- Patrolling the Boundaries Inside America - Robert Reich
- It Is All Ideology on the Other Side? - Brad DeLong
- Good for the rich, bad for the poor - Vox EU
- UK Macroeconomic Policy Mistakes of the Past - Angry Bear
- On the First Law of Causal Inference - Causal Analysis
- Immigration & spontaneous order - Stumbling and Mumbling
- How income inequality undermines U.S. power - Washington Post
- Macroeconomics at George Mason University - EconoSpeak
- What Is Free Banking All About? - Uneasy Money
Sunday, November 30, 2014
Saturday, November 29, 2014
- In Front Of Your Macroeconomic Nose - Paul Krugman
- Do we get the leaders our media deserves? - mainly macro
- Beware middle-aged men waving feminist flags - Frances Woolley
- Lower Working Age Population and Secular Stagnation - Tim Taylor
- Diminishing Returns Aren't Waste (Wonkish) - Paul Krugman
- Liquidity and foreign asset management inL atin America - Vox EU
- Why Did Republicans Become Anti-Environmentalists? - Mathew Kahn
- Development and foreign aid: A historical perspective - Vox E
- Harvard GWomen Fall Short of Their Work Expectations - NYTimes.com
- You Want a Bigger Paycheck? Convince Me. - Noah Smith
Friday, November 28, 2014
Why and when did Republicans become anti-environmentalists?:
Pollution and Politics, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: Earlier this week, the Environmental Protection Agency announced proposed regulations to curb emissions of ozone, which causes smog, not to mention asthma, heart disease and premature death. And you know what happened: Republicans went on the attack, claiming that the new rules would impose enormous costs.
There’s no reason to take these complaints seriously... Polluters and their political friends have a track record of crying wolf. ... Again and again, the actual costs have been far lower than they predicted. In fact, almost always below the E.P.A.’s predictions.
So it’s the same old story. But why, exactly, does it always play this way? ... When and why did the Republican Party become the party of pollution?
For it wasn’t always thus. The Clean Air Act of 1970 ... was signed into law by Richard Nixon. (I’ve heard veterans of the E.P.A. describe the Nixon years as a golden age.) A major amendment of the law, which among other things made possible the cap-and-trade system that limits acid rain, was signed in 1990 by former President George H.W. Bush.
But that was then. Today’s Republican Party is putting a conspiracy theorist who views climate science as a “gigantic hoax” in charge of the Senate’s environment committee. And this isn’t an isolated case. ...
So what explains this anti-environmental shift?
You might be tempted simply to blame money in politics... But this doesn’t explain why money from the most environmentally damaging industries, which used to flow to both parties, now goes overwhelmingly in one direction. ...
One answer could be ideology... My guess, however, is that ideology is only part of the story — or, more accurately, it’s a symptom of the underlying cause...: rising inequality. ... Any policy that benefits lower- and middle-income Americans at the expense of the elite — like health reform, which guarantees insurance to all and pays for that guarantee in part with taxes on higher incomes — will face bitter Republican opposition.
And environmental protection is, in part, a class issue,... ownership of, say, stock in coal companies is concentrated in a few, wealthy hands. ...
In the case of the new ozone plan, the E.P.A.’s analysis suggests that, for the average American, the benefits would be more than twice the costs. But that doesn’t necessarily matter to the nonaverage American driving one party’s priorities. On ozone, as with almost everything these days, it’s all about inequality.
Economists vs politicians: ... I suspect that there is a greater distance now between the political parties and economist than there has been for years. ...
You might think this isn't a wholly bad thing. Many ideas are not worth adopting ... This, however, doesn't justify politicians' lack of interest in the settled, established knowledge that economists do have.
So, where is there such a gap between politicians and economists?
The fault might partly lie with economics. Many academics aren't as interested in closing the gap between academia and the "real world" as they should be. At least some of the discipline was discredited by the crisis, and I get the feeling that there aren't so many good new policy-relevant ideas now.
It might be that the voters are to blame. Maybe they don't want serious politicians who are interested in good ideas but rather, in our narcissistic age, they simply expect their demands to be met, however unreasonable. But is this the whole story? Janan Ganesh thinks not:There is...an unsatisfied demand for seriousness and leadership. Most people do not vote Ukip or parse an MP’s tweet for class meaning. The flight to frivolity in public life is not the voters’ doing. Many are in fact waiting for a leader to arrest it.
This leaves a third suspect - the media. ... Political journalists have been complicit in creating a hyperreal bubble of mediamacro which perpetuates witless ideas (such as conflating the economy with the deficit) to the exclusion of such good ones as might exist.
I'm not sure, then, how exactly to apportion blame for the divorce between politicians and economists. But I do suspect that, net, it is a bad thing.
[I left out his examples of "established knowledge that economists do have".]
Why the Job Market is Better Than it Looks: True or false: Most of the jobs created during the sluggish economic recovery consist of part-time, not full-time, employment? ...
- Bitcoiners: Surely we can do Buiter than this? - MacroMania
- Disemployment and FDI: Evidence from Japan - Vox EU
- Inflation truthing, asset prices, discount rates, QE - longandvariable
- SR vs LR order of moves for monetary and fiscal authorities - Nick Rowe
- Causes of the G7 fixed investment doldrums - Vox EU
- Euro Bond Yields - Paul Krugman
Thursday, November 27, 2014
As Mark Thoma often says, the problem is with macroeconomists rather than macroeconomics.
Much, much more here.
Happy Thanksgiving everyone. Not sure how much blogging I'll get done today:
Washington, D.C. October 3, 1863
By the President of the United States of America.
The year that is drawing towards its close, has been filled with the blessings of fruitful fields and healthful skies.
To these bounties, which are so constantly enjoyed that we are prone to forget the source from which they come, others have been added, which are of so extraordinary a nature, that they cannot fail to penetrate and soften even the heart which is habitually insensible to the ever watchful providence of Almighty God.
In the midst of a civil war of unequaled magnitude and severity, which has sometimes seemed to foreign States to invite and to provoke their aggression, peace has been preserved with all nations, order has been maintained, the laws have been respected and obeyed, and harmony has prevailed everywhere except in the theatre of military conflict; while that theatre has been greatly contracted by the advancing armies and navies of the Union. Needful diversions of wealth and of strength from the fields of peaceful industry to the national defence, have not arrested the plough, the shuttle or the ship; the axe has enlarged the borders of our settlements, and the mines, as well of iron and coal as of the precious metals, have yielded even more abundantly than heretofore. Population has steadily increased, notwithstanding the waste that has been made in the camp, the siege and the battle-field; and the country, rejoicing in the consiousness of augmented strength and vigor, is permitted to expect continuance of years with large increase of freedom.
No human counsel hath devised nor hath any mortal hand worked out these great things. They are the gracious gifts of the Most High God, who, while dealing with us in anger for our sins, hath nevertheless remembered mercy. It has seemed to me fit and proper that they should be solemnly, reverently and gratefully acknowledged as with one heart and one voice by the whole American People. I do therefore invite my fellow citizens in every part of the United States, and also those who are at sea and those who are sojourning in foreign lands, to set apart and observe the last Thursday of November next, as a day of Thanksgiving and Praise to our beneficent Father who dwelleth in the Heavens. And I recommend to them that while offering up the ascriptions justly due to Him for such singular deliverances and blessings, they do also, with humble penitence for our national perverseness and disobedience, commend to His tender care all those who have become widows, orphans, mourners or sufferers in the lamentable civil strife in which we are unavoidably engaged, and fervently implore the interposition of the Almighty Hand to heal the wounds of the nation and to restore it as soon as may be consistent with the Divine purposes to the full enjoyment of peace, harmony, tranquillity and Union.
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington, this Third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the Unites States the Eighty-eighth.
