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Jeb Goes Galt: This is amazing:
“I think the left wants slow growth because that means people are more dependent upon government,” Bush told Fox Business’ Maria Bartiromo.
Remember, this is the establishment candidate for the GOP nomination — and he thinks he’s living in Atlas Shrugged.
Back when Romney made his "47 percent" remark, Rich Lowry of the National Review Online responded:
...The contention is that if people aren’t paying federal income taxes, they are essentially freeloaders who will vote themselves more government benefits knowing that they don’t have to pay for them. As NR’s Ramesh Ponnuru has pointed out, there’s no evidence for this dynamic. ...
Fear of the creation of a class of “takers” can slide into disdain for people who are too poor — or have too many kids or are too old — to pay their damn taxes. For a whiff of how politically unattractive this point of view can be, just look at the Romney fundraising video.
Bush didn't learn a thing from Romney' venture down this road. "There's no evidence" for the charge itself, it's a political loser except with a certain population that would vote Republican in any case, and it falsely asserts that Democrats are opposed to policies that spur economic growth (hence our repeated calls for things like infrastructure to provide jobs, get the economy ready for a highly competitive international economy, and avoid the potential for secular stagnation?).
What we are opposed to, or what I am opposed to -- guess I should speak for myself -- is growth where all the benefits are captured by those at the top. Imperfections in economic institutions along with changes in the rules of the game pushed forward by those with political influence have caused those at the top to be rewarded in excess of their contribution to economic output, while those at the bottom have gotten less than their contribution. It's not "taking" to increase taxes at the top and return income to those who actually earned it, to the real makers who toil each day at jobs they'd rather not do to support their families. It's a daily struggle for many, a struggle that would be eased if they simply earned an amount equivalent to their contributions. That's why it's so "politically unattractive", people explicitly or implicitly understand they have been, for lack of a better word, screwed by the system. The blame is sometimes misplaced, but that doesn't change the nature of the problem. They don't want "free stuff," they want what they deserve, and there is nothing whatsoever wrong with that.
The other thing I'm opposed to is tax cuts for those at the top that make this problem even worse without delivering any corresponding benefits. These tax cuts redistribute income upward and cause the income received by workers to fall even further below their contribution, and there's no corresponding benefit to economic growth (or if there is, it's very, very small). We keep hearing that putting money in the hands of the "makers' at the top will produce magical growth, but the reality is that these are the true takers, the ones who are receiving far more from the economy than they contribute, while those who actually work their butts off each day to make the things we all need and enjoy struggle to pay their bills.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, September 30, 2015 at 11:23 AM in Economics, Income Distribution, Market Failure, Politics, Taxes |
Curious to hear what people think of this:
On the Ethics of Redistribution, by V. V. Chari and Christopher Phelan, The Region, FRB Minneapolis: When evaluating economic inequality, economists frequently employ the ethical principle referred to as behind-the-veil-of-ignorance. Originated by Nobel Laureate John Harsanyi and philosopher John Rawls, this criterion imagines the social contract that would be developed by a society of risk-averse people who don’t yet know where each of them will end up in that society’s distribution of income.1 ...
From behind the veil of ignorance, no individual could know into which country (or economic class) he or she will be born. Behind-the-veil, risk-averse people would therefore want to ensure that people born in rich countries do not adopt policies that hurt people born in poor countries. Nevertheless, analysts almost invariably ignore the effects of domestic tax policy on those in other nations. But consistent use of the behind-the-veil criterion would mean that analysts cannot treat people who live in rich, developed economies differently than they treat people who live in poor, less-developed economies. ...
Increasing world trade is an example of the tension between policies that help those in developing countries versus those that help those lower in the income distribution in developed countries. According to a World Bank Study, in the three decades between 1981 and 2010, the rate of extreme poverty in the developing world (subsisting on less than $1.25 per day) has gone down from more than one out of every two citizens to roughly one out of every five, all while the population of the developing world increased by 59 percent.8 This reduction in extreme poverty represents the single greatest decrease in material human deprivation in history.
But this decrease in extreme poverty in the developing world has coincided with a marked increase in income inequality in the developed world, and the latter has received much more attention, at least from policy analysts in these richer nations.
One possible cause of both trends has been the increase in international trade, which lessens the market value of less-skilled labor in developed countries while increasing its value in developing countries.9 If one uses a behind-the-veil criterion focused only on developed countries, then the increase in trade has made things worse. If instead one considers the entire world, then the trade increase has made the world phenomenally better. ...
We conclude that using the behind-the-veil-of-ignorance criterion to advocate for redistributive policies within developed countries while ignoring the effect of these policies on people in poor countries violates the criterion itself and is therefore fundamentally misguided.
Many economic analysts use social welfare functions in which, implicitly, only the well-being of domestic residents matters. This type of analysis is acceptable as long as the analyst acknowledges that such a social welfare function is not developed from deeper ethical considerations. A giant literature in public finance justifies such social welfare functions by appealing to the veil-of-ignorance. Our point simply is that those who use this criterion should weight the welfare of poor people in Chad, the world’s poorest nation, very heavily. To our knowledge, very little if any of the relevant research does so.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, September 30, 2015 at 10:13 AM in Equity, Income Distribution |
I think I buried the main point on this one for MoneyWatch. There has been quite a bit of criticism of the Fed's messaging on the timing of a rate liftoff. But while the messaging has been far from perfect, the bigger problem is the Fed's overly rosy forecasts. The Fed's forecasting models generally impose what is known as a stationarity assumption in response to demand-side shocks -- that is, the models have a relatively fast return to full employment baked into them. The rosy forecasts lead the Fed to adopt a relatively hawkish stance that has to be adjusted as more sobering data arrive. Thus, observers see the Fed continually revising its message, putting itself on a different "data dependent" path each time, and the succession of revisions causes observers to conclude that the Fed's messaging is off-base. But if the forecasts had been better, messaging wouldn't be so much of a problem:
Is communication the Fed's big problem?, Commentary: The Federal Reserve has gotten plenty of criticism for its recent communications about its monetary policy intentions. For example, Mark Gilbert at Bloomberg complained that "...the forward guidance policy adopted in recent years by many central banks is in tatters, and is probably doing more harm than good in telling companies and consumers when borrowing costs are likely to rise and at how fast."
Edward Luce at the Financial Times had similar sentiments, concluding that "Ms Yellen has juggled with different types of communication. They call this learning by doing. As the next countdown begins, her goal must be to share her thinking more clearly."
Is the Fed guilty as charged, and why is this important? ...
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, September 30, 2015 at 08:54 AM in Economics, Monetary Policy |
Education is not the only cause of inequality, but it's part of the problem:
Are American schools making inequality worse?, American Educational Research Association: The answer appears to be yes. Schooling plays a surprisingly large role in short-changing the nation's most economically disadvantaged students of critical math skills, according to a study published today in Educational Researcher, a peer-reviewed journal of the American Educational Research Association.
Findings from the study indicate that unequal access to rigorous mathematics content is widening the gap in performance on a prominent international math literacy test between low- and high-income students, not only in the United States but in countries worldwide.
Using data from the 2012..., researchers from Michigan State University and OECD confirmed not only that low-income students are more likely to be exposed to weaker math content in schools, but also that a substantial share of the gap in math performance between economically advantaged and disadvantaged students is related to those curricular inequalities. ...
"Our findings support previous research by showing that affluent students are consistently provided with greater opportunity to learn more rigorous content, and that students who are exposed to higher-level math have a better ability to apply it to addressing real-world situations of contemporary adult life, such as calculating interest, discounts, and estimating the required amount of carpeting for a room," said Schmidt, a University Distinguished Professor of Statistics and Education at Michigan State University. "But now we know just how important content inequality is in contributing to performance gaps between privileged and underprivileged students."
In the United States, over one-third of the social class-related gap in student performance on the math literacy test was associated with unequal access to rigorous content. The other two-thirds was associated directly with students' family and community background. ...
"Because of differences in content exposure for low- and high-income students in this country, the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer," said Schmidt. "The belief that schools are the great equalizer, helping students overcome the inequalities of poverty, is a myth."
Burroughs, a senior research associate at Michigan State University, noted that the findings have major implications for school officials, given that content exposure is far more subject to school policies than are broader socioeconomic conditions.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, September 30, 2015 at 12:24 AM in Economics, Education, Income Distribution |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, September 30, 2015 at 12:06 AM
Magic plans meet the reality called the Fed:
Trump World and the Fed, by Dean Baker: ...Suppose that Donald Trump's tax cut really is the magic elixir that would get the economy to 6.0 percent annual growth. But what if the people at the Fed's Open Market Committee (FOMC) don't recognize this fact? Suppose the FOMC thinks the economy is still bound by the pre-Trump tax cut rules and believes that inflation will start to accelerate out of control if the unemployment rate falls much below its current 5.1 percent level.
In this case, we would expect to see the Fed raise interest rates sharply as they saw the Trump tax cuts boosting growth. ... If the Fed raises interest rates high enough, it could fully offset the boost that Trump's tax cut is giving to the economy. In this case, even though the Trump tax cuts might have been the best thing for the economy since the Internet (okay, better than the Internet), we wouldn't see any dividend because the Fed would not allow it.
For this reason, the Fed's likely response to a tax cut is a fundamental question that reporters should be asking. If the Fed is likely to simply slam on the brakes to offset any possible stimulus, then a tax plan will have little prospect of providing a growth dividend.
Maybe they aren't asking because they know in their heart of hearts that the plan will be lucky to boost growth at all.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Tuesday, September 29, 2015 at 06:28 PM in Economics, Monetary Policy, Politics, Taxes |
The Price Impact of Margin-Linked Shorts: The real money peer-to-peer prediction market PredictIt just made a major announcement: they plan to margin-link short positions. This will lead to an across-the board decline in the prices of many contracts, especially in the two nominee markets. Given that the prices in this market are already being referenced by the campaigns, this change could well have an impact on the race.
What margin-linking short positions does is to make it substantially cheaper to bet simultaneously against multiple candidates. Instead of a trader's worst-case loss being computed separately for each position, it is computed based on the recognition that only one candidate can eventually win. So a bet against both Bush and Rubio ought to require less cash than a bet against just one of the two, since we know that a loss on one bet implies a win on the other.
