Tradeable Gas Rights

Martin Feldstein has a way to reduce gasoline consumption, tradeable gas rights:

Tradeable Gasoline Rights, by Martin Feldstein, Commentary, WSJ: The rapid rise in the price of gasoline has produced calls for tougher fuel economy standards on new cars and trucks. Although reduced gasoline consumption would be good for the environment and for national security, such a regulatory change would be a mistake. A far better approach would be a system of tradeable gasoline rights, or TGRs. These could be distributed in a way that actually raises the income of a majority of households while giving everyone an incentive to reduce gasoline consumption.

In a system of tradeable gasoline rights, the government would give each adult a TGR debit card. The gasoline pumps at service stations ... would be modified to read these new TGR debit cards... Buying a gallon of gasoline would require using up one tradeable gasoline right as well as paying money.

The government would decide how many gallons of gasoline should be consumed per year and would give out that total number of TGRs. In 2006, Americans will buy about 110 billion gallons of gasoline. To keep that total unchanged in 2007, the government would distribute 110 billion TGRs. To reduce total gasoline consumption by 5%, it would cut the number of TGRs to 104.5 billion.

The government could distribute TGRs to reflect geographic differences in driving patterns. ... Businesses that use trucks would also get TGRs.

A key feature of these gasoline rights is that they are tradeable. Individuals with more TGRs than they need could sell the excess, while those who want to use more gallons than their allocation would have to buy extra TGRs. The gasoline companies could act as clearing houses for these trades, using their gasoline pumps to sell TGRs in the same way that they sell gasoline or to buy TGRs in exchange for the cash needed to purchase gasoline. Other institutions like banks could also trade TGRs for cash. And individuals could of course buy and sell TGRs among themselves by letting others use their card.

The market price of a TGR would depend on the number of TGRs that the government distributed relative to the number of gallons that households would buy if there were no TGR system. The smaller the number of TGRs, the greater would be the price per TGR... The money price of gasoline would continue to reflect the world price of oil and the local cost of refining and distribution.

If the price of a TGR turned out to be 50 cents, an individual who buys an extra 20 gallons of gasoline would use up $10 worth of TGRs. If he avoids the purchase -- by driving less, driving at speeds that use less gas, or driving a more fuel-efficient car -- he could sell the 20 TGRs for $10.

The 50 cent price of the TGR would have the same incentive effect as a 50 cent gasoline tax. But while a gasoline tax lowers everyone's real income, the TGR system creates winners as well as losers. Someone who receives 800 TGRs for a year but only needs 500 would pocket $150 by selling his unwanted TGRs. But even such individuals would still face the right incentive: Every extra gallon consumed would reduce their net cash by 50 cents.

Advocates of a gasoline tax argue that it would produce extra revenue that could be used to reduce the budget deficit or to finance equally large cuts in personal taxes. ... [But] it is hard to believe that Congress would now respond to the public's unhappiness over high gasoline prices by enacting a gasoline tax that would raise the price even more.

That aversion to a higher gasoline tax is why tougher mileage standards for new cars is back on the legislative table. They would, however, do virtually nothing to lower the price of gasoline. And if individuals want to economize on gasoline by driving smaller or more fuel-efficient cars, they can do so now without government action. ...

Higher gas mileage standards would reduce gasoline demand in a very inefficient way by focusing exclusively on the rated mileage of new cars. Separate fuel efficiency standards for each type of vehicle -- one of the options now being considered -- would be even worse because it would provide no incentive to switch to more fuel-efficient cars.

Requiring higher mileage standards on new cars would do very little to reduce total gasoline consumption in the near term because each year's new cars are only about 10% of the total cars on the road. Unlike the system of TGRs that raises the effective cost per gallon, the new car standard would do nothing to change the behavior of owners of existing cars. But the TGR system would cause owners to economize on gasoline by driving fewer miles, driving at speeds that use less gasoline, using tires that improve miles per gallon, and servicing their engines to maintain fuel efficiency. And of course the higher effective cost of gasoline would also cause new car buyers to prefer more fuel-efficient vehicles.

In short, a system of tradeable gasoline rights would be better than either higher taxes or tougher new car regulations. That a majority of households could benefit from the TGR system while all households would have an increased incentive to economize on gasoline is both an economic and a political advantage. It would be an efficient way to reduce gasoline that Congress could actually pass.