By the President: Abraham Lincoln
- What Tech-Worker Shortage? - Noah Smith
- The Skeptics Guide to Institutions - Growth Economics
- US government has finally stopped holding back the recovery - FT Alphaville
- Should we believe the institutions and growth literature? - Chris Blattman
- Weekly Initial Unemployment Claims increased to 313,000 - Calculated Risk
- The role of bank guarantees in international trade - Vox EU
- Confidence vs. Credibility Intervals - Freakonometrics
- World shocks and the UK economy - Vox EU
- An Economist Chews Over Thanksgiving - Tim Taylor
- Fault lines within the ECB - Gavyn Davies
Wednesday, November 26, 2014
[Travel day, so no more until later.]
Keynes Is Slowly Winning: Back in 2010, I had a revelation about just how bad economic policy was about to get; I read the OECD Economic Outlook, which called not just for fiscal austerity but for interest rate hikes — 350 basis points on the Fed funds rate by the end of 2011! — because, well, because.
Now, the OECD is calling for fiscal and monetary stimulus in Europe. ....
It has taken a while. ... But the hawks seem in retreat at the Fed; Mario Draghi ... sounds an awful lot like Janet Yellen; the whole way we’re discussing Japan is very much on Keynesian turf. Three and a half years ago Businessweek was declaring that expansionary austerian Alberto Alesina was the new Keynes; now it tells us that Keynes is the new Keynes. And we have people like Paul Singer complaining about the “Krugmanization” of the debate.
Why does the tide finally seem to be turning? Partly, I think, it’s just a matter of time; after six years it’s becoming hard not to notice that the anti-Keynesians have been wrong about everything. Europe’s slide toward deflation makes it even harder to deny the realities of liquidity-trap economics. And the refusal of almost everyone on the anti-Keynesian side to admit any kind of error has gradually made them look ridiculous.
All of this may be coming too little and too late to avoid policy disaster, especially in Europe. But it’s something to cheer, faintly.
Understanding George Osborne: Yesterday I spoke at the Resolution Foundation’s launch of their analysis of the UK political parties’ fiscal plans post 2015. I believe this analysis shows two things very clearly. First, there is potentially a large gap between the amount of austerity planned by the two major parties. Second, George Osborne’s plans are scarcely credible. They represent a shrinking of the UK state that is unprecedented and which in my view virtually no one wants.
I would add one other charge - Osborne's plans are illiterate in macroeconomic terms. The UK economy desperately needs more growth. ...
In this situation a Chancellor should not plan to reduce growth further. I have yet to come across a single macroeconomist who argues that Osborne’s plans for renewed austerity will not in themselves reduce aggregate demand. So doing this when the recovery could go much further but is still fragile is just plain dumb. It is even dumber if you have done this once before, in a very similar situation, and the risks I outlined above have indeed materialised.
So why is the Chancellor proposing to make the same mistake twice? ...
I cannot think of any way to rationalise what the Chancellor is planning in macroeconomic terms. But perhaps I’m looking for something that does not exist. Perhaps he does not have a coherent economic framework. Instead he has a clear political framework, which has so far been remarkably successful. The goal is to reduce the size of the state, and because (with his encouragement) mediamacro believes reducing the deficit is the number one priority, he is using deficit reduction as a means to that end. However another priority is to get re-elected, so deficit reduction has to take place at the start of any parliament, so its impact on growth has disappeared by the time of the next election. But this explanation would imply we have a Chancellor that quite cynically puts the welfare of the majority of the UK’s citizens at major risk for ideological and political ends, and I do not think I have ever experienced a UK Chancellor (with possibly one exception) who has done that. But as Sherlock Holmes famously said ...
The new fiscal mandate is expected to enshrine in law one area of common ground between the Tories and Lib Dems: that the cyclically adjusted current deficit should be eliminated by 2017-18.
This is imbecilic. ...
Now, you might think that, in saying all this I'm merely being a Keynesian.
Wrong. In fact, I'm writing in a Hayekian spirit. Hayek famously and correctly argued that economic knowledge was inherently fragmentary and dispersed and so central agencies could not possibly know very much. I'm echoing him. I'm saying that the OBR cannot know enough about the productive potential of millions of firms to know what the output gap is. And it hasn't got enough knowledge of the future to predict recessions.
In presuming otherwise, Osborne is thus not only anti-Keynesian, but anti-Hayekian. I thus agree with Simon - that he is illiterate and plain dumb.
Some Good News for the Unemployed: There has been considerable discussion of the “hollowing out” of middle class jobs in recent years, a trend that started before the Great Recession. But where do those who have lost their jobs go? Do they end up with low paying service jobs, McJobs as they are sometimes called, or do they move up the ladder to higher paying jobs?
Many people believe that most people who lose middle class jobs end up worse off than before, but recent research by Ellie Terry and John Robertson of the Atlanta Fed finds some surprising results. ...
- The Stimulus Program Was a Smashing Success - Brookings Institution
- Tax Extenders Package Is Fundamentally Flawed - CBPP
- Regime Change From Roosevelt to Rousseff - Carola Binder
- Radical cures for unusual economic ills - Martin Wolf
- If Output Is Near Potential, Why Is Inflation so Low? - Econbrowser
- O.E.C.D. Calls for Fiscal and Monetary Measures for EU - NYTimes.com
- Markets Love Central-Bank Gifts - Bloomberg View
- NY Fed: Deleveraging process has ended - Calculated Risk
- Black Swans, Frankenfoods and Disaster Fairy Tales - Noah Smith
- Labour shares, inequality, and the relative price of capital - Vox EU
- Feeling wealthy drives opposition to wealth redistribution - EurekAlert
- The Origins of the Value of a Statistical Life Concept - Tim Taylor
- Economists aren't in the prediction business - Frances Woolley
- Q3 GDP Revised Up to 3.9% Annual Rate - Calculated Risk
- Fake Asperger's guys? - Noahpinion
- Economists Without Borders - Thomas Palley
- Stagnation or exponential growth - Louis Johnston
Tuesday, November 25, 2014
Over at Project Syndicate: Economic Growth and the Information Age: Daily Focus: ...America ... has become a vastly more unequal place since 1979... But the past generation has seen a third industrial revolution, a worthy information-age successor to the first of steam, iron, cotton, and machines and to the second of internal combustion, electricity, steel, and chemicals. Not everyone, but almost everyone in the North Atlantic and many and soon most in the world, can now if they wish have a smartphone–and so gain cheap access to the universe of human knowledge and entertainment to a degree that was far beyond the reach of all but the richest of a generation ago.
How much does this matter? How much does this mean that conventional measures of real income and real standard of living understate how much we, even the relatively poor of we, have progressed toward utopia? ...
Perhaps the right way to view the situation is that before the information age began our estimates of economic growth overstated true reality by perhaps 0.5%/year as the extra well-being we got from increased real wealth and income was offset by our noticing that the Jones’s next door had more, better, and newer than we did? Perhaps the right way to view the situation is that those parts of the information age that escape conventional growth-accounting calculations simply neutralize those forces of envy and spite that were never included in the calculations in the first place? That is my tentative judgment–or rather guess–today.
For those of you interested in Uber, this is from Joshua Gans:
Is Uber really in a fight to the death?: In recent days, since their PR troubles, there has been much discussion as to why Uber seems to be so aggressive. Reasons ranged from being inept, to the challenges of fighting politics against taxi regulations to a claim that Uber’s market has a ‘winner take all’ nature. It is this last one that is of particular interest because it suggests that Uber has to fight hard against competitors like Lyft or it will lose. It also suggests that Uber’s $20 billion odd valuation is based on beliefs that it will win, and win big.
I am not sure that this is really the case. Despite the name ‘Uber’ connoting, ‘one Uber to rule them all,’ the theory underlying the notion of winner take all is rather special and is far from being proven in cases like this. ...
How to think about “think” tanks: It is sometimes said that think tanks are good for democracy; indeed the more of them, the better. If there are more ideas in the public arena battling it out for your approval, then it’s more likely that the best idea will win, and that we will all have better public policies. But intuitively many of us have trouble believing this, have trouble knowing who is being truthful, and don’t know who to trust.