In an earlier post I argued that a failure to margin-link short positions was a design flaw that results in artificially inflated prices for all contracts in a given market, making the interpretation of these prices as probabilities untenable. The problem can be seen by looking at some of the current prices in the GOP nominee market:
The "Buy No" column tells us the price per contract of betting against a candidate for the nomination, with each contract paying out a dollar if the named individual fails to secure the nomination. One could buy five of these contracts (Rubio, Bush, Trump, Fiorina, and Carson) for a total of $3.91, and even of one of these were to win, the payoff from the bet would be $4. If, on the other hand, Cruz or Kasich were to be nominated, the bet would pay $5. There is no risk of loss involved.
Margin-linking shorts recognizes this fact, and would make this basket of five bets collectively cost nothing at all. This would be about as pure an arbitrage opportunity as one is likely to find in real money markets. Aggressive bets would be placed on all contracts simultaneously, with consequent price declines.
A useful effect of this change in design is that manipulating the market becomes much harder. Buying contracts to push up a price would be met by a wall of resistance as long as the sum of all contract prices yields an opportunity for arbitrage. To sustain manipulation would require a trader not only to put a floor on the favored contract, but a ceiling on all others. This has been done before, but would be considerably more costly than under the current market design.
I'd be interested to see which prices are affected most as the transition occurs, and how much prices move in anticipation of the change. But no matter how the aggregate decline is distributed across contracts, this example illustrates one important fact about financial markets in general: prices depend not just on beliefs about the likelihood of future events, but also on detailed features of market design. Too uncritical an acceptance of the efficient markets hypothesis can lead us to overlook this somewhat obvious but quite important point.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Tuesday, September 29, 2015 at 05:57 PM in Economics |
And Then There Were None: ...I ... want to weigh in for a minute on Donald Trump’s tax plan — which would, surprise, lavish huge cuts on the wealthy while blowing up the deficit. That’s in contrast to Jeb Bush’s plan, which would lavish huge cuts on the wealthy while blowing up the deficit, and Marco Rubio’s plan, which would lavish huge cuts on the wealthy while blowing up the deficit.
At this point there are no Republican candidates deviating at all from the usual pattern. Why, it’s almost as if nobody in the party ever cared about deficits except as an excuse to slash social spending, and is totally committed to redistributing income upward.
And there is, of course, no evidence — zero, nada, zilch — that cutting taxes on the rich will yield large economic benefits.
What we’re seeing here is a party completely incapable of reforming …
Posted by Mark Thoma on Tuesday, September 29, 2015 at 10:30 AM in Economics, Politics |
Sharun Mukand and Dani Rodrik at Vox EU:
The political economy of liberal democracy, Vox EU: There are more democracies in the world today than non-democracies, according to data from Polity IV.1 Yet, few of those are what we would call liberal democracies – regimes that go beyond electoral competition and protect the rights of minorities, the rule of law, and free speech and practice non-discrimination in the provision of public goods.
Hungary, Ecuador, Mexico, Turkey, and Pakistan, for example, are all classified as electoral democracies by the Freedom House.2 But in these and many other countries, harassment of political opponents, censorship or self-censorship in the media, and discrimination against minority ethnic/religious groups run rampant. Fareed Zakaria coined the term ‘illiberal democracy’ for political regimes such as these that hold regular elections but routinely violate rights (Zakaria 1997). More recently, political scientists Steve Levitsky and Lucan Way (2010) have used the term ‘competitive authoritarianism’ to describe what they view as hybrid regimes between democracy and autocracy.
Democracy developed in Western Europe out of a liberal tradition that emphasized individual rights and placed limits on state coercion (Ryan 2012, Fawcett 2014, Fukuyama 2014). In Britain, France, Germany, and even the US, mass enfranchisement arrived only after liberal thought had become entrenched. Most of the world’s new democracies, by contrast, emerged in the absence of a liberal tradition and did little to foster one. As the shortcomings of these democracies have become more evident, it has become commonplace to talk about a ‘democratic recession’ (Diamond 2015). ...
Circumstances supporting civil rights But liberal democracies do exist, and the question is how they can ever be sustained in equilibrium. We discuss several circumstances that can mitigate the bias against civil rights in democracies.
- First, there may not be a clear, identifiable cleavage – ethnic, religious, or otherwise – that divides the majority from the minority.
In highly homogenous societies, the ‘majority’ derives few benefits from excluding the ‘minority’ from public goods and suffers few costs from providing equal access. This may account for the emergence of liberal democracy in Sweden during the early part of the 20th century or in Japan and South Korea more recently.
- Second, the two cleavages that distinguish the majority from the minority and the elite from the non-elite may be in close alignment.
In such a case, the elite will seek both property and civil rights as part of the political settlement with the majority. Think, for example, of the position of the white minority government in South Africa prior to the transition to democracy in 1994.
- Third, the majority may be slender and need the support of the minority to mount a serious challenge to the elite.
Or there may be no clear-cut majority, with society characterized by a preponderance of cross-cutting cleavages. In these cases, repeated game incentives may ensure that each group recognizes the rights of others in return for its rights being protected by them. Lebanon’s ‘consociational’ democracy may have been an example of this, before differential population growth and outside intervention upset the pre-existing balance of power among different religious denominations.
The role of societal cleavages As these examples make clear, two societal cleavages play a crucial role in our story.
- First, there is the divide between the propertied elite and the poor masses.
This is largely an economic divide and is determined by the division of land, capital and other assets in society, as well as access to the opportunities for accumulating those assets. Standard class-based accounts of the dynamics of political regimes emphasize primarily this cleavage.
- Second, there is a cleavage between what we call a majority and a minority.
This particular divide may be identity based, deriving from ethnic, religious, linguistic, or regional affiliations. Or it may be ideological – as with secular modernizers versus religious conservatives in Turkey, and Western-oriented liberals versus traditionalists in Russia. (We will call this second cleavage an ‘identity’ cleavage for short, but it should be kept in mind that the relevant majority-minority cleavage will run often on ideological lines.) These two cleavages may align, as they did in South Africa, but more often than not, they will not. Their divergence is what allows us to make an analytical and substantive distinction between electoral and liberal democracy.
In our formal model, the majority-minority split exerts a variety of influences on the prospects for liberal democracy. First, and most crucially, it makes the majority favor electoral over liberal democracy. By discriminating against the minority, the majority can enjoy more public goods for itself. But there are effects that go in the opposite direction too. Under some circumstances, the split can make the elite favor liberal democracy. We identify two such consequences. First, the rate of taxation is generally lower under liberal democracy as the majority reap fewer benefits from redistributive taxation when they have to share public goods with the minority. So the elite may support liberal democracy when the income/class cleavage is very deep. Second, when the elite’s identity aligns with that of the minority, the elite have a direct stake in civil rights too. These channels can produce a rich mix of results.
Concluding remarks We suggest that the differential fortunes of liberal democracy in Western Europe and the developing world are related to the nature of dominant cleavages at the time of the social mobilization that ushered in democracy. In the West, the transition to democracy occurred as a consequence of industrialization at a time when the major division in society was the one between capitalists and workers. In most developing nations, on the other hand, mass politics was the product of decolonization and wars of national liberation, with identity cleavages as the main fault line. Our framework suggests that the second kind of transition is particularly inimical to liberal democracy. ...
Posted by Mark Thoma on Tuesday, September 29, 2015 at 01:05 AM in Economics, Politics |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Tuesday, September 29, 2015 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
Advice about selling goods on eBay from the NBER Digest:
Cheap Talk, Round Numbers, and Signaling Behavior: In the marketplace for ordinary goods, buyers and sellers have many characteristics that are hidden from each other. From the seller's perspective, it may be beneficial to reveal some of these characteristics. For example, a patient seller may want to signal unending willingness to wait in order to secure a good deal. At the same time, an impatient seller may want to signal a desire to sell a good quickly, albeit at a lower price.
This insight is at the heart of Cheap Talk, Round Numbers, and the Economics of Negotiation (NBER Working Paper No. 21285) by Matthew Backus, Thomas Blake, and Steven Tadelis. The authors show that sellers on eBay behave in a fashion that is consistent with using round numbers as signals of impatience.
The authors analyze data from eBay's bargaining platform using its collectibles category—coins, antiques, toys, memorabilia, and the like. The process is one of sequential offers not unlike haggling in an open-air market. A seller lists an initial price, to which buyers may make counteroffers, to which sellers may make counteroffers, and so on. If a price is agreed upon, the good sells. The authors analyze 10.5 million listed items, out of which 2.8 million received offers and 2.1 million ultimately sold. Their key finding is that items listed at multiples of $100 receive lower offers on average than items listed at nearby prices, ultimately selling for 5 to 8 percent less.
It is tempting to label such behavior a mistake. However, items listed at these round numbers receive offers 6 to 11 days sooner and are 3 to 5 percent more likely to sell than items listed at "precise" numbers. Furthermore, even experienced sellers frequently list items at round numbers, suggesting it is an equilibrium behavior best modeled by rationality rather than seller error. It appears that impatient sellers are able to signal their impatience and are happy to do it, even though it nets them a lower price.
One concern with the analysis is that round-number pricing might provide a signal about the good being sold, rather than the person or firm selling it. To address this issue, the authors use data on goods originally posted with prices in British pounds. These prices are automatically translated to U.S. dollars for the American market. Hence, the authors can test what happens when goods intended to be sold at round numbers are, in fact, sold at non-round numbers. This removes the round-number signal while holding the good's features constant. In this setting, they find that buyers of goods priced in non-round dollar amounts systematically realize higher prices, though the effect is not as strong as that in their primary sample. This evidence indicates the round numbers themselves have a significant effect on bargaining outcomes.
The authors find additional evidence on the round-number phenomenon in the real estate market in Illinois from 1992 to 2002. This is a wholly different market than that for eBay collectibles, with much higher prices and with sellers typically receiving advice from professional listing agents. But here, too, there is evidence that round-number listings lead to lower sales prices. On average, homes listed at multiples of $50,000 sold for $600 less.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, September 28, 2015 at 05:54 PM in Academic Papers, Economics |
Kevin Williamson at the National Review Online tells Republican candidates to get real:
The Thing about Tax Cut, by Kevin D. Williamson: Every Republican tax-reform plan should be rooted in this reality: If you are going to have federal spending that is 21 percent of GDP, then you can have a.) taxes that are 21 percent of GDP; b.) deficits. There is no c.
If, on the other hand, you have a credible program for reducing spending to 17 or 18 percent of GDP, which is where taxes have been coming in, please do share it.
The problem with the Growth Fairy model of balancing budgets is that while economic growth would certainly reduce federal spending as a share of GDP if spending were kept constant, there is zero evidence that the government of these United States has the will or the inclination to enact serious spending controls when times are good (Uncork the champagne!) or when times are bad (Wicked austerity! We must have stimulus!). So even if we buy Jeb Bush’s happy talk about growth, or Donald Trump’s, the idea that spending is just going to magically sit there, inert, while the economy zips forward and the tax coffers fill up, is delusional.
