar, a leading Republican senator, yesterday said it would be "useful" for the US to talk directly to Iran over the stand-off. Gareth Smyth, Tehran

[Movie Guy]

It's interesting to note that Clarke and Simon never once mention the advanced mission planning well underway in Israel nor the growing frequency of concerned visits by Israeli leadership to Washington, D.C. over the matter of recent nuclear program revelations by Iran. Now, we have Iran supposedly funding Palestine to the tune of $50 million.

Yet, not one word of concern from Clarke/Simon about the possible likelihood of Israel taking unilateral military action against Iran. That omission is absurd, considering the military analysis available which indicates that it is likely that Israel will lack sufficient conventional capability to avoid employing tactical nuclear bombs, missiles and/or rockets.

It's similarly interesting that Clarke/Simon fail to inform readers that the U.S. would, in the event of not attacking Iran directly, be obligated to support Israel's potential attack on Iran based on existing defense treaty obligations in the event that Iran were to retaliate against Israel.

[Movie Guy]

DevsAd,

I didn't even vote for President Bush. You have missed the point from the beginning.

I simply provided what I believe are the U.S. strategies for the Middle East, Central and South Asia, and Iran. And I addressed what I believe are the U.S. concerns that Isreal may, with increasing likelihood, take unilateral military action on Iran. I didn't provide a lengthy overview to the Strategies posts and say that I thought the U.S. should attack Iran. Instead, in a few posts I said that I thought the U.S. would take military action against Iran. I still believe that is a strong likelihood at this stage in the event that the G-8 and EU-3 diplomatic and technical nuclear capability negotiations with Iran fail to stop current Iran leadership plans to plus up centrifuge cascade operations with 3,000 centrifuges next year.

I make no apologies whatsoever for my military or civilian service to my nation. Your remarks on military service in general were pure trash. The U.S. military doesn't determine U.S. foreign policy. It falls in line with such policy.

If you believe that you can mount a national uprising to stop any potential U.S. military action against Iran, do get started because you are way behind the power curve on that project. At least four chess moves behind. If you and other people were successful with such a campaign, then you need to go international because your "don't touch Iran" campaign is not supported by many in the G-8, UN, and Israel. If you want to take a shortcut and concentrate your funding and efforts, I recommend that you use a passport to travel at the earliest opportunity to Israel. That nation is the best threat to attacking Iran, and attacking with tactical nuclear weapons.

From all indications, you do not have a good grasp of the U.S. strategies for the Middle East, Central and South Asia, and Iran. If you believe that you can quickly undo those national strategies which have been underway for five years, then you have much to learn besides economics. And you have not, to the best of my knowledge, answered the question raised on Saturday as to whether you are a student or a full fledged PhD in economics.

Your emotional outbursts and $1.19 for a Coke will not changed the ongoing national plans. It will take much more effort. Are you up to the task? If so, Walk the Talk.

[Movie Guy]

Yes, calmo, a treaty would be nice if both parties could be trusted to honor such a treaty. But you are talking about a treaty between two nations that have not had diplomatic relations since 1979 and not met formally one-on-one to discuss relations since that time. I wouldn't bet the farm on the treaty move. Iran, after all, has declared its intent for complete destruction of Israel, and is actively funding and training terrorists. That will not serve to support a treaty relationship between the U.S. and Iran.

I do not believe that Secretary Rumsfeld is the driving force on Iran. I have him sloted down in the fourth or fifth chair, at best.

I recommend that you view what is ongoing between the G-8, UN, EU-3, Israel, and Iran as a three dimensional chess game. Iran has no principal powerful supporters with its most recent moves, other than Russia.

The U.S. will never provide the current regime in Iran with nuclear anything... Iran is too far along with its underground centrifuge facilities construction projects and other underground facilities. Too big a threat with no indication that they would ever destroy those hardened facilities.

[Movie Guy]

Bruce Wilder,

You do not believe that the U.S., G-8, and EU-3 have the real facts on Iran's nuclear program potential and intent to pursue nuclear nonproliferation violations?

The IAEA found nuclear bomb design blueprints in a facility in Iran. And the satellite images of underground construction and finished hardened facilities are clear evidence of what is happening in Iran. Some of the facilities are using hardened structure designs used by Russia.

The news coverage and written news reports in the past week have only increased the concerns over Iran's nuclear proliferation program. With each successive technical step, Iran demonstrates the urgency of racing forward at breakneck speed.

[Winslow R.]

I've just finished 'one of those books' on the crusades...sad, but this thing will never end.

[Movie Guy]

Mark,

The Iran leadership is underestimating the resolve of the G-7 (G-8 excluding Russia), UN, Secretary Rice, President Bush, Israel, and other nations concerned about Iran's nuclear ambitions.

Iran's leadership is apparently incapable of fully recognizing the risk that they have undertaken. The adrenaline rush and emotional imbalance appear to have gone to their heads.

[Bruce Wilder]

Movie Guy, the Israelis almost certainly have vastly better intelligence on, and inside, Iran that the U.S., which has diddly squat, just as the U.S. had diddly squat on and inside Iraq. So, if the U.S. is actively planning an attack on Iran, they need Israeli intelligence and planning assistance, desperately. The step-up in Israeli mission planning is just a mirror and support of the U.S. effort, not an independent effort.

As you imply by your analysis, any Israeli action with a high likelyhood of success would require U.S. permission and, at least, passive support, and becomes, as a consequence, a U.S. action. There’s really no advantage to the U.S. of using Israel as a surrogate; and Israel is not in a position to act independently, as long as the U.S. is occupying Iraq and controlling Iraqi airspace.

Israel also has no independent motivation to act urgently on Iran’s nuclear capabilities. The apparent willingness of the U.S. to act is the only urgency factor, from an Israeli perspective. Destroying Iran’s nuclear capability is certainly a desiderata for Israel, but a capability, which will remain merely potential for 3 to 10 years, or more, is a very serious matter, but not an urgent matter, for Israel.

Independent Israeli action, in any sense, is just not a possibility, which needs to be considered. Ain't gonna happen.