This battle of ideas, studies, and statistics has the potential to make many of us cynical about the whole process, and less trusting of all research and numbers. If a knowledgeable journalist like the Canadian Kady O’Malley expresses a certain exasperation that think-tank studies always back up “the think-tank’s existing position,” what hope is there for the rest of us? A flourishing of think tanks just let’s politicians off the hook, always allowing them to pluck an idea that suits their purposes, and making it easier to justify what they wanted to do anyways.
Maybe we shouldn’t be so surprised that think tanks produce studies confirming their (sometimes hidden) biases. After all this is something we all do. We need to arm ourselves with this self-awareness. If we do, then we can also be more aware of the things in a think tank’s make-up that can help in judging its credibility, and also how public policy discussion should be structured to help promote a sincere exchange of facts and ideas. ...
He goes on to explain in considerable detail.
On Twitter, Jared Bernstein says he is "Correcting the record for those who claim that accounting for taxes & transfers changes the inequality story":
A deeper dive into the weeds of the CBO household income data: ...between 1979 and 2011, inequality measured by the Gini coefficient rose 24% based solely on market outcomes and by 22% based on CBO’s comprehensive, post-tax and transfer income data.
Here we show that changes in pre- and post-tax income shares* – the percentage of total U.S. income held by different income groups – reveals a similar trend:
The “low” category in this figure represents the lowest before-tax income quintile, the “middle” category represents households between the 40th and 60th income percentiles, and the “high” category represents the top quintile. As with the Gini, the change in pre- and post-tax income shares are similar. The share of total income held by the poorest households fell by 1 percentage point on a pre-tax basis, and by 1.2 points on a post-tax basis. The share of income held by middle-class households fell by almost two percentage points on a pretax basis and by 1.4 percentage points post-tax.
Only within the top fifth of households do we see relative gains, and in fact, most of the increase in top quintile income shares has accrued to the richest subset of this group: the top 1%.
A second motivation of our report was to document the stagnation of middle-class earnings to households with children and the increased importance of transfer income to these families. We note, for example, that the increase in earnings to middle-income households with children was actually less than the increase in the dollar value of transfers. ...
To be clear, there’s nothing wrong and a lot right with transfers replacing lost earnings, especially in downturns. Tax cuts also helped offset middle quintile income losses. But this is not a reliable strategy by which to raise middle-class living standards for working families. For that, we must reconnect overall economic growth to paychecks... The CBO data highlight the nature of this problem and the urgency with which we must pursue the right solutions. ...
- Is 0% growth for 90% a successful economic model? - Antonio Fatas
- A short history of the Canadian one per cent - Stephen Gordon
- The Unsettling Mystery of Productivity - Alan Blinder
- Bitcoin: How Likely Is a 51 Percent Attack? - Liberty Street
- How business funded the anti-soda tax coalition - Washington Post
- An Unbeatable Investment for Millennials - Noah Smith
- Are big businesses slowing wage growth? - Nick Bunker
- Princeton Abandons Grade Deflation Plan . . . - Andrew Gelman
- Why College Is Necessary But Gets You Nowhere - Robert Reich
- Monetary Policy When the Spyglass Is Smudged - FRBSF
- An appreciation of Robert Solow - Nick Bunker
- More on Big Data - No Hesitations
- A Question for Richard Koo - Brad DeLong
- Underutilized Labor in the U.S. Economy - Tim Taylor
- Piketty/Poverty - Stephen Williamson
- The right direction - Cecchetti & Schoenholtz
- A better way to open knowledge - Digitopoly
Monday, November 24, 2014
This is from "Julie Hotchkiss, a research economist and senior policy adviser at the Atlanta Fed":
And the Winner Is...Full-Time Jobs!: Each month, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) surveys about 60,000 households and asks people over the age of 16 whether they are employed and, if so, if they are working full-time or part-time. The BLS defines full-time employment as working at least 35 hours per week. This survey, referred to as both the Current Population Survey and the Household Survey, is what produces the monthly unemployment rate, labor force participation rate, and other statistics related to activities and characteristics of the U.S. population.
For many months after the official end of the Great Recession in June 2009, the Household Survey produced less-than-happy news about the labor market. The unemployment rate didn't start to decline until October 2009, and nonfarm payroll job growth didn't emerge confidently from negative territory until October 2010. Now that the unemployment rate has fallen to 5.8 percent—much faster than most would have expected even a year ago—the attention has turned to the quality, rather than quantity, of jobs. This scrutiny is driven by a stubbornly high rate of people employed part-time "for economic reasons" (PTER). These are folks who are working part-time but would like a full-time job. Several of my colleagues here at the Atlanta Fed have looked at this phenomenon from many angles (here, here, here, here, and here).
The elevated share of PTER has left some to conclude that, yes, the economy is creating a significant number of jobs (an average of more than 228,000 nonfarm payroll jobs each month in 2014), but these are low-quality, part-time jobs. Several headlines have popped up over the past year or so claiming that "...most new jobs have been part-time since Obamacare became law," "Most 2013 job growth is in part-time work," "75 Percent Of Jobs Created This Year  Were Part-Time," "Part-time jobs account for 97% of 2013 job growth," and as recently as July of this year, "...Jobs Report Is Great for Part-time Workers, Not So Much for Full-Time."
However, a more careful look at the postrecession data illustrates that since October 2010, with the exception of four months (November 2010 and May–July 2011), the growth in the number of people employed full-time has dominated growth in the number of people employed part-time. Of the additional 8.2 million people employed since October 2010, 7.8 million (95 percent) are employed full-time (see the charts). ...
During the Great Recession (until about October 2010), the growth in part-time employment clearly exceeded growth in full-time employment, which was deep in negative territory. The current high level of PTER employment is likely to reflect this extended period of time in which growth in part-time employment exceeded that of full-time employment. But in every month since August 2011, the increase in the number of full-time employed from the year before has far exceeded the increase in the number of part-time employed. This phenomenon includes all of the months of 2013, in spite of what some of the headlines above would have you believe.
So, in the post-Great Recession era, the growth in full-employment is, without a doubt, way out ahead.
Companies on trial: are they ‘too big to jail’?: Disillusionment with government and large institutions is a salient feature of contemporary American life. An important cause is the widespread sense that big companies and those who run them are not held accountable for their crimes – that they are ... Too Big To Jail. The fact that no one has been imprisoned for the misdeeds that led to the financial crisis is seen as outrageous by many on Main Street. At the same time, the multibillion-dollar fines and enforcement actions against financial institutions that now seem to be a monthly event are a new phenomenon...
The current trend towards large fines ... seems to promote a somewhat unattractive combination of individual incentives. Managers do not find it personally costly to part with even billions of dollars of their shareholders’ money, especially when fines represent only a small fraction of total market value. Paying with shareholders’ money as the price of protecting themselves is a very attractive trade-off. Enforcement authorities like to either collect large fines or be seen as delivering compensation for those who have been victimized by corporate wrongdoing. So they are all too happy to go along.
In the process, punishment of individuals who do wrong or who fail in their managerial duty to monitor the behavior of their subordinates is short-changed. And deterrence is undermined. There is a broader cultural phenomenon here as well. Relative to other countries such as the UK or Japan, the principle that leaders should resign to take responsibility for failure on their watch even when they did not directly do wrong is less established in the US. This is probably an area where we have something to learn. ...
The era of "rock-bottom economics" is far from over:
Rock Bottom Economics, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: Six years ago the Federal Reserve hit rock bottom. It had been cutting the federal funds rate ... more or less frantically in an unsuccessful attempt to get ahead of the recession and financial crisis. But it eventually reached the point where it could cut no more...
Everything changes when the economy is at rock bottom... But for the longest time, nobody with the power to shape policy would believe it.