There are no tax cuts when the government is running deficits, only tax deferrals.
Remembering that the "math simply does not add up" for Republicans -- partly that's Williamson's point -- let's take a look at the evidence on government spending as a share of potential GDP. This is from Paul Krugman in 2013, but the underlying trends do not change. He explains why this is the best measure to use when looking at this question:
The Non-Surge in Government Spending: The fiscal debate in Washington is dominated by things everyone knows that happen not to be true. One of those things is the notion that we have a fiscal crisis... The crucial thing to understand here is that you do need to take the state of the business cycle into account; it’s not enough simply to do what Nate Silver, for example, does, and look at spending as a share of GDP — a calculation that can be deeply misleading in the aftermath of a severe recession followed by a slow recovery.
Why does this matter? First, if the economy is depressed — if GDP is low relative to potential — the share of spending in GDP will correspondingly look high. ...
Second, there are some programs — unemployment benefits, food stamps, to some extent Medicaid — that tend to spend more when the economy is depressed and more people are in distress. And rightly so! You don’t want to take a temporary spike in UI payments after a deep slump as a sign of runaway spending.
So how can we get a better picture? First, express spending as a share of potential rather than actual GDP; we can use the CBO estimates of potential for that purpose. Second, keep your eye on the business cycle — and, in particular, on how spending is evolving now that a gradual recovery is underway.
So, let’s look first at a longish time series of total government spending as a share of potential GDP:
Ratio of government spending to potential GDP
What you see is not a sustained upward trend: there’s actually a considerable fall during the Clinton years, reflecting in part falling defense spending, then a more modest rise in the Bush years, mainly reflecting spending on the War on Terror (TM), and finally a temporary surge associated with the financial crisis — but much of that surge has already been reversed.
Here’s a closeup on Bush’s last two years and Obama’s first four:
That was the spending surge that was. ...
The claim is that "the idea that spending is just going to magically sit there, inert, while the economy zips forward and the tax coffers fill up, is delusional." Here's an updated graph using the latest data:
Taking away the surge from the crisis, which has been reversed, the trend in the last few decades looks pretty flat to me. To the extent that there is a tendency for the ratio to move upward in recent years, it's hardly the fault of Democrats. There is something delusional here, but it's not that spending as a share of potential GDP -- the right way to look at this question -- always rises when times are good or bad, or that Democratic administrations cannot keep spending under control.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, September 28, 2015 at 04:42 PM in Economics, Politics, Taxes |
No sense hiding from evidence that works against my support of immigration. This is from George Borjas (if you are unfamiliar with the Mariel boatlift, see here):
The Wage Impact of the Marielitos: A Reappraisal, by George J. Borjas, NBER Working Paper No. 21588 [open link]: This paper brings a new perspective to the analysis of the Mariel supply shock, revisiting the question and the data armed with the accumulated insights from the vast literature on the economic impact of immigration. A crucial lesson from this literature is that any credible attempt to measure the wage impact of immigration must carefully match the skills of the immigrants with those of the pre-existing workforce. The Marielitos were disproportionately low-skill; at least 60 percent were high school dropouts. A reappraisal of the Mariel evidence, specifically examining the evolution of wages in the low-skill group most likely to be affected, quickly overturns the finding that Mariel did not affect Miami’s wage structure. The absolute wage of high school dropouts in Miami dropped dramatically, as did the wage of high school dropouts relative to that of either high school graduates or college graduates. The drop in the relative wage of the least educated Miamians was substantial (10 to 30 percent), implying an elasticity of wages with respect to the number of workers between -0.5 and -1.5. In fact, comparing the magnitude of the steep post-Mariel drop in the low-skill wage in Miami with that observed in all other metropolitan areas over an equivalent time span between 1977 and 2001 reveals that the change in the Miami wage structure was a very unusual event. The analysis also documents the sensitivity of the estimated wage impact to the choice of a placebo. The measured impact is much smaller when the placebo consists of cities where pre-Mariel employment growth was weak relative to Miami.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, September 28, 2015 at 12:11 PM in Academic Papers, Econometrics, Immigration |
Trump Plan Is Tax Cut for the Rich, Even Hedge Fund Managers: Donald Trump’s tax plan, released Monday, does not live up to the populist language he has offered on taxes all summer.
When talking about taxes in this campaign, Donald Trump has often sounded like a different kind of Republican. He says he will take on “the hedge fund guys” and their carried interest loophole. He thinks it’s “outrageous” how little tax some multimillionaires pay. But his plan calls for major tax cuts not just for the middle class but also for the richest Americans — even the dreaded hedge fund managers. And despite his campaign’s assurances that the plan is “fiscally responsible,” it would grow budget deficits by trillions of dollars over a decade.
You could call Mr. Trump’s plan a higher-energy version of the tax plan Jeb Bush announced earlier this month: similar in structure, but with lower rates and wider tax brackets, meaning individual taxpayers would pay even less than under Mr. Bush, and the government would lose even more tax revenue. ...
A document from the Trump campaign says all these tax cuts would be “fully paid for” by the elimination of deductions and by a one-time tax on foreign profits of American firms held abroad. That math simply does not add up: As discussed above, rich people do not currently take enough tax deductions to offset the tax rate cuts Mr. Trump proposes, and the one-time foreign profits tax might raise $250 billion, not close to the trillions of revenue that would be lost through tax rate cuts.
At a news conference Monday, Mr. Trump offered another way his tax plan would pay for itself: economic growth, perhaps as fast as 6 percent a year, again a higher-energy estimate than the 4 percent Mr. Bush has proposed. But there is no evidence to support the idea that such rapid growth can be produced through tax cuts.
"That math simply does not add up" could be applied to Republican tax plans in general. There's always some sort of magical thinking that makes their plans work (or, perhaps, better described as cunning deception that relies upon the press remaining effectively silent, or playing the "he said she said" game that gives people little information about truth, in the face of absurd claims). Talk like a populist, act like a plutocrat seems to be a winning formula -- somehow many who have been disaffected by the economic system believe Republicans are on their side, and have their best interests at heart, that all the unfairness they see around them (which is not always real, but rather stoked by the closed loop news system they adhere to) will be addressed by a Republican administration. Not gonna happen.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, September 28, 2015 at 11:06 AM in Economics, Politics, Taxes |
Why is Boehner quitting?:
The Blackmail Caucus, a.k.a. the Republican Party, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: John Boehner was a terrible, very bad, no good speaker of the House. Under his leadership, Republicans pursued an unprecedented strategy of scorched-earth obstructionism, which did immense damage to the economy and undermined America’s credibility around the world. ...
For me, Mr. Boehner’s defining moment remains what he said and did ... when a newly inaugurated President Obama was trying to cope with the disastrous recession that began under his predecessor. ...
In 2008 a stimulus plan passed Congress with bipartisan support, and the case for a further stimulus in 2009 was overwhelming. But with a Democrat in the White House, Mr. Boehner demanded that policy go in the opposite direction, declaring that “American families are tightening their belts. But they don’t see government tightening its belt.” And he called for government to “go on a diet.” This was know-nothing economics, and incredibly irresponsible at a time of crisis...
The Boehner era has been one in which Republicans have accepted no responsibility for helping to govern the country, in which they have opposed anything and everything the president proposes.
What’s more, it has been an era of budget blackmail, in which threats that Republicans will shut down the government or push it into default unless they get their way have become standard operating procedure. ...
So why is he out? Basically because the obstructionism failed..., despite all Mr. Boehner’s efforts to bring him down, Mr. Obama is looking more and more like a highly successful president. For the base,..., this is a nightmare. And all too many ambitious Republican politicians are willing to tell the base that it’s Mr. Boehner’s fault, that he just didn’t try blackmail hard enough.
This is nonsense, of course. In fact, the controversy over Planned Parenthood that probably triggered the Boehner exit — shut down the government in response to obviously doctored videos? — might have been custom-designed to illustrate just how crazy the G.O.P.’s extremists have become, how unrealistic they are about what confrontational politics can accomplish.
But Republican leaders who have encouraged the base to believe all kinds of untrue things are in no position to start preaching political rationality.
Mr. Boehner is quitting because he found himself caught between the limits of the politically possible and a base that lives in its own reality. But don’t cry for (or with) Mr. Boehner; cry for America, which must find a way to live with a G.O.P. gone mad.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, September 28, 2015 at 12:42 AM in Economics, Politics |
Why We Must End Upward Pre-Distribution to the Rich: You often hear inequality has widened because globalization and technological change have made most people less competitive, while making the best educated more competitive.
There’s some truth to this. The tasks most people used to do can now be done more cheaply by lower-paid workers abroad or by computer-driven machines.
But this common explanation overlooks a critically important phenomenon: the increasing concentration of political power in a corporate and financial elite that has been able to influence the rules by which the economy runs.
As I argue in my new book, “Saving Capitalism: For the Many, Not the Few” (out this week), this transformation has amounted to a pre-distribution upward. ...
After a large number of examples illustrating how changes in the rules of the game driven by political influence have worked against the economic interests of the working class, he concludes
... The underlying problem, then, is not just globalization and technological changes that have made most American workers less competitive. Nor is it that they lack enough education to be sufficiently productive.
The more basic problem is that the market itself has become tilted ever more in the direction of moneyed interests that have exerted disproportionate influence over it, while average workers have steadily lost bargaining power—both economic and political—to receive as large a portion of the economy’s gains as they commanded in the first three decades after World War II.
Reversing the scourge of widening inequality requires reversing the upward pre-distributions within the rules of the market, and giving average people the bargaining power they need to get a larger share of the gains from growth.
The answer to this problem is not found in economics. It is found in politics. Ultimately, the trend toward widening inequality in America, as elsewhere, can be reversed only if the vast majority join together to demand fundamental change.
The most important political competition over the next decades will not be between the right and left, or between Republicans and Democrats. It will be between a majority of Americans who have been losing ground, and an economic elite that refuses to recognize or respond to its growing distress.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, September 28, 2015 at 12:15 AM in Economics, Income Distribution, Politics |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, September 28, 2015 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
The end of an essay by David Warsh:
... Many regulators and bankers contend that the thousand-page Dodd Frank Act complicated the task of a future panic rescue by compromising the independence of the Fed. Next time the Treasury Secretary will be required to sign off on emergency lending.
