"Learning the Lessons of Iraq"

I don't think we will know if the war in Iraq was a success or not until many years, decades even, after we are gone. If, for example, a few years after we leave, Iraq breaks down terribly and alliances that are very much against our geopolitical interests are formed, that won't be a success, will it? We just don't know yet if it is a success or not, and furthermore, if things do break down, we will have no way of knowing if an alternative path would have produced a better outcome -- we can't run the alternative scenario and find out.

I hope it is a success, let there be no mistake about that, but I just don't see how we can say anything beyond so far so good, and we'll see how it goes from here. As for repeating this strategy in Afghanistan, if we don't know for sure that Iraq will remain stable after we leave, and we don't, and if we don't know for sure if it was the surge or something else that caused the reduction in violence, and we don't, then we should be very careful before repeating the strategy once again.

If it was other factors that caused the reduction in violence, in combination with or independent of the surge in troops, and if we can better understand what those factors were, there may be a way to produce a similar outcome in Afghanistan without so much death and destruction.

So before we commit to repeating the same tactic, let's better understand exactly why things improved in Iraq. I realize that whether the reduction in violence is attributed to the surge or not has large political consequences, but I don't care about that, I just want our best assessment of what factors were at work. It's a matter of life and death:

Learning the Lessons of Iraq, by Joseph Stiglitz, Project Syndicate: The Iraq war has been replaced by the declining economy as the most important issue in America’s presidential election campaign, in part because Americans have come to believe that .. the ... ‘surge’ has ... cowed the insurgents, bringing a decline in violence. The implications are clear: a show of power wins the day.

It is precisely this kind of macho reasoning that led America to war in Iraq in the first place. The war was meant to demonstrate the strategic power of military might. Instead, the war showed its limitations. Moreover, the war undermined America’s real source of power – its moral authority. ...

To be sure, the reduction in violence is welcome, and the surge in troops may have played some role. Yet the level of violence, were it taking place anywhere else in the world, would make headlines; only in Iraq have we become so inured to violence that it is a good day if only 25 civilians get killed.

And the role of the troop surge in reducing violence in Iraq is not clear. Other factors were probably far more important, including buying off Sunni insurgents... But that remains a dangerous strategy. The US should be working to create a strong, unified government, rather than strengthening sectarian militias.

Now the Iraqi government has awakened to the dangers, and has begun arresting some of the leaders whom the American government has been supporting. The prospects of a stable future look increasingly dim.

That is the key point: the surge was supposed to provide space for a political settlement, which would provide the foundations of long-term stability. That political settlement has not occurred. ...

Meanwhile, the military and economic opportunity costs of this misadventure become increasingly clear. Even if the US had achieved stability in Iraq, this would not have assured victory in the “war on terrorism,”... Things have not been going well in Afghanistan, to say the least, and Pakistan looks ever more unstable.

Moreover, most analysts agree that at least part of the rationale behind Russia’s invasion of Georgia, reigniting fears of a new Cold War, was its confidence that, with America’s armed forces pre-occupied with two failing wars..., there was little America could do in response...

The belief that the surge was successful is especially dangerous because the Afghanistan war is going so poorly. ... [T]he belief that the surge ‘worked’ is now leading many to argue that more troops are needed in Afghanistan. True, the war in Iraq distracted America’s attention from Afghanistan. But the failures in Iraq are a matter of strategy, not troop strength.

It is time for America, and Europe, to learn the lessons of Iraq – or, rather, relearn the lessons of virtually every country that tries to occupy another and determine its future.

Comments

[leo]

Strange, you don't declare victory until the enemy has laid down his arms and you get the troops home. Until that point, it's hard to say how things will end. For all we know this is nothing but a temporary lull whose duration may last no longer than the installation of a new Administration.

It won't be the first time a messy conflict was passed from one administration to the next -- only to blow up in the new administration's face.

[outsider]

outsider says...

Iraq is a country invented by the British in 1918, designed to split the kurds in half in the North, the Shia in half in the Southeast, and give power to the previously marginal minority Sunnis behind British Maxim guns centrally. The Sunni, of course said "Oh sure". and ceded oil interests in the Shia and Kurd camps to the British in return, weakening the remnants of the Ottoman Empire.

Excellent book (though tedious and confusing prose) by Niall Ferguson "Colossus" makes an interesting case that Empire depends on a permanent (or at least very long) occupation of a country until the local order of bribes, tribalism, and prejudice yields to a common law.

the U.S. has no such long term diplomatic corps, so control reverts to what it was before strong dictators said differently. The Vichy Government maneuvers buying time.

America lacks the ( Arrogance, Sense of divine destiny, sense of empire?) to commit to terraforming a people. Perhaps due to the failure of a 400 year crusade to do so.

We overthrew a popular democratically elected official to get "our" Shah in, leading to Islamic fundamentalism rising. Blowback.

Solution? Anyone?

[Extinct Species]

If we won't know how things will turn out until years down the road and if even then we won't know what the alternative paths could have been, how can we have really learned anything (at this point in time)?

Okay, well I hope we have learned Iraq was a big mistake and never should have been undertaken.

The surge on the other hand was really about Iran. America was bleeding and the Iranians thought they could keep the pressure on, break American will (which was cracking) and dominate Iraq. The US dealing with the Sunni tribes and the surge demonstrated to Iran that (at least for a while) America wasn't going away and that some other arrangement for control of Iraq would need to be found. Lo and behold the Mahdi Army disappeared and Shiite violence subsided. Will it work out in the long run? Nobody knows, but given the stupidity of going into Iraq in the first place, the surge was a very small expenditure to try and salvage a bad situation. Democrats don't want to admit it, but the surge was well worth the risk. The additional cost it brought was minimal.

No matter what was learned from the surge in Iraq (although as you say we will likely not know for years), it is not applicable to Afghanistan because the conditions are not the same.

And would someone please explain to me what the US could have done in Georgia if not "pre-occupied with two failing wars"? The reality is virtually nothing.

[Gegner]

You raise the very interesting spectre of what does 'victory' look like?

Is the definition of victory what's acceptable to us or what's acceptable to the people of Iraq?

We may desire a particular outcome but as of yet, that outcome hasn't been 'defined'.

[John]

"I hope it is a success, let there be no mistake about that, but I just don't see how we can say anything beyond so far so good, and we'll see how it goes from here."

The invasion of Iraq was not only an infamous crime, it was also a mistake. Once we invaded, this tarpit we are stuck in was the best possible result. Suppose the invasion had turned out well, instead? Suppose "Mission Accomplished" had been true? The Bush Administration wouldn't have stopped there. Next would have been Iran or Syria, most likely.

At some point, the rest of the world would have woken up and said, "No!" Result: World War III.

If one commits an infamous crime, it's better that they bungle it.

[Foreign observer]

To speak of a needless war that killed about a million innocent Iraquis, and created several millions of refugees and displaced persons, as a "sucess", even potentially, betrays moral bankrupcy.(I have not mentioned your own dead and wounded because I feel they got what they deserved for participating in this crime.)

This post is something only a complete national narcissist could write, for whom the rights and pain and death of anyone outside his narrow circle is totally abstract and meaningless. What do you see when looking in the mirror every morning, and do you ever wonder why other cultures see a monster?