What do I mean by saying that everything changes? As I wrote..., in a rock-bottom economy “the usual rules of economic policy no longer apply...” Government spending doesn’t compete with private investment — it actually promotes business spending. Central bankers, who normally cultivate an image as stern inflation-fighters, need to do the exact opposite, convincing markets ... that they will push inflation up. “Structural reform,” which usually means making it easier to cut wages, is more likely to destroy jobs than create them.
This may all sound wild and radical, but ... it’s what mainstream economic analysis says will happen once interest rates hit zero. And it’s also what history tells us. ...
But as I said, nobody would believe it. By and large, policymakers and Very Serious People ... went with gut feelings rather than careful economic analysis. ...
Thus we were told ... that budget deficits were our most pressing economic problem, that interest rates would soar ... unless we imposed harsh fiscal austerity... —... demands that we cut government spending now, now, now have cost millions of jobs and deeply damaged our infrastructure.
We were also told repeatedly that printing money ... would lead to “currency debasement and inflation.” The Fed ... stood up to this pressure, but other central banks didn’t. ...
But... Isn’t the era of rock-bottom economics just about over? Don’t count on it..., the counterintuitive realities of economic policy at the zero lower bound are likely to remain relevant for a long time..., which makes it crucial that influential people understand those realities. Unfortunately, too many still don’t; one of the most striking aspects of economic debate in recent years has been the extent to which those whose economic doctrines have failed the reality test refuse to admit error, let alone learn from it. ...
This bodes ill for the future. What people in power don’t know, or worse what they think they know but isn’t so, can very definitely hurt us.
- The Skeptics Guide to Institutions - Growth Economics
- When economic models are unable to fit the data - Vox EU
- Left, Right and Macroeconomic Competence - mainly macro
- How professionals think - Understanding Society
- What Big Economies Got Right, or Wrong, After Crisis - WSJ
- Wanted: class consciousness - Stumbling and Mumbling
- Fair shares in pledged carbon cuts - Vox EU
- Hobson’s Choice v. Cochrane’s Madoff Economics - EconoSpeak
Sunday, November 23, 2014
Since I posted an excerpt from Noah Smith's column, I should also post this response from Frances Woolley:
Is economics really a dismal science for women?: Donna Ginther and Shulamit Kahn have just published a paper that tracks thousands of American academics from the time they first get their PhDs through to their tenure and promotion decisions. ...
Noah Smith ... takes, Ginther and Kahn's cautious and nuanced results, and leaps to the conclusion that economics "seems to have a built-in bias that prevents women from advancing."
I have never seen a woman denied tenure when a man with similar number and quality of publications was awarded it. I don't deny Ginther and Kahn's findings, but might there be a non-discriminatory explanation of the fact that a woman in economics with X number of publications is less likely to receive tenure than a man with X publications? ...
She goes on to give the "non-discriminatory explanation", and then says:
"Sexism" is not the result of some high level conspiracy. It is the product of millions of every day actions by thousands of ordinary people. ... If a man with 5 publications gets tenure while a woman with 5 publications does not, there must be a reason: either the man has higher quality publications, or higher impact publications, or more evidence of national or international reputation, or better letters of reference.
But a scholar's reputation and impact is determined by ... others: who they choose to acknowledge, who they choose to network with. Every single active academic can, through the citation and other decisions they make every day, influence other academics' reputations - and thus the probability that they will receive tenure or get promoted.
Who do you cite? If you're like most people, you're more likely to cite the seminal work of some well-known male academic than the work of a female scholar. ...
Do you give women credit for their ideas? Just about every woman has had the experience of sitting in a committee, saying something, and having her contribution ignored. A man will then restate her point, and he is listened to, and receives credit for the idea. ...
How do you word your letters of reference? Do you use the same adjectives to describe women and men? Or are women delightful, pleasant, conscientious and hard-working while men are strong, original, insightful and persistent?
Who do you invite to present at conferences or departmental seminars? If a man, do you turn down invitations to participate in conferences with all-male line-ups...? Do you make it easy for female colleagues to come for a drink in the bar after a seminar by corralling them into the bar-going group?
The economics profession is far from perfect. I personally don't find it any worse than the world of media (that the Globe and Mail paid Stephen Gordon more than me still burns), or the world of academic administration. But it could be better - and the power to change it lies within every one of us.
Lower oil prices and the U.S. economy: ... The current price of gasoline is 80 cents/gallon below what it has averaged over the last 3 years. Last year Americans consumed 135 billion gallons of gasoline. That means that if prices stay where they are, consumers will have an extra $108 billion each year to spend on other things. And if the historical pattern holds, spend it they will. ...
But another thing that’s changed is that much more of the oil we consume is now being produced right here at home. While lower prices are a boon for consumers, they pose a potential threat to producers, especially the higher-cost operators. ...
If there are employment cuts in places like Texas, Louisiana, and North Dakota, that would obviously offset some of the gains to consumers noted above, and ultimately undercut the major force keeping the price of crude low for the time being, that being the success of small U.S. oil producers.
Nevertheless, there should be no question that at this point this is a favorable development on-balance for the U.S. economy. We’re still importing 5 million more barrels each day of petroleum and products than we are exporting. Importing fewer barrels, and paying less for the barrels we do import, is a good thing.
Saturday, November 22, 2014
Fabian Kindermann and Dirk Krueger:
High marginal tax rates on the top 1%: Optimal tax rates for the rich are a perennial source of controversy. This column argues that high marginal tax rates on the top 1% of earners can make society as a whole better off. Not knowing whether they would ever make it into the top 1%, but understanding it is very unlikely, households especially at younger ages would happily accept a life that is somewhat better most of the time and significantly worse in the rare event they rise to the top 1%.
Recently, public and scientific attention has been drawn to the increasing share of labour earnings, income, and wealth accruing to the so-called ‘top 1%’. Robert B. Reich in his 2009 book Aftershock opines that: “Concentration of income and wealth at the top continues to be the crux of America’s economic predicament”. The book Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty (2014) has renewed the scientific debate about the sources and consequences of the high and increasing concentration of wealth in the US and around the world.
But what is a proper public policy reaction to such a situation? Should the government address this inequality with its policy instruments at all, and if so, what are the consequences for the macroeconomy? The formidable literature on optimal taxation has provided important answers to the first question.1 Based on a static optimal tax analysis of labour income, Peter Diamond and Emmanuel Saez (2011) argue in favour of high marginal tax rates on the top 1% earners, aimed at maximising tax revenue from this group. Piketty (2014) advocates a wealth tax to reduce economy-wide wealth inequality....
Conclusions and limitations Overall we find that increasing tax rates at the very top of the income distribution and thereby reducing tax burdens for the rest of the population is a suitable measure to increase social welfare. As a side effect, it reduces both income and wealth inequality within the US population.
Admittedly, our results apply with certain qualifications. First, taxing the top 1% more heavily will most certainly not work if these people can engage in heavy tax avoidance, make use of extensive tax loopholes, or just leave the country in response to a tax increase at the top. Second, and probably as importantly, our results rely on a certain notion of how the top 1% became such high earners. In our model, earnings ‘superstars’ are made from luck coupled with labour effort. However, if high income tax rates at the top would lead individuals not to pursue high-earning careers at all, then our results might change.7 Last but not least, our analysis focuses solely on the taxation of large labour earnings rather than capital income at the top 1%.
Despite these limitations, which might affect the exact number for the optimal marginal tax rate on the top 1%, many sensitivity analyses in our research suggest one very robust result – current top marginal tax rates in the US are lower than would be optimal, and pursuing a policy aimed at increasing them is likely to be beneficial for society as a whole.
