"Is The 'Surge' Working? Some New Facts"

This NBER paper by MIT's Michael Greenstone reinforces Paul Krugman's message (in the post below this one) that the "smart money" is betting against Iraq's survival. According to this analysis of the Iraqi state bond market, since the Surge began there has been "a 40% increase in the market's expectation that Iraq will default. This finding suggests that to date the Surge is failing to pave the way toward a stable Iraq and may in fact be undermining it." Here's the abstract, introduction, and conclusion the paper:

Is The 'Surge' Working? Some New Facts, by Michael Greenstone, SSRN, September 14, 2007: Abstract There is a paucity of facts about the effects of the recent military Surge on conditions in Iraq and whether it is paving the way for a stable Iraq. Selective, anecdotal and incomplete analyses abound. Policy makers and defense planners must decide which measures of success or failure are most important, but until now few, if any, systematic analyses were available on which to base those decisions. This paper applies modern statistical techniques to a new data file derived from more than a dozen of the most reliable and widely-cited sources to assess the Surge's impact on three key dimensions: the functioning of the Iraqi state (including civilian casualties); military casualties; and financial markets' assessment of Iraq's future. The new and unusually rigorous findings presented here should help inform current evaluations of the Surge and provide a basis for better decision making about future strategy.

The analysis reveals mixed evidence on the Surge's effect on key trends in Iraq. The security situation has improved insofar as civilian fatalities have declined without any concurrent increase in casualties among coalition and Iraqi troops. However, other areas, such as oil production and the number of trained Iraqi Security Forces have shown no improvement or declined. Evaluating such conflicting indicators is challenging.

There is, however, another way to assess the Surge. This paper shows how data from world financial markets can be used to shed light on the central question of whether the Surge has increased or diminished the prospect of today's Iraq surviving into the future. In particular, I examine the price of Iraqi state bonds, which the Iraqi government is currently servicing, on world financial markets. After the Surge, there is a sharp decline in the price of those bonds, relative to alternative bonds. The decline signaled a 40% increase in the market's expectation that Iraq will default. This finding suggests that to date the Surge is failing to pave the way toward a stable Iraq and may in fact be undermining it.

Introduction

"We need a surge of facts." Tony Snow, Press Secretary for President George W. Bush, July 12, 2007

Is the war in Iraq worth its cost? The rationales for the war include that it plays a central role in protecting the nation against threats from al-Qaeda, ensuring a reliable supply of oil to the world market, preventing a humanitarian crisis in Iraq, providing an environment that allows for a stable Middle East, and ensuring the future of a sovereign Iraqi state. As of September 1st 2007, approximately 27,662 US soldiers have been wounded and 3,735 have been killed in the course of the war’s prosecution. The US has spent about $403 billion (Sunshine 2007) to date on the war and related activities, and it has been estimated that its ultimate costs could exceed $2 trillion (Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006). The current debate about the war in Iraq is centered on whether the Surge is working.

There is a paucity of facts about the effects of the recent military “Surge” on conditions in Iraq and whether it is paving the way for a stable Iraq. Selective, anecdotal and incomplete analyses abound. Policy makers and defense planners must decide which measures of success or failure are most important, but until now few, if any, systematic analyses were available on which to base those decisions. This paper applies modern statistical techniques to a new data file derived from more than a dozen of the most reliable and widely-cited sources to assess the Surge’s impact on three key dimensions: the functioning of the Iraqi state (including civilian casualties); military casualties; and financial markets’ assessment of Iraq’s future. The new and unusually rigorous findings presented here should help inform current evaluations of the Surge and provide a basis for better decision making about future strategy. The central challenge for this analysis is to determine what would have happened in Iraq in the absence of the Surge. In the ideal, there would be two completely identical Iraqs--- one in which the Surge took place and another in which it did not. These two Iraqs could be compared to determine the Surge’s causal impacts. As a feasible alternative, this paper compares outcomes in the period before the Surge to the same outcomes in the period after the Surge’s initiation. In some cases the outcome variables were trending upwards or downwards in advance of the Surge. In order to avoid confounding these pre-existing trends with the effect of the Surge, this paper tests for changes in these trends.