What you are seeing evidence of, is, as I wrote, simply Israel cooperating with an urgent U.S. effort. For the U.S., the urgent factor is the deteriorating situation in Iraq, and the imminent need to draw down U.S. troops in Iraq. To the extent that the U.S. is forced to withdraw from Iraq, or even just forced to withdraw within Iraq – meaning withdraw from the streets to remote bases – Iranian influence will wax. Iran is in a remarkably good position to completely dominate Iraq and the Persian Gulf, within a few years, as a consequence of the Bush debacle in Iraq.

The potential of an Iranian nuclear capability is the impetus giving urgency to the U.S. effort. The Iranian nuclear capability is too remote and theoretical to be a cause of great urgency at this moment.

The U.S., to salvage the situation in Iraq, has to do something to significantly weaken Iran, so that Iran does not come to dominate the Persian Gulf. With a pro-Iranian government in Iraq, Iran has hegemony, unless it is very much weakened. So, something has to be done to weaken Iran, before the U.S. is forced out of Iraq. That is the source of urgency driving U.S. military planning, and by extension, Israeli planning in support of the U.S.

Attacking Iran looks to be a crazy, high-stakes gamble, which is very unlikely to be anything, but another catastrophe for the U.S.

[Bruce Wilder]

The Iranians saw what happened to Saddam's nuclear program, and have planned accordingly. And, the Iranians have literal mountains, under which to hide anything they want to hide.

I absolutely believe they have underground facilities. What I have seen zero evidence of, is that they have any nuclear capability, which requires urgent action. That's just B.S.

[Bruce Wilder]

Billmon provides a very good analysis of what may very well be Bush Administration "thinking" on Iran:

"For Bush, or the neocons, or both, regime change in Iran not only may appear doable, it may also look like the only way out of the spectacular mess they have created in Iraq.

"The logic is understandable, if malevolent. Instead of creating a secular, pro-American client state in the heart of the Middle East, the invasion of Iraq has destroyed the front-line Arab regime opposing Tehran, installed a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad and vastly increased Iranian influence, not only in Iraq, but throughout the Shi'a world. It's also moved the Revolutionary Guard one step closer to the Kuwaiti and Saudi oil fields – the prize upon which the energy security of the West depends.

"By the traditional standards of U.S. foreign policy, this is a fiasco of almost unbelievable proportions. More to the point, the neocons may believe that unless they can do something dramatic to recoup those losses, they won't be able to safely withdraw large numbers of troops from Iraq, since they are A.) the only remaining source of U.S. influence in the country and B.) the only shield against Iranian infiltration of both Iraq and the Shi'a majority regions of Saudia Arabia and the Gulf emirates. Yet the military need for such a draw down becomes more critical with each passing day, as the all-volunteer Army is stretched towards its breaking point.

"In other words, the administration, and the Pentagon, have gotten themselves into one hell of a jam – militarily, strategically and politically. As desperate and reckless as attempted regime change in Iran might seem to us, to the Cheneyites it may look like the only move left on the board.

"Hersh suggests the neocons have convinced themselves that an air campaign against Iran would quickly lead to a popular rebellion and the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. Perhaps this is so, at least for the gullible and the ignorant among them (such as Bush.) Drowning men, after all, will clutch at straws.

"But my suspicion is that at least some of the civilian war planners see events playing out very differently. They understand that air strikes would lead very quickly to a wider war, which in turn would make it politically feasible to launch a full-scale invasion of Iran."

Source of above quote:
http://billmon.org/archives/002390.html

[calmo]

Thanks for those posts MG and Bruce.
I have nothing to add (such is my depression) except that I think the information we have is mostly what the military want us to see.
So the chess board, to use Movie's analogy, is not a matter of complexity so much as duplicity. To lay out my doubts more clearly, consider those many satellite links that Movie provided exhibiting the stunning accuracy of this surveillance. But the records of this surveillance is classified, open to modification and can be manipulated to reinforce political agenda.
The actual reporters on the ground (Scott Ritter et al) who can present an unscrubbed report are few and so far, easily discounted by mainstream media who have a vested interest in the current administration and that agenda.
The avowed statements of Iran to wipe Israel off the face of the map are not much different than the Cold War US/Russia statements AND nuclear proliferation within their boundaries to back it up, no? [It's just that we just don't trust W as much as Krushev, no?]
We must be consistent even if we must acknowledge our insulation from the facts, our pre-ordained ignorance.

[Movie Guy]

Bruce Wilder -- "The step-up in Israeli mission planning is just a mirror and support of the U.S. effort, not an independent effort."

Disagree. The opposite is the case based on all indications. Israel has a Plan C, beyond the U.S. Plan B. Go alone as required.

Bruce Wilder -- "As you imply by your analysis, any Israeli action with a high likelyhood of success would require U.S. permission and, at least, passive support, and becomes, as a consequence, a U.S. action. There’s really no advantage to the U.S. of using Israel as a surrogate; and Israel is not in a position to act independently, as long as the U.S. is occupying Iraq and controlling Iraqi airspace."

Yes, I agree with passive support, and subsequent direct support if Iran launches missiles on Israel or U.S. locations in Iraq, or any other Middle East territories, by the way.

There is a perfect advantage is passively supporting an action by Israel. President Bush could readily bypass the normal full support of the Congress in responding to treaty support for Israel. He would go operational in a minute. The U.S. Air Force tankers have operational orders to be fully deployed to close in a theater within 96 hours maximum. Everything else would probably already be "nearby" or on the ground, other than some B-52s sitting off the coast of Spain. B-2s might already be at any of the three isolated U.S. combat air bases in Iraq. Maybe. Maybe not. Same for some F-22s. And whatever else in the inventory.

Bruce Wilder -- "Independent Israeli action, in any sense, is just not a possibility, which needs to be considered. Ain't gonna happen."

I believe you're thinking too much like an American. Israel could most assuredly act independently as long as the U.S. did not provide a blocking action. It's highly unlikely that the U.S. would interfere with an Israeli response once such was launched. The U.S. Israel lobby would go live wire in a minute, reining in D.C. support or noninterference all over town.

Bruce Wilder -- "What you are seeing evidence of, is, as I wrote, simply Israel cooperating with an urgent U.S. effort."

Baloney. You have this backwards by a ratio of 60-40% in my opinion. You're thinking like an American. Bad thing to do in this case.

Bruce Wilder -- "For the U.S., the urgent factor is the deteriorating situation in Iraq, and the imminent need to draw down U.S. troops in Iraq."

