- Ordoarithmetic - Paul Krugman
- Tax Tactics Threaten Public Funds - NYTimes.com
- The permanent scars of fiscal consolidation - Antonio Fatas
- The disappearance of routine jobs - vox
- John Cochrane’s diatribe on inequality - longandvariable
- Age Structure, Experience, Productivity…… and France! - Growth Economics
- Inflation Panic Will Kill the Recovery - Clive Crook
- What's Wrong With Ignoring Inequality - Noah Smith
- Re-basing GDP and Estimating Growth Rates - Growth Economics
- Unemployment Hurts Happiness More Than Modest Inflation - WSJ
- The Transmission of Liquidity Risk through Global Banks - Liberty Street
- Public Infrastructure Investment: IMF v. Mankiw - EconoSpeak
- Understanding China's Hard Line on Hong Kong - Justin Fox
- The torch that wouldn't burn - UCLA in 1968 - Tiago Mata
- Your Debt, Our Nation's Headache - Barry Ritholtz
- How many UK elections can a nasty party win? - mainly macro
- Caught in the social safety net - MIT News
- 2011 And All That - Paul Krugman
- On CORE - EconoSpeak
Thursday, October 02, 2014
Wednesday, October 01, 2014
The fiscal impact measure shows how much federal, state, and local government taxes and spending added to or subtracted from the overall pace of economic growth. Between 2008 and 2011, fiscal impact was positive, indicating that government policy was stimulative; in recent years, it has been negative, indicating restraint. (For more detail on how this measure was constructed and how to interpret it, see our methodology.)
I'm not so sure that the solution to Americans working "strange hours" is "to revert to the shop-closing laws (Blue Laws) that prevailed in the US years ago." What do you think?:
Americans work too long (and too often at strange times), by Daniel S. Hamermesh, Elena Stancanelli, Vox EU: The facts on work hours and timing The average US workweek is 41 hours, 3 hours longer than Britain’s and even longer than in Germany, France, Spain, or the Netherlands (see the Table below).
- 32% of American employees work 45 or more hours, compared with 18% in Germany, and 4% in France.
- Only in the UK does the percentage of employees putting in these long hours approach the US one.
Over a year, the average American employee puts in 1,800 hours, which is more than any other wealthy country, even Japan. What is remarkable is the change during the past three decades. In 1979, Americans looked little different from workers in these other countries, working about the same number of hours per year as the French or the British, and many fewer hours than Japanese. Since then, employees in other countries have begun to take it easier, to enjoy their riches, but Americans have not.
The picture is even bleaker than these numbers suggest. Not only do Americans work longer hours than their European counterparts, but they are much more likely to work at night and on weekends.
- 27% of US employees perform some work between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.
- In France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Germany the comparable fractions are much lower. Even in the UK, only 19 % of workers are on the job at night.
Work on weekends is also more common in the US than in other rich countries, with 29% of American workers doing some work on weekends, far above Germany, France, Spain, and the Netherlands; and even in the UK only 25% of employees do some work on weekends. But despite their greater likelihood of working at these strange times, those Americans who work then put in no more hours per day than the smaller numbers of European workers who are on the job at nights and weekends.
Table 1. Characteristics of work hours in the US and elsewhere: Amounts and timing
Source: Hamermesh and Stancanelli (2014)
Why these facts matter
Weekend and night work is not attractive to most workers. Unsurprisingly, therefore, it generates, on average, higher pay per hour than work at ‘normal’ times—wage differentials that compensate for the undesirability of working at unattractive hours (Kostiuk 1990). Also unsurprisingly, it attracts workers with the least human capital. In the US and Germany, young workers, those with less education, and immigrants are more likely than other employees to work at these times. In the US, minorities are also more likely to perform weekend and night work (Hamermesh 1996). The burden of working at unpleasant times falls disproportionately on those who have the least earning power.
Are the phenomena related?
If Americans’ workweeks were shortened to European levels, would their likelihood of working at these strange times drop to European levels? Do the American labour market, institutions, and culture make night and weekend work more prevalent independent of the length of the workweek?