The analysis shows mixed evidence on the Surge’s effect on the current functioning of the Iraqi state. Perhaps the crudest expression of the security situation in Iraq is the rate of civilian fatalities. I find a substantial reduction in civilian fatalities in Baghdad and the rest of Iraq. Further, there isn’t a decline and there may be an increase in the number of hours of electricity available to Iraqi consumers (although not in Baghdad). On the less positive side, the size of the Iraqi Security Force was about 10% lower 25 weeks after the Surge began than would have been predicted by trends prior to the Surge. Additionally, the analysis finds that after the Surge oil production didn’t increase and may have decreased. Oil is Iraq’s primary source of income.

The second category of outcomes examines the impact of the Surge on casualties suffered both by coalition soldiers and Iraqi Security Forces. The analysis indicates that the Surge had little impact on the number of casualties suffered by coalition and Iraqi Security Force troops. There is even some evidence of a decline in the number of non-fatal casualties per day among US soldiers. Since the number of US troops in Iraq was increasing in this period, these findings are noteworthy.

The stated purpose of the Surge was to create the conditions necessary for a stable Iraq to emerge. These first two categories provide mixed evidence on the Surge’s effect on the current functioning of the Iraqi state. Making sound decisions about how to proceed in Iraq based on such conflicting indicators is extraordinarily challenging. For example, does the positive news on security outweigh the negative findings about Iraqi Security Forces (or the failures on many of the 18 congressionally mandated benchmarks)? In the face of this uncertainty, analyst judgment and politics may play too large a role.

There is, however, another way to assess the Surge. This paper shows how data from world financial markets can be used to shed light on the central question of whether the Surge has increased or diminished the prospect of a functioning Iraq. In particular, I examine the price of Iraqi state bonds, which the Iraqi government is currently servicing, on world financial markets. Importantly, these bonds trade on world financial markets; for example, hedge funds hold a substantial fraction of them and their price on the secondary market is quoted in Bloomberg’s financial data services. The appeal of using financial markets is that traders’ only concern is to make profitable decisions and this necessarily requires making correct projections. There isn’t room for personal biases in this setting. Consequently, it isn’t surprising that these markets have a good track record at predicting uncertain future events (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004).

Overall, the bond market findings fail to support the view that the Surge is helping to pave the way for a stable Iraq to emerge and may in fact be undermining it. After the Surge, the Iraqi bonds’ yield increased by 115 to 170 basis points, relative to comparison bonds. This translates into an approximate 40% increase in the expected annual probability of default. In other words, the world financial markets are saying that the Iraq’s prospects declined after the Surge.

Examining bond yields to learn about the effectiveness of the Surge requires several assumptions, including that financial markets efficiently accurately aggregate public and private information from diverse sources. Further, the meaning of this exercise would be undermined if the documented movements in bond yields reflect domestic US politics. I find that the increases in default risk remain even after controlling for the probability that a Democrat will be elected President in 2008. This finding does not eliminate the domestic politics explanation, but it substantially weakens the case for it.

There are several caveats to this analysis that bear highlighting. First, due to the absence of data that predates the invasion of Iraq, the analysis can only inform the question of the Surge’s efficacy. This paper is not directly informative about the broader question of the impact of the Iraq war. Second, the data on the current functioning of Iraq fail to cover many outcomes that would be of great interest and are potentially more informative than the available ones. Third, even among the available data, there are legitimate questions about quality and reliability. This is especially the case with the civilian casualty data.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a brief background on the Surge. Section III briefly describes the data file compiled for the analysis (there is a much more extensive discussion in the Data Appendix) and IV outlines the statistical models. Section V discusses the results. Section VI concludes.

...

VI. Conclusions There is a paucity of facts about the effects of the recent military “Surge” on conditions in Iraq and whether it is paving the way for a stable Iraq. Selective, anecdotal and incomplete analyses abound. Policy makers and defense planners must decide which measures of success or failure are most important, but until now few, if any, systematic analyses were available on which to base those decisions. This paper applies modern statistical techniques to a new data file derived from more than a dozen of the most reliable and widely-cited sources to assess the Surge’s impact on three key dimensions.