The situation is not deteriorating rapidly. I read email traffic out of Iraq almost every week. That's not the back channel unclassified info I am reading from boots on the ground. They're not hyping, rather just laying out what is and isn't happening at various unit levels. No panic. No "imminent need" junk, either.

Bruce Wilder -- "For the U.S., the urgent factor is the deteriorating situation in Iraq, and the imminent need to draw down U.S. troops in Iraq."

Political need, perhaps. But that's all. There is no imminent need to conduct a drawdown. Only enough to support Nov 06 political results.

Bruce Wilder -- "To the extent that the U.S. is forced to withdraw from Iraq, or even just forced to withdraw within Iraq – meaning withdraw from the streets to remote bases – Iranian influence will wax. Iran is in a remarkably good position to completely dominate Iraq and the Persian Gulf, within a few years, as a consequence of the Bush debacle in Iraq."

The U.S. probably should pull more troops back to isolated posts and bases. That's would be an intelligent supporting role to play as the Iraq government forms up and takes over, if the U.S. and Allies continue to provide increased levels of training and logistical support.

Iran is not in a good position to completely dominate Iraq and the Persian Gulf in a few years. That's hardly the case. Iran is on the verge of being driven back to the Stone Age in a few geographic locations. And if that message doesn't take, it will probably happen on a broader scale. Again and again until the message takes hold. Israel and the U.S. (depending on administrations over the next two subsequent terms) will never allow Iran to dominate the Persian Gulf. And there's no way in the world that the U.S. Navy will allow ANY military force to dominate the Persian Gulf or shipping lanes. It will not happen.

Bruce Wilder -- "The potential of an Iranian nuclear capability is the impetus giving urgency to the U.S. effort. The Iranian nuclear capability is too remote and theoretical to be a cause of great urgency at this moment."

Yes and no. The U.S. has moved on to formally call for regime change, reason number 2 (which is really goal number 1).

Your thinking that Iran's nuclear capability is "too remote and theoretical to be a cause of great urgency at this moment" is wishful daydreaming in my opinion. That's just too naive of a position to take based on available indications, including the full range of expressed G-7 (G-8 less Russia), EU-3, UN, and Israeli serious concerns. Your scenario does not fit the reality of what we are observing. The concerns are quite serious.

Bruce Wilder -- "The U.S., to salvage the situation in Iraq, has to do something to significantly weaken Iran, so that Iran does not come to dominate the Persian Gulf. With a pro-Iranian government in Iraq, Iran has hegemony, unless it is very much weakened. So, something has to be done to weaken Iran, before the U.S. is forced out of Iraq. That is the source of urgency driving U.S. military planning, and by extension, Israeli planning in support of the U.S."

The U.S. is under no threat to be forced out of Iraq. If anything, the U.S. will logically conduct a drawdown and related pullbacks to allow the new government, once functioning, room to exercise it's authority and grow from the puppy or young dog stage. It's a logical progression.

The pending urgency over Iran's nuclear proliferation efforts is one of two main issues for which the U.S. has expressed considerable public concerns. The other principal concern has to do with the latest reorganization in Iran whereby the Revolutionary Guards, one of six principal support groups for the high cleric, are purging the government positions of the Iranian national government. As a result, it is realized that Iran is becoming an increasing cause for concern in all matters related to the Middle East democratic initiatives and other concerns, including the free flow of crude oil past the Strait of Hormuz and spot market pricing of crude oil.

Your position that Israel, by extension, is involved in planning in support of the U.S. problems associated with being "forced out of Iraq" is quite a stretch of the imagination in my view. Israel is actually very concerned about Iran. Period.

[Movie Guy]

Bruce Wilder -- "...the Iranians have literal mountains, under which to hide anything they want to hide."

Not for long.

Bruce Wilder -- "I absolutely believe they have underground facilities. What I have seen zero evidence of, is that they have any nuclear capability, which requires urgent action. That's just B.S."

How much do you know about centrifuges and cascading?

Iran officials have already mastered the fundamentals, and they made another jump in technical understanding as announced this past week. As predicted to occur this spring by Israeli scientists. Iran officials, moreover, stated that they will step up to 3,000 centrifuges in 2007. It has been stated that Iran could have enough enriched uranium to produce a nuclear bomb 271 days later. And this analysis is based solely on 3,000 centrifuges operating in cascades. If the calculations are even close by a year (add one year to 271 days) , that shortens the window of expectation considerably. The notion that Iran is 8 to 10 years away from having nuclear bombs is pure nonsense in my judgment.

It also may be the case that Iran has uranium enrichment facilities other than the Natanz Complex. That matter has been discussed actively in recent months, though no public information appears to have been released. At least I haven't found such info thus far. I have called a few people I know who aren't jumping at the opportunity to speak up, so I don't know the bottom line on other available facilities. If I did know and it wasn't public info, I would not say so here.

If Iran can be producing nuclear bombs by the end of 2007 or 2008, then they're ahead of schedule in terms of what was anticipated by some observer scientific groups during the past few years. One organization believed previously that they could go nuke bomb by 2009 if Iran solved certain technical problems with uranium enrichment. Well, Iran appears to resolving the technical problems fairly quickly. There should little expectation that Iran is going to operate a casual 9AM to 3PM operation with its sole or multiple (if others exist) uranium enrichment facilities. They will go full force. These guys are nuts. Totally nuts.

[Movie Guy]

calmo -- "To lay out my doubts more clearly, consider those many satellite links that Movie provided exhibiting the stunning accuracy of this surveillance. But the records of this surveillance is classified, open to modification and can be manipulated to reinforce political agenda."

If you check the web site that posted the satellite images, there is some information that indicates that some of the satellite images were purchased from a civilian satellite source at considerable cost I believe. Granted, that doesn't mean that someone couldn't have modified them, but the Iran government has not disputed the satellite images (to my knowledge), some of which have been shown on CNN television news during the past week.

[Movie Guy]

Good exchanges, Calmo and Bruce Wilder.

Worthwhile. Thanks.

[hj]

Is "Movie Guy" a Zionist warmonger? He smells like one to me.

says...

Anti-Semitism is horrid and horrifying. Stop making anti-Semitic remarks for the sake of your own sanity.

says...