Remember all those predictions from those with other agendas about runaway inflation (e.g. see Paul Krugman today on The Wisdom of Peter Schiff)?:
The Risks to the Inflation Outlook, by Vasco Cúrdia, FRBSF Economic Letter: The Federal Reserve responded to the recent financial crisis and the Great Recession by aggressively cutting the target for its benchmark short-term interest rate, known as the federal funds rate, to near zero. The Fed also began providing information about the probable future path of the short-term interest rate. Known as forward guidance, this policy is intended to lead to lower long-term yields and therefore stimulate economic activity. Additionally, the Fed has purchased long-term Treasury securities and mortgage-backed securities, leading to a balance sheet that is substantially larger than before the financial crisis. Taylor (2014), among others, argues that these policies are likely to lead to substantially higher inflation. Nevertheless, the inflation rate remains below 2%, the target set by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).
This Economic Letter describes results from a model that explicitly accounts for the different dimensions of monetary policy to quantify the risks to the inflation forecast. This analysis suggests that inflation is expected to remain low through the end of 2016, and the uncertainty around the forecast is tilted to the downside, that is, the risk of lower inflation. In particular, the probability of low inflation by the end of 2016 is twice as high as the probability of high inflation—the opposite of historical projections. The analysis also suggests that the risk of high inflation collapsed in 2008 and has remained well below normal since. Importantly, according to the model, there is little evidence that monetary policy constitutes a major source of inflation risk. ...
Of course, the lack of inflation can't be explained with modern macroeconomic models:
Inflation Dynamics During the Financial Crisis, by Simon Gilchrist, Raphael Schoenle, W. Sim, and Egon Zakrajsek, September 18, 2013, Preliminary & Incomplete: Abstract Using confidential product-level price data underlying the U.S. Producer Price Index (PPI), this paper analyzes the effect of changes in firms’ financial conditions on their price-setting behavior during the “Great Recession.” The evidence indicates that during the height of the crisis in late 2008, firms with “weak” balance sheets increased prices significantly, whereas firms with “strong” balance sheets lowered prices, a response consistent with an adverse demand shock. These stark differences in price-setting behavior are consistent with the notion that financial frictions may significantly influence the response of aggregate inflation to macroeconomic shocks. We explore the implications of these empirical findings within the New Keynesian general equilibrium framework that allows for customer markets and departures from the frictionless financial markets. In the model, firms have an incentive to set a low price to invest in market share, though when financial distortions are severe, firms forgo these investment opportunities and maintain high prices in an effort to preserve their balance-sheet capacity. Consistent with our empirical findings, the model with financial distortions—relative to the baseline model without such distortions—implies a substantial attenuation of price dynamics in response to contractionary demand shocks.
I know, some of you hate old Keynesian models (which can also explain this), and you don't believe in New Keynesian models (ad hoc price stickiness -- reject! -- even if, for some, it is only a cover to reject the notion of government involvement in the economy...). But your model predicted inflation that never came. Or some other such nonsense.
... I think it is quite possible that we will look back on QE2 as a severe error. In spite of the talk from some quarters about the intervention being too small, this is a very large-scale asset purchase for the Fed, on top of a previous very large purchase of mortgage-backed securities and agency securities. One possibility is that economic growth picks up, of its own accord, reserves become less attractive for the banks, and inflation builds up a head of steam. The Fed may find this difficult to control, or may be unwilling to do so. Even worse is the case where growth remains sluggish, but inflation well in excess of 2% starts to rear its ugly head anyway. Bernanke is telling us that he "has the tools to unwind these policies," but if the inflation rate is at 6% and the unemployment rate is still close to 10%, he will not have the stomach to fight the inflation. My concern here is that, given the specifics of the QE2 policy that was announced, the FOMC will be reluctant to cut back or stop the asset purchases, even if things start looking bad on the inflation front. Once inflation gets going, we know it is painful to stop it, and we don't need another problem to deal with.
More than four years later...we now have the same group using neo-Fisherism to explain why the Fed is causing low inflation with low nominal interest rates. With QE2 (and QE of any sort), it was the Fed's fault that we faced so much inflation risk, now it's the Fed's fault that we don't.
- Patents and the global diffusion of new drugs - Vox EU
- Keynes's Theories Can Fix the World Economy - Businessweek
- Inequality and Crises: Scandinavian Skepticism - Paul Krugman
- Economic inequality and for-profit universities - Bridget Ansel
- The butterfly defect: How to manage systemic risk - Vox EU
- Central banks: Stockholm syndrome - FT.com
- India Rebounding? - Tim Taylor
- Why workers matter - Stumbling and Mumbling
- Top incomes soared as tax rates fell - David Cay Johnston
- Solving the depression in the eurozone - Biagio Bossone, et. al.
- Postage Stamps Portray Banking History - Liberty Street Economics
- Scabs, Scantrons, and Strikes at the University of Oregon - Crooked Timber
Friday, November 21, 2014
... Why is it that the sciences look like a feminist nirvana compared with the economics profession, which seems to have a built-in bias that prevents women from advancing? ...
People Who Wanted Market-Driven Health Care Now Have it in the Affordable Care Act, by Alice M. Rivlin, Brookings: ... The United States ... relied primarily on employer-based health insurance, generously favored by tax laws. ... But there was a huge hole: Millions of people were left out of employer-based coverage and were not old enough or poor enough to qualify for the public programs. For 50 years, we have been arguing over how to fill that hole. ...
In general, Republicans argued that relying on market forces would give people what they wanted while also putting pressure on the health system to offer more effective care for less money. ...
In general, Democrats ... pointed out that markets didn't work well in health care because consumers didn't know enough to choose what was best for them, putting them at the mercy of providers and insurers. They pointed out that competition in health insurance drove insurers to compete for healthy patients, dumping people who got sick or cost too much and refusing coverage to those with preexisting conditions.
The compromise was to combine markets with regulation, sometimes called "managed competition," now called "the Affordable Care Act." ... The proponents of the Affordable Care Act don't claim the law is perfect. The act's markets are in their infancy. ... The rules will have to be adjusted as experience accumulates.
But millions of people do have health coverage who didn't have it two years ago. The markets are working pretty well... Should believers in market forces try to gut the Affordable Care Act? Heavens, no. They should seize this huge opportunity to prove their case by helping to make the law's markets work effectively.
It's the decent thing to do:
Suffer Little Children, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: The Tenement Museum, on the Lower East Side, is one of my favorite places in New York City. It’s a Civil War-vintage building that housed successive waves of immigrants, and a number of apartments have been restored to look exactly as they did in various eras, from the 1860s to the 1930s... When you tour the museum, you come away with a powerful sense of immigration as a human experience, which — despite plenty of bad times,... was overwhelmingly positive.
I get especially choked up about the Baldizzi apartment from 1934. When I described its layout to my parents, both declared, “I grew up in that apartment!” And today’s immigrants are the same, in aspiration and behavior, as my grandparents were — people seeking a better life, and by and large finding it.
That’s why I enthusiastically support President Obama’s new immigration initiative. It’s a simple matter of human decency.
That’s not to say that I, or most progressives, support open borders. ...
But ... the proposition that we should offer decent treatment to children who are already here — and are already Americans in every sense..., that’s what Mr. Obama’s initiative is about.
Who are we talking about? First, there are more than a million young people ... who came — yes, illegally — as children and have lived here ever since. Second, there are large numbers of children who were born here — which makes them U.S. citizens, with all the same rights you and I have — but whose parents came illegally, and are legally subject to being deported.
What should we do about these people...? ... The truth is that sheer self-interest says that we should do the humane thing. Today’s immigrant children are tomorrow’s workers, taxpayers and neighbors. Condemning them to life in the shadows means that they will have less stable home lives than they should, be denied the opportunity to acquire skills and education, contribute less to the economy, and play a less positive role in society. Failure to act is just self-destructive.
But... What really matters ... is the humanity. My parents were able to have the lives they did because America, despite all the prejudices of the time, was willing to treat them as people. Offering the same kind of treatment to today’s immigrant children is the practical course of action, but it’s also, crucially, the right thing to do. So let’s applaud the president for doing it.