The analysis reveals mixed evidence on the Surge’s effect on key trends in Iraq. The security situation has improved insofar as civilian fatalities have declined without any concurrent increase in casualties among coalition and Iraqi troops. However, other areas, such as oil production and the number of trained Iraqi Security Forces have shown no improvement or declined. Making sound decisions about how to proceed in Iraq based on such conflicting indicators is challenging and uncertain. Moreover, this uncertainty may allow analyst judgment and politics to play too large a role.

There is, however, another way to assess the Surge. This paper has shown how data from world financial markets can be used to shed light on the central question of whether the Surge has increased or diminished the prospect of a functioning Iraq. An appeal of using financial markets is that traders’ only concern is to make profitable decisions and this necessarily requires making correct projections. There isn’t room for personal biases in this setting and it therefore isn’t surprising that financial markets have a good track record of predicting future events.

I examine the price of Iraqi state bonds, which the Iraqi government is currently servicing, on world financial markets. After the Surge, there is a sharp decline in the price of the Iraqi bonds, relative to alternative bonds. This decline signaled an increase of approximately 40% in the market’s expected annual probability of default. This finding suggests that to date the Surge is failing to pave the way toward a stable Iraq and may in fact be undermining it. In many respects, it is consistent with recent assessments that fail to find that Surge has led to substantial progress toward meeting many of the 18 congressionally mandated benchmarks for progress in Iraq (GAO 2007)

This paper has produced a series of new facts on the Surge’s impact. It is straightforward to update these facts as new data becomes available. Further, the new facts can be used to aid decision making about the future of the Surge.

More broadly, the paper shows that even in unconventional wars, it is feasible to measure and analyze important outcomes to learn about the war’s success. Finally, it highlights that world financial markets may be an important new source of information to judge a war’s success.

Comments

[kthomas]

"Is the war in Iraq worth its cost?"

Cost to whom? To the millions of dead Iraqis? To our dead soldiers?

We have not paid financially, the Dems and Repubs have deferred that to another generation.

[anne]

"As of September 1st 2007, approximately 27,662 US soldiers have been wounded...."

Notice what has tragically happened. Linda Bilmes found that there had been over 50,000 physical casualties in Iraq in January 2007. The findings from military statistics were rerporte in the Los Angeles Times and academically.

Immediately an assistant Secretary of Defense called the dean of Harvard's Kennedy School to complain about Bilmes' research. Then, the military statistics were changed to record not over 50,000 casualties but fewer than 25,000. Of course, this is the base for physical casualties casualties that has since been used.

[anne]

Now, several weeks ago a group of 7 soldiers wrote an article for the New York Times explaining that whatever we were about in Iraq was failing. By the time the article was published, 1 soldier was wounded. This week, 2 soldiers were killed. But, where the first casualty was by explosive round and the second casualties were by the rolling of an armored vehicle, only 1 casualty will be recorded in subsequent totals.

[anne]

"I find a substantial reduction in civilian fatalities in Baghdad and the rest of Iraq...."

Notice, though I have found nothing because I have not personally counted, the way of reporting Iraqi civilian casualties has evidently been changed radically in these surgy times. Where military statistics show a substantial reduction, there are curious omissions such as casualties from explosions that are suddenly no casualties at all. Find a pattern here?

[anne]

"Further, there isn’t a decline and there may be an increase in the number of hours of electricity available to Iraqi consumers (although not in Baghdad)...."

Notice that in celebration of the surge, which is a surge overwhelmingly in Baghdad, in celebration the American Ambassaor to Iraq told Congress that there would be no more electricity figures issued for Baghdad. The Ambassador of course told Congress that there was elctricity in Baghdad at the beginning of summer for about 2 hours a day. Find a pattern here?

[DJM]

Reminds me of the game they play with three walnut shells ...they put the data under one move it around a bit and suddenly it can't be found....yes, the old shell game.