Anti-Semitism as all racism will destroy your sanity. I would suggest immediate psychological help.

[ilsm]

Movie Guy,

"The U.S. Air Force tankers have operational orders to be fully deployed to close in a theater within 96 hours maximum. Everything else would probably already be "nearby" or on the ground, other than some B-52s sitting off the coast of Spain. B-2s might already be at any of the three isolated U.S. combat air bases in Iraq. Maybe. Maybe not. Same for some F-22s. And whatever else in the inventory."

Is there a 10000 foot long aircraft carrier patrolling off the coast of Spain?

Or are those 8 engine B-52's on Gibraltar?

And what is the treaty with Israel? Has the Senate ratified one that says we help them execute a forward defense, preemptive strike?

I am sure Tom Clkancy sees the 10000 foot carrier option.

[anne]

Language is a fierce weapon, words creating reality as they are ferociously set down. Leaving Iraq becomes "cutting and running," and we are not capable of cutting and running even when we have fought a needless war against a government or country that was no threat to us, even when we occupied a country that needed no occupation and presided over tragedy on tragedy. But, of course, leaving Iraq would be "cutting and running" and that is psychologically impossible. So, beyond the command to remain in Iraq by the President, analysts assure we must stay in Iraq by telling us that leaving is "cutting and running."

[ilsm]

These guys make a career of "cutting and running" from their honor for their career facing Bush and Rumsfeld's lies.

[groucho]

What's Our Next Move?

The WH is under tremendous pressure. When your back is against the wall, you tend to lash out and make irrational decisions. A terrorist "incident" is needed quickly by the WH to galvanize support.
I am pretty certain an Iranian backed "terrorist attack" will be forthcoming within the next 3-6 months.

[save_the_rustbelt]

De Borchgrave, hardly a liberal, has a rather strong column outlining our failure in Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.

His scenario is hardly reassuring, but then the Bush administration is hardly reassuring.

[save_the_rustbelt]

My computer is going insane (damn you Bill Gates).

Try
http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20060416-103032-8779r.htm

[calmo]

groucho has my ear with a very plausible suggestion and against which we have few resources to counter the authenticity of such a staging. Timing is everything, someone here reported and I think that is why Iran comes up now, not 6 months ago and not just before elections. It is the poll position, isn't it?
Of course, anne's heart is in the right place and men are suffering hugely from an inferiority complex that denies this (and any other reality that deviates from 'Cut and Run' vs 'Stay the Course').
At our peril.

[Movie Guy]

rust,

de Borchgrave's article is pretty good.

[Movie Guy]

ilsm,

I believe that enough pieces of the strategy puzzle are laying on the table.

It is my hope that individuals monitor news reports to fill in the blanks if they want to keep abreast of the possibilities associated with Iran's nuclear program developments.

[ilsm]

Movie Guy,

I read Washington Times once in a while as well.

[Richard]

At one time I almost married a woman who is Muslim. For various cultural and religious reasons, this means I would have chosen to convert to Islam. Now mind you, this was before the days of 9/11, so I'd like to think that my reading and thinking about Sunni and Shia were done in a day and an era a bit more balanced than what prevails today.

So based upon cultural and religious claims alone, I'll throw out a few predictions:

1) Bush will bomb Iran, either late summer this year or sometime just after the election. And its not the nukes or any other such thing which will drive him to do it. The man is a dry drunk and in a tight spot politically, and he will do what dry drunks have always done. He will lash out at others.

2) There are multiple min-max games going on here, between Iran and Isreal, Isreal and the U.S., the U.S. and Iran. Each once to provoke the Other into going Over The Top so that they can each justify their own coming actions. Iran is provoking FOR a bombing as much as the U.S. is provoking FOR Iranian excess. The Isrealis have their own domestic uncertainties (Likud is out, Labor is in) and I'm not sure the Isrealis themselves know what they will do.

3) My one real contribution here: Shia is 10% of the world's Muslim population, and is mostly concentrated in Iran and Iraq. Shia Islam is, IMNSHO, MUCH more paranoid than Sunni. Much of the insecurity in Iran is not just due to the actions of the U.S. in the past (remember the Shah), but also the historic anxiety between Shia and Sunni. Much of Iraq was bankrolled by the Arab states during the Iran-Iraq war. For Iran, getting nuclear weapons is more about security than becoming a threat to Isreal, again IMNSHO.

4) Much has been spoken about military interventions, how it might go operational, what kind of use of force might be used. But it is important not to get caught up in the fetish of technique: the ultimate goal of policy is always economic and political ends and not the use of force per se. The naive use of force tends to be counterproductive in the extreme, since the force is expensive (in lives and material) and often tends to strengthen the adversary and create dissent for the exercisor of force.

Bush will bomb. And when he does, it will be an act of extraordinary foolishness. It will alienate allies in a throughgoing fashion and it will alienate neutral and non-aligned countries dramatically away from us. Iran is three times the population of Iraq and four times the land area, and bombing Iran threatens to be a fiasco larger than Vietnam and Iraq combined.

[Lee A. Arnold]

The soundest policy would be to let the U.N. blabber on with Mr Ahmadinejad, see if it can take a stand on his nuclear proliferation, then get all the major allies on board and in full participation in a military activity; then, and only then!, make an ultimatum—which must not include the use of nuclear weapons by the West.

But if Iran wants to be a nuclear power, then it will be one someday no matter what happens. So I think the West should avoid bombing Iran pre-emptively in case diplomacy fails. Bombing won’t change anything for the better, and it will kill tens or hundreds of thousands of innocents, create an humanitarian disaster that will rival several of the worse ones, and hasten a unified jihad where none, thank goodness, has yet arisen.

So if diplomacy fails—if Iran proceeds on its nuclear path—the West should not attack, but move immediately to a comprehensive Cold-War-type containment and deterrence of Iran, and plan for a long-term MANAGEMENT of the situation. The region will then have a Shiite Iran-and-Iraq in contention with their Sunni neighbors, and plenty of opportunities for diplomacy and learning by everyone. Indeed, if the Iranians gain a little pride by becoming a nuclear power, they may start to turn-around their psychology on more important matters, as all other nuclear publics in the world have done, and begin to think about how to get to a world in which everybody can survive, and begin that reformation of political Islam which we all hope for.