Politically and morally, historically and legally, "Iraq" is already a failure and will be seen as the beginning of the end for your country's preeminence. But continue to live in your amoral, sheltered dream world while you can - it may not be for that much longer.

[lonesome moderate]

The Iraq War has many parallels with our war against the Phillipines a century earlier, and that adventure doesn't seem to have had any major lasting effect on how the USA was viewed (either by the rest of the world or by history).

[hari]

Stiglitz - *It's time for America, and Europe, to learn the lessons of Iraq - or....*

Mark - *I hope (the war in Iraq) is a success...let there be no mistake about it....*

As a (retired) professional expert on international conflicts and conflict resolution, let me politely advise our good host to refrain from entering this stupid debate unless he wants to be *discharged with dishonor* or ostricized - ie. Iraq is none of your (US) bloody business. Get out, if you can, with your tail between your legs. The political disaster is complete and final - American image is in tatters and its influence reduced to a *paper tiger*.

On the other hand, if you read between the lines what Stiglitz is saying, the message is clear and unequivocal.
His mistake, however, is to assume Europe (less UK) has *a lesson to learn* from American invasion and occupation of an Arab land - The Babylonian Civilization.

Germany and France, in particular, opposed US intervention in the Security Council. EU has never supported American policy in Iraq, to my knowledge. And will not, in future.

If , as Mark says, it's a matter of life and death for American policy - ie. whether the surge succeeded or not -
and Mark doesn't care a hoot about its political implications. I understand, he doesn't want to - for whatever personal or moral reasons - the notion of the end of history (Fukayama) was the tool of neocons to establish Pack Americana. And Iraq was just the start of their strategic thinking (Wolfowitz & Co)....

Recall America, after 9/11, was literally non-plused by invasion/attack on its sovereign soil - for first time!
However, GWB/Cheney and their neocons used 9/11 opportunity to get American military-industrial power mirred in the hot sun of Arabian desert - for Oil!

Having lost the Viet Nam War, in SE Asia, and, now, the Iraq War, in Middle East, the label of a *paper tiger* is more or less significant to be attached to American Super Power.

If there is an end to history (if ever!), it's evident that American power and influence in the world is not only on decline but falling - rapido - much faster than the Chinese or Russian anticipated, me thinks.

[pgl]

As I read this excellent oped by Stiglitz, it's clear to me that he thinks the invasion of Iraq was a grave mistake. I agree.

[anne]

Mark Thoma:

"I don't think we will know if the war in Iraq was a success or not until many years, decades even, after we are gone....

"I hope it is a success, let there be no mistake about that, but I just don't see how we can say anything beyond so far so good, and we'll see how it goes from here."

[Wow.]

[John]

"Having lost the Viet Nam War, in SE Asia, and, now, the Iraq War, in Middle East, the label of a *paper tiger* is more or less significant to be attached to American Super Power."

Unfortunately, the label *real tiger* would be more apt. The US may be on its decline, but the US still has huge numbers of WMD. If the neocon-men behind the Bush Administration or some fundamentalist obsessed with Armageddon are at the helm, the US might bring the rest of the world down with her. There's nothing more dangerous than a cornered ferocious beast.

[baileyman]

Whenever I hear "surge" I mentally add that the total "surge" strategy includes paying the insurgents to back off.

[anne]

http://www.juancole.com/2008/09/zardari-president-65-killed-in-bombings.html

September 7, 2008

The attacks by the US inside the Pakistani border on the Tehrik-i Taliban and on Arab al-Qaeda members have left Pakistani civilians dead this week, raising a public outcry.

It is interesting that when Sen. Barack Obama began pushing for US attacks inside Pakistan on Arab al-Qaeda, he was slammed as impractical by John McCain. In fact, Obama looks closer to the thinking of the US officer corps in Afghanistan than does McCain.

-- Juan Cole

[Wow.]

[anne]

"The surge on the other hand was really about Iran. America was bleeding and the Iranians thought they could keep the pressure on, break American will (which was cracking) and dominate Iraq."

Iran? Iran? Lie on, lie on, lie on.

[Was It Necessary?]

Maybe the best lesson would be to learn how to stay out of unnecessary wars in the first place. The Taiban were harboring the group that attacked us, so that was self defense. Iraq was the mortal enemy of the group that attacked us, so that was something else entirely.

[ken melvin]

One can not a silk purse from a sow's ear make.

[hari]

Look America - under this racist *lead head* - has made Afghnistan and Iraq the new *killing fields* of American democracy.

Watchout Biden/BO you don't fall into same ditch....!

[bakho]

Germany is a stable democracy today. Would anyone in retrospect ask the question whether starting WWII was a success for Germany in the long run?

However, it is exactly the framing that Mark has used above that is used by the Bush administration, the Neocons and McCain.

[hari]

Mark is off his rocker!

I never expected him to mouth the slogans of neocons in this way....Either he's absolutely innocent, or God forbid, he's showing his true clolor.

[bakho]

I don't think the US has really learned any lessons at all from Iraq, Afghanistan, Cambodia or Vietnam.

Vietnam was a proxy war against Russian and China. Afghanistan was a proxy war against Russia. In those wars, governments were toppled and stability destroyed. Years of instability resulted in millions dead.

Iraq was encouraged in a proxy war against Iran, which also led to millions more dead.

Georgia was armed and encouraged in a proxy war against Russia. In their military attack against Ossetia, the Georgian army sent tens of thousands of refugees streaming across the border into Russia. The US only sees the Great Game and restarting the Cold War. Lost in the shuffle is the lack of respect for minority rights by the Georgians and the role of Russia as peacekeeper in Ossetia for the past 2 decades. Why was the US arming Georgia and encouraging them to disrespect minority rights?

The Bush doctrine of preemptive engagement is "We have the biggest baddest military and we will use it." Bush doctrine has merged with the Cold War doctrine of arming factions in other countries to fight destabilizing proxy wars in other countries to tax the resources of our competitors. This is a lose-lose strategy.

The real lesson is the abandonment of international institution building, protection of human rights (especially minority rights) make a world that is far more dangerous, dysfunctional and leaves much of the world's population far worse off. In turn, this imposes very large external costs on our own country. My uncle traveled to Afghanistan and found the people friendly and the country safe for tourists like himself. After our proxy war, we find that Americans being recruited to help build Afghanistan will have to stay in armed camps and the country is unsafe for Americans to travel. Prior to 2003, Iraq was safe for Americans to travel. It is not safe today. There is a real cost to our unfriendly policies.

[hari]

bakho - you're close to the truth of recent history, as I understand it. I wish there are more voices like you in the land of plenty.

The damage to US prestige and power cannot be measured - like our host would like it to be measured with his perfect econometric models - and the consequence is not good for rest of the civilized world, to put it midly.

[me]

Torture? Kidnapping? Gitmo? Abu Grahib? Success? Are you kidding Mark? Invading a sovereign nation without UN authorization? Success? I am going to have to side with pgl and foreign observer on this one. The damage done to this country will be with us for decades because of our lost moral compass.

[chriss1519]

Iraq was a strategic blunder, and nothing that happens going forward will change that. This war cost the US, Iraq and the world, trillions of dollars, not to mention destroyed lives, millions of refugees (whom the US has abandoned) and loss of US prestige.