[anne]

The problem is the old shell game fools professors at MIT, who may even wish to be fooled. But, what I noticed was that almost immediately after the military changed the accounting of casualties, a change that was recorded in several prominent articles in the New York Times, the revised figures began to be used everywhere no matter the sudden decline by more than 50%.

Also, I did not even bother to point out that psychological casualties are counted in a wholly separare way and were they counted would have set the casualty figure above 100,000.

[anne]

Just a year ago, more than 100,000 returned soldiers from Iraq and Afghanistan had already been granted disability status by the Veterans Administration. Again, all these assertions were well documented in the New York Times.

Care to try to figure the number of casualties of civilian contractors?

[Mark Thoma]

I thought the point was the because the data can be manipulated, or are of poor quality, we should pay attention to the bond market instead (which isn't perfect either, but ought to be much better). And when we look there the message is clear, the surge has failed and may have made things worse.

"Third, even among the available data, there are legitimate questions about quality and reliability. This is especially the case with the civilian casualty data."

Am I reading this wrong?

[anne]

Mark Thoma is reading the paper correctly, which of course is no surprise. The analogy is looking at difficulty to analsis macro economic statistics and feeling a case could be made for reasonable or faltering growth. Reading macro economic trends for near term predictions is quite difficult, so use the bond market. The bond market now is telling us growth is faltering.

Similarly Michael Greenstone is trying to make sense of conflicting or seemingly conflicting evidence on the effectiveness of the surge in Iraq. This is a clever and important approach.

I however muddied the reading of the paper by complaining about the the quality of the data which has been annoying to me for months. I wish Greenstone had noted the data quality problem, but the paper is nonetheless valuable.

[Mark Thoma]

I didn't dig into all the details of the paper - so it may be there to some extent - but I also wished some of the data had been qualified (and doubted) more. He says he spent hundreds of hours on the data, and that large investment could, I suppose, lead him to give the data more credibility than someone looking in from outside.

[Peter]

How does he go about isolating the effects of The Surge? I.e. what if it were, say, some failure of the Iraqi government (e.g. a sudden lack of confidence caused by statements from the Iraqi president at the same time as the Surge) that caused the markets to more greatly expect failure, and this would have happened irrespective of The Surge?

Thanks for any information.

[anne]

The point of using the bond market to gain a sense of economic strength or weakness is that specific current statistics can be set aside. What is assumed is that the collective investor sense in the bond market is a better judge of the direction of the economy than any single person, even me. So, in a sense the conflicting data in Iraq can be set aside for investor decisions. Not really, but close, but remember the bond market can and does give conflicting information. Still, I notice the bond market.

[ilsm]

There is no connection betweenthe surge which is a misuse of military forces to
serve and protect" Iraqis in isolate irrelevant localities and the viability of the Shiite dominated puppet government inside the green zone.

What about the US providing 160,000 targets to do nothing of value should be priced in Iraqi boonds?

How do those bond make $180B a year in US waste worthwhile?

[calmo]

Well, I think Greenstone is right: you might have your reputation on the line (consider any GOP member or affliate at the moment) wrt your views of The Surge (so dramatic!), but if you have money on the line, that's genuinely something to lose/win and those opinions might just be a little more thorough and a little less theatrical.
So, not just Hunt, but the financial community sees this quite differently than 'the Surge is working'.
A nice follow-up to PK's piece, no?

[david]

Greenstone's both smart and clever, but the bond market is no guide to this mess, and sensible people should know that.

[Peter]

Hi Anne,

The paper appears to say that the surge is failing, ceteris paribus. But perhaps the author is just saying that the bond market indicates that things are not going well overall, contrary to other conflicting indicators. I think the latter is what you were saying.

[Lafayette]

MT: I thought the point was the because the data can be manipulated, or are of poor quality, we should pay attention to the bond market instead (which isn't perfect either, but ought to be much better).

If this is the point of the paper, then it is rubbish. The authors' arguments are themselves replete with dubious points that are unverifiable and even suspect on prima facie evidence.