The idea that Iran is a bunch of crazies is itself crazy. Ahmadinejad is yanking our chains much as Mr Chavez is, down in Venezuela banging on the table in front of a television camera, and we shouldn’t fall for it. We should strongly resist those in the United States who suggest that Iran is some type of new “total suicide” country that will risk it all, by firing a rocket at Israel. The evidence of recent history is the reverse—they are very practical.

And it is unlikely they are expansionist. Going much beyond southern Iraq, if they make it that far, will put them into conflict with Sunni Arab states, causing an Islamic-internecine conflict that may redound to Western advantage. Some threatened Sunni states may acquiesce to basing Western troops and/or granting airspace.

Present U.S. policy is, however, asking the Iranians to act like cowards, from their point of view. We cannot suppose that much good will issue from this. Nor will it relieve our management of the situation. Their most rational response would then be to lie, and try to get the nukes anyway.

If Iran gets the bomb, we need strong deterrence and containment after that, promising to ensure their annihilation if they lob a rocket at anyone, while making overtures of peace. And then if the Mullahs do not modify their exertions, I think all those Iranians dissatisfied with their government, seeing that they have become pariahs in the eyes of outsiders who would prefer peace, will have a much stronger impetus to change that government. It may be the crisis which begins to change Islam. But there can be no concurrent exterior agitation, if you are to show your leaders the door. The Bush Administration in fact made it harder for Mr Khatami as well as the NGO reform groups by its rhetorical posturings. Certainly the Iranians will have a much greater opportunity to change their government, than if the West follows through on its threat to bomb them beforehand, kills lots of people, and makes the place unliveable.

[Bruce Wilder]

MG: "These guys are nuts. Totally nuts."

Richard: "Bush will bomb Iran, either late summer this year or sometime just after the election. And its not the nukes or any other such thing which will drive him to do it. The man is a dry drunk and in a tight spot politically, and he will do what dry drunks have always done. He will lash out at others. . . . Bush will bomb. And when he does, it will be an act of extraordinary foolishness."

Just to add to the catalogue of the insane, check out this article in the American Prospect, on Cheney's staff:
http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId=11401

I've lost track of it, but a few weeks ago I read something on-line about how humans sometimes have a hard time recognizing their own deficiencies. I know I have no ability to play a musical instrument, but can appreciate that there are others, who can play beautifully, but, in other areas, my discernment may be more limited. Almost everyone tends to think his own sense of humor is above average, but only some people are actually good at identifying what most people will find funny.

Foreign relations, which, in some respects, is just human relations writ large, may be more like humor than, say, musical skill or the ability to draw. We all have personal strategies for dealing with others, and tend to believe our personal strategies work well. Some are bullies, others use empathy, and so on. It may be really hard for most people to readily recognize a superior strategy or policy.

I am not sure what "dry drunk" means. Years ago, I had a close friend, who was clearly a potential alcoholic. He had a car accident, which temporarily scared him into relative sobriety. During that period, I had dinner with him, and was enjoying one of the most intimate conversations I had ever had with him. For me, the intimacy was intensely pleasurable, and not something I was accustomed to, in my relationship with him. Near the close of the evening he made a remark to me, concerning how painful the conversation had been for him, without alcohol. It was a moment of surprising insight for me, into how different subjective experience can be, and how that hidden difference may shape behavior. I thought about that incident, when I read the phrase "dry drunk".

With George W. Bush, I do not fear the dry drunk syndrome as much as I fear the consequences of a "C" student being put in charge of contending bands of experts and ideologues. Social hostility will play its part, of course, but I fear that his mind has never been prepared to make the fine distinctions, ask questions or discern better from worse, in matters of policy. Would Bush even recognize the name, Thomas Schelling?

Does a Cheney or Rumsfeld ever consider the possibility that his own judgement might not be the best? That seems unlikely to me, from the impression given by their public personas. And, is Bush at all equipped to lead them, or discriminate among the policy proposals they make?

I do not see any reason to believe that Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, or the various Iranian leaders, are actually "nuts" in a psychiatric sense. But, I still wonder about the quality of their judgement, and the quality of their meta-judgement, and what anyone, outside their circles, can do about it. If Bush does not already know that the course he has chosen is unwise, and lacks the ability to discriminate between wise and unwise strategies reliably, what can be said that might persuade him in a wiser direction?

[hj]

>

Fact: warmongers exist.

Fact: Zionists exist.

Fact: sometimes one person is both: Wolfowitz comes to mind or Perle.

Is asking if a person is like Wolfowitz or Perle "anti-Semitic"? Or is "anti-Semitic" just a "please shut up" remark?

[Lee A. Arnold]

hj, I don't happen to agree with the tactics of Messrs. Wolfowitz and Perle, but neither one is a "Zionist warmonger." They want to protect Israel, as an ally of the United States.

And if you read Movie Guy's comments above, they compose a very sharp and clear-minded analysis of the strategic and tactical situation, without, in fact, any statement of his personal preferences, which, I can assure you from reams of his other comments throughout these various threads, are honorable. And that is what we want to read.

[Richard]

When I characterized Bush as a "dry drunk", I was being descriptive, not pejorative. There's a certain kind of person who drinks so as to be able to lose control and have an excuse for being belligerent. Dry drunks are those who no longer drink but still retain their fondness for belligerence.

I'm less concerned with his mediocrity in school. I do expect a leader to have some sense of subtlety and humility, an understanding of both his personal limitations and the limitations of his office. I believe that George Jr. lacks both, and it was this lack of self-knowledge that I was trying to get at by refering to him as a dry drunk.

[Movie Guy]

Lee A. Arnold,

Thanks.

The original U.S. strategies for the Middle East and Iran posts were provided under Paul Krugman: Yes He Would - April 10, 2006

I have added the U.S. strategies for the Middle East and Iran posts to the end of the shorter and older comment thread under The U.S. Considers Using Nukes Against Iran - April 08, 2006

The posts are easier to find at the bottom of the thread.

[Movie Guy]

Here's my summary of hot actions at the moment.

I have left out a few issues in play, but I decided to stick with the orginal strategy post considerations for purposes of discussion.