Getting over my surprise at the Feldstein's call for government intervention in the marketplace, particularly for the government to set a national cap, I'm not fully convinced. Would the cap on gasoline usage be as easy to lift as the debt limit?

In addition, while this proposal does provide the correct incentive at the margin, I can envision an endless political fight over the allocation of credits. Should LA residents get more credits than NY or SF in the zero-sum allocation? Will cities or regions with more credits per person relative to average distance traveled see people moving in to take advantage of the chance to earn extra income? If I don't own a car, am I out of luck? Is it per person as in Feldstein's proposal, or will it be changed to per household? Do households with more kids get more coupons? Will rural residents get more credits? If so, how much more? Over time, will the credits per person be decided based upon political considerations rather than economics? This may well be better than other proposals in a lot of dimensions and I am not opposed to it, but unless I missed something on the allocation part, it doesn't seem so obvious that it would sail through congress. [Update: More at Brad Delong and Angry Bear]

Comments

[Tom DC/VA]

Feldstein's proposal can only appeal to economists with way, way too much time on their hands. Back in the real world, a gas tax is a much better policy. It's proven to reduce demand and is easy to collect because the gasoline distribution chain is well known. No, American voters won't go for it, but American voters won't go for a lot sensible things. Just look who is president.

[save_the_rustbelt]

Has WW II broken out again?

I'm glad someone has some original thoughts, but this is a little over the top.

[John Caddell]

I think it's a very interesting idea. Of course there'll be terrific fights over the allocations, etc., but there would be similar fights over the details of a larger gas tax or updated CAFE standards. It also avoids a full-on ideological battle by giving each side (Dem/Rep) something that they can support. I believe this concept has promise.

[bakho]

I agree with this prediction:

"Requiring higher mileage standards on new cars would do very little to reduce total gasoline consumption in the near term because each year's new cars are only about 10% of the total cars on the road."

This prediction needs a qualifier:

"tougher mileage standards for new cars is back on the legislative table. They would, however, do virtually nothing to lower the price of gasoline."

This is true only for a very short time frame.
In fact this is contradicted by EIA data that show the demand response to the 1970s round of CAFE stanadards and the price response to the decreased demand. Is there a lag between CAFE standards and reduced demand? You bet. Is the reduction real? Of course.

Why is it that we have efficiency standards for everything from airconditioners to toilets, but:

"Higher gas mileage standards would reduce gasoline demand in a very inefficient way".

Please. What is the basis of this statement? Help me out?

Whether or not gas coupons are a good idea, CAFE standards make sense.

[Liberal Chris]

the initial allocation is incredibly difficult. this same problem has been faced by pollution credit systems like the successful SOx trading program. Of course, that program has the advantage that there are only about 2000 significant sources of SOx emissions in the country (basically coal fired power plants).

Part of the reason we don't have a carbon trading system worldwide is because like the TGR the initial allocation problem is nearly overwhelming. And if you screw up the initial allocation, the program is kind of warped. For example, if you base initial credits on current gasoline consumption, you effectively punish those (whether businesses or citizens) who have already conserved. Why should someone living 45 miles from downtown be rewarded with more TGR than an in-city resident?

I humbly propose that the best way to allocate these credits would be per person. No age limit, nothing else. Businesses get no initial allocation whatsoever, they have to buy the credits from the citizens. This system is fair and simple. The minute you start allowing businesses an initial TGR allocation, the whole system falls apart. What if I start a new transportation company, do I get credits? How many? Just wait til you see all the sham companies getting credits and the lobbying involved.

[bakho]

Link to 2006 EIA is here:

http://www.eia.doe.gov/bookshelf/brochures/aeo2006/aeo2006.html

Scroll down.

IMHO, there is no one silver bullet but a need for a comprehensive energy policy similar to what happened back in the 1970s.

[anne]

There must be examples set. We should be careful about price adjustments that make conservation vouchers less useful than planned, even self-defeatingly less useful. Had vehicle efficiency standards been increased after 1985, we could be buying the General Motors "Prius" even in an SUV guise let alone as a reasonably sized car :)

[Nelson]

When I read Feldstein's proposal I thought that guy is an idiot. The last thing we need is more federal bureaucracy interfering in the market.

(different subject)
Since when did "fair use" include quoting an entire newspaper article verbatim?

[save_the_rustbelt]

Many members of the middle class have moved in the 'burbs due to crime, drugs, corruption, incompetence, high housing prices, lousy schools and all of the other urban ills ( if you doubt that Google "Detroit school board").