Bank Regulators? Some economists, including Gorton, worry that by focusing on its new “liquidity coverage ratio” the Bank for International Settlements, by now the chief regulator of global banking, will have rendered the international system more fragile rather than less by immobilizing collateral.
Bankers? You know that the young ones among them are already looking for the Next New Thing.
Meanwhile, critics left and right in the US Congress are seeking legislation that would curb the power of the Fed to respond to future crises.
So there is plenty to worry about in the years ahead. Based on the experience of 2008, when a disastrous meltdown was avoided, there is also reason to hope that central bankers will once again cope. Remember, though, as the Duke of Wellington said of the Battle of Waterloo, it was a close-run thing.
Update: See Brad Delong's reply.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Sunday, September 27, 2015 at 01:54 PM in Economics, Financial System, Regulation |
Economic importance of China: How important would an economic downturn in China be for the United States? Paul Krugman reviews some of the reasons why the United States perhaps shouldn’t worry too much...
I’ve long believed that to understand business cycles we need to consider not just net flows but also gross interdependencies. A downturn in China will affect some businesses much more than others. If specialized labor and capital do not easily move to other sectors, that can end up having significant multiplier effects.
For example, while China may only account for 15% of world GDP, it has been a huge factor in commodity markets over the last decade. ... Of course, lower commodity prices [from the slowdown in China] will force layoffs for oil companies and miners but leave more money in the hands of consumers. However, additional spending from that channel has been more modest than many of us were anticipating.
Another concern comes from financial linkages. A Chinese downturn will unquestionably be a big hit for certain financial institutions. Exactly who those will be and what it means for the rest of us, I don’t know. As Warren Buffett observed, “you only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out.”
The bottom line is that an economic slowdown in China already is a very big deal for some U.S. workers and businesses. I don’t know what the ultimate implications for the U.S. of a significant recession in China would be.
But things I don’t know cause me to worry.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Sunday, September 27, 2015 at 12:13 PM in China, Economics |
Inequality goes beyond income and wealth, it extends to the political arena:
The Soaring Price of Political Access, Editorial, NY Times: ... This year,... the two national parties reported to be planning tenfold increases in the rates V.I.P. donors will be charged to secure the right to attend exclusive dinners and presidential convention forums with candidates and party leaders.
This means that top-tier Republican donors will pay $1.34 million per couple for the privilege of being treated as party insiders, while the Democratic Party will charge about $1.6 million, according to The Washington Post. Four years ago the most an individual could give to a national party was $30,800. This time, that top $1.34 million ticket for a couple in the Republican National Committee’s Presidential Trust tier, reserved for the “most elite R.N.C. investors,” promises “influence messaging and strategy” opportunities at exclusive party dinners and retreats...
The prices for getting into the inner sanctum are rising because of loosened restrictions on political money from the courts and Congress. ...
The Republicans have rendered the election commission completely dysfunctional by blocking regulatory decisions and refusing to take action against improper practices. And now the Democrats are trying to get official approval of the very practices that eviscerate the law.
While Democrats led by Hillary Rodham Clinton have called for broad reforms of campaign fund-raising, Mrs. Clinton and party leaders say they will emulate Republican tactics in going after big money if that’s what it takes to compete. At what cost to democracy is the looming question for voters.
There was a time when unions provided a bit of countervailing influence over politicians, and hence provided a way to consolidate the political power of individual workers. That influence has faded over time, in no small part due to the very imbalances in political power that unions helped to overcome. Unfortunately, no new institutions have risen to take their place. Until that happens, until the power of individuals is magnified through collective coordination, if ever, it's hard for me to see how the problem of inequality of income, and the problem of inequality of political influence will be overcome.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Sunday, September 27, 2015 at 10:21 AM in Economics, Politics |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Sunday, September 27, 2015 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
From an interview with Olivier Blanchard:
...IMF Survey: In pushing the envelope, you also hosted three major Rethinking Macroeconomics conferences. What were the key insights and what are the key concerns on the macroeconomic front?
Blanchard: Let me start with the obvious answer: That mainstream macroeconomics had taken the financial system for granted. The typical macro treatment of finance was a set of arbitrage equations, under the assumption that we did not need to look at who was doing what on Wall Street. That turned out to be badly wrong.
But let me give you a few less obvious answers:
The financial crisis raises a potentially existential crisis for macroeconomics. Practical macro is based on the assumption that there are fairly stable aggregate relations, so we do not need to keep track of each individual, firm, or financial institution—that we do not need to understand the details of the micro plumbing. We have learned that the plumbing, especially the financial plumbing, matters: the same aggregates can hide serious macro problems. How do we do macro then?
As a result of the crisis, a hundred intellectual flowers are blooming. Some are very old flowers: Hyman Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. Kaldorian models of growth and inequality. Some propositions that would have been considered anathema in the past are being proposed by "serious" economists: For example, monetary financing of the fiscal deficit. Some fundamental assumptions are being challenged, for example the clean separation between cycles and trends: Hysteresis is making a comeback. Some of the econometric tools, based on a vision of the world as being stationary around a trend, are being challenged. This is all for the best.
Finally, there is a clear swing of the pendulum away from markets towards government intervention, be it macro prudential tools, capital controls, etc. Most macroeconomists are now solidly in a second best world. But this shift is happening with a twist—that is, with much skepticism about the efficiency of government intervention. ...
Posted by Mark Thoma on Saturday, September 26, 2015 at 01:12 PM in Economics, Financial System, Macroeconomics, Methodology |
Paul Krugman returns to a familiar theme:
Economics: What Went Right: ...I’m at EconEd; here are my slides for later today. The theme of my talk is something I’ve emphasized a lot over the past few years: basic macroeconomics has actually worked remarkably well in the post-crisis world, with those of us who took our Hicks seriously calling the big stuff — the effects of monetary and fiscal policy — right, and those who went with their gut getting it all wrong. ...
One thing I do try is to concede that one piece of the conventional story hasn’t worked that well, namely the Phillips curve, where the “clockwise spirals” of previous protracted large output gaps haven’t materialized. Maybe it’s about what happens at very low inflation rates.
What’s notable about the Fed’s urge to raise rates, however, is that Fed officials, including Janet Yellen, are acting as if they have high confidence in their models of inflation dynamics –which is the one thing we really haven’t done well at recently. I really fear that we’re looking at incestuous amplification here.
Agree about the uncertainty about inflation dynamics, but fear Fed officials will interpret it as risks on the upside that must be nullified through interest rate hikes. As for the Phillips curve, here's a graph from his talk:
As Krugman says, "Maybe it’s about what happens at very low inflation rates." I would add that the combination of the zero bound, low inflation, and downward wage rigidity may be able to explain the change in the Phillips curve -- I'm not quite ready to give up yet.
More generally, estimating inflation dynamics has been far from successful. For example, in many VAR models (a widely used empirical specification for establishing relationships among macroeconomic series), a shock to the federal funds rate often causes prices to go up (theory says they should go down). This can be overcome somewhat by including commodity prices in the model. The idea is that when the Fed expects inflation to go up it raises the federal funds rate, and since the policy does not complete eliminate the inflation, the data will show a positive correlation between the federal funds rate and inflation. Commodity prices are thought to embody and be sensitive to future expected inflation, so including this variable helps to solve the "price puzzle" as it is known. Even so, the results are highly sensitive to specification, and when you work with these models regularly you come away believing that the estimated price dynamics are not very good at all.
But the Fed must forecast in order to do policy. There are lags (though I've argued they are likely shorter than common wisdom suggests), and the Fed must act before a clear picture emerges. The question is how the Fed should react to such uncertainty about its inflation forecasts, and to me -- given the corresponding uncertainties about the state of the labor market and the asymmetric nature of the costs of mistakes about inflation and unemployment (plus the distributional issues -- who gets hurt by each mistake?), it counsels patience rather than urgency on the inflation front.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Saturday, September 26, 2015 at 12:47 PM in Economics, Inflation, Macroeconomics, Unemployment |
Matthew Yglesias takes up a quote from Bush (I highlighted this yesterday):
Jeb Bush can't explain the cost of his tax cuts correctly: ...Jeb Bush ... talking to CNBC's John Harwood about the impact of his plan on the deficit:
Everybody freaks out about the deficit. And I worry about the structural deficit for sure. But if we grow our economy at a faster rate, the dynamic nature of tax policy will kick in. And so we'll be in the hole around $1.2 trillion over 10 years. And these are moderate growth effects. I'm not using the ones that I believe. I'm more optimistic.
There's never been a time where there hasn't been a dynamic effect of taxation. That's not a risk at all. That's just a simple fact. Take the contrary argument here for a second: If tax policy doesn't matter, why don't we just tax everything?
Bush is referring to an estimate prepared for media consumption by John Cogan, Martin Feldstein, Glenn Hubbard, and Kevin Warsh — four men who are smart economists in good standing but who are also very much partisan Republicans. The right way to think about an estimate they put together is that it represents the outer limit of what a person is willing to claim on behalf of the growth impacts of Bush's tax cut and feel like he can still look at his graduate students with a straight face.
And guess what? The paper doesn't say what Bush says it says. ...
Obviously even if Bush were able to get his basic facts right, the underlying claim about the growth-boosting impact of the tax cuts is disputable. Jeb's brother claimed that the growth-boosting power of his tax cuts would avoid increasing the deficit, and we got eight years of fairly dismal economic performance.
The argument Republicans can make is that growth would have been even faster without the drag from Obama's policies.. But that's where comparisons to the past are useful. These comparisons establish a baseline on what we should expect. So let's take a look. This is from Calculated Risk. It shows private sector employment under recent past presidents:
So Obama's job growth is all but tied with Reagan's, he beats both Bushes, G.W. by a considerable margin, but loses to Clinton and Carter. The most relevant comparison here is to G.W. Bush since Jeb promises to follow his policies for the most part, and by that comparison Obama wins soundly.
What about public sector jobs? Government has expanded under Obama correct? So if you add private sector jobs to public sector jobs, or course Obama looks even better than for private sector jobs alone and wins handily -- it's the undue influence of government expansion that is driving the overall job numbers, not his economic policies.
That story falls apart when the data are examined:
Obama is the big "loser" here in terms of public sector job creation, a source of annoyance for me (that's not what you do in a recession, instead wait until the economy improves to make these kinds of cuts -- it's stimulative, it avoids sending people to unemployment and a dismal job market and compounding our problems, and it avoids the need to increase social services to help the unemployed during their struggle to find new employment). But to Republicans, Obama ought to be a hero.