The bond market is a reflection of Iraqi sentiment regarding the outcome of this conflict? Pure, unadulterated drivel. It is a poll of bond investor belief in the Iraqi capacity to pay its debts, that is pump and distribute enough oil.

The Iraqis know full well that a pull-out of Americans has a strong potential for sparking a full-blown civil war. To any "normal" mind this would be sufficient evidence that a better path is sectarian accommodation. Perhaps, even apartheid in places like Baghdad where the mix Shiites and Sunnites is strong.

Short of this, the only other option for Americans other than a pull out is a pull back to bases where forces are contained. The mere threat that they would be engaged in case of a civil revolt may be enough. Anyway, it would stop the slaughter of Americans, but not of Iraqis.

Permit me to remind us all of this. America got Iraq into this mess. No one invited Americans into Iraq. And, whether one detests George Bush II or not, there is a moral responsibility to help them get themselves out of the mess. This responsibility prevails against any personal hatred one might have rightfully for lead-head.

The sectarian violence was expected. America made mistakes shortly after the invasion that assured its happening. It happened, and I doubt most Iraqis -- both Sunnites and Shiites -- would not want it to end this very second.

The wild card is al Qaeda, these religiously misguided nutters, who think that even sectarian violence is worth the price to pay in order to bring Great Satan to heel. They will continue planting the bombs. This option, however, ultimately undermines their existence as well.

You don't "save a people" by killing them.

[Lafayette]

Let's also remember this (from a Project on Defense Alternatives paper called "Reconstructing Iraq"):

During the first Gulf War allied air power systematically destroyed much of Iraq’s infrastructure and industry, including 92 percent of electric power generating capacity, 80 percent of oil refinery capacity, eight major dams, four of seven major water pumping stations, 31 municipal water and sewerage facilities, numerous water purification plants, and dozens of factories producing goods ranging from tires and electrical cable to medical supplies, fertilizer, textiles, aluminum, cement, and paint

When the Allies did much the same to Europe in order to defeat Hitler, America also assured that a post-war Marshall Plan was in place to reconstruct Europe. (It did so to avoid the replacement of Nazi domination by that of Communist domination. A similar -- but different -- logic is observable in Iraq.)

The Iraqis deserve less? Why? Muslims are subhuman?

NB: Oh, I can see them now ... the posts saying "WW2 Europe was different!". Yes, WW2 Europe was different. History repeats itself, but not always in the same manner. Moral obligations remain steadfast.

[ilsm]

Lafayette,

Iraq is no different than Vietnam.

There comes a point when the US cannot; for reasons of economics, anthropology, sociology, religion, psychology, physics or what have you; change the situation on the ground and has to retrench.

The Marshall plan took place two years after the end of WW II in Europe.

It was implemented in western Europe where a generally homogeneous culture existed and the political infrastructure at the local level, western Germany had not become part of Germany until Bismarck, was somewhat intact.

While no Marshal Plan (America is not so blessed today as to have George Marshall) there has been a huge amount of money spent on reconstructing Iraq, even though most of the "damage" was either from 1991 or due to "insurgent activity".

We could debate whether the reconstruction money was plundered by US contractors or Iraqis. Whether it was right for the US military to hire their usual suspects and so forth.

Or, whether the reconstruction money was irrelevant because there was no political organization to benefit from it as there was in Europe in 1947.

I am against the continued waste. I do not believe the president's intentions were moral or ethical.

I do not believe there was a good plan.

I think US motives were bad. I think it was oil and making a showplace success for the war machine.

But the disenfranchised US tax payer and our kids have paid a price and the taxpayers expected more from Bush.

[Lafayette]

ilism: even though most of the "damage" was either from 1991 or due to "insurgent activity"

How convenient for Americans to believe this, isn't it?

A shame that it is far from the truth.

ilism: Iraq is no different than Vietnam.

This is simplistic at the very least. America intervened to prop up its client state, not to bring it down. Still, America intervened. No difference, there, and the fact is fundamental. It triggered all subsequent actions.