Now I can see them being punished for trying to get their kids into decent schools.

And the only escape the poorer folks have to get better jobs is through their autos.

Given the generalized incompetence of government at all levels, this would be a cluster mess.

(And the military should scrap its plan to buy more jets and helicopters used primarily by members of Congress - why the hell do we need more than 50 copies of the new Marine 1 helicopter?)

[Steve Waldman]

I really like this idea. But, like Mark and others, I'm skeptical about implementation details and political plausibility. Aside from the initial allocation problem, creating a special purpose electronic trading network physically linked to every existing gas-station seems like a lot of infrastructure for an experimental proposal. Making it impossible for people to buy gas without a special-purpose ATM card would, well, suck.

Here's a variation on the idea that is a little more incremental and does not require every gas station and consumer to suddenly change habits, but offers the same "free money to the efficient" advantages while discouraging gas consumption:

1) Enact a simple gasoline tax of $x.xx per gallon.
2) Define an online "refund coupon" which entitles a gasoline consumer to a refund of one gallon's worth of gasoline tax.
3) Permit the coupons to be tradable on the internet.

Less fundamentally, but I think politically useful:

4) Allocate coupons on the basis of social-security numbers to individual taxpayers, not businesses, same amount for every taxpayer. (Businesses would have taxpayer-ID-linked accounts, but no initial allocation.)
5) Cement a connection to social security by stating that all unrefunded gas taxes go to the social security trust fund

What are some advantages of this? First, nobody has to change behavior if they don't want to. Consumers can just pay a gas tax. But, in doing so, they leave money on the table, so many consumers will save their gas receipts and file for a refund. Plus, if the initial allocation is approximately current US gas consumption, most individual tax payers will have more coupons than they need (since they will have effectively received business consumers' "share"), and will receive free money by getting to know the system and selling excess coupons.

Business consumers also don't need to change their behavior. But again, gasoline-using businesses leave money on the table if they don't purchase coupons (which would always have a market value somewhere between 0 and the amount of the per-gallon-tax). There will be lots of buyers and sellers with incentive to participate in the market, and any "inefficiency" due to laziness or transaction costs benefits social security and discourages gasoline consumption.

Gas stations needn't do anything new but pay and price in a very ordinary per-gallon tax, and provide good receipts to customers. The government could design a system whereby entering a special code from a gas-station receipt automatically adds refundable gas purchase information to an account without the hassle of a mail-in. This wouldn't be a mandate, but a competitive advantage that gas stations implement over time.

This scheme does not cap gas consumption, just makes it more expensive beyond a government set aggregate limit. But taken to an extreme, a "refundable gas tax" can be a firm cap. The goverment can make the tax $10000 per gallon, so just about no one would buy a gallon without a refund coupon. But rather than a sudden "cap and trade", the scheme can be implemented incrementally, letting the market grow comfortable with it over time. And unusually, once in place, savvy consumers would lobby for, rather than against, gas tax hikes, as they combine a backdoor gasoline tax for businesses with an upfront cash subsidy to taxpayers, particularly consumers who conserve.

[Mark Thoma]

Nelson –

This is a bit rushed, apologies, but first let me note that there are no ads on my site for a reason. I don’t want anyone thinking this is a commercial venture. It is not, I see it is an extension of my academic work. A way to bring economics to people and help them understand what it means (though I probably learn just as much from all of you), or debate the merits of policy proposals.

In that effort, I try to present no more than is necessary from an article to get the essential ideas out, and I try not to go beyond 60% in general, but there is a lot of variation around that. I rarely present an article verbatim. It depends a lot on how tightly they are written and how important the qualifications around the main theme are.

In this particular case, it is Marty Feldstein, and this was going to get a lot of note, so I thought it deserved a full airing. I went through it four times and cut several hundred words, but because of the importance I thought this would have, I made sure all the points I felt were essential were present. I think this one ended up around 80% (I keep track as I cut them down, my recollection is that this is about 800 of the 1,000 word piece).

My goal is to bring economics to as many people as possible and to provide a forum for commentary on things I think are important enough to bring to people’s attention. I probably see all the little qualifications in economics articles as important to note, and thus probably err on the side of including more than others might, but I do try to pick out the essential elements when I post things.

Anyway, thanks for commenting lately. I always appreciate hearing people’s views.

says...