And what is the best we can hope for? Even if we stay, Iraq will probably revert to something along the lines of an "Egypt model", with a nominal democracy headed by a strongman who justifies his power on national security. He will probably, by necessity, have close ties to Iran. Economy will be based on oil revenues, which will flow to the priviledged few, while the bulk of the society struggles with chronically high unemployment. The Iraqi citizens will see their leader as a US (or perhaps Iranian) puppet. I see this as the best case scenario. And to any rational observer, it was always the likely scenario from the beginning.

Yes, we can say, today, that the US Iraqi adventure has been an abysmal failure. Will we learn from it? No. Even Obama wants to send more troops to Afghanistan.

[Me]

"Unfortunately, the label *real tiger* would be more apt. The US may be on its decline, but the US still has huge numbers of WMD."

It might be helpful to recall the original meaning of the term "Paper Tiger." It is usually interpreted as a fake tiger; it actually meant as entity that is both paperish and tigerish. That is, an entity than was hollow, would collapse, but is really dangerous in the meantime.

On another topic: Dr. Thoma's remarks about hoping the war was a success have become standard liberal rhetoric whose only purpose is to deflect accusations of lack of patriotism.
Trust me; he doesn't intend all the horrible implications some commenters have drawn from it.

FWIW (practically nothing) my own view is that the violence has declined simply because all parties concerned have concluded that it's tactically better to wait until we leave. This has been aided by buying off some factions essentially by leaving them better armed and trained for the forthcoming conflict.

And PLEASE: let's be cautious to the point of paranoia about apply lessons supposedly learned in Iraq to Afghanistan. The two places are very different.

[Don Quijote]

The damage done to this country will be with us for decades because of our lost moral compass.

What moral compass?

Any honest history of the US will show a country of greedy, shortsighted immoral bastards leading a flock of sheep from one war against some weak Nation to the next war against another weak Nation, Starting with the Indian Wars, the Mexican Wars, the Spanish American War, the invasion/occupation of the Philippines, to the Banana wars of Central America, to the various coups that we have backed
(Iran 1953, Guatemala 1957, Indonesia 1965, Chile 1970, Haiti multiple times )

[Noni Mausa]

Foreign observer said: To speak of a needless war that killed about a million innocent Iraqis, and created several millions of refugees and displaced persons, as a "success", even potentially, betrays moral bankruptcy...

Or terminal niceness. [Sorry, Mark.] Success at this point consists in figuratively getting the plane down without killing everybody or landing in a shopping centre.

Wishing for our peaceful-society success in this war is only a kindhearted but futile desire to paint history and the world to be other than it is or probably can be. The underpinnings of power in both countries are built on tribe and clan and sect, on threat and force, and on strategies going back 2 or 3 thousand years, tailored for a landscape (especially in Afghanistan) which itself probably acts as a mnemonic for those strategies and those ancient grudges.

Is/was there a way to cultivate western style democracy, or even the dispassionate rule of law, into either Afghanistan or Iraq? I'm no historian, but I suspect the ways this could be approached would have been as costly as both wars, very long term (not less than a generation, more likely 2 or 3) and would have had to NOT look like an attempt to introduce those things. Those approaches sure as hell wouldn't look like a war.

Noni

[hari]

Strongly suggest you guys read todays (WP) Part I *The War Within* by Bob Woodward.

The story deals with summer 2006 and the killing fields in Baghdad...and WH/Petagon/State interpretation of the strategy to follow before midterm congressional elections that year. It sounds more a like a house divided with no C-C.

[Jrossi]

Quijote is on to something, although he overstates his case. The US has been on the side of justice in many conflicts (Civil War, world wars), but often morality didn't enter into it.The Mexican War and the conquest of the west are prime examples.

[Mark Thoma]

You can make a big deal out of the word success if you want to, but there's a difference between success conditional on where you are, and an unconditional statement. Given where we are today, I hope it turns out well - successful - whatever term you want to use, that is better, given where we are, than a disaster (and when there was lots more violence in Iraq, it was better when there was less - use some word other than success if you want to, but it's better when less people die). I don't see how our strategy at this point can be independent of how best to proceed to bring about "success" rather than "failure", however defined, or whatever words you want to use to describe it.

The other point being made is that contrary to McCain, et. al., there is no way to call this a success now (even by their shifting standards). They are doing that, and I'm trying to say that you cannot, not yet (even if you adopt their framework of analysis). Some of you don't want to call this an (unconditional) success under any circumstances, I have no problem with that -- I opposed the war from the start and I thought non-war alternatives would have been better (as I said), and still do. But there's no way to prove that to doubters.

I am trying to argue against repeating this in Afghanistan unless we know that it will prevent more needless death and destruction, and I'm not convinced that it will. As I said, it is not at all clear to me that it was the surge that brought down the violence, or at least was the major force behind it (though even Stiglitz gives it some credit). So this is an argument against more war. I don't want some kid coming home in a box or Afghans dead based upon a mistaken notion that the surge was the main thing responsible for "success" - meaning decline of violence and more stability in this instance. If you want to get on me for that, go right ahead, I'm not backing down.

And those of you who are calling me a neocon and saying I supported the war or whatever (or it's some secret I have or something) - those of you who have been here for awhile - come on, you know me better than that. My views have been absolutely clear, and I've stood firm, so get off it, okay?

[Bruce Wilder]

Comments have been very interesting. "Hoping" that Iraq "has been a success" reveals a singular weak-mindedness.

We know right now that the War in Iraq has been a catastrophic failure, enormously costly in blood, honor and money, and unproductive in anything but corruption and destruction.

Iraq may well recover to some degree in the future, and in the interim, absent an American occupation, Iraq may well have its civil war. Neither eventuality is properly an outcome measure for the U.S. The outcome of the Iraq War is now. The outcome is the need to recover, and the apparent inevitability of a civil war.

Personally, I am no pacifist, nor am I an isolationist. I actually think the U.S. should have a foreign policy, which is not so different from the foreign policy George W. Bush says we have: promoting democracy, ready to oppose military dictatorships with international cooperation and even armed force, etc. My objections are to not to what Bush says, but to what Bush has us do. I object to the cynical corruption, which directs a war to profit Halliburton, company that wasn't even willing to remain American. I object to torture as a policy. I object to the cavalier disregard and disrespect for international treaties, obligations and institutions. Above all, I object to the incompetence and stupidity and irresponsibility with which great power has been exercised.

I am disappointed with Mark Thoma's willingness to go along with the Bush propaganda, which asserts the narrative trope that we cannot know the outcome, as a way for distracting attention from the reality in front of our eyes. We can know the outcome. The outcome is now. The only question is whether we have the moral substance to face the realization of the consequences of our evil.

I've watched the news media bully Barack Obama on "the success of teh Surge" and am disappointed that the Democrats have not found any way to puncture this propaganda offensive. The Surge has been successful, alright, in the only way it was intended to be successful, as a way of extending the war long enough, that Bush would not be forced to withdraw within his term of office.

Mark Thoma asks if we will learn the right lessons from Iraq. I am afraid he answers that himself, and in the negative. The Surge was intended to prevent the American People from learning the outcome of the War in Iraq and from blaming the politicians most responsible. In that it succeeded. It succeeded as a public relations offensive, even if it accomplished no more than a costly delay, from a military perspective.