America assumed the responsibility for its intervention in Vietnam and was left with no alternative but to leave. The same will happen in Iraq, but only after an exhaustive effort to bring peace between the sectarian factions. Wasn't "fight, fight, fight and talk, talk, talk" also Kissinger's tactic to bring the North Vietnamese about in his negotiations with them in Paris?

What bothers America presently about Iraq is this: It realized it can’t win and so it wants out … winning be everything in a competitive country like America. So, just as some kid who doesn’t like the way the ballgame is going –he decides to leave and take the baseball home with him.

Puerile reaction. This isn't the Rose Bowl or a Basketball Championship. Nope, not at all.

ilism: But the disenfranchised US tax payer and our kids have paid a price and the taxpayers expected more from Bush.

Nice sentiment, but not nearly enough.

As a nation, when you start something, you try to finish. This is the fourth or fifth time that America has elected President’s who wanted, for a variety of reasons, to poke their nose in other people’s business.

I repeat; when you do that, you have a moral obligation – whether you like it or not – to see it through.

That bitter end is coming up within the next year. What remains is either of two alternatives. Do we leave – and take everything with us – or do we leave the battle field but stay nearby to prop up an Iraqi state such that it can obtain a semblance of governmental functionality.

Another year is necessary to find out which.

NB: And, next time around, let's keep our penis in our pants as regards foreign policy.

[Daniel]

In Vietnam:
Major: "What's your estimate of the enemy kill, son."
Lieutenant: "About 200, sir."
Major: "There's something wrong with your eyes, boy. I see
2500 dead V.C. on that hill."

I doubt we can depend on the accuracy of field reports from the military. These guys want to look good for their bosses.
They know what their bosses want and if they can't produce in the field they can produce it in a report.

[ilsm]

Lafayette,

"A shame that it is far from the truth."

Your statement that the US rebuild Iraq because we did the damage is irrelevant. The shock and awe was primarily military on military; a blitz like in France in 1940, the Germans had very little to rebuild in France once the people accepted their new masters and got on with their selfish compromised existence.

The US in 2003 did very little damage to infra-stucture.

Now, I would say the policy of the US is to avoid civilian casualties and certainly the reports like from Petraeus are we are doing good for the people, no?

"What bothers America presently about Iraq is this: It realized it can’t win and so it wants out "

You think because you decide the US has a "moral obligation" the US should act as if it has unlimited resources and all the time and lives. That the US should pursue forever practices that do not work with puppets like the French used in Indo China to stay on forever.

There is a point when the US must realize there is not career in attempting to save Iraq when it neitehr wishes to be saved nor has any support from elsewhere in the world to be saved.

The US now is like the French in 1954 after Dien Bien Phu.

The US has limited resources to attempt Herculean tasks you assign in your moral judegement.

What in your mind makes you think some outside force would expect the US to slay the Hydra without the ability to do so, and continue on wasting its respurces?

I turned off the football game I was interested in to answer this.

I will go back now.

I won't smash the heads on your Hydra.

[howard]

lafayette has now entered the realm of moral obligation (as we wander afield from the actual economics at hand here) and, direct from sinai, apparently, tells us about ours.

this is, of course, the intellectual version of the pottery barn rule, widely misinterpreted. if a bull enters a china shop and breaks some china, the bull "owns" it, but the "moral obligation" of the bull is not to try and fix the china. it has no "obligation" to keep stomping around in the china shop causing more damage while thinking it is cleaning up.

and to retreat from cheesy metaphors into reality, the "moral obligation" of the united states government is to put the constitution in practice and try and form a more perfect union. because a deranged president and a supine congress got confused about what constitutes a more perfect union doesn't oblige the rest of us ad infinitum to maintain their delusion. the emperor has no clothes.

[ilsm]

howard,

The US did not enter the pottery store as a bull, was my point the US only smashed the head and his bodyguards.

Taking out the guy at the cash register of a store that is already smashed does not make the US liable to put together the mess that has existed since the Ottomans.

[anne]

"The US has spent about $403 billion (Sunshine 2007) to date on the war and related activities...."

Forgive me, but this bothered me enough to find whether I could still add. After all, we are reading an MIT academic. I make the direct cost of Iraq above $600 billion as of September 2007, and I was counting conservatively. That is a difference of 50% in cost, an intolerable difference. I am not happy.