Nelson, if you bothered to read the article, you would understand the proposal is completely market driven and the only worry is whether such a market would work without regulation. Also, learn to be polite!

[Richard]

1) This proposal would be dead the minute it hit congress and the first outraged representative referred to it as "gasoline rationing". And really, it is.

2) Why not a gas tax, pure and simple? Make it high enough and you will see usage drop down to any desired level. To counter the regressive nature of the tax the standard deduction could be substantially raised.

3) It always amazes me when stuanch market proponents blanche at a sales tax on gas. Surely, if anyone could be a proponent of using market forces to reduce consumption it would be the libertarian crowd. Yet their ire towards taxes of any kind is so ingrained that they are unable to promote even reasonable taxes. Such is the power of their relentless hostility.

[bakho]

Richard, What gas tax is high enough? My my calculations, high enough would be around $7 tax/gal or a pump price of about $10 per gal. Some over at Angry Bear have argued that this would be too low.

I believe that a gas tax large enough to really drive the type of conservation we need would be damaging to the economy and a hardship for the poorest Americans. I prefer a strategy of keeping prices high enough to maintain support for CAFE standards, but not high enough to cause economic hardship.

Our utilities use a similar strategy, especially the public utilities. By promoting conservation, they can eliminate the need to expand capacity or purchase power and keep the cost to customer/owners low. It works for hot water heaters. There is no good reason why it does not work for cars. Feldstein's coupons remind me too much of the FERC handling of the CA energy crisis. The whole system would lend itself to a group of Enron-esque Greedheads cornering the market on coupons and price gouging consumers no end.

[anne]

When I set down examples, even if the idea were simplified to treat every consumer in every area alike, put down a single quota for the year and let traders trade gas coupons as they wish, the problem is the final price of gas would be just as high since the price would be set both at the pump and through the price for traded coupons. This is a rationing system, a quota system, that would create impossible tension between, say, Los Angeles and New York City and Topeka. Interesting, but impossible.

[anne]

Why then is a fiercely complex gasoline rationing system better than pushing vehicle makers to improve efficiency? Again, had American vehicle makers not fought so against gasoline use standards, General Motors might just just just have decided to offer a "Prius" in case for some strange reason Americans might in time begin to worry about conserving and saving on gasoline. But, of course there is Toyota....

[Tom DC/VA]

"I believe that a gas tax large enough to really drive the type of conservation we need would be damaging to the economy and a hardship for the poorest Americans."

On the second point, obviously the money raised could be funnelled back to the poor in the form of an increased EITC, paying for the worker's portion of the first few thousand dollars of the payroll tax, or through many other programs.

On the first point, why would it hurt the US economy? Other industrialized economies do quite well while using much less energy per dollar of GDP. Yes, there would be somewhat painful adjustment period as the higher rate is phased in (at, say, $0.25/yr for 12 years) but since that painful adjustment is going to happen sooner or later anyway, why not do it now, in a controlled manner?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Gdp-energy-efficiency.jpg

[Tom DC/VA]

Correlation is not causation, YMMV, yadda yadda; nonetheless this map is very interesting.

International Fuel Prices

[lonesome moderate]

bakho's link got cut off, here is the complete link:

http://www.eia.doe.gov/bookshelf/brochures/aeo2006/aeo2006.html

You can also go there by clicking my handle below.

Incidentally, does anybody know of any site, anywhere, that has the EPA stats for fuel economy for all cars in the current model year? I tried to google it, but all I got was a googol or so sales pitches. Dogpile couldn't find it either.

[Tom DC/VA]

LM - It doesn't have the data all in once nice downloadable list, but it does have all the data for this model year and several past ones.

www.fueleconomy.gov

[Nelson]

"Nelson, if you bothered to read the article, you would understand the proposal is completely market driven and the only worry is whether such a market would work without regulation. Also, learn to be polite!"

I appologize for not being polite in my previous post.

I did, however, read the article.

This system is NOT completely market driven. It's politically driven. The column states:
"Although reduced gasoline consumption would be good for the environment and for national security, such a regulatory change would be a mistake. A far better approach would be a system of tradeable gasoline rights, or TGRs."

The TGRs system itself would be a "regulatory change" with the intent of reducing gasoline consumption. It's just a more interesting way of implementing that regulation than what we're normally used to. Essentially it's rationing system that relies on politicians to decide who should have the tradable "right" to buy gasoline instead of using only free market prices to ration gasoline as is the case now.