More details for elements listed below are available at the bottom of this thread, The U.S. Considers Using Nukes Against Iran - April 08, 2006 or in the middle of this thread, Paul Krugman: Yes He Would - April 10, 2006

SUMMARY STATUS:

The Bush Administration - Middle East Strategy: 2000-2008

Overriding master priorities since February 2001:

1. Nuclear Nonproliferation
2. Iran - long term strategy required

Priorities: [HOT status - bold print]

1. Nuclear Nonproliferation
2. Energy
3. Terrorism
4. Iraq - needed to support Plan B strategy for Iran
Iran
6. South and Central Asia - Pakistan
7. South and Central Asia - India
8. Afghanistan
9. North Africa - Libya
10. Middle East Democratic Initiatives
11. OPEC

The Bush Administration - Middle East Strategy: IRAN 2000-2008

Plan A Strategy Priorities:

A1. Iran National Government
A2. Iran Democratic Initiatives
A3. Iran Nuclear Weapons Program Capability
A4. Energy
A5. Reestablishment of Diplomatic Relations

Plan B Strategy Priorities: [HOT status - bold print]

B1. Iran Nuclear Weapons Program Capability - Plan B - Drives priorities B2-B12
B2. Afghanistan - done
B3. Pakistan - done
B4. India - done
B5. Iraq - done
B6. Israel - holding action requested; don't go unilateral.
B7. NATO Missions in the Middle East - in place
B8. Russia - done
B9. China - done
B10. Iran Democratic Initiatives - Plan B
B11. Energy - Plan A/B
B12. Iran National Government - Plan B
B13. Reestablishment of Diplomatic Relations - Plan B
B14. Eliminate Terrorist Threats from Iran - Plan B

[Movie Guy]

To avoid yelling over my above comments, particularly about Iraq, I will go ahead and provide some level of detail here. But to review the U.S. Government link sources under each header, one will have to go to the other threads.

The Bush Administration - Middle East Strategy: 2000-2008

Priorities

1. Nuclear Nonproliferation - Improve U.S., G-8, Near Asia (Middle East), South and Central Asia, Far East, and all other Independent States programs and initiatives directed at reducing and eliminating global concerns regarding nuclear nonproliferation.
2. Energy - Stabilize and advance the availability of global crude oil and natural gas supply access to Western powers and other powers as deemed appropriate.
3. Terrorism - Coordinate programs and actions which will reduce the power threat represented by terrorist and dissident activity groups throughout the Middle East and World. Engage METO (U.S. and M.E. Strategic Partners - the equivalent of NATO) to actively move forward in addressing anti-terrorism initiatives while concurrently promoting phase one of METO democratic initiatives.
4. Iraq - Remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq in support of requests by or on behalf of Israel, Gulf Cooperation Council nations (5 nations), Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. All are nations that the United States support with defense treaties and military cooperation agreements, including weapons systems, other equipment, and various forms of government funding. In essence, this is 'NATO Middle East alliance' or METO.
5. Iran - Support the replacement of the government of Iran with a moderate pro-West government; eliminate the threat of nuclear weaponry capability and finished nuclear weapons from falling in the hands of radical Islamic groups in Iran and elsewhere.
6. South and Central Asia - Pakistan - Stabilize and promote pro-West relations with Pakistan.
7. South and Central Asia - India - Stabilize and promote pro-West relations with India.
8. Afghanistan - Remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. Reduce the presence of AQ and strip bin Laden of his capability to further threaten pro-West interests and initiatives of Middle East nations in METO (U.S. and M.E. Strategic Partners - the equivalent of NATO). Further, establish a presence in Afghanistan to accomplish four principal goals related to Russia, China, Pakistan, and Iran.
9. North Africa - Libya - Reestablish pro-West relations with Libya. Secure U.S. oil leases in Libya, dormant and unavailable at the beginning of 2000; under seizure threat by Kadafi.
10. Middle East Democratic Initiatives - Promote democratic initiatives including voting rights, women's rights, and educational reforms throughout the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.
11. OPEC - Reduce the level of global crude oil market influence of key disruptive OPEC nation members. Undertake this initiative in such a manner as to not disrupt the viability of METO relations. Establish new oil supply relationship with Russia and other previously untapped sources of crude oil and natural gas supply.

The Bush Administration - Middle East Strategy: IRAN 2000-2008

Plan A Priorities:

A1. Iran National Government - Plan A - Support the freely elected replacement the radical government of Iran with a moderate pro-West government; eliminate the threat of nuclear weaponry capability and finished nuclear weapons from falling in the hands of radical Islamic groups in Iran and elsewhere.
A2. Iran Democratic Initiatives - Plan A - Promote democratic initiatives among Middle East nations with the hope that such initiatives will also be adopted by Iran.
A3. Iran Nuclear Weapons Program Capability - Plan A - Eliminate the threat of nuclear weaponry capability and finished nuclear weapons.
A4. Energy - Plan A - Reduce the potential disruptive influence of Iran over global crude oil spot markets, Caspian Sea extractions and delivery; and Strait of Hormuz transportation movements.
A5. Reestablishment of Diplomatic Relations - Plan A - No meetings since 1979; one pending meeting regarding Iraq requested by Iran.

Plan B Priorities:

B1. Iran Nuclear Weapons Program Capability - Plan B: Attempt to eliminate the threat of nuclear weaponry capability and finished nuclear weapons through G-8, IAEA, and U.N. negotiations. As necessary, the U.S., NATO, and Israeli military options remain available
B2. Afghanistan: Provide a base of military operations for future requirements.
B3. Pakistan: Stabilize pro-West relations with Pakistan.
B4. India: U.S.-India relations are sound. India-Pakistan conflict reduced to minimal level. U.S.-India commercial trade expanded over the last 5 years. Nuclear Cooperation agreement reached.
B5. Iraq: Establish U.S./NATO military operations capability for external or inbound support operations. Status: Three major combat theater air bases were constructed in remote desert locations, fully protected from ground and air assault; 100% accomplished.
B6. Israel: The goal is insure that Israel does not act unilaterally in addressing the Iran regime problem, and the problem with Iran's nuclear nonproliferation noncompliance with G-8, IAEA, and UN requirements.
B7. NATO Missions in the Middle East
B8. Russia: Seek the support of Russia in avoiding actions directed at supporting Iranian national government initiatives related to nuclear proliferation and military ambitions.
B9. China: Seek the support of China in avoiding actions directed at supporting Iranian national government initiatives related to nuclear proliferation and military ambitions.
B10. Iran Democratic Initiatives - Plan B: Promote democratic initiatives among Middle East nations with the hope that such initiatives will also be adopted by Iran.
B11. Energy - Plan B: Reduce the potential disruptive influence of Iran over global crude oil spot markets, Caspian Sea extractions and delivery; and Strait of Hormus transportation movements.
B12. Iran National Government - Plan B: Seek Regime Replacement.
B13. Reestablishment of Diplomatic Relations - Plan B: No meetings since 1979; one pending meeting regarding Iraq requested by Iran.
B14. Eliminate Terrorist Threats from Iran - Plan B: Once a regime change occurs, potential progress can be accomplished.

says...