After a Democratic Administration withdraws American troops from Iraq, the full power of the right-wing propaganda machine will be turned on the Democrats, to prove that Obama "lost Iraq", snatched defeat from the jaws of victory, wasted the sacrifice of the brave troops whose Veteran's Benefits the Republicans have been trying to cut, etc. No matter how brief the inevitable Iraqi civil war may be, it will be treated in the news Media as bloody and destructive, in ways never acknowledged in U.S. Media for the bloody and destructive Occupation. That Civil War will be an "outcome" of the withdrawal, but, somehow, not the long-postponed "outcome" of the American invasion and occupation, which did so much to destroy the civil institutions, infrastructure and economy of the country.

I have some reserve hope that Americans may be gradually awakening to how easily they are manipulated by these propaganda narratives, and an escalation in critical thought, fed in part by the blogosphere, will change what the body politic "learns". But, today, I am a bit discouraged.

[Larry]

"As for repeating this strategy in Afghanistan, if we don't know for sure that Iraq will remain stable after we leave, and we don't, and if we don't know for sure if it was the surge or something else that caused the reduction in violence, and we don't, then we should be very careful before repeating the strategy once again."

What defines that strategy? More troops? Applying the new counterinsurgency manual? Backing the "Awakening" and employing the "Sons of Iraq"? Doubling the size of and better training the army and police? All of the above? Or was it simply being willing to rethink and adapt to the situation as it had developed. If it's the latter, then reapplying our strategy is correct.

The first difference is that the Taliban survive because they have sanctuaries in Pakistan. We have to figure that out.

"The implications are clear: a show of power wins the day."

That's the opposite of the conclusion that surge supporters have drawn.

"the surge in troops may have played some role."

Well, that's pretty weak. But their role has been to backstop the government, not get more aggressive.

"And the role of the troop surge in reducing violence in Iraq is not clear. Other factors were probably far more important, including buying off Sunni insurgents."

We tried buying them off before. Without the security that the additional forces provided, switching sides was suicidal

"The US should be working to create a strong, unified government, rather than strengthening sectarian militias."

Or...doing both?

"The prospects of a stable future look increasingly dim."

Versus when exactly? When did the prospects look better than now? Last year? Hilarious.

"the surge was supposed to provide space for a political settlement, which would provide the foundations of long-term stability. That political settlement has not occurred. ..."

It certainly isn't complete, but you have to consider the trends. Life on the streets has been completely transformed, as many visitors have attested. Iraqis are utterly sick of the violence. Money is flowing, as is oil and reconstruction is happening. The lake in which the insurgency swam has dried up. That doesn't mean that all is well, or will ever be well, but in which country is all well?

"Things have not been going well in Afghanistan, to say the least, and Pakistan looks ever more unstable."

This is true, but what is Stiglitz' recommendation if not using American forces to secure the peace?

"reigniting fears of a new Cold War"

Ludicrous. Russia has money, but ever less power, not to mention its shrinking, aging population. Its aggression has cemented the desire of its former vassals to look westward for their future. (See Poland.)

[anne]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/06/AR2008090602691_pf.html

September 7, 2008

Doubt, Distrust, Delay
The Inside Story of How Bush's Team Dealt With Its Failing Iraq Strategy

By Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writer

During the summer of 2006, from her office adjacent to the White House, deputy national security adviser Meghan O'Sullivan sent President Bush a daily top secret report cataloging the escalating bloodshed and chaos in Iraq. "Violence has acquired a momentum of its own and is now self-sustaining," she wrote July 20, quoting from an intelligence assessment.

Her dire evaluation contradicted the upbeat assurances that President Bush was hearing from Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the U.S. commander in Iraq. Casey and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld were pushing to draw down American forces and speed the transfer of responsibility to the Iraqis. Despite months of skyrocketing violence, Casey insisted that within a year, Iraq would be mostly stable, with the bulk of American combat troops headed home.

Publicly, the president claimed the United States was winning the war, and he expressed unwavering faith in Casey, saying, "It's his judgment that I rely upon." Privately, he was losing confidence in the drawdown strategy. He questioned O'Sullivan that summer with increasing urgency: "What are you hearing from people in Baghdad? What are people's daily lives like?"

"It's hell, Mr. President," she answered, determined not to mislead or lie to him....

[Reference only, I have not read the article yet.]

[anne]

An increase in troop numbers in Iraq, an increasing turn to air power, and a division of Iraq neighborhood by neighborhood all worked to limited violence in Iraq. There will be a similar strategy that will work to limit violence in Afghanistan and Southwest Pakistan, and we could limit violence in Somalia as well with enough troops and suitable tactics. From such an American perspective, the wars will be successful.

Governments were easily replaced in Iraq and Afghanistan and Somalia, and Pakistan has a President wholly dependent on America, from this perspective the wars have been successful and there is no reason to wait years to declare them so. The problem is what a succesful war happens to be.

[anne]

Mark Thoma:

"You can make a big deal out of the word success if you want to, but there's a difference between success conditional on where you are, and an unconditional statement. Given where we are today, I hope it turns out well - successful - whatever term you want to use, that is better, given where we are, than a disaster (and when there was lots more violence in Iraq, it was better when there was less - use some word other than success if you want to, but it's better when less people die)....

"I opposed the war from the start and I thought non-war alternatives would have been better (as I said), and still do. But there's no way to prove that to doubters...."

This argument is completely acceptable.

[hari]

Mark - you're still not clear in your own mind on the fundamental strategic error of GWBs invasion and occupation of an Arabland (by infidels)...with all its horrendous regional conseqquences.

However, I know you didn't support Iraq War. So why try and rationalize now the false pretense of surge *tactics* by an incompetent leader of the Western world?

Bruce Wilder is atleast consistent with his abomination of the War.

==================

IMHO there is a practical solution to Afghanistan. Get Nato and all (I mean ALL!) Western military battalions out of Hindu Kush...before they're destroyed by their false military strategy against the civilian population. Give finally a chance for regional SouthAsian partners of Afghanistan to intervene, at official request of Kabul, and try to find ways and means to resolve its protracted domestic conflict.

It will surely take time, but I think it's a much more realistic approach. Outsiders, may I submit, are not culturally or otherwise competent to resolve this conflict...without indefinte military occupation and more killings.

[Mark Thoma]

I am completely clear.

It's your interpretation of what I'm saying that's screwed up.

As I said, get off of it - you are trying to stick me with something that doesn't apply. You are not the only one capable of understanding the bigger picture.

[anne]

Sorry, I do not understand the argument since I do not even find a necessary argument in positions. I do not find a necessary division, once there is actually a definition of success. What am I missing? Where is the fight?

[hari]

There is what's called -

* a war of Choice, and

* a war of necessity.

Which one do you think best interprets you view today?

[Benign Brodwicz]

IMHO this war resulted from a half-baked idea that we were going to take control of the Iraqi oil fields. If so, we failed.

We had no other credible reason for the war, as some of us knew all along. Nation-building isn't in our Constitution.

[hari]

Mark - *You are not the only one capable of understanding the bigger picture*.