- The Skeptics Guide to Institutions - Growth Economics
- Falling Wages at Factories Squeeze the Middle Class - NYTimes.com
- Macroprudential policy and distribution of risk - Antonio Fatas
- A glut-wrenching experience - The Economist
- GDP must not rule our lives - Diana Coyle
- Structural Deformity - Paul Krugman
- How to run a research departmen - longandvariable
- Why the St. Louis Fed Focuses on Academic Research - St. Louis Fed
- Today’s CPI release: If you just squint, you’ll see … - Jon Faust
- Why Tax Cuts Aren’t the Answer to Wage Problems - EPI
- Google’s New Market for Contributions - Digitopoly
- The Most Aggressive Tax Authorities? - Transfer Pricing Economics
- Executive Action on Immigration Will Improve the Wages - EPI
- How foreign firms benefit domestic firms - Vox EU
- Secular Stagnation - Biagio Bossone
- The UK feel good factor - mainly macro
Thursday, November 20, 2014
Encouraging Work: Tax Incentives or Social Support?: Consider two approaches to encouraging those with low skills to be fully engaged in the workplace. The American approach focuses on keeping tax rates low and thus providing a greater financial incentive for people to take jobs. The Scandinavian approach focuses on providing a broad range of day care, education, and other services to support working families, but then imposes high tax rates to pay for it all. In the most recent issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Henrik Jacobsen Kleven contrasts these two models in "How Can Scandinavians Tax So Much?" (28:4, 77-98). Kleven is from Denmark, so perhaps his conclusion is predictable. But the analysis along the way is intriguing.
As a starting point, consider what Kleven calls the "participation tax rate." When an average worker in a country takes a job, how much will the money they earn increase their standard of living? The answer will depend on two factors: any taxes imposed on what they earn, including, income, payroll, and sales taxes; and also the loss of any government benefits for which they become less eligible or ineligible because they are working. In the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, this "participation tax rate" is about double what it is in the United States. ...
A standard American-style prediction would be that countries where gains from working are so low should see a lower level of participation in the workforce. That prediction does not hold true in cross-country data among high-income countries. ...
What explains this pattern? Kleven argues that just looking at the tax rate isn't enough, because it also matters what the tax revenue is spent on. For example, the Scandinavian countries spend a lot of money on universal programs for preschool, child care, and elderly care. Kleven calls these "participation subsidies," because they make it easier for people to work--especially for people who otherwise would need to find a way to cover or pay for child care or elder care. The programs are universal, which means that their value expressed as a share of income earned means much more to a low- or middle-income family than to a high-income family. ...
Any direct comparisons between the United States (population of 316 million) and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark (6 million), Norway, (5 million) and Sweden (10 million) is of course fraught with peril. Their history, politics, economies, and institutions differ in so many ways. You can't just pick up can't just pick up long-standing policies or institutions in one country, plunk them down in another country, and expect them to work the same way.
That said, Kleven basic conceptual point seems sound. Provision of good-quality preschool, child care and elder care does make it easier for all families, but especially low-income families with children, to participate in the labor market. In these three Scandinavian countries, the power of these programs to encourage labor force participation seems to overcome the work disincentives that arise in financing and operating them. This argument has nothing to do with whether preschool and child care programs might help some children to perform better in school--although if they do work in that way, it would strengthen the case for taking this approach.
So here is a hard but intriguing hypothetical question: The U.S. government spends something like $60 billion per year on the Earned Income Tax Credit, which is a refundable tax credit providing income mainly to low-income families with children, and almost as much on the refundable child tax credit. Would low-income families with children be better off, and more attached to the workforce, if a sizeable portion of the 100 billion-plus spent for these tax credits--and aimed at providing financial incentives to work--was instead directed toward universal programs of preschool, child care, and elder care?
Or we could raise taxes on the wealthy, cut defense spending, etc., etc. and then ask which if the two programs it would be better to enhance (or in what proportions), the EITC and other tax credits or the "universal programs of preschool, child care, and elder care." If the programs are complementary and insufficient, as I believe they are, then neither should be cut to enhance the other (though I would choose the Scandinavian model if I had to pick on of the two to augment).
Ellie Terry and John Robertson of the Atlanta Fed:
For Middle-Skill Occupations, Where Have All the Workers Gone?: Considerable discussion in recent years has concerned the “hollowing out of the middle class.” Part of that story revolves around the loss of the types of jobs that traditionally have been the core of the U.S. economy: so-called middle-skill jobs.
These jobs, based on the methodology of David Autor, consist of office and administrative occupations; sales jobs; operators, fabricators, and laborers; and production, craft, and repair personnel (many of whom work in the manufacturing industry). In this post, we don't examine why the decline in middle-skill jobs has occurred, just how those workers have weathered the most recent recession. But our Atlanta Fed colleague Federico Mandelman offers an explanation of why this has occurred.
So how have workers in middle-skill occupations fared during the last recession and recovery? Let's examine a few facts from the Current Population Survey from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Only employment in middle-skill occupations remains below prerecession levels ...
Those in middle-skilled occupations were most likely to become unemployed...
Underemployment has improved only slowly at all skill levels...
Ready for some good news?
Those who held middle-skill jobs are more likely to obtain high-skill jobs than before the recession
Currently, of those in middle-skill occupations who remain in a full-time job, about 83 percent are still working in a middle-skill job one year later (see chart 4). What types of jobs are the other 17 percent getting? Mostly high-skill jobs; and that transition rate has been rising. The percent going from a middle-skill job to a high-skill job is close to 13 percent: up about 1 percent relative to before the recession. The percent transitioning into low-skill positions is lower: about 3.4 percent, up about 0.3 percentage point compared to before the recession. This transition to a high-skill occupation tends to translate to an average wage increase of about 27 percent (compared to those who stayed in middle-skill jobs). In contrast, those who transition into lower-skill occupations earned an average of around 24 percent less. ...
In summary, the number of middle-skill jobs declined substantially during the last recession, and that decline has been persistent—especially for full-time workers. Many of the workers leaving full-time, middle-skill jobs became unemployed, and some of that decline is the result of an increase in part-time employment. But others gained full-time work in other types of occupations. In particular, they are more likely than in the past to transition to higher-skill occupations. Further, the transition rate to high-skill occupations has gradually risen and doesn't appear directly tied to the last recession.
- The Long-Term Unemployed and Wages - Liberty Street Economics
- Business culture in banking favors dishonest behavior - EurekAlert
- Achieving College Diversity - Richard Kahlenberg
- Currency carry trades are not what you think - Vox EU
- The Rise of Bayesian Econometrics - Dave Giles
- GDP Counts in War and Peace - Noah Smith
- Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee - FRB
- Who is Doing their Fair Share in Pledged Carbon Cuts - Jeffrey Frankel
- 5 Big Things Paul Krugman Got Wrong - Business Insider
- When Minsky raises an eyebrow, I pay attention - Jared Bernstein
- Growth: An Essential Part of a Cure for Unemployment - iMFdirect
- High-stakes school testing - Vox EU
- Replication controversies - Andrew Gelman
- World Toilet Day - Tim Taylor
- Avoiding Fiscal Fudge - mainly macro
Wednesday, November 19, 2014
Branko Milanovic has a very nice follow-up to my column yesterday:
On Mark Thoma: marginalism, Marx etc: Mark Thoma has written a very nice blog on how Piketty’s work is transforming economics by bringing it closer too it political economy roots. I found the post excellent, and wanted just to point out one thing which I think is very pertinently argued by Thoma and another where he somewhat simplifies the matter. ...[continue]...
Fiscal Responsibility Claims Another Victim: A few more thoughts on Japan.
The bad growth news shows, pretty clearly, that the consumption tax hike was a big mistake. It also shows, by the way, how weak the market monetarist argument — which is that fiscal policy doesn’t matter, because central banks can always achieve the nominal GDP they want — really is; do you seriously want to contend that Kuroda likes what he sees, that he isn’t trying as hard as he can to boost Japan out of deflation?