Okay, but surely Obamacare has been a job-killer, right? Republicans are noted for their forecasting ability, that runaway inflation we've had, the spike in interest rates, the stimulative effects of austerity (well, they are noted for how bad their forecasts have been), so surely they are right about this too. Obamacare has killed jobs and caused employers to shift people to part-time work, right?
That story falls apart when the data are examined (this should be the first thing to think when Republicans start spouting claims about economics). This is from Jared Bernstein:
Smell Something, Say Something: Obamacare, O’Reilly, and full-time jobs: ...I heard Fox’s Bill O’Reilly claim that the Affordable Care Act “has made it more difficult to create full-time jobs in America,” (around 2:30 in the video). The figure below, which indexes both full-time and part-time jobs to 100 in 2010, belies his claim. As ACA measures have been introduced, most notably the arrival of the subsidized exchanges and the Medicaid expansion in 2014, there’s been no noticeable change and certainly no Obamacare-induced shift to part-time work. Other data show that the number of involuntary part-time workers is down 18 percent—1.4 million fewer workers—since 2013.
Source: BLS, my analysis
No one’s claiming that the ACA is having miraculous effects on job growth, or even that it’s responsible for the full-time job growth you see above. ... My point is that while Obamacare is having its intended effect of making coverage more affordable and thereby lowering the uninsured rate, I’ve not seen any data that would lead an objective person to conclude it’s having a meaningful impact on the job market one way or the other.
In other words, those who still want to repeal Obamacare need a new rationale besides “it’s not working” or “it’s a job killer.” It is working and it’s not killing jobs. Those who claim otherwise are, in fact, fact-killers. ...
If you want slow growth, poor job creation, tax cuts for the wealthy, harder times for everyone else as social programs are cut on the false pretenses of ending dependency and building character (we know what the true goals are for most Republicans), if you want health care to be harder to get for those "others", environmental policies to be rolled back in the name of "business interests", if you want all of this and more -- we haven't even touched on issues like the supreme court, war, and Federal Reserve appointments -- Jeb is the man for you.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Saturday, September 26, 2015 at 12:05 PM in Economics, Politics |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Saturday, September 26, 2015 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
The politics in the UK is so much better than here. Politicians in the UK would never think of using smokescreens like concern over the deficit to conceal their true intentions:
The path from deficit concern to deficit deceit, by Simon Wren-Lewis: ...A few days ago Lord Turnbull had the opportunity to question the Chancellor on his drive for further austerity. This is a part of what he said.
“I think what you are doing actually, is, the real argument is you want a smaller state and there are good arguments for that and some people don’t agree but you don’t tell people you are doing that. What you tell people is this story about the impoverishment of debt which is a smokescreen. The urgency of reducing debt, the extent, I just can’t see the justification for it.”
A former head of the civil service, who had initially supported Osborne on the deficit, was now accusing him of deliberate deceit. Big news you might have thought. And quite a turnaround in just 5 years.
Yet it is not surprising. Osborne’s fiscal plans really have no basis in economics. That leaves two alternatives. Either Osborne is just stupid and cannot take advice, or he has other motives. George Osborne is clearly not stupid, which leaves only the second possibility. It is therefore entirely logical that Lord Turnbull should come to agree with what some of us were saying some time ago.
What a strange world we are now in. The government goes for rapid deficit reduction as a smokescreen for reducing the size of the state. No less than a former cabinet secretary accuses the Chancellor of this deceit. Yet when a Labour leadership contender adopts an anti-austerity policy he is told it is extreme and committing electoral suicide. Is it any wonder that a quarter of a million Labour party members voted for change.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Friday, September 25, 2015 at 12:34 PM in Budget Deficit, Economics, Politics |
This worked so well for Romney:
Our message is one of hope and aspiration," he said at the East Cooper Republican Women’s Club annual Shrimp Dinner. "It isn't one of division and get in line and we'll take care of you with free stuff. Our message is one that is uplifting -- that says you can achieve earned success.
Bush says this is how he will win back black voters, but I have a feeling his message of "hope and inspiration" and the reference to "free stuff" is for another group of voters.
If the pope was a scientist, Bush would listen?:
“I oppose the president’s policy as it relates to climate change because it will destroy the ability to re-industrialize the country, to allow for people to get higher wage jobs, for people to rise up,” Bush said, according to the Huffington Post.
This is not the first time Bush has rejected the pope’s teachings on climate, but it may be the first time he has given the “not a scientist” reason.
“He’s not a scientist, he’s a religious leader,” Bush says
In fact, the pope studied chemistry and worked as a chemist. ...
He couldn't possibly be using concern about people's ability to "rise up" as a cover for supporting business interests, could he?
Tax cuts work, ignore the evidence:
HARWOOD: Do you regard your brother's economic tenure—which pursued a broadly similar strategy to what you're proposing—as a proof point that this strategy works?
BUSH: Well, look, he was impacted by some big secular events. The tech bubble, 9/11—those had huge impacts. There was growth. And there was some job growth.
Wage growth has been flat for a long time in our country. We have this big challenge that we have to fix. And that's part of the mission I'm on—growth by itself isn't going to create higher wages. But higher growth will generate more wage growth than no growth. And if you do it in the right way, where you're putting money in people's pockets, you can create economic activity.
The tax cuts will trickle down and let people "rise up" just like they did before. Oh wait. This is the "earned success" he talks so much about. It has nothing to do with supporting wealthy interests, it's all about economic growth and helping the disadvantaged. On the "earned success" point, it's hard not to recall Molly Ivins on George Bush:
Jim Hightower's great line about [George] Bush, "Born on third and thinks he hit a triple," is still painfully true. Bush has simply never acknowledged that not only was he born with a silver spoon in his mouth -- he's been eating off it ever since..., he doesn't admit to himself or anyone else that he owes his entire life to being named George W. Bush. He didn't just get a head start by being his father's son -- it remained the single most salient fact about him for most of his life. He got into Andover as a legacy. He got into Yale as a legacy. He got into Harvard Business School as a courtesy (he was turned down by the University of Texas Law School). He got into the Texas Air National Guard -- and sat out Vietnam -- through Daddy's influence. (I would like to point out that that particular unit of FANGers, as regular Air Force referred to the "Fucking Air National Guard," included not only the sons of Governor John Connally and Senator Lloyd Bentsen, but some actual black members as well -- they just happened to play football for the Dallas Cowboys.) Bush was set up in the oil business by friends of his father. He went broke and was bailed out by friends of his father. He went broke again and was bailed out again by friends of his father; he went broke yet again and was bailed out by some fellow Yalies.
That Bush's administration is salted with the sons of somebody-or-other should come as no surprise. I doubt it has ever even occurred to Bush that there is anything wrong with a class-driven good-ol'-boy system. ...
But of course, nothing like that could possibly be true of self-made, I did it all by myself Jeb! Bush success (he "made it!" himself).
Finally, surprise of surprises, when asked about the impact of his tax cut policies on the deficit, he gives the standard response, economic growth, like that his brother would have gotten if he wasn't so darn unlucky, will nullify much of the impact that tax cuts have on the deficit:
Everybody freaks out about the deficit. And I worry about the structural deficit for sure. But if we grow our economy at a faster rate, the dynamic nature of tax policy will kick in. ... There's never been a time where there hasn't been a dynamic effect of taxation. That's not a risk at all. That's just a simple fact.
It's also a "simple fact" (he hasn't moved on to "complicated facts" yet, apparently) that the Bush tax cuts did not trickle down, inequality was made worse by the Bush policies, and those in the lower parts of the income distribution had a harder time "rising up" because of these policies, and other policies that stripped away social support.
Jeb's I will do what my brother did, except this time it will work for those who are not in the top of the income distribution, is not exactly inspiring. Unless, of course, you are used to eating with silver spoons.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Friday, September 25, 2015 at 12:06 PM in Economics, Politics |
Republicans can't help but side with business, but there are very good reasons for the recent increase in regulatory oversight:
Dewey, Cheatem & Howe, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: Item: The C.E.O. of Volkswagen has resigned after revelations that his company committed fraud on an epic scale, installing software on its diesel cars that detected when their emissions were being tested, and produced deceptively low results.
Item: The former president of a peanut company has been sentenced to 28 years in prison for knowingly shipping tainted products that later killed nine people and sickened 700.
Item: Rights to a drug used to treat parasitic infections were acquired by Turing Pharmaceuticals, which specializes not in developing new drugs but in buying existing drugs and jacking up their prices. In this case, the price went from $13.50 a tablet to $750. ...
There are, it turns out, people in the corporate world who will do whatever it takes, including fraud that kills people, in order to make a buck. And we need effective regulation to police that kind of bad behavior... But we knew that, right?
Well, we used to know it... But ... an important part of America’s political class has declared war on even the most obviously necessary regulations. ...
A case in point: This week Jeb Bush, who has an uncanny talent for bad timing, chose to publish an op-ed article in The Wall Street Journal denouncing the Obama administration for issuing “a flood of creativity-crushing and job-killing rules.” Never mind his misuse of cherry-picked statistics, or the fact that private-sector employment has grown much faster under President Obama’s “job killing” policies than it did under Mr. Bush’s brother’s administration. ...
The thing is, Mr. Bush isn’t wrong to suggest that there has been a move back toward more regulation under Mr. Obama, a move that will probably continue if a Democrat wins next year. After all, Hillary Clinton released a plan to limit drug prices at the same time Mr. Bush was unleashing his anti-regulation diatribe.
But the regulatory rebound is taking place for a reason. Maybe we had too much regulation in the 1970s, but we’ve now spent 35 years trusting business to do the right thing with minimal oversight — and it hasn’t worked.
So what has been happening lately is an attempt to redress that imbalance, to replace knee-jerk opposition to regulation with the judicious use of regulation where there is good reason to believe that businesses might act in destructive ways. Will we see this effort continue? Next year’s election will tell.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Friday, September 25, 2015 at 12:33 AM in Economics, Politics, Regulation |
Technological Progress Anxiety: Thinking About “Peak Horse” and the Possibility of “Peak Human”, by by Brad DeLong: Another well-written piece by an authorial team led by the very sharp Joel Mokyr–The History of Technological Anxiety and the Future of Economic Growth: Is This Time Different?–that in my mind fails to wrestle with the major question, and so leaves me unsatisfied.
Hitherto,... every form of non-human power that substitutes and thus tends to reduce the value of human backs and thighs...–from the horse to the watermill to the steam engine to the diesel to the jet engine–and every single source of manipulation–from the potter’s wheel to the loom to the spinning jenny to the assembly line to the mechanized factory–has required a cybernetic control mechanism. Without such a mechanism, machines are useless. They cannot keep themselves on course and on track. ... And as cybernetic control mechanisms human brains had an overwhelming productivity edge.