I've never claimed that...my intervention is principally to distort (as much as possible) a US-centric view of the world which, for good or evil, is the cause of a lot of problems in a globalized world today.

Senator Fullbright called it *the arrogance of power* - in aftermath of investigating the (justification of) Viet Nam War.

[btg]

when i read the article, i was reminded of the sotry of chou en lai, who was asked by kissinger what he thought were the consequences of the french revolution, said "its too soon to tell"

but the line "a show of power wins the day" is something that critics have being saying since the beginning - a show of force in the early days of the occupation would have stopped the looting and the rise of factionalism - an initial surge several years ago, when the US had an abundance of fresh troops to really maintain control would have made a quick exit possible (assuming the iraqi army hadn't been disbanded, of course)

[anne]

The war was obviously a war of "choice" unless there was ever the idea that Iraq could actually threaten America. But, in what way could Iraq have threatened America or Britain (to remember Tony Blair)? Later, how could Iran have threatened America as was charged? There were no mass destructive weapons in Iraq, I think the sum of Iranians arrested since the war against Iraq began has been less than 10 with almost every Iranian having been invited to Iraq by the Iraqi government.

The war then was of choice, the surge was of choice, because we could have not gone to war since Iraq was long contained and we could have left Iraq after deposing the government. We chose to say and to win and we defined winning as creating enough quite to be recorded as quiet by reporters. So we have won and we were successful in deposing the government and successful in quieting an Iraq that had been quiet before March 2003.

The success is our collective political definition, as is obvious now even if the term seems jarring to those using a different perspective. I find Iraq a failure, but there is less sympathy for this view all the time.

[bakho]

The word "success" is vague and implies an end point rather than the process that is foreign policy.
A true foreign policy success is win-win.
Wars are at best win - lose.
Iraq is a lose-lose policy looking for damage control.
A win-win (success) going forward would require a political and social reconciliation, no a military solution. Given the high levels of ethnic cleansing in Iraq, this will be very difficult.
Our military only further fractures an already fractured society. A military success is not an option.

[anne]

BTG:

But the line "a show of power wins the day" is something that critics have being saying since the beginning - a show of force in the early days of the occupation would have stopped the looting and the rise of factionalism - an initial surge several years ago, when the US had an abundance of fresh troops to really maintain control would have made a quick exit possible (assuming the Iraqi army hadn't been disbanded, of course).

[Precisely; when the problem with war is criticizing the strategy rather than the need for war, the argument as to whether war was necessary has already been lost. There will always be strategy problem in a war. Strategy problems had nothing however to do with going to war when we were neither attacked nor threatened.]

[anne]

Hari:

"I've never claimed that...my intervention is principally to distort (as much as possible) a US-centric view of the world which, for good or evil, is the cause of a lot of problems in a globalized world today."

However, there is little question at all here at this time of taking a US-centric view of the world, nor of assuming there must be US leadership of the world, morally and physically. There has been a continual emphasis about US world leadership, echoing the current Administration, since the close of primaries by the supposed political opposition.

[Foreign observer]

Your group, and the media you read, may have a heavily US-centric view, but it gives you a highly distorted and partial reflection of international realities. One of the fascinating aspects of the Iraq saga is the extent to which the "West" lost control of the narrative, outside its own bubble.

As for the moral issue, Thoma's weak defense sounds very lame. OK, so compared to many others he may feel he is and was one of the good guys, but sorry, when people die for greed and lies, a dispassionate "so far so good" is adding insult to injury.

Would Thoma be willing to expound his views on the success (or not) of this invasion and occupation to family members of dead and surviving maimed Iraqis, looking them in the eye as he does so? Has he done anything at all to atone to them for the damage his taxes helped inflict? If he himself were one of the victims (if his imagination can stretch so far), how would he react to reading this post?

[anne]

Mark Thoma:

"So before we commit to repeating the same tactic, let's better understand exactly why things improved in Iraq. I realize that whether the reduction in violence is attributed to the surge or not has large political consequences, but I don't care about that, I just want our best assessment of what factors were at work."

This is a completely fair argument, but self-defeating in that looking closely at how the geography of Iraq has been changed since 2003 the answer in clear. Distinct and divided ethnic communities, physically divided, and millions of displaced households along with direct losses. Also, though less clear in effect, a government militia that is increasingly well armed and able to afford American arms indefinitely. A Sunni led country, turned Shiite led even with a few splits among Shiites, with a Kurdish sphere of independent influence.

My problem from the beginning however, was that such a remaking of Iraq was never morally given to us.

[lee A. Arnold]

At this moment? No more troop drawdowns until "next year."

Victory or success is defined in at least four separate parts: 1. The military spread of fundamentalist Islam -- few days ago in Pakistan a woman (along with two teenagers) was buried alive for taking her own choice of husband. 2. Oil, and the military empire of the United States -- thousands of books, multi-millions of opinions on this. 3. In Iraq, Bush gave democracy to a Shi'ite majority. And, 4. How this is being spun in the 2008 presidential campaign.

As the latter is my favorite sports topic:

The Democrats should instantly own-up to eating crow in the reduction of violence, which is always to the good -- and not give an inch on the full report of their original position: still no political reconciliation, rather it looks a certainty that all hell breaks loose if we don't stay interposed in their civil war, down into the Baghdad neighborhoods. --These were the likely outcomes guessed by the Democrats, (in fact probably much of the military community,) BEFORE the surge.

And here we are.

Real "victory" for the United States could come only after the Shi'ite government evolves, through a couple of generations of leaders, into a workable and durable constitution of liberty -- an overseas sort of military-cultural program for which it appears no government in the West, perhaps none of the West, is intellectually capable.

Whether or not it is morally appropriate.

Anyway permanent U.S. troops are totally unacceptable to the Grand Ayatollah Sistani and every one in line after him. He has signalled, "Out, soon."

So, pending the inevitable:

Gungho McCainers must create for our view the stereotype of the Democrats' lack of moral authority. This is because they need to distract from their own non-plan, and to avoid explaining What Happens Next.

So their battle cry: almost two years into the surge: "Only 98 Years to Go!"

Democrats, for their part, must harp upon the fears of more Bushian Bad Management (a true enough fear in my own view,) yet like the Repubs they are noticeably reticent on details of Iraq policy forward, having instead jumped cleverly to the repositioning of forces to fight murderers elsewhere.

The presidential debates should be interesting, because it seems to me that Obama has signalled that he is going to take it down to brass tacks. That could precipitate a game-changing debate. For example, a peaceful outcome to a sooner U.S. withdrawal from Iraq might require evacuating neighborhoods to safer areas and partitioning. Reports that Iraqis are against partition exclude the well-perched Kurds; while other responses seem more concerned with the land rights under the bodies.

[erewhon]

I'm with bakho and bruce wilder. The US lost the minute that we invaded Iraq. If we take a long term perspective, nobody did well in World War I- horrible loss of life, hateful settlements which guaranteed another even bigger war. World War II was not a war of choice for the US. Pat Buchanan has claimed that the Brits could have stayed out of it, and then the war might have been a small regional war, but his argument doesn't convince me. His arguments about Churchill being stubborn and impulsive are convincing, but Churchill was a great leader (albeit militarily stupid) . The Japanese attacked us at Pearl Harbor. In the end the Allies were victorious but both the US and the USSR drew the wrong conclusions. Each felt that their perception of themselves as a chosen people with special rights was confirmed. We thought that our exceptional status was confirmed by the Soviet collapse- the Clinton administration repeated some of the mistakes of the Versailles treaty in a much smaller and less obnoxious way, but their actions plus the vast Russian energy resources, guaranteed another round of US- Russian animosity. How bad that gets remains to be seen. Power corrupts; great power corrupts greatly.