Though we can have no idea what "hj" is referring to, for the remarks are only intended to be anti-Semitic, we know how evil such comments are. As was remarked above, a psychologist or psychiatrist is called for "hj."

[Movie Guy]

Mark - can you fix the tech error that I made in the post at Apr 17, 2006 1:47:27 PM?

I have a problem with:

Iran

Should read:

5. Iran

You will see what I did wrong in the original html formatting.

Bill

[ilsm]

Movie Guy,

Help.

I googled METO and did not find any treay organization.

Is that something that we should not know about? Does the senate ratify secret treaties?

[hj]

To Nobody (there is no name on the post) who smears me as an "anti-Semite": what I find interesting about the Iraq war is that one can say it is a disaster, a evil thing, a stupid move, and a strategic catastrophe, or worse, and one can finger Rummy, and Bush, and the Pentagon as the guilty authors, and no one minds in the least, but if one ever dares to violate the "never criticize Israel" tabu and fingers the Israel Lobby and the Zionists as sharing in the blame---even though their prints are all over it---the screeching and screaming and smearing begins. Mearsheimer and Walt were right as right can be about the kind of intellectual blackmail used by the Lobby on Americans who dare tell the truth about it.
The idea that Wolfowitz wanted to "protect" Israel is debatable. You might recall that Hitler said he invaded Czechoslovakia to protect the Suedeten Germans.

[ilsm]

Movie Guy,

This is probably pretty "black": Status: Three major combat theater air bases were constructed in remote desert locations, fully protected from ground and air assault; 100% accomplished.

How do you get the fuel in there? How about 3 gallons potable water per day per troop? Beans? Bullets?

A fighter burns 1000 gal (5600 lbs) fuel per sortie. Needs X hours maintenance, Y pounds of spare parts and Z pounds of ordnance.

Need large commo apparatus.

Need large defensive force, have to clear or at least reach out 8 miles. Got troops, arty, helos and Strykers for that too?

Putting patriot there, are you buying life insurance for our guys returning from their missions?

What is the cost of setting up the bases? What is the cost of deploying and sustaining ops? What is the potential value of whatever this expensive logistical nightmare may yield?

What are the risks that what you planned is not going to go your way?

How do you evacuate these things?

Always the most expensive method to achieve something which may not be doable, nor worthwhile once you get into the real unanticipated, paid schilling ignored parts of the operations.

[hj]

Of interest:

http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060501/alterman

says...

Learn the difference between fair criticism and anti-Semitic name calling and argue on. The posts before were just anti-Semitic, which is evil.

[Movie Guy]

ilsm,

I created the term, METO, and provided a supporting explanation for what it means when I constructed the U.S. strategies posts.

You will find the information among the last five comment posts at The U.S. Considers Using Nukes Against Iran - April 08, 2006 (or in the middle of this thread, Paul Krugman: Yes He Would - April 10, 2006).

See this comment post: The Bush Administration - Middle East Strategy: 2000-2008, fifth post from the bottom of the thread (Apr 17, 2006 1:19:32 PM)

Note METO statements and explanations under:

3. Terrorism

4. Iraq

8. Afghanistan

[Movie Guy]

ilsm,

The three combat theater air bases are already constructed, manned, and in use.

One of the prinicipal leaders from Iran today said that the Persian Gulf would not allow the U.S. to use its air bases in attacking Iran. Sounds like they still don't get it.

The U.S. is fully prepared for various contingencies if military action is required to deter Iran from pursuing nuclear weaponry program initiatives.

[Movie Guy]

That should read Persian Gulf nations.

[ilsm]

In SEA, 1965 to 1976, we had air bases ringing N Vietnam. Each had better logistic lines than the desert places you infer.

Far better logistics situation. Additionally, four main air bases in Thailand, four USAF, One Marine Air Wing, and all kinds of rotor aviation in S Vietnam (evacuated in 1973).

There were several aircraft carrier in the Tonkin serving up about as many sorties as an AF ground attack squadron.

The B-52's flew in from Guam as well as another location in large numbers and well within range.

Support was available in several other nations on the periphery.

We bombed til we dropped.

The result was predicted in the US WW II Bombing Campaign Study.

Boots on the ground is all that works.

Iraq containment bombing did not work.

Israeli attack on Osiris reactor in Iraq may have ended Saddam's nuke program or maybe they were no where near the supposed threat.

Possibly Iran war and US support against Iran kept Osiris down, maybe Iraq just was not getting anywhere.

Looking at the A- Bombs in Japan, maybe got Hirohito's attention, but Tojo and the war party were out by then and Hirohito had no one encouaging his Samurai nature.

He was emperor not Shogun.

Bombs do not work.

This Bush warfare is not like any war we have had so far. You are using the military arm far too soon.

With far too little logistics and no plan for what to do with the kettle once we turn it over.

[Movie Guy]

ilsm,

You can argue with what appears to be a future military strategy and action, but I recommend that you click on some of the map links that I provided in the strategies posts.

If an attack were to be launched on Iran from multiple directs with an air campaign, it's clear that the U.S. is well positioned from three of the four geographic sides of Iran. It couldn't be much better from a planning perspective. Two of the three available directions could be loaded heavily.

The notion that boots on the ground must be applied in the case of destroying Iran's primary nuclear facility complexes is not a position that I support. While there could very well be a need for special ops teams to roll into Iran on specific targets, there just would be no purpose to conduct a full land invasion. Not for the purposes of neutralizing the existing known level of nuclear facilities.