The fear is that this time things really are different. The fear is that, this time, technological anxiety is not misguided... For the first time, we find our machines substituting not for human backs, things, eyes, and hands, but for human brains. ... And this factor is offset only by the hope that our machines will reduce the market value of commodities faster than they reduce the value of the median worker’s labor...
I must say that I really do wish that Mokyr et al. had included, in their paper, a discussion of “peak horse”.
A standard economists’ argument goes roughly like this: Technology is introduced only when it is profitable, and lowers the costs of production. Thus the prices of the goods and services produced must go down, leaving consumers with more money to spend on other products, and this creates demand for any workers who are displaced. Thus there will always be new industries growing up to employ any workers displaced by technological change in existing industries.
But that argument applies just as well to the oats, apples, and grooming needed for horses to subsist as for the wages of humans, no? One could ... just as easily have said, a century ago, that: “Fundamental economic principles will continue to operate. Scarcities will still be with us…. Most horses will still have useful tasks to perform, even in an economy where the capacities of power sources and automation have increased considerably…”
Yet ... “Peak horse” in the U.S. came in the 1910s, I believe. After that there was no economic incentive to keep the horse population of America from declining sharply, as at the margin the horse was not worth its feed and care. And in a marginal-cost pricing world, in which humans are no longer the only plausible source of Turing-level cybernetic control mechanisms, what will happen to those who do not own property should the same come to be true, at the margin, of the human? What would “peak human” look like? Or–a related but somewhat different possibility–even “peak male”?
Posted by Mark Thoma on Friday, September 25, 2015 at 12:24 AM in Economics, Productivity, Technology |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Friday, September 25, 2015 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
Federal Reserve Chair Janet L. Yellen:
Inflation Dynamics and Monetary Policy, by Chair Janet L. Yellen: ... In my remarks today, I will discuss inflation and its role in the Federal Reserve's conduct of monetary policy. I will begin by reviewing the history of inflation in the United States since the 1960s, highlighting two key points: that inflation is now much more stable than it used to be, and that it is currently running at a very low level. I will then consider the costs associated with inflation, and why these costs suggest that the Federal Reserve should try to keep inflation close to 2 percent. After briefly reviewing our policy actions since the financial crisis, I will discuss the dynamics of inflation and their implications for the outlook and monetary policy. ...
It's a relatively long speech. Skipping ahead:
Assuming that my reading of the data is correct and long-run inflation expectations are in fact anchored near their pre-recession levels, what implications does the preceding description of inflation dynamics have for the inflation outlook and for monetary policy?
This framework suggests, first, that much of the recent shortfall of inflation from our 2 percent objective is attributable to special factors whose effects are likely to prove transitory. ...
To be reasonably confident that inflation will return to 2 percent over the next few years, we need, in turn, to be reasonably confident that we will see continued solid economic growth and further gains in resource utilization, with longer-term inflation expectations remaining near their pre-recession level. Fortunately, prospects for the U.S. economy generally appear solid. ... My colleagues and I, based on our most recent forecasts, anticipate that this pattern will continue and that labor market conditions will improve further as we head into 2016.
The labor market has achieved considerable progress over the past several years. Even so, further improvement in labor market conditions would be welcome because we are probably not yet all the way back to full employment ... which most FOMC participants now estimate is around 4.9 percent...
Reducing slack ... may involve a temporary decline in the unemployment rate somewhat below the level that is estimated to be consistent, in the longer run, with inflation stabilizing at 2 percent. For example, attracting discouraged workers back into the labor force may require a period of especially plentiful employment opportunities and strong hiring. Similarly, firms may be unwilling to restructure their operations to use more full-time workers until they encounter greater difficulty filling part-time positions. Beyond these considerations, a modest decline in the unemployment rate below its long-run level for a time would, by increasing resource utilization, also have the benefit of speeding the return to 2 percent inflation. Finally, albeit more speculatively, such an environment might help reverse some of the significant supply-side damage that appears to have occurred in recent years, thereby improving Americans' standard of living.33
Consistent with the inflation framework I have outlined, the medians of the projections provided by FOMC participants at our recent meeting show inflation gradually moving back to 2 percent, accompanied by a temporary decline in unemployment slightly below the median estimate of the rate expected to prevail in the longer run. ... This expectation, coupled with inherent lags in the response of real activity and inflation to changes in monetary policy, are the key reasons that most of my colleagues and I anticipate that it will likely be appropriate to raise the target range for the federal funds rate sometime later this year and to continue boosting short-term rates at a gradual pace thereafter as the labor market improves further and inflation moves back to our 2 percent objective.
By itself, the precise timing of the first increase in our target for the federal funds rate should have only minor implications for financial conditions and the general economy. What matters for overall financial conditions is the entire trajectory of short-term interest rates that is anticipated by markets and the public. As I noted, most of my colleagues and I anticipate that economic conditions are likely to warrant raising short-term interest rates at a quite gradual pace over the next few years....
The economic outlook, of course, is highly uncertain... Given the highly uncertain nature of the outlook, one might ask: Why not hold off raising the federal funds rate until the economy has reached full employment and inflation is actually back at 2 percent? The difficulty with this strategy is that monetary policy affects real activity and inflation with a substantial lag. If the FOMC were to delay the start of the policy normalization process for too long, we would likely end up having to tighten policy relatively abruptly to keep the economy from significantly overshooting both of our goals. Such an abrupt tightening would risk disrupting financial markets and perhaps even inadvertently push the economy into recession. In addition, continuing to hold short-term interest rates near zero well after real activity has returned to normal and headwinds have faded could encourage excessive leverage and other forms of inappropriate risk-taking that might undermine financial stability. For these reasons, the more prudent strategy is to begin tightening in a timely fashion and at a gradual pace, adjusting policy as needed in light of incoming data.
To conclude, let me emphasize that, following the dual mandate established by the Congress, the Federal Reserve is committed to the achievement of maximum employment and price stability. To this end, we have maintained a highly accommodative monetary policy since the financial crisis; that policy has fostered a marked improvement in labor market conditions and helped check undesirable disinflationary pressures. However, we have not yet fully attained our objectives under the dual mandate: Some slack remains in labor markets, and the effects of this slack and the influence of lower energy prices and past dollar appreciation have been significant factors keeping inflation below our goal. But I expect that inflation will return to 2 percent over the next few years as the temporary factors that are currently weighing on inflation wane, provided that economic growth continues to be strong enough to complete the return to maximum employment and long-run inflation expectations remain well anchored. Most FOMC participants, including myself, currently anticipate that achieving these conditions will likely entail an initial increase in the federal funds rate later this year, followed by a gradual pace of tightening thereafter. But if the economy surprises us, our judgments about appropriate monetary policy will change.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Thursday, September 24, 2015 at 02:43 PM in Economics, Monetary Policy |
Should we rationally expect rational drug pricing?:
Rational Drug Pricing, by Jeff Sachs: Drug pricing has taken center stage in U.S. politics, and it's high time that it should. ...
Drug pricing is not like the pricing of apples and oranges, clothing, or furniture that well and good should be left to the marketplace. There are two major reasons. First, the main cost of drug production is not the cost of manufacturing the tablet but the cost of producing the knowledge embedded in the tablet. Second, there is often a life-and-death stake in access to the drug, so society should take steps to ensure that the drug is affordable and accessible.
To ensure that financial resources flow to scientists to produce the knowledge embedded in the tablet, the government does two things. First, the government pays directly for a substantial part of the research and development (R&D). ... Second, the government grants patent rights for drug discovery. ...
It's a basic insight of economics that patent rights are a "second-best" solution to drug pricing, not an optimal solution. A patent creates an artificial monopoly to incentivize R&D. Yet it also reduces access to the product, perhaps with unacceptable and immoral life-and-death consequences. Rational drug pricing would get the best of the patent system but ensure that it is compatible with access to the life-saving drugs.
Unfortunately, the current rules of the game in the U.S. pharmaceutical sector do not compensate for the weaknesses of patents. They amplify them. ... What should be done? Here are three key principles.
First, private R&D should certainly be protected by patents but only enough to elicit the needed R&D, not to produce outlandish profits. ...
Second, when the U.S. government pays for much of the R&D, it should share in the property rights. This should be a no-brainer, but in fact the NIH simply gives away most or all the intellectual property that it has financed, so the taxpayer pays part of the R&D bills but the returns are fully captured by private companies.
Third, when companies ... make profits from their U.S.-based research and U.S.-based production and sales, they should certainly pay U.S. taxes on their profits. The fact that the IRS lets them hide their profits in overseas tax havens is scandalous and without any logical justification whatsoever.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Thursday, September 24, 2015 at 10:42 AM in Economics, Health Care, Market Failure, Regulation |
America’s Collapsing Trade Initiatives: ...Obama's trade policy is in tatters. The grand design, created by Obama's old friend and former Wall Street deal-maker, trade chief Mike Froman, comes in two parts: a grand bargain with Pacific nations aimed at building a U.S.-led trading bloc to contain the influence of China, and an Atlantic agreement to cement economic relations with the European Union.
Both are on the verge of collapse from their own contradictory goals and incoherent logic.
This past June, the president, using every ounce of his political capital, managed to get Congress to vote him negotiating authority (by the barest of margins) for these deals. Under the so-called fast-track procedure, there is a quick up-or-down vote on a trade agreement that can't be amended.
The assumption was that the administration could deliver a deal backed by major trading partners. But our partners are not playing. ...
The U.S. negotiators, increasingly, are prepared to give away the store, to get a deal. ...
It is a bit premature to write the obituaries for these deals. Never underestimate the power of corporate elites. But one has to ask, what was Obama thinking? The U.S. faces serious economic challenges from an economy that is still stagnant for regular people. And we face complex national security challenges from China. These trade deals address neither challenge, much less the even more daunting economic woes in Europe. ...
In general, I support lowering trade restrictions, but the details of trade agreements are important. Just because a deal is proposed does not necessarily mean it's a good one. I haven't kept up with the details of the current negotiations, but for the most part those that have appear less than impressed.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Thursday, September 24, 2015 at 10:18 AM in Economics, International Trade, Politics |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Thursday, September 24, 2015 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
Kevin Drum is not impressed with Jeb Bush's plan for regulation, or his justification for it:
Jeb Bush Has No Clue About Business Regulation: Jeb Bush today in the Wall Street Journal:
To understand what is wrong with the regulatory culture of the U.S. under President Obama, consider this alarming statistic: Today, according to the World Bank—not exactly a right-wing think tank—the U.S. ranks 46th in the world in terms of ease of starting a business. That is unacceptable. Think what the U.S. could be and the prosperity we could have if we rolled back the overregulation that keeps us from ranking in the top 10.