Our invasion of Iraq could only have been successful if Chalabi had been able to bring up a government with great Iraqi support in a short period of time. That was always a lunatic idea. One of these days, the Iraqis will demand that we leave, all of us, and our fancy embassy and other bases will seem as ridiculous as the monster base at Cam Ranh bay. Just blowin in the wind.

How badly will we lose? Well, we have lost a lot of wealth and respect already. A McCain presidency will increase our loss of both. The Fannie/Freddie bailout with its cute trick of saving those who own preferred stock gives the lie to the idea that the Republicans love the little main street investors. Chris Dodd is no more honest. The idea that a few billion can save F & F is most dubious. What about the Investment banks? How much are the taxpayers going to do for them?

The whole US political system is corrupt; it's a mistake to even ask if Iraq is or will be a victory and an equal mistake to think that counter-terrorist Petraeus with his aerial bombing (guaranteed to turn the population against you) can salvage Afghanistan, even if every single US fighter in Iraq moves to A’stan. It’s too late; we can’t put humpty dumpty together again. Our factotum in Kabul is blaming all the Afghan civilian deaths on the Brits- just like Pat Buchanan, what goes around goes around.

[rufus]

hari says...
There is what's called -

* a war of Choice, and

* a war of necessity.

I completely disagree with this categorization. No country would 'choose' to wage war, and claim it was anything but a 'necessity'.

[Fred Thompson]

pgl says...

As I read this excellent oped by Stiglitz, it's clear to me that he thinks the invasion of Iraq was a grave mistake. I agree.

I agree too. But that mistake has been made. The question is what to do in the future and learning the lessons of recent events may be useful to answering that question One very compelling discussion of those lessons can be found in Moment of Truth in Iraq: How a New 'Greatest Generation' of American Soldiers is Turning Defeat and Disaster into Victory and Hope by Michael Yon.

[roger]

Mark, I accept that you opposed the war from the beginning. So did I. What I think is odd about this post is the univocal use of the term success. It is possible, for instance, that the majority of Iraqis might find the occupation a ¨success¨in that it led to a Shi´ite government, allied to Iran, that is able to impose a certain modified Khomenei-ist regime on Iraq, without the presence of a supreme leader, but with a religiously conditioned set of laws, a continuation of the nationalized system of oil ownership, opposition to Israel, etc. Now, it might be this would not be called a success by the U.S. Myself, I think something close to it is where Iraq is heading. If the Sunnis and Kurds can successfully negotiate positions that prevent Iraq from being run absolutely by a small Shiá elite, that would be a kind of success from the point of view of seeing that the state wasn´t systematically biased against a minority. And of course that minority composes much of the exiled community.

Success for the U.S. seems to have been something like Iraq becomes a U.S. ally, achieves reconciliation with Israel, and privatizes to a large extent its oil fields. Myself, I consider that colonization, and an impossible program save by imposition by dictatorial fiat.
I assume you don´t have the second scenario in mind as a success, but your post sounded close to it. Ultimately, I think success for the U.S. will come when America dissolves its automatic and kneejerk enmity with Iran, and is able to use Iraq as a conduit to detente. On the other hand, I don´t believe there is a large chance of this.

[Extinct Species]

anne says...

"The surge on the other hand was really about Iran. America was bleeding and the Iranians thought they could keep the pressure on, break American will (which was cracking) and dominate Iraq."

"Iran? Iran? Lie on, lie on, lie on."

Hmmm.... Very intelligent argument. I don't really care if you believe it or if you can't follow the line of thinking. I do find your replies here relatively intelligent (although less than objective) so I am a bit surprised that you think calling something a lie without offering any explanation or counter argument is intelligent, worthy or even convincing to anyone
but the choir.

You truly believe Iran was not offering support to violent elements in Iraq? You truly believe that Iran would not love an outcome where it exerts significant control over a highly dominate Shiite Iraqi government (an outcome that would be very possible (fairly quickly) if America had exited rather than surged)? And even if you truly believe those things, do you truly believe the possibility of those things and the grave geopolitical consequences they could bring should not be of concern to American decision making? And if decisions were made (the surge) with those things in mind how is it incorrect (or a lie) to say they were about Iran?

I was against the war from before the beginning. I pride myself in attempting to be as objective as possible. I am more than open to being shown that my thinking is flawed. However the cry of "lie on" (and using a partial quote that shades the flavor of what I said) is pitifully inadequate and unconvincing.

[anne]

ES:

"The surge on the other hand was really about Iran. America was bleeding and the Iranians thought they could keep the pressure on, break American will (which was cracking) and dominate Iraq."

Thank you for being kind to make up for my being mean. The problem here though is serious indeed and has been a problem with planning and justifying military strategy from the time we were deciding to attack Iraq. The assumption always was both that Iraq was subject to outside influence that was meant to be threatening to America and that attacking for the purpose of preemption would not only set aside any threat in Iraq but in turn dictate the course of any country that looked to Iraq to be a threat to us.

Change of government in Iraq was meant to change government structures and directions through the Middle East, but changing the government of Iraq did not have such a Middle East effect.

Iran especially had from the beginning even less influence on Iraq that any larger neighbor might expect to have, an influence however that had to increase by changing the government in Iraq and setting up a Shiite government rather than a Sunni government which we began to do immediately on attacking. Iran has never had reason to worry about influence in Iraq since the initial attack, but Iran has been used with absolutely no evidence as an excuse for repeated military operations.

[anne]

"The surge on the other hand was really about Iran. America was bleeding and the Iranians thought they could keep the pressure on, break American will (which was cracking) and dominate Iraq."

The problem with the comment is that it simply assumes the problem leading to the surge was Iran, and there is no, really no, evidence of any such thing. Fewer than 10 Iranians have been taken prisoner in Iraq these last years, and these prisoners were Iranian diplomats invited to Iraq by Iraqi governors. Iran was not and is not a problem, militarily, in Iraq.

[Barkley Rosser]

hari,

There is no evidence the Iraq war was about control of oil. It is only now that major oil companies (aside from Cheney's Halliburton for special contracts) are getting to bid on projects in Iraq, and there still is no national oil law there. Indeed, the best available evidence says that the heads of the oil majors opposed the US invasion out of fear that it would "disrupt the oil markets," although the disruption that occurred, with the fall of oil production in Iraq after Saddam was overthrown, leading to their profits rising as oil supplies were tight in the face of rising demand from China.

The claim that the "surge" was a success is based on the decline in deaths in Iraq to a level that was going on at the beginning of 2004, hardly a "success." Woodward makes it clear that little of this decline had anything to do with the surge, with the Sunni tribesmen already pissed at al Qaeda in Iraq for its activities in al Anbar and going to fight them no matter what, and al-Sadr calling for his people to stop fighting due to internal political factors. At most the surge increased the building of walls around the neighborhoods in Baghdad after the several years of ethnic cleansing and segregation of neighborhoods there had been completed last year (with a major outmigration by Sunnis and Christians).