The idea that President Bush is supposedly using the military arm too soon is based on what premise? The U.S. or Israel forces haven't initiated a bombardment. The U.S., G-7, UN, and EU-3 are still in negotiations with Iran.

[ilsm]

Movie Guy,

Are you research to write one of those military adventure fiction novels?

The point I made on South East Asia is we had them surrounded we blasted hell out of them and we did not achieve our objectives, other than a lot of us got good careers and the contractors all grew and profited.

So, let's discourse with objectives, techniques or tactics, risks, and costs.

I would rather the lists you present be viewed as objectives of the Bush administration.

Let's not say Bush has a weird perspective or that his concerns are more for the 1 tenth of one precent of the population he represents and identifies with. Let's not say W sees the people as existing to support the government whatever he wants with it rather than government existing to provide good for the 99.9 -percent of the population he has no concern for.

That kind of stuff is for Dailykos and ilk.

Let's talk rational decision and costs and benefits. This is an economist's site.

1. Your Objective Iran Democratic Initiatives:

This objective may have good things for the US, and Iranians. But the how to achieve this objective and the cost of the how and the likely unintended consequences and the likelihood of achievement are not supported by military action. See the history of the nationalist wars in Indo China through 1990.

Military action usually effects the materiel side of broad human economy. I refer to Napolean 'the material is to the moral as 1 is to 3'. Military action to attempt this is potentially wasteful.

2. Your objective Iran Nuclear Weapons Program Capability:

This objective is related to non proliferation objectives. The benefits to the US oil interests of Iran not having nuclear weapons are obvious. But I would argue the theories of deterence and the history of the cold war may propose a contained nuclear capability in Iran. I also argue the forceable denial of Iran nuclear capabilities would have severe moral consequences which must be considered.

Further, the chances of aggression to deny nuclear capabilities failing or wasting our resources (materiel and moral) in the area and around the world are too large to ignore.

Using the min min and min max concepts I referred to recently, I see no support for a military solution to denying Iran a nuclear arms capability.

I bet you a quarter Israel has done the analysis.

3. Terrorism:

This is the classic Napoleonic issue of material versus moral strength. He had few issues with Prussian, Austrian or other occupied nation guerillas because his occupation replaced oligarchs and he had a pretty forceful way of dealing with the few royalists remaining.

Napoleon was a liberator in some aspects, despite the Austrian and British propaganda.

How can the US military respond to the moral? How do you take a midievil religion and bring its adherents into the first world?

Surely on going blasting hell out of Iraq and muffing the peace is not an example of our moral prowess.

You fight an enemy in the way they are not prepared.

Can Bush be sold as a liberator?

The more killing, bombing and occupying we do with the kind of fascists we seem to support and we lose the moral battle.

So, I can see a really neat novel here, three secret US air bases in the regional. A Patton like hard charger with two brigades on supported FCS units and supernatural command of the elements, logistics and technology; Tom Clancy would be proud.

[hj]

I guess Juan Cole is engaged in "anti-Semitic" name calling???

To wit:

http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fuj/salon5.htm

[Movie Guy]

ilsm,

I not convinced that you have read many of the links under each of the strategy elements of the strategies that I outlined which I believe are the U.S. strategies for the Middle East, Central and South Asia, and Iran.

ilsm - "1. Your Objective Iran Democratic Initiatives:

This objective may have good things for the US, and Iranians. But the how to achieve this objective and the cost of the how and the likely unintended consequences and the likelihood of achievement are not supported by military action."

It's not my objective. I stated that it is a U.S. strategy element for Iran.

I believe that you need to read the links.

ilsm - "2. Your objective Iran Nuclear Weapons Program Capability:

This objective is related to non proliferation objectives. The benefits to the US oil interests of Iran not having nuclear weapons are obvious. But I would argue the theories of deterence and the history of the cold war may propose a contained nuclear capability in Iran. I also argue the forceable denial of Iran nuclear capabilities would have severe moral consequences which must be considered."

"Further, the chances of aggression to deny nuclear capabilities failing or wasting our resources (materiel and moral) in the area and around the world are too large to ignore.

Using the min min and min max concepts I referred to recently, I see no support for a military solution to denying Iran a nuclear arms capability."

It's not my objective. I stated it is a U.S. strategy element for Iran.

I recommend that you forward your proposal to the Administration for consideration with a CC to the national government of Israel.

I do not expect that the Israeli government would support your concept to "propose a contained nuclear capability in Iran." The issue isn't civil nuclear power generation, but rather nuclear weaponry development which is Israel's big concern.

ilsm - "3. Terrorism:

...How can the US military respond to the moral? How do you take a midievil religion and bring its adherents into the first world? Surely on going blasting hell out of Iraq and muffing the peace is not an example of our moral prowess. ...The more killing, bombing and occupying we do with the kind of fascists we seem to support and we lose the moral battle."

I do not note an alternate course of action from you regarding how to deal with terrorist threats and actions. Secondly, there is no question that the collective response to terrorism and terrorists activities extend far beyond actions by the U.S. military. While many may scoff at U.S. GWOT initiatives and the program overall, there are some interesting details in that effort. I suggest that quite a bit has to do with denial of funds for terrorist organizations as well as the promotion of other efforts directed at education initiatives and economy improvements in key nations.

Summary:

In my judgment, you have not rebutted the U.S. strategies for the Middle East, Central and South Asia, and Iran in an effective manner.

If you believe that the strategies should be displaced with strategies, objectives, goals, initiatives, and actions that lead to other outcomes, then you can state such and lay out a national plan for the USA.

[ilsm]

Movie Guy,

It is all in the word "effective".

If you only know the hammer, you only know the effects it yields.

I judged your strategies you judged or missed mine.

Okay.

We have different views on tools.

I look to effects and efficiencies and suitabilities and risks.

My last comment: I noted earlier reference to airbases.

Any idea what it costs and what are the risks to running airlift dependent forward sites?

Do you know what it cost to sustain Khe Sahn? Do you know what it cost to invest Khe Sahn? Dien Bien Phu? The Athenians at Syracusa?

We have lots of resources, they should be used efficiently, meaning with some chance they the result justifies the expense.

A lot is possible to the US, much of it is not worth the cost, even though we are a rich indebted nation.

Let's start looking at costs, opportunity costs and relate cost to effects.

That is a paradigm we need to install in this war.