My goodness. That does sound unacceptable. Still, it never hurts to check up on these presidential candidates... So let's click the link ... and see what it says: "The rankings of economies with populations over 100 million are based on data for 2 cities." Hmmm. It turns out the World Bank is ranking the US based on starting up a business in New York City. That seems to tip the scales a wee bit, no? ...
Now I get it. This isn't about getting a business up and running. It's solely about registering a new business. And it's got nothing to do with any of Obama's regulations. It's all about state and local stuff. ... I'm not sure what Jeb Bush thinks he's going to do to streamline this. Bottom line: this is completely meaningless. ...
But wait! There's more. The World Bank does have a broader "Ease of Doing Business" rank that takes into account the things you need to do to get up and running: construction permits, electricity, credit, paying taxes, enforcing contracts, etc. As it happens, the bulk of this stuff is still state and local, and has nothing to do with Obama or the federal government. Still, let's take a look since Jeb chose not to share it with us for some reason...
The World Bank has us in 7th place. We're already in the top ten that Jeb is aiming for. Mission accomplished! ...
As for the outrageous regulations he promises to repeal on Day One, this would mostly just benefit big campaign donors, not the yeoman entrepreneurs he claims to be sticking up for. No big surprise there, I suppose.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, September 23, 2015 at 12:11 PM in Economics, Politics, Regulation |
Chinese Spillovers: China is clearly in economic trouble. But how worried should we be about spillovers from China’s woes to the rest of the world economy? I have in general been telling people “not very”, although it’s a bigger issue for Japan and Korea. But Citi’s Willem Buiter suggests that it could be a quite big deal, leading to a global recession. ... So could he be right?
Let me start with the case for not worrying too much, which comes down to the fact that China’s economy, while big, is still a small fraction of the global economy...
One possibility is ... that a Chinese slump could, via its impact on commodity prices, do a lot more harm to some other emerging markets than the above analysis suggests. I’m still working on this, although so far I don’t seem to be finding much there.
Another possibility is an international version of the financial accelerator. As Buiter points out, many emerging markets seem to be vulnerable thanks to private-sector foreign currency debt (which was so deadly in 1997-98). ...
Maybe, also, we could see some version of the financial contagion so obvious in the 1990s. Troubles in Brazil might make investors leery of other emerging markets, driving up interest spreads and forcing fiscal austerity that worsens the downturn. Or for matter, to the extent that the same hedge funds have been buying assets in a number of emerging nations, losses in one place could force them to liquidate assets elsewhere, causing a sort of global debt deflation. That was a popular story in the 1990s...
Overall, I’m not convinced of the Buiter thesis; China still seems to me not big enough to bring down the rest of the world. But I’m not rock-solid in that conviction, largely because we’ve seen so much contagion in the past. Stay tuned.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, September 23, 2015 at 09:57 AM in China, Economics, International Finance, International Trade |
At Moneywatch, a discussion of the Atlanta Fed's new ZPOP measure of the labor market's performance:
How will the Fed know if we've hit "full employment"?: How close are we to full employment? That is a crucial question for the Federal reserve, and the answer plays a crucial role in the Federal Reserve’s decision about when to begin raising its target rate of interest.
According to the most recent data, the unemployment rate is 5.1 percent, a level that historically has been at or very near full employment. But there are well-known problems with the “headline” unemployment statistics such as the failure to account for discouraged workers, underutilized workers, and demographic effects. When these factors are accounted for, and when other statistics such as the prime-age employment to population ratio are examined, the labor market picture does not look as rosy. But there is still considerable uncertainty about the true state of the labor market, and researchers at the Atlanta Fed have developed an alternative to standard labor market measures that hopefully gives a clearer picture of where we stand. ...
[The editors always change the title/introduction, and there are usually other edits as well, but I never read the new versions to avoid becoming annoyed at the changes (I don't approve changes, they are simply made).]
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, September 23, 2015 at 09:54 AM in Economics, MoneyWatch, Unemployment |
Education Gap Between Rich and Poor Is Growing Wider, NY Times: ...in the 1970s..., African-American children had nowhere near the same educational opportunities as whites. The civil rights movement, school desegregation and the War on Poverty helped bring a measure of equity to the playing field. Today,... racial disparities in education have narrowed significantly. ... But ...the achievement gaps between more affluent and less privileged children is wider than ever... Today the biggest threat to the American dream is class.
Education is today more critical than ever. ... And yet American higher education is increasingly the preserve of the elite. ... The problem, of course, doesn’t start in college. ...
“If we could equalize achievement from age zero to 14,” Professor [Jane] Waldfogel told me, “that would go a long way toward closing the college enrollment and completion gaps.”
It can be done. Australia, Canada — even the historically class-ridden Britain — show much more equitable outcomes..., yet the strains from our world of increasing income inequality raise doubts about our ability to narrow the educational divide... The ... rich ... are spending hand over fist to ensure that their children end at the front of the rat race. Our public school system has proved no match to the forces reproducing inequality across the generations. ...
Today, the proficiency gap between the poor and the rich is nearly twice as large as that between black and white children. In other words, even as one achievement gap narrowed, another opened wide. ...
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, September 23, 2015 at 12:24 AM in Economics, Income Distribution, Universities |
The Return of Policy Uncertainty: From Hatzius et al., in Goldman Sachs Global Macro Research yesterday:
A federal shutdown due to a funding lapse looks no less likely than it did two weeks ago, and we believe the probability is nearly 50%. The Senate is expected to begin voting later this week on a funding extension, but the House looks unlikely to act until shortly before the September 30 deadline.
The impact on measured policy uncertainty is shown in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Daily policy uncertainty index (blue), and 7 day trailing moving average (red). Source: Baker, Bloom and Davis, at policyuncertainty.com, accessed 9/22/2015.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, September 23, 2015 at 12:15 AM in Economics, Politics |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Wednesday, September 23, 2015 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
I have a new column:
The Political Party of the President Matters for the Economy: Since WWII, the economy does better when there is a Democrat in the White House. That conclusion holds for “almost every metric” of the economy’s performance according to research by Princeton economists Alan Blinder and Mark Watson. But is this due to policy differences between Democratic and Republican administrations? Or, with the limited number of observations since WWII, is this simply a statistical artifact, simply the luck of having Democrats in the office when good things happen?
The dominant position among economists, one I’ll push back against, is that presidents have little ability to influence the economy. Steven Dubner, one of the authors of Freakonomics, gives the standard response:
“…just once I'd love a presidential candidate to get up there on the stump and say: 'My fellow Americans, I can't control the U.S. economy. I've got a little bit of influence but mostly it does what it does. So if it gets worse on my watch, you shouldn't blame me -- and if it happens to get better, you probably shouldn't give me too much credit either.'”
Austan Goolsbee, quoted in the same interview, echoes this:
“I think the world vests too much power -- certainly in the president, probably in Washington in general -- for its influence on the economy, because most all of the economy has nothing to do with the government.”
I disagree. Whether the president is a Republican or Democrat can make a critical difference for the economy. ...
Posted by Mark Thoma on Tuesday, September 22, 2015 at 08:28 AM in Economics, Politics |
Paul Marshall, chairman of London-based hedge fund Marshall Wace, in the FT:
Central banks have made the rich richer: Labour’s new shadow chancellor has got at least one thing right. ... Quantitative easing ... has bailed out bonus-happy banks and made the rich richer. ...
It is no surprise that the left is angry about this, nor that they are looking for other versions of QE that do not so directly benefit bankers and the rich. Instead of increasing the money supply by buying sovereign bonds from banks, central banks could spread the love evenly by depositing extra money in every person’s bank account..., it might have been fairer.
Mr McDonnell and Jeremy Corbyn, the new Labour leader, advocate a second approach: targeting QE at infrastructure projects. The central bank would buy bonds direct from the Treasury on the understanding that the funds would be used to improve housing and transport infrastructure. ...
QE had clear wealth effects, which could have been offset by fiscal measures. All political parties should acknowledge this. So should those of us who want free markets to retain their legitimacy.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Tuesday, September 22, 2015 at 08:25 AM in Economics, Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy |
How do you save for the future when your kids are barely getting enough to eat, let alone the other things they need?:
Poor People Don't Have Less Self-Control. Poverty Forces Them to Think Short-Term, by Elliot Berkman, New Republic: When considering poverty, our national conversation tends to overlook systemic causes. Instead, we often blame the poor for their poverty. Commentators echo the claim that people are poor because they have bad self-control and therefore make nearsighted choices. But psychology research says the opposite might be the case: poverty makes it hard for people to care about the future and forces them to live in the present.
As a researcher who studies goals and motivation, I wanted to know how self-control works and if science can help us get better at it. Poverty seemed like a good place to start, because greater self-control could be especially helpful there. In fact, the federal Administration for Children and Families is adding character-skills training to its programs in efforts to improve self-control among children.
But as I started this work I was surprised by all the reasons that it’s so hard for people in poverty to have good self-control. In fact, I started to question whether the usual definition of self-control–choosing long-term over short-term outcomes–even makes sense for people who are short on time, money, or both.
The very definition of self-control is choosing behaviors that favor long-term outcomes over short-term rewards, but poverty can force people to live in a permanent now. Worrying about tomorrow can be a luxury if you don’t know how you’ll survive today.
Research supports this idea by showing that poor people understandably have an increased focus on the present. People who are among the poorest one-fifth of Americans tend to spend their money on immediate needs such as food, utilities and housing, all of which have gotten more expensive. In this situation, the traditional definition of self-control doesn’t make a lot of sense. ...
This research makes me rethink both poverty and self-control. The science suggests that poverty has powerful harmful effects on people, and helps explain why it’s so hard to escape. Their choices are much more a product of their situation, rather than a lack of self-control.
The way we scientists define self-control is part of the problem, too. We tend to think that focusing on long-term goals is always a good thing and satisfying short-term needs is always a bad thing; we say that “self-control failure” is equivalent to focusing on the near term. This definition works well for people who have the luxury of time and money to meet their basic needs and have resources left over to plan for the future. But self-control as currently defined might not even apply to people living in the permanent now.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Tuesday, September 22, 2015 at 08:19 AM in Economics |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Tuesday, September 22, 2015 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
For the bitcoin/blockchain enthusiasts, this is from Cecchetti & Schoenholtz:
Virtual Frenzies: Bitcoin and the Block Chain: Bitcoin has prompted many people to expect a revolution in the means by which we make and settle everyday payments. Our view is that Bitcoin and other “virtual currency schemes” (VCS) lack critical features of money, so their use is likely to remain very limited.