Iran has been friendly with the Iraqi government, while some elements have supported factions of the Mahdist army. The focus on Iran as a pretext for the surge is just baloney.

Ironically, the Woodward story suggests that the military was probably right. Things were getting aligned so that we could have withdrawn troops and things were going to get better. We did not need the surge. The level of deaths was going to go down because of the inevitable and eventual winding down of the internal conflicts in Iraq, the reaction of the Sunni tribesmen against the foreigners in their midst, and the completion of the ethnic segregation of Baghdad's neighborhoods. Hadley, the main inside supporter of the surge even admits this, defending it ultimately on the shaky claim that it "reinforced" these other trends that were happening (or were going to happen) anyway. The military was right; the surge was a waste.

[Bruce Wilder]

Barkley Rosser: "There is no evidence the Iraq war was about control of oil."

You really are an economist. Take a reality pill.

[Barkley Rosser]

Bruce,

Provide the evidence. Do not repeat widespread prejudices. If that was the case, then why were the CEOs of the leading oil companies not supporting the US invasion of Iraq? Maybe because they were smart enough to realize that the invasion would not lead to any increased control of oil in the Middle East by the US or its companies, which it has not? Where is this increased control? I suggest you take a reality pill.

[Bruce Wilder]

Barkley, look again at your statement:
"There is no evidence the Iraq war was about control of oil."

Think about this seriously for ten seconds, please. No evidence? No evidence, at all?

You make an extreme hyperbolic assertion, and phrase it as an broad, absolute negative. Even in the abstract, it is hard to "prove" a negative. And, there's abundant evidence that the American invasion and occupation of Iraq was about oil; much more than that it was about WMD, and considerably more evidence than that it was some singular, idiosyncratic project of Bush's personality.

So, what do you do? You define "control of oil" narrowly, and adduce some fairly weak evidence about prospective interest in the invasion, and an even weaker argument about the consequences of the occupation, while grudgingly acknowledging that Halliburton, an oil services giant with a close association with the powerful Vice-President, did rather well.

I don't want to take responsibility for reciting or re-reporting tons of evidence on Administration purposes for its invasion of Iraq, or arguing over the correct inferences from that evidence. Figuring out precisely why a secretive, PR-obsessed, disjointed and disorganized Administration did what it did in Iraq, is a huge undertaking. But, I don't think it is mere prejudice to suggest that oil had a lot to do with the motivations and expectations and hopes of many of the players -- including Bush, Cheney, and Rice, who are all closely associated with the oil industry. Quite apart from the personalities of a few involved leaders, the U.S. institutional interest in Iraq and the region takes Persian Gulf oil as a primary concern. No matter what the most proximate cause of invasion and occupation, oil would figure in the calculation of interest and the shaping of policy in execution.

I would suggest that one of the best narrative analyses goes something like this: The international sanctions regime, which had restricted Iraqi oil sales was beginning to break down by 2001, with the French and Russians competing to gain entry. Iraq has some of the largest reserves in the world, and the best potential for increasing production volume of high-quality crude. A resumption and expansion of Iraqi oil production would provide finance for Saddam's military ambitions in the region. Hope for Saddam's overthrow, as a result of sanctions, had faded. Sufficient expansion of Iraqi oil production might depress prices and destabilize the Saudi regime. Cheney, at least, was in a position to know of limits on Saudi production, and to anticipate.

So, Iraq was invaded and occupied to prevent an early, uncontrolled resumption and expansion of Iraqi oil production. World oil prices were elevated as a result, with great benefits to the Saudis and to U.S. oil interests.

U.S. policy toward Iraq, under Bush, has centered on getting the Iraqis to pass "an oil law" that would permit U.S. firms to participate in the expansion of Iraqi oil production, and in trying to achieve a permanent U.S. military presence in Iraq, presumably to protect American interests in the region (aka, protect access to the oil). U.S. efforts to reconstruct the Iraqi economy and to promote democracy have not been pursued so assiduously, and have mostly, failed, except as ways to profit U.S. contractors with ties to the Republican Administration.

That's the kind of narrative, I find plausible. It features "control of oil" as a central theme. This is only a blog comment, and I don't intend to write a tome. But, do you honestly want to argue that "no evidence" could be adduced to support that narrative?

Maybe, there's some useful point to be made about the endless folly of Man, in an argument about how Iraq was all just a huge, multifaceted mistake, but, surely, even if all the players were wildly mistaken in their judgments, they were not so delusional as to overlook the oil?

I have heard some right-wingers, their faith in Bush undiminished by experience, argue that it couldn't be about oil, because gas prices are so high. If Bush had gone for the oil, surely he would have delivered low gas prices to his supporters in middle America. You wouldn't make that argument, would you?

The Iraq War has proven to be very good for the oil industry and very bad for the United States. That some risk-averse parties in the oil industry would prefer not to have made the bet, doesn't seem to have discouraged any from raking in the chips.

There are deep, unsolved epistemological problems with developing sensible explanations for collective action by large institutions, organizations and groups. Some of those problems, certainly present themselves in trying to "prove" "why" the U.S. invaded Iraq. But, I don't have any doubt that "control of oil" had something important to do with it. And, to assert otherwise, makes you look like a lunatic. I know you are not a lunatic, Barkley, but you might want to adopt a more nuanced rhetoric. It could be productive of sensible exchanges in a way that wildly overbroad assertions are not.

[Barkley Rosser]

Bruce W.,

Some of the "it is all about oil" conspiracy theorists argue that the high oil prices prove that it was all about oil. You see, Bush knew that the invasion would disrupt the supply of oil, and he wanted that to happen, because oil company profits have soared with the higher price of oil. See? That makes sense, doesn't it?

Here is where I think oil played a role, at a much deeper level, because at the deeper level the invasion of Iraq was the followup to the first Gulf War, just as WW II was the followup to WW I, and the first Gulf War was about oil, with more intelligent oil man Bush Sr. in the White House. After all, we had been generally siding with Saddam against Iran, the Great Enemy, until he did not get the weakly conveyed message from Ambassador April Glaspie that we did not approve of his invading Kuwait. Now, we had all our excuses about legality and all that, quite correctly, but it was the oil in Kuwait, and the greater fear that Saddam would run down the coast to grab the big prize, Saudi Arabia, that really drove Bush Sr. to organize that grand international coalition to push Saddam back.

Of course, it was Bush Sr.'s "failure" to go all the way to Baghdad and overthrow Saddam, largely following the advice of the Saudis who said it would destabilize things and grant too much power to Iran, that held him back. But this holding back set up this story for Cheney to play to the aggrieved Oedipal problems of Bush Jr. and play to his desire to outshine his daddy by doing it and "finishing the job." This stuff lost any connection with the oil question by the time Bush, Jr. was in charge, especially given that the oil majors were not supporting this crap.

So, sure, the reason we are mucking about in the Persian Gulf ultimately is because of oil. But this stupid invasion of Iraq has been, among other things, a major distraction from being able to manage things there, especially given the heightened power of Iran.