Isn't it interesting how a program that "gives" us the "right" to buy gasoline is actually giving us less freedom to buy gasoline than what we already have?

[anne]

Nelson

'Isn't it interesting how a program that "gives" us the "right" to buy gasoline is actually giving us less freedom to buy gasoline than what we already have?'

Yes; there is a curious market in a market, defined by rationing being proposed. The more I thought, the more needlessly complex this proposal became :)

[lonesome moderate]

Tom - thanks much, that was exactly the link I was looking for.

I think that I see where Feldstein is coming from here, though I'm not saying that I agree with him. You could, at least in theory, accomplish exactly the same thing more efficiently by imposing a gas tax high enough to bring down consumption to where we want it, and then rebating the revenue to the people through tax cuts, and lump-sum checks for the poor. The beauty of the idea is that, instead of trying to guess what tax level you would need to bring down consumption to the appropriate level, you simply set the level, issue the coupons, and let the market take care of the rest. It avoids making a pot of money available for congress to spend, and prevents political wrangling over who should get how big a gas tax rebate. It would also be a progressive tax, probably very much so.

In theory, anyway. I can't imagine this working in practice, it would turn into the ultimate pork barrel in very short order.

[james o'neill]

an uninteresting game theory idea

[camille roy]

Wow, what an opportunity for the crony corporatocracy to invade even more sectors of our society!
"Should LA residents get more credits than NY or SF in the zero-sum allocation? "

That's not the question. Why give blue states credits when the Red Repubs of say Idaho are manifestly more deserving (and more Christian!).

The mind boogles at what the Administration could do with this, as they've just cut Homeland Security funding for NYC by 40% - and declared NYC has no national monuments or icons. (Take that, Statue of Liberty! I've always thought 'Statue' was a suspiciously French looking word.)

[slink]

i'm not surprised by this

its a nice way to send the wonks hounding off after a snark

i think mark hits a homer here
the orginal allocation would be a beast to draft up
by the time we'd tar babied it for too long
it would start to look like 666

says...

"Richard, What gas tax is high enough? My my calculations, high enough would be around $7 tax/gal or a pump price of about $10 per gal. Some over at Angry Bear have argued that this would be too low."

I understand the objection, although, as has been pointed out above, substantial taxes on oil are part of the current policy in Japan and Europe. There's a reason you do not see oversized vehicles in those locations.

I'm not opposed to increasing CAFE substantially; in fact, I think it would be good policy. I believe that there are so many good reasons for being responsbile about oil -- from the possible environmental damage, to the wanton use of a limited resource, to the possible funding of interests that are hostile to the U.S. -- that a stiff tax could quite possibly get a strong backing from the public, if pushed for the multiple reasons of environment and national security. If every dime generated were used in a fashion that had broad buy-in -- say that 80% were used to raise the standard deduction and the remaining 20% were used for energy research and mass transit -- there might be broader acceptance from the public than most people realize. It would be a more worthwhile legislative goal than, say, income tax cuts for the wealthy or cutting social security benefits.

Cheap oil favors rural economies over suburban economies and suburban economies over urban economies. But we all know at some level the cost will continue to go up, and that a realignment of resources will result. The U.S. has done well to date by defering that realignment, but over the long haul we may do more poorly. There's a case to be made for looking thirty years down the line and establishing policies to deal with those long-term issues.

[dryfly]

We have TGRs already - they are in your wallet and are called dollars. And last I knew they were tradeable.

If we distributed them more equitably & wisely the gasoline problem would take care of itself.

[rana]

I should not bother posting on this ridiculous idea, but I'm bored. As Mark notes, the politics is crazy. A gas tax would be far more popular than this rationing proposal. First, will the republican senators from rural states vote to send money to the Upper East side? I think not. (Of course the redistribution from businesses to consumers may be more popular, until the consumers see it in higher prices.) Second, the added bureaucracy, mandates for retrofitting millions of gasoline pumps,etc. will be a boom to economic inefficiency. Third, busy surburbanites will love the extra complications of trying to minimize their ration coupon expenses. So REpublicans will be more likely to vote for a gas tax with a cut in other taxes then for this turkey.

Of course the crazy poliitcs is better than the looney economics. We may be able to price the externalities of an added gallon of gas, and thus the proper tax. But to judge the optimal quantity of gas, without knowning the price is, quite simply impossible. Why would an economist propose this?