To answer the titular question of this section, we examine the determinants of the probability of night work using data from various time-diary surveys for the US and France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. For the US, we relate these probabilities to workers’ weekly work-hours and a large number of their demographic characteristics—age, immigrant and urban status, educational attainment, and others.
- Compared to those working 40 hours, American employees putting in 65+ hours per week are 44% more likely also to work on weekends, and 37% more likely to work at night. The phenomena of long hours and strange hours are related.
If we simulate what would happen to the probabilities of weekend and night work if the US had the same distributions of weekly work-hours as each of the 5 European countries, not surprisingly, those probabilities would drop -- but not very much. Even with France’s short workweeks, 25% of American employees would still be working on weekends, as high as the highest percentage in any of these 5 countries; and 22% would still be working at night, well above even the highest percentage in Europe. Even if no American worked more than 45 hours per week, the percentage performing weekend work would fall only to 24, and the percentage doing night work would fall only to 25.
Even with a reduction in American workweeks that lowered American work-hours down to European hours, Americans would be doing more night and weekend work than Europeans. Looking at time-diary data from the mid-1970s, this result should not be surprising. For example, at that time 26% of American employees worked on weekends, whereas only 14% of Dutch employees did so, both about the same as today, even though the Dutch and American workweeks were then much closer in length than they are today.
Why, and what to do (if anything)?
Why are Americans so much more likely to work at strange times than Europeans? The results here show that it is not because Americans work more than Europeans.
- One cause might be the greater inequality of earnings in the US that induces low-skilled workers -- earning relatively less than low-skilled Europeans -- to desire more work at times that pays a wage premium.
- Another possibility is cultural, so that Americans just enjoy working at these times more than their European counterparts. But citing cultural differences is an easy way to avoid thinking or doing anything about an issue.
Many European countries impose penalties on work at nights and on weekends, with some of the penalties being quite severe (Cardoso et al. 2012). The evidence in Cardoso et al. (2012) suggests that imposing penalties on night and/or weekend work will reduce its incidence. Work at different times of the week is substitutable, and employers are responsive to changing incentives to alter the timing of work. But that evidence also shows that even substantial incentives do not produce huge changes in work timing. If we really want to reduce the amount of work that occurs at times that are viewed as unpleasant, the solution may be to revert to the shop-closing laws (Blue Laws) that prevailed in the US years ago. No free-marketer would like this, but it may well be worth reviving these laws in order to get the US out of what might be a low-level, rat-race equilibrium.
Cardoso, A R, D Hamermesh and J Varejão (2012), “The Timing of Labor Demand,” Annals of Economics and Statistics, 105/106, 15-34.
Hamermesh, D (1996), Workdays, Workhours and Work Schedules: Evidence for the United States and Germany, Kalamazoo, MI: The W.E. Upjohn Institute.
Hamermesh, D and E Stancanelli (2014), “Long Workweeks and Strange Hours,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 20449.
Kostiuk, P (1990), “Compensating Differentials for Shift Work,” Journal of Political Economy, 98(3), 1054-75.
Jared Bernstein says there's more slack in the labor market than you'd think from just looking at the unemployment rate:
...So why not just look at the unemployment rate and call it a day? Because special factors in play right now make the jobless rate an inadequate measure of slack. In fact, at 6.1 percent last month, it’s within spitting distance of the rate many economists consider to be consistent with full employment, about 5.5 percent (I think that’s too high, but that’s a different argument).
There are at least two special factors that are distorting the unemployment rate’s signal. First, there are over seven million involuntary part-time workers, almost 5 percent of the labor force, who want, but can’t find, full-time jobs. That’s still up two percentage points from its pre-recession trough. Importantly, the unemployment rate doesn’t capture this dimension of slack at all...
The second special factor masking the extent of slack as measured by unemployment has to do with participation in the labor force. Once you give up looking for work, you’re no longer counted in the unemployment rate, so if a bunch of people exit the labor force because of the very slack we’re trying to measure, it artificially lowers unemployment, making a weak labor market look better.
That’s certainly happened over the recession and throughout the recovery...