[Lafayette]

howard: the "moral obligation" of the united states government is to put the constitution in practice and try and form a more perfect union. because a deranged president and a supine congress got confused about what constitutes a more perfect union doesn't oblige the rest of us ad infinitum to maintain their delusion. the emperor has no clothes.

And this is nothing more than "contextual justification"; meaning if the context no longer suits you, get a plausible reason to deny the obligation of seeking an honorable exit.

Jurisprudence holds that a person is responsible for their actions -- given that they are of sound mind. Why not nations? Lead-head was not a clinical idiot, when he committed the US to an "illegal" war. (Yes, Kofi Anan is right; the UN charter states that a signatory nation will NOT attack another signatory state.)

So, let's get out. Just get out. Go. Leave them to their own devices. Regardless of who did what to whom and why.

If America does not have the moral fibre to see its actions through to a logical, humane end; then it should retreat into isolationism. There's enough to get right in America, Lord knows, so let's concentrate on getting our own house in order before telling others how to do theirs.

NB: Iraq not about reconstruction money. Iraq had more than enough money to contract foreign construction companies to build its original infrastructure under Hussein. Iraq today does not really need anyone's reconstruction money. It needs to be free of civil strife in order to pump/sell its own natural resource, oil. The windfall will be more than adequate enough to repair the damages and employ Iraqis to do so.

[Lafayette]

ilism: The US now is like the French in 1954 after Dien Bien Phu.

Balderdash. Do you know WHAT Dien Bein Phu was?

It was a single battle where the French foolishly consecrated significant military resources into an indefensible crucible and was overrun by the Viet Cong from the surrounding mountainsides.

After its defeat, French political will to keep Viet Nam wilted. But, there the similarity stops. There was NO sectarian strife. The French simply abandoned the war to a willing United States ... that went on to waste more time, effort, lives and money for a rather ignoble outcome.

Iraq, today, is certainly not the same. It is beset by a sectarian Civil War.

Yes, the US should have never got in. (But, wow!, where the Americans happy enough that they did, at the onset.) Yes, the US should get out.

But not just abandon the Iraqis to an inhumane mutual genocide. Which is precisely what will happen.

[ilsm]

Lafayette,

"But not just abandon the Iraqis to an inhumane mutual genocide. Which is precisely what will happen."

Please define the concept of "inhumane mutual genocide", who to whom, how long, how many casualties and what effect?

Describe this in the context of the secular cleansing now going on and in the context of the U arming Sunni tribes to the teeth.

The US may be watching it go on now, only feebly limiting the carnage.

That is why the concern for numbers, th US is doing the cleansing much more kindly and gently.

[ilsm]

Lafayette,

Had Eisenhower sent US Navy carriers into the Gulf of Tonkin and authorized air support Dien Bien Phu would have been like Khe Sahn, a Pyrrhic victory in a futile crusade against South Asian nationalism.

My point is the US is in the same position in Iraq as the French and US were in Southeast Asia.

Even the vast resources of the great debtor cannot put this humpty dumpty together.

The UK tried, the Ottomans ran the place for hundreds of years.

It is like piecing together a Frankenstein.

[Chris]

What poor Lafayette doesn't get is that the US is doing nothing to prevent the "inhumane mutual genocide" right now. In fact our presence is most likely increasing it. It is typical of the warmongers who have changed their arguments almost every month for the last several years that they are now justifying the invasion as a mean to prevent the very things the invasion that they wanted has brought about. They have no morals and no shame and their slights of mind are disgusting.

[Chris]

ilsm says:

"The US has limited resources..."

Tell that to the Bush administration or this Congress who continue to squander billions and billions on a completely pointless war with no end in sight. The US's resources may be limited, but we have, so far, infinite credit with China, so we just keep on spending, spending, spending. China is the only agent that can force us to acknowledge a limit to our resources, and it has not done so yet.

says...

speaking of moral obligation,
what about bringing those war criminals
to justice.
when will the american public face up to their
moral obligation