The US only got around to pushing a national oil law in the last year or two. Check the record, and one has not been passed yet, and is not likely to be passed anytime soon. More failure on that front, which is exactly my point. What increase in control? (and the Iraqis are now cutting deals with both the Russians and the Chinese, what a joke.)

As for the Saudis, they easily survived $9 per barrel of oil. They are better at handling low prices of oil than pretty much all but one or two of the other OPEC members. All the stories you read about their government being unstable or in danger of being overthrown? Baloney by ignorant people.

Also, please keep in mind that some of the major players in pushing the invasion of Iraq were Israel-oriented neocons. While some like to fantasize that somehow Israel is in cahoots with the US oil companies and willing to play some kind of praetorian guard role for them in the Gulf, this has never been the case and never will be. Quite the contrary. There has been a long twilight struggle in Washington by the oil company and Arab oil-producing country-oriented "Arabists" of the State Department against the pro-Israeli faction that has opposed them. The Arabists have been the buddies of the Saudis who have complained about US support for Israel ever since the country was founded in 1948 (FDR had promised King Abdulaziz, aka "Ibn Saud," that he would consult with him about the disposition of Palestine), with the US oil companies operating in Saudi, especially those based in Texas, supporting the Saudis (and other Arabs) against Israel. Please, learn your history and get real here. This is about a lot more than just economics.

[hari]

Barkley -
Bruce Wilder -

Re: Oil & Iraq

Sorry I was out of town after Mark's flip flop on *surge* and whatnot which began this thread....

Let's be honest and admit we really don't have any factual evidence, so far, on Iraq Oil, except AGs insider view that it was all about oil (see his book).

Bruce and I (may be) coming from a policy decision-making background which more or less guides us intuitively in how such decisions are arrived at the highest policy level....
In case of GWB, it was simply a *gut reaction* to invade and occupy Iraq for future oil reserves and its supply. US has no other national interest in the region, since WW11.

If Afghanistan had similar oil reserves, you can be sure he'd have done the same in Hindu Kush! The failure in Hindu Kush is more a reflection of (no oil reserves!)- his initial gut reaction, after 9/11, was to punish Taliban.

Bob Woodward's - *The War Within* further reveals GWB decision-making style - policy doosiers are not for this guy - his gut reaction is the style of his Admin. [May be his brain cells are damaged from youthful alcoholism - who knows!]

Those of us who have made serious decisions based on our gut reactions (at the time!) know bloody well our *mistakes* for not dealing with such decisions calmly and deliberately. It's dangerous, to say the least, when national security and policy decisions are based on gut reactions - rather than incontrovertible factual evidence> GWB memoires will have to deal with it and, as well as, his place in history.

PS. It's astonishing how the q' of *surge* is bandied by media at BO to discredit him. The surge, as we know now from Bob Woodward, was not what rescued Bush from being forced to vacate Bhaghdad lock-stock-and-barrel...There were other internal Iraqi factors in play (as BO has argued). AIE and its *surge*, notwithstanding, all these *factual matters* will eventually come out into the open once this Admin is out of power.

[me]

Imposter alert.This was not posted by ME.

Me says...

"Unfortunately, the label *real tiger* would be more apt. The US may be on its decline, but the US still has huge numbers of WMD."

It might be helpful to recall the original meaning of the term "Paper Tiger." It is usually interpreted as a fake tiger; it actually meant as entity that is both paperish and tigerish. That is, an entity than was hollow, would collapse, but is really dangerous in the meantime.

On another topic: Dr. Thoma's remarks about hoping the war was a success have become standard liberal rhetoric whose only purpose is to deflect accusations of lack of patriotism.
Trust me; he doesn't intend all the horrible implications some commenters have drawn from it.

FWIW (practically nothing) my own view is that the violence has declined simply because all parties concerned have concluded that it's tactically better to wait until we leave. This has been aided by buying off some factions essentially by leaving them better armed and trained for the forthcoming conflict.

And PLEASE: let's be cautious to the point of paranoia about apply lessons supposedly learned in Iraq to Afghanistan. The two places are very different.

[Barkley Rosser]

hari,

Allow me to exhibit ignorance for once: which "insider" is the one you label "AG"?

Reading Woodward's work, I see no discussions anywhere about oil, the need to secure it, control it, or anything else. Totally secondary, aside from Cheney making sure Halliburton got all its goody contracts, although again a deep backdrop cause as I noted above thanks to this Iraq invasion being an extension, "completion," of the first Gulf War. Certainly the general interest and focus on the Gulf by the US is motivated by oil.

The only administration figure to make a comment about oil was ironically the pro-Israeli neocon figure, Paul Wolfowitz, and that was just once and only in a very general way. Again, of course, oil has not been secured and there has been no increase in control. If that was the real goal of the war, it is yet another failure.

Oh yes, some have argued for the primacy of oil in the invasion because when US troops first got to Baghdad one of the first things they did was to secure the Oil Ministry. Well, kiddies, the reason for that was a leftover memory of the first Gulf War. Kuwait paid for it, and Wolfie and others had this fantasy that Iraq was both going to be so overjoyed by our actions and also in such great shape economically and whatnot afterwards, that they would just step forward and imitate the Kuwaitis. Heck, Wolfie and gang were all over the Congress and the press prior to the invasion telling us that it would not cost anything (or very much) because the Iraqis would pay for it out of all their oil earnings. So, that was what securing the Oil Ministry was all about, making sure that they would pay for the war. And, of course, we are still waiting on that one...

BTW, sometimes it takes an economist to point out that not everything is driven by economics.

[hari]

Barkley - AG = Allen Greenspan!

Let me thank you for discussing your knowledge of *Arabists* in FoggyBottom - place I got to know in 1970s.

IMHO you've not only ready access (from Virginia) but this aspect of internal policy debate is crucial to understand US policy towards Arab world. And, if you have the energy, I'd like to encourage you to follow-up in bits and pieces pls. Bring them here for our info and comments.

You know EU dealt with Ukraine q' today, in Paris. Short of EU Membership - they discussed everything else....

[Barkley Rosser]

hari,

Alan Greenspan. Of course. Of course he also had nothing to do with planning or executing the war in Iraq, despite his "insider" status.

I am pleased that it looks like a deal has been cut to replace the Russian troops in Georgia proper with EU observers. Hope that it actually works out.

[Real Person from the Real World]

We had NO BUSINESS going into a new war, with a difficult war already going in Afghanistan. They were looking for a "TIPPING POINT" in the middle east, and now that there has been no tipping point, we have a big, ugly, expensive mess that it will be difficult to extricate ourselves from. Meanwhile, all our money is spent, and our people losing out to wage arbitrage with global elites, not other countries, just stateless rich people who make more and more, at everyone else's expense.

[kuaför malzemeleri]

Having faced this myself, and having handled it poorly, my first reaction was to try to change the beliefs, to argue why my way of looking at the world was better. The result? I gave the impression, probably a true impression at the time, that I did not respect, and even had disdain for the beliefs I was arguing against, particularly those with religious roots.kuaför malzemeleri ts about evolution, and so on? If you found out your child had these beliefs, how would you react? Would your first inclination be to try to change their beliefs, to explain through gentle (or not so gentle) persuasion why other