There's still plenty of room, and plenty of time for fiscal policymakers to do more to help the unemployed (and with infrastructure, our future economic growth at the same time). Unfortunately, Congress has been captured by other interests. As for monetary policy, let's hope that the FOMC listens to Charles Evans' call for patience. Raising rates too late and risking a temporary outbreak of inflation is far less of a mistake than raising them too early and slowing the recovery of employment. And there's this too: Unemployment Hurts Happiness More Than Modest Inflation.
- Now Is a Good Time to Invest in Infrastructure - iMFdirect
- Helicopter money: Today’s best policy option - vox
- Lawrence Summers Says Treasury Undermined Fed - NYTimes.com
- Explaining the Hegemony of New Classical Economics - Uneasy Money
- The Pimco Perplex - Paul Krugman
- Re-discovering the Phillips curve - vox
- The deficit: blame foreigners - Chris Dillow
- Deindustrialization Redeploys Workers to Service Sector - Sposi and Grossman
- Do Unemployment Benefits Expirations Explain Job Openings? - Liberty Street
- Government Debt Management at the Zero Lower Bound - Jerome Powell
- Apple set to lose billions in EU state aid case - Kenneth Thomas
- What the left hand buyeth, the right hand issueth - longandvariable
- Energy-Efficient Appliances: Labels, not Subsidies - Tim Taylor
- Ed Yardeni is the Wanker of the Day - wage stagnation edition - Bonddad Blog
- What's the Matter With Alabama? - Paul Krugman
- How Not to Regulate - James Kwak
Tuesday, September 30, 2014
Martin Wolf, in "Why inequality is such a drag on economies":
...in 2012, says the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the US ranked highest among the high-income countries in the share of relatively low-paying jobs. ...
I have a new column:
Why Have Policymakers Abandoned the Working Class?, by Mark Thoma: The risks associated with a negative economic shock can vary widely depending on the wealth of a household. Wealthy households can, of course, absorb a shock much easier than poorer households. Thus, it’s important to think about how economic downturns impact various groups within the economy, and how policy can be used to offset the problems experienced by the most vulnerable among us.
When thinking about the effects of an increase in the Fed’s target interest rate, for example, it’s important to consider the impacts across income groups. I was very pleased to hear monetary policymakers talk about the asymmetric risks associated with increasing the interest rate too soon and slowing the recovery of employment and output, versus raising rates too late and risking inflation. ...
But there is more to it than this. ...
The silver lining in falling college enrollment, by Mark Thoma: College enrollment "declined by close to half a million (463,000) between 2012 and 2013, marking the second year in a row that a drop of this magnitude has occurred," according to a report from the Census Bureau. And it's the largest two-year drop since Census began collecting enrollment data in 1966. Notably, the decline was concentrated in two-year colleges.
It is, of course, desirable to have a more educated population, particularly in an era of globalization and technological change that makes it harder for low-skilled workers to find good jobs. But the report also has a silver lining. ...
- Revisiting the Lehman Brothers Bailout That Never Was - NYTimes.com
- Offshoring and skill-biased technical change - vox
- Americans work long and at strange times - vox
- Draghi the Euro Breaker? - Gloomy European Economist
- Modelling sticky prices and monetary shocks - vox
- Recessions result in lower birth rates in the long run - EurekAlert
- Options-Based Expectations of Future Policy Rates - FRBSF
- Nobody Could Have Predicted, Bill Gross Edition - Paul Krugman
- Is It Time? A Case for Patience on Monetary Policy - Charles Evans
- A Mind-Blowing Optimal Prediction Result - No Hesitations
- Why and how we care about inequality - John Cochrane
- Why is the Fed planning to fail? - The Economist
- On Bogs and Dots - macroblog
- Early Warnings - Economic Principals
- Is Repeating a Grade a Useful Practice? - Tim Taylor
- Health Care Affordability Gap Widens - St. Louis Fed
- Direct Purchases of Treasury Securities by Fed Banks - Liberty Street
- Key Inflation Reading Slips Further Below Fed’s 2% Target - WSJ
- The new normal of monetary policy - Jérémie Cohen-Setton
- The dollar is now everyone's problem - Cecchetti & Schoenholtz
- Need We Fear the Robot Uprising? - Brad DeLong
Monday, September 29, 2014
Why are economic forecasts wrong so often?: The Queen of England famously asked why economists failed to foresee the financial crisis in 2008. "Why did nobody notice it?" was her question when she visited the London School of Economics that year.