In contrast, the technology used to record Bitcoin ownership and transactions – the block chain – has potentially broad applications in supporting payments in any currency. The block chain can be thought of as an ever-growing public ledger of transactions that is encrypted and distributed over a network of computers. Even as the Bitcoin frenzy subsides, the block chain has attracted attention from bank and nonbank intermediaries looking for ways to economize on payments costs. Only extensive experimentation will determine whether there are large benefits.
Again, however, we are somewhat skeptical. Today’s wholesale payments systems are so efficient that it is hard to see how or why one would make the costly and time-consuming effort to replace them. And the apparently high costs of retail transfers at least partly reflect factors that the block chain technology is unlikely to address. ...
After much discussion of these and other points:
So, what’s the bottom line? We share with Bitcoin advocates the desire to protect privacy (see, our post on paper money), but remain skeptical about the potential for any private currency – digital or otherwise – to do the job better than what we currently use. And the evidence so far is that government fiat monies – dollar, euro, yen, or whatever – are far more stable than Bitcoin. Not only that, but if there’s to be profit from issuing a currency, then we believe that it is the public that should benefit.
As for the block chain, there’s plenty of room for experimentation – with the potentially greatest benefits coming where the current payments system is the least developed. But it remains to be seen whether the public ledger can compete against the big clearinghouses that dominate wholesale payments and settlement, and whether it can ensure payments providers have the ability to reliably filter out illegitimate transactions.
Of course, even a big clearinghouse might find the block chain technology useful (see WSJ-gated story here). Wouldn’t it be ironic if it did so, but wished to keep the innovation private?
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, September 21, 2015 at 10:30 AM in Economics, Financial System |
Michael Bauer and Erin McCarthy of the SF Fed:
Can We Rely on Market-Based Inflation Forecasts?, Michael D. Bauer and Erin McCarthy, Economic Letter, FRBSF: The Federal Reserve’s dual mandate requires monetary policy to aim for both maximum employment and price stability. Although employment has recovered since the recession, inflation has consistently remained below the Fed’s 2% longer-run objective. Because expectations of future inflation play an important role in determining current inflation, decreases in measures of inflation expectations based on market prices have raised some concerns. For example, between June 2014 and January 2015, one-year inflation swap rates, which measure market-based expectations of inflation in the consumer price index (CPI) one year ahead, dropped over 2.5 percentage points. Large decreases were also observed in breakeven inflation rates, the difference between yields on nominal and inflation-indexed Treasury securities, known as TIPS.
Market-based measures of inflation expectations are calculated from the prices of financial securities. Their advantage is that they are readily available at high frequency and therefore are widely monitored. However, they reflect not only the public’s inflation expectations but also other idiosyncratic factors that affect market prices, which are difficult to quantify. For example, they include a risk premium to compensate investors for inflation uncertainty and are affected by changes in liquidity, unusual demand flows, and, more broadly, “animal spirits” that change prices but are unrelated to expectations (see Bauer and Rudebusch 2015). Hence it is unclear how much useful information they provide, and how much one should pay attention to these rates when forecasting inflation.
If market-based inflation expectations provided accurate inflation forecasts, then one surely would want to pay close attention to their evolution. In this Economic Letter, we evaluate their performance in comparison with a variety of alternative forecasts for CPI inflation. ...
Conclusions We find that market-based measures of inflation are poor predictors of future inflation. In particular, they perform much worse than forecasts constructed from survey expectations of future inflation, which incorporate all the information used by professional forecasters. Interestingly, a simple constant inflation rate corresponding to the Federal Reserve’s 2% inflation target consistently performs best. While our analysis is based on a short sample that displays a lot of volatility during the Great Recession, our results appear quite robust as they are consistent across two subsamples.
Our results add to the discussion about how much attention policymakers and professional forecasters should pay to market-based inflation forecasts. These measures mostly reflect current and past inflation movements, and do not contain a lot of useful forward-looking information. Idiosyncratic market forces and inflation risk premiums appear to be important drivers of market-based inflation expectations. Overall, it is important to keep this caveat in mind when interpreting market-based inflation expectations.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, September 21, 2015 at 10:30 AM in Economics, Inflation, Monetary Policy |
Why are bankers so angry about the Fed's decision not to raise interest rates?:
The Rage of the Bankers, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: Last week the Federal Reserve chose not to raise interest rates. It was the right decision. In fact, I’m among the economists wondering why we’re even thinking about raising rates right now. ... Yet the Fed has faced constant criticism for its low-rate policy. Why?
The ... story keeps changing. In 2010-2011 the Fed’s critics issued dire warnings about looming inflation. You might have expected some change in tune when inflation failed to materialize. Instead, however, those who used to demand higher rates to head off inflation are still demanding higher rates, but for different reasons. The justification du jour is “financial stability,” the claim that low interest rates breed bubbles and crashes. ... Why does anyone take this stuff seriously?
Well, when you see ever-changing rationales for never-changing policy demands, it’s a good bet that there’s an ulterior motive. And the rate rage of the bankers — combined with the plunge in bank stocks that followed the Fed’s decision not to hike — offers a powerful clue... It’s the bank profits, stupid. ...
For banks make their profits by taking in deposits and lending the funds out at a higher rate of interest. And this business gets squeezed in a low-interest environment... The ... difference between the interest rate banks receive on loans and the rate they pay on deposits ... has fallen sharply over the past five years.
The appropriate response of policy makers ... should be, “So?” There’s no reason to believe that what’s good for bankers is good for America. But bankers are different from you and me: they have a lot more influence. Monetary officials meet with them all the time, and in many cases expect to join their ranks when they come out on the other side of the revolving door. ...
So we shouldn’t be surprised to see institutions that cater to bankers, not to mention much of the financial press, spinning elaborate justifications for a rate hike that makes no sense in terms of basic economics. And the debate of the past few months, in which the Fed has seemed weirdly eager to raise rates..., suggests that even U.S. monetary officials aren’t immune.
But the Fed did the right thing last week: nothing. And the howling of the bankers should be taken not as a reason to reconsider, but as a demonstration that the clamor for higher rates has nothing to do with the public interest.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, September 21, 2015 at 01:08 AM in Economics, Monetary Policy |
This might interest some of you:
The lifecycle of scholarly articles across fields of economic research, by Sebastian Galiani, Ramiro Gálvez, Maria Victoria Anauati, Vox EU: Citation counts stand as the de facto methodology for measuring the influence of scholarly articles in today’s economics profession. Nevertheless, a great deal of criticism has been made of the practice of naively using citation analysis to compare the impact of scholarly articles without taking into account other factors which may affect citation patterns (see Bornmann and Daniel 2008).
One recurrent criticism focuses on ‘field-dependent factors’... In a recent paper (Anauati et al. 2015), we analyze if the ‘field-dependent factors’ critique is also valid for fields of research inside economics. Our approach began by assigning into one of four fields of economic research (applied, applied theory, econometric methods and theory) every paper published in the top five economics journals – The American Economic Review, Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, and The Review of Economic Studies.
The sample consisted of 9,672 articles published in the top five journals between 1970 and 2000. It did not include notes, comments, announcements or American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings issues. ...
What did they find?:
Conclusions Even though citation counts are an extremely valuable tool for measuring the importance of academic articles, the patterns observed for the lifecycles of papers across fields of economic research support the ‘field-dependent factors’ inside this discipline. Evidence seems to provide a basis for a caveat regarding the use of citation counts as a ‘one-size-fits-all’ yardstick to measure research outcomes in economics across fields of research, as the incentives generated by their use can be detrimental for fields of research which effectively generate valuable (but perhaps more specialized) knowledge, not only in economics but in other disciplines as well.
According to our findings, pure theoretical economic research is the clear loser in terms of citation counts. Therefore, if specialized journals' impact factors are calculated solely on the basis of citations during the first years after an article’s publication, then theoretical research will clearly not be attractive to departments, universities or journals that are trying to improve their rankings or to researchers who use their citation records when applying for better university positions or for grants. The opposite is true for applied papers and applied theory papers – these fields of research are the outright winners when citation counts are used as a measurement of articles' importance, and their citation patterns over time are highly attractive for all concerned. Econometric method papers are a special case; their citation patterns vary a great deal across different levels of success.
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, September 21, 2015 at 12:51 AM in Academic Papers, Economics |
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, September 21, 2015 at 12:06 AM in Economics, Links |
William D. Nordhaus reviews Pope Francis’s encyclical on the environment and capitalism (Laudato Si’: On Care for Our Common Home, an encyclical letter by Pope Francis, Vatican Press, 184 pp., available at w2.vatican.va):
The Pope & the Market, NYRB: Pope Francis’s encyclical on the environment and capitalism, Laudato Si’, is an eloquent description of the natural world and its relationship to human societies.1 ... Most commentaries have focused on the pope’s endorsement of climate science, but my focus here is primarily on the social sciences, particularly economics.
My major point is that the encyclical overlooks the central part that markets, particularly market-based environmental policies such as carbon pricing, must play if countries are to make substantial progress in slowing global warming. ...
Unfortunately, Laudato Si’ does not recognize the fact that environmental problems are caused by market distortions rather than by markets per se. This is seen in the condemnation of “carbon credits”... Many commentators have interpreted this passage as a condemnation of cap-and-trade... Whatever the specific target, this part of the encyclical is clearly a critique of market-based environmental approaches. ...
Cap-and-trade has in fact been successfully used, for example to phase out lead from gasoline, to limit sulfur dioxide emissions in the United States by more than half, and to limit carbon dioxide emissions both in the European Union and more recently in major Chinese municipalities. The alternative to cap-and-trade is carbon taxation, which raises carbon prices by taxing carbon emissions. Such a tax is simpler and avoids any of the potential corruption, market volatility, and distributional issues that might arise with cap-and-trade systems.
Given the successes of cap-and-trade and other market mechanisms to improve the environment, it is unfortunate that they are the target of Pope Francis’s criticism. ... He does indeed acknowledge the soundness of the science and the reality of global warming. It is unfortunate that he does not endorse a market-based solution, particularly carbon pricing, as the only practical policy tool we have to bend down the dangerous curves of climate change and the damages they cause.
[I left out quite a bit. All of his points, and much more, are fully explained in the review.]
Posted by Mark Thoma on Sunday, September 20, 2015 at 09:18 AM in Economics, Environment |