Beyond that, the Japanese story is another example of the damage wrought by the rhetoric of fiscal responsibility in a depressed economy.
Leave on one side the expansionary austerity nonsense. Even among relatively sensible people, you often encounter calls for a strategy that couples loose fiscal policy, maybe even stimulus, in the short run with measures to address long-run sustainability. ... But ... the urgency of the stimulus part gets lost, and in fact the practical result is generally austerity even in depression.
So it was with Japan... — the country that has offered many useful lessons to the West, none of which our policymakers have been willing to learn.
From Ben Craig and Sara Millington of the Cleveland Fed:
The Effect of Oil Price Declines on Consumer Prices, by Ben Craig and Sara Millington: Oil prices have declined significantly in recent weeks, reaching levels not seen in several years. At the same time, the year-over-year percent change in the most widely known measure of inflation, the Consumer Price Index (CPI), came in at 1.7 percent for September, which is below policymakers’ targeted levels. Given these circumstances, there is some concern that low oil prices, which have continued to remain below $90 a barrel through October, will keep inflation persistently below or even push it further from targeted levels. A look at historical relationships between oil prices and various price measures can help gauge the potential pass-through of the recent oil-price declines to other domestic prices. ...
Oil price changes can potentially play a large role in the US economy. With respect to inflation, the two most likely channels through which they could do so are retail gasoline prices and producer prices. However, as consumers use savings from lower energy prices for other goods and services, these prices are likely to rise in response, offsetting the initial disinflationary impact of lower oil prices. Accordingly, as the FOMC observed in its Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, “the inflation rate over the longer run is primarily determined by monetary policy,” rather than by movements in individual price components.
I'm not as sure as they are that other prices will rise as demand shifts from oil to other goods and services. In an economy like this one where demand is deficient and firms are operating below capacity (and therefore presumably below the minimum point on their average total cost curves assuming they were at or near the minimum before the recession, or at least on the flat part of the curve if the minimum extends over a range of output), shouldn't there be some room for demand to expand without putting upward pressure on prices (e.g. wages shouldn't rise until there are shortages in the labor market, but as noted here there is excess labor supply across the board)? The statement from the FOMC is about the long-run, and an economy operating near capacity, but we aren't there yet and won't be for some time at the present rate of recovery.
Or, as I said here, we shouldn't ignore the long-term unemployed.
- A Carbon Tax Could Bolster Green Energy - NYTimes.com
- Robert Solow on Topics in Productivity Growth - Tim Taylor
- Missing corporate income and tax progressivity - Nick Bunker
- The Skeptics Guide to Institutions - Growth Economics
- Americans recognize slow economic recovery - YouGov
- Fragility of Nash equilibria and Neo-Fisherites - Nick Rowe
- Finance and the jelly bean problem - Tim Harford
- Market expectations and futures prices - Vox EU
- The Long-Term Unemployed? - Liberty Street Economics
- The spillovers of fiscal and monetary policies - Jérémie Cohen-Setton
- Redistribution under the UK coalition government - mainly macro
- Japan: Some Perspective - MacroMania
- Growth, inequality, and social welfare - Vox EU
- The Japanese GDP Release: The Bad and the Not so Bad - Econbrowser
Tuesday, November 18, 2014
Paul Krugman says pundits need to do their homework:
The Structure of Obamacare: The big revelation of this week has been how many political pundits have spent six years of the Obama administration opining furiously about the administration’s signature policy without making the slightest effort to understand how it works. They’re amazed and in denial at the suggestion that it has the same structure as Romneycare, which has been obvious and explicit all along...
So, why was Obamacare set up this way? It’s mainly about politics, but nothing that should shock you. Partly it was about getting buy-in from the insurance industry; a switch to single payer would have destroyed a powerful industry, and realistically that wasn’t going to happen. Partly it was about leaving most people unaffected: employment-based coverage, which was the great bulk of private insurance, remained pretty much as it was. ... And yes, avoiding a huge increase in on-budget spending was a consideration, but not central.
The main point was to make the plan incremental, supplementing the existing structure rather than creating massive changes. And all of this was completely upfront; I know I wrote about it many times.
Look, I understand why the hired guns of the right have to act ignorant and profess outrage. But I really am shocked at centrists who apparently thought they could opine on the politics of health reform, year after year, without taking a hour or two to learn how the darn thing was supposed to work.
It seems to me this takes some degree of willful ignorance.
David Leonhardt argues "It’s the economy, stupid." Do you agree? Or is it mostly about turnout? (These may not be independent factors):
How the Great Wage Slowdown Hurts Democrats: It’s a simple rule: A weak economy makes for an unpopular president. President Obama is on course to become the fourth president of the last six to leave office with an approval rating well below 50 percent. Each of the previous three — both Bushes and Jimmy Carter — also had something else in common: Median family income fell during their presidencies.
The other two recent presidents, of course, were Bill Clinton and Ronald Reagan. Incomes rose while they were in the White House, and they left office with more Americans approving of their performance than not.
The most famous expression of this rule is still the one made famous by the 1992 Clinton campaign: It’s the economy, stupid. ...
Ezra Klein ... wrote he was skeptical that slow wage growth was “driving elections in a very clear way.” He instead suggested that structural political forces played a bigger role.
We live in a time of partisan polarization, with most voters loyal to their side. The Republicans have an advantage in midterm elections ... because their older, whiter coalition turns out... The Democrats have an edge in presidential elections ... because their coalition is larger, even if large parts of it vote only in presidential years. Mr. Klein was suggesting that these structural forces affect politics more than the state of the economy. ...
See also "Americans recognize slow economic recovery."
I have a new column:
How Piketty Has Changed Economics: Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century is beginning to receive book of the year awards, but has it changed anything within economics? There are two ways in which is has...
I'm not sure everyone will agree that the changes will persist. [This is a long-run view that begins with Adam Smith and looks for similarities between the past and today.]
Update: Let me add that although many people believe that the most important questions in the future will be about production (as it was in Smith's time), secular stagnation, robots, etc., I believe we will have enough "stuff", the big questions will be about distribution (as it was when Ricardo, Marx, etc. were writing).
It was edited quite a bit, e.g. here is my opening for comparison:
Economists have long believed that shocks to aggregate demand are temporary. It might take time to return to the previous trend rate of output growth, years in some cases, but given enough time the economy will return to the pre-recession path. This graph from Nobel Prize winning economist Robert Lucas, for example, illustrates this point of view. The red line is trend economic growth, and the blue line shows how aggregate demand shocks cause the economy to deviate from the trend, and then return.
However, the experience of the great recession along with recent work such as “Potential Output and Recessions: Are We Fooling Ourselves?” from economists Robert F. Martin, Teyanna Munyan, and Beth Anne Wilson at the Federal Reserve call this into question. ...
- The Risks to the Inflation Outlook - FRBSF
- I Do Not Understand the Argument for the Taper - Brad DeLong
- What the Fed Needs - Elizabeth Warren and Joe Manchin
- And Now the Richest .01 Percent - Robert Reich
- A Pundit Explains What's Wrong With Washington - Paul Krugman
- America’s bank bailouts worked - The Washington Post
- Financial leverage and where to find it - Nick Bunker
- Linkages between Good Government and National Well-being - NBER
- Ludwig von Mises Explains (and Solves) Market Failure - Uneasy Money
- How Many Still Without Health Insurance? - Tim Taylor
- Deep Recessions Leave Permanent Scars, Fed Research Finds - WSJ
- Haldane on cutting the umbillical research cord - longandvariable
- Cameron's lousy defence - Stumbling and Mumbling
- Increasing unemployment benefits for the young - Vox EU
- Contractionary Policies Are Contractionary - Paul Krugman
Monday, November 17, 2014
We shouldn't ignore the long-term unemployed:
Measuring Labor Market Slack: Are the Long-Term Unemployed Different?, by Rob Dent, Samuel Kapon, Fatih Karahan, Benjamin W. Pugsley, and Ayşegül Sahin, Liberty Street Economics: [First in a three-part series] There has been some debate in the Liberty Street Economics blog and in other outlets, such as Krueger, Cramer, and Cho (2014) and Gordon (2013), about whether the short-term unemployment rate is a better measure of slack than the overall unemployment rate. As the chart below shows, the two measures are sending different signals, with the short-term unemployment rate back to its pre-recession level while the overall rate is still elevated because of a high long-term unemployment rate. One can argue that the unemployment rate is exaggerating the extent of underutilization in the labor market, based on the premise that the long-term unemployed are, in practice, out of the labor force and likely to exert little pressure on earnings. If this is indeed the case, inflationary pressures might start building up sooner than suggested by the overall unemployment rate. In a three-part series, we study the available evidence on the long-term unemployed and argue against this premise. The long-term unemployed should not be excluded from measures of labor market slack.