Economists' failure to accurately predict the economy's course isn't limited to the financial crisis and the Great Recession that followed. Macroeconomic computer models also aren't very useful for predicting how variables such as GDP, employment, interest rates and inflation will evolve over time.
Forecasting most things is fraught with difficulty. See the current dust-up between Nate Silver and Sam Wang over their conflicting predictions about the coming Senate elections. Why is forecasting so hard?
Because so many things can go wrong. For example...
New paper from Joseph Stiglitz:
Reconstructing Macroeconomic Theory to Manage Economic Policy, by Joseph E. Stiglitz, NBER Working Paper No. 20517, September 2014 NBER: Macroeconomics has not done well in recent years: The standard models didn't predict the Great Recession; and even said it couldn't happen. After the bubble burst, the models did not predict the full consequences.
The paper traces the failures to the attempts, beginning in the 1970s, to reconcile macro and microeconomics, by making the former adopt the standard competitive micro-models that were under attack even then, from theories of imperfect and asymmetric information, game theory, and behavioral economics.
The paper argues that any theory of deep downturns has to answer these questions: What is the source of the disturbances? Why do seemingly small shocks have such large effects? Why do deep downturns last so long? Why is there such persistence, when we have the same human, physical, and natural resources today as we had before the crisis?
The paper presents a variety of hypotheses which provide answers to these questions, and argues that models based on these alternative assumptions have markedly different policy implications, including large multipliers. It explains why the apparent liquidity trap today is markedly different from that envisioned by Keynes in the Great Depression, and why the Zero Lower Bound is not the central impediment to the effectiveness of monetary policy in restoring the economy to full employment.
[I couldn't find an open link.]
The difference between the rich and the poor is larger than most people realize:
Our Invisible Rich, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: Half a century ago, a classic essay in The New Yorker titled “Our Invisible Poor” took on the then-prevalent myth that America was an affluent society with only a few “pockets of poverty.” For many, the facts about poverty came as a revelation...
I don’t think the poor are invisible today... Instead, these days it’s the rich who are invisible. ... In fact, most Americans have no idea just how unequal our society has become.
The latest piece of evidence to that effect is a survey asking people in various countries how much they thought top executives of major companies make relative to unskilled workers. In the United States the median respondent believed that chief executives make about 30 times as much as their employees, which was roughly true in the 1960s — but since then the gap has soared, so that today chief executives earn something like 300 times as much as ordinary workers.
So Americans have no idea how much the Masters of the Universe are paid, a finding very much in line with evidence that Americans vastly underestimate the concentration of wealth at the top. ...
So how can people be unaware of this development, or at least unaware of its scale? The main answer, I’d suggest, is that the truly rich are so removed from ordinary people’s lives that we never see what they have. We may notice, and feel aggrieved about, college kids driving luxury cars; but we don’t see private equity managers commuting by helicopter to their immense mansions in the Hamptons. The commanding heights of our economy are invisible because they’re lost in the clouds. ...
Does the invisibility of the very rich matter? Politically, it matters a lot. Pundits sometimes wonder why American voters don’t care more about inequality; part of the answer is that they don’t realize how extreme it is. ...
Most Americans say, if asked, that inequality is too high and something should be done about it — there is overwhelming support for higher minimum wages, and a majority favors higher taxes at the top. But at least so far confronting extreme inequality hasn’t been an election-winning issue. Maybe that would be true even if Americans knew the facts about our new Gilded Age. But we don’t know that. Today’s political balance rests on a foundation of ignorance, in which the public has no idea what our society is really like.
- Joe Stiglitz vs. the Austerity Zombies - Brad DeLong
- Perceptions of inequality in Europe and the US - vox
- Labour under-utilisation in America - Gavyn Davies
- Raising Most People's Wages - Robert Reich
- Real wages continue to fall in the UK - vox
- Finally, the Truth About the A.I.G. Bailout - NYTimes.com
- Enough With Claims That Economics Is Unscientific - Modeled Behavior
- The Geneva Report on global deleveraging - vox
- The Washington Post Is a Mess: Social Security