I would also note that his example is disingenuous. The inelasticity of demand for gasoline in the short run is phenominally low. There are three margins to work on--fuel efficiecy (MPG), vehicle miles traveled (VMT), and driving behavior. Some say the long-run elasticity of these is about 0.4 (with about 0.2 for MPG and about 0.2 for VMT), but this may be too high and is certainly too high in the short run. I would note that over the past two years we have seen a doubling of gasoline prices. The efficiency of NEW cars has gone up from about 19-3/4 MPG to 20-1/2. This implies an elasticity of about .04 (4% gain for 100% change in price), and would take about fourteen years to translate into an elasticity of .04 for the whole fleet. Gasoline consumption growth has barely dipped below trend increases. (How many of you have changed your daily driving habits?). This points to a huge change in prices to push down gas consumption in the short run. Marty's 50 cent example is probably off by a factor of 10, since a doubling of gas prices was not able to stabilize gas consumption. Clearly, an increase in gas taxes with offsetting cuts in other distorting taxes is superior than his complicated rationing scheme. Now with $5 TGRs we can imagine the evening dinner table conversation when the ration coupons get low at the end of the month.

We should look again at CAFE standards, which are politically popular, unlike ration cards or gas excise taxes. There is reason to believe that imperfections in the automobile market can create a rationale for CAFE standards. These include short-sighted consumers (frequently modeled by using very high dsicount rates) an the inability to mix and match characteristics of an automobile--e.g. you can't get a hybrid version of all models. We also know that CAFE standards work at reducing gas consumption. If you are concerned that they boost miles traveled because higher MPG makes it cheaper to drive an extra mile, then boost the gas tax at the same time. If you think that CAFE will kill you because the manufacturers will make the car lighter, then look at the data. Vehicle weight fell mostly before CAFE, so there is no real data showing that CAFE caused lighter cars. Also more stringent CAFE on light trucks will tend to even the playing field and reduce the weight disparities.

[DJM]

Pulling the Plug On the Green Machine

Source: Hamilton Spectator/Canada
[Jun 06, 2006]

Speedy exit; It has all the makings of an conspiracy engineered by the motoring giants. Why all the electric cars went missing after they were snatched from happy drivers.

A decade ago, Chris Paine was just a guy who loved his electric car. He and about 800 other Californians leased battery-powered cars from General Motors, Ford, Toyota and a handful of other companies in the full expectation that this was the future.

The car companies, spurred on by tough California anti-pollution laws, had been working on alternatives to the internal combustion engine since about 1990 and several environmentally conscious cities had installed recharging stations at supermarkets and in car parks.

But then as a new millennium came and U.S. dependence on foreign oil became a hot political issue, something weird happened. The car companies who'd leased out electric cars began demanding them back. And they wouldn't take no for an answer.

Paine, an internet entrepreneur who had dabbled in film-making, knew something was up when he took his General Motors EV1 to a dealership for a routine tire rotation in 2003.

When he called to see if his car was ready, he was told he would never see it again. "But there are two months left on the lease," he objected.

The dealership told him the car had left the premises. When Paine asked where it was, they said, "We can't tell you." He then said, "What about all the stuff in my car? My gym bag?"

They said they'd try to find his things. He asked if he couldn't simply pick them up himself. No, they said.

"I'd had an idea of making a film to show how cool the electric car was, especially since it was only available in California," Paine says.

"Suddenly I realized -- this story is way bigger than that." Three years later he's finished his film, a startling documentary entitled Who Killed the Electric Car? In interviews with key players -- designers, engineers, marketers, politicians, industry regulators and consumer advocates -- it makes a powerful case that California's experiment with EVs was deliberately sabotaged by a coalition of oil and car companies, along with their political allies, for short-term profit.
........................Paine's film, due for release at the end of June.............

[calmo]

I dunno DJM. The Hamilton Spectator no less which is sort of an industrial town if it doesn't have an auto assembly plant, yes? (It is not the splash it would get in the NYTs , so I hesitate.) [like I'm supposed to until it appears in a bigger paper.]
Is this a promo for Paine's film or really legit (and thereby really legit promo for Paine's film) [I'm going already, in any case you?]

[seth]

It is interesting to note that flex fuel vehicles under CAFE only count the 15% gasoline in the e85 they are assumed to use for the calculation. This is why so many auto makers are producing these vehicles.