In today’s post, we consider several important characteristics of long-term unemployed workers and compare them to the characteristics of three other groups of potential workers: the short-term unemployed, nonparticipants who report that they want a job, and nonparticipants who do not want a job (whom we refer to as “other nonparticipants”). ...
Finally, we consider the occupation and industry composition of short- and long-term unemployed workers, classified by their former jobs..., they are remarkably similar.
On the basis of these observable characteristics, we find that long-term unemployed workers are not less attached to the labor market than short-term unemployed workers. If anything, the long-term unemployed group has the largest share of prime-age workers, the age group likely to have the strongest labor force attachment. We also see that long-term unemployment is an economy-wide phenomenon, spread across industries and occupations. While there may be unobservable characteristics of long-term unemployed workers that make them less attached to the labor force, when looking at their observable characteristics, it’s hard to argue that they should not be considered as part of labor market slack. ...
[Disclaimer: The views expressed in this post are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.]
Cecchetti & Schoenholtz
It's the leverage, stupid!: In the 30 months following the 2000 stock market peak, the S&P 500 fell by about 45%. Yet the U.S. recession that followed was brief and shallow. In the 21 months following the 2007 stock market peak, the equity market fell by a comparable 52%. This time was different: the recession that began in December 2007 was the deepest and longest since the 1930s.
The contrast between these two episodes of bursting asset price bubbles ought to make you wonder. When should we really worry about asset price bubbles? In fact, the biggest concern is not bubbles per se; it is leverage. And, surprisingly, there remain serious holes in our knowledge about who is leveraged and who is not. ...
All of this leads us to draw two simple conclusions. First, investors and regulators need to be on the lookout for leverage; that’s the biggest villain. In the United States and many other countries, mortgage borrowing has been at the heart of financial instability, and it may be so again in the future. But we should not be lulled into a sense of security just because banks’ real estate exposure has declined. If leverage starts rising in real estate or elsewhere – on or off balance sheet – then we should be paying attention.
Sometimes, government is the best solution:
When Government Succeeds, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: The great American Ebola freakout of 2014 seems to be over. ...
When the freakout was at its peak, Ebola wasn’t just a disease — it was a political metaphor. It was, specifically, held up by America’s right wing as a symbol of government failure. ... Leading Republicans suggested ignoring everything we know about disease control and resorting to extreme measures like travel bans, while mocking claims that health officials knew what they were doing.
Guess what: Those officials actually did know what they were doing. The real lesson of the Ebola story is that sometimes public policy is succeeding even while partisans are screaming about failure. And it’s not the only recent story along those lines.
Here’s another: Remember Solyndra? It was a renewable-energy firm that borrowed money using Department of Energy guarantees, then went bust, costing the Treasury $528 million. And conservatives have pounded on that loss relentlessly... Last week the department revealed that the program that included Solyndra is, in fact, on track to return profits of $5 billion or more.
Then there’s health reform. As usual, much of the national dialogue over the Affordable Care Act is being dominated by fake scandals drummed up by the enemies of reform. But if you look at the actual results so far, they’re remarkably good. ...
One last item: Remember all the mockery of Obama administration assertions that budget deficits, which soared during the financial crisis, would come down as the economy recovered? ... Well,... the deficit has indeed come down rapidly...
The moral of these stories is ... that ... government-hating politicians can sometimes turn their predictions of failure into self-fulfilling prophecies, but when leaders want to make government work, they can.
And let’s be clear: The government policies we’re talking about here are hugely important. We need serious public health policy, not fear-mongering, to contain infectious disease. We need government action to promote renewable energy and fight climate change. Government programs are the only realistic answer for tens of millions of Americans who would otherwise be denied essential health care.
Conservatives want you to believe that while the goals of public programs on health, energy and more may be laudable, experience shows that such programs are doomed to failure. Don’t believe them. Yes, sometimes government officials, being human, get things wrong. But we’re actually surrounded by examples of government success, which they don’t want you to notice.
- German economic policy and chameleons - Antonio Fatas
- Happier workers, higher profits - Vox EU
- Japan Through the Looking Glass - Paul Krugman
- The Fourth Generation in Chicago - Economic Principals
- Orthogonal Regression: First Steps - Dave Giles
- Can we have our instrument back? - mainly macro
- Another Look at Neo-Fisherism - David Beckworth
- Inequality, Unbelievably, Gets Worse - NYTimes.com
- Encouraging financial innovation - Stumbling and Mumbling
- Abe’s choice between recovery and fiscal sustainability - Gavyn Davies
Sunday, November 16, 2014
'The Real Scientific Study of the Distribution of Wealth Has, We Must Confess, Scarcely Begun as Yet'
This is a small part of Irving Fisher's presidential address to the American Economic Association in 1919 (it is worth reading in its entirety, via Piketty's book and online notes):
Economists in Public Service: Annual Address of the President: ... The real scientific study of the distribution of wealth has, we must confess, scarcely begun as yet. The conventional academic study of the so-called theory of distribution into rent, interest, wages, and profits is only remotely related to the subject. This subject, the causes and cures for the actual distribution of capital and income among real persons, is one of the many now in need of our best efforts as scientific students of society. I shall here merely throw into the discussion a few tentative thoughts which seem to me to be now either completely overlooked or only dimly appreciated.
There are, I believe, two master keys to the distribution of wealth: the Inheritance system and the Profit system.
The practices which happen to be followed by men of great wealth in making wills is certainly the chief determinant of the distribution of their wealth after their death. Mr. Albert G. Coyle, one of my former students, has estimated that four-fifths of the one hundred and fifty or more fortunes in the United States having incomes of over $1,000,000 a year have been accumulating for two generations or more. It is interesting to observe that, although the formulae expressing distribution by Pareto's logarithmic law are similar for the United States and England, the number of wealthy men at the top is two and a quarter times as great, in proportion to population, in England as in the United States, presumably because the number of generations through which fortunes have been inherited are much greater there than here.
Yet the man who wills property does so without regard to its effect on the social distribution of wealth. In fact even from the private point of view careful thought is seldom bestowed on the solemn responsibility of bequeathing property. The ordinary millionaire capitalist about to leave this world forever cares less about what becomes of the fortune he leaves behind than we have been accustomed to assume. Contrary to a common opinion, he did not lay it up, at least not beyond a certain point, because of any wish to leave it to others. His accumulating motives were rather those of power, of self-expression, of hunting big game.
I believe that it is very bad public policy for the living to allow the dead so large and unregulated an influence over us. Even in the eye of the law there is no natural right, as is ordinarily falsely assumed, to will property. "The right of inheritance," says Chief Justice Coleridge of England, "a purely artificial right, has been at different times and in different countries very variously dealt with. The institution of private property rests only upon the general advantage." And again, Justice McKenna of the United States Supreme Court says: "The right to take property by devise or descent is the creature of the law and not a natural right-a privilege, and therefore the authority which confers it may impose conditions on it."
The disposal of property by will is thus simply a custom, one handed down to us from Ancient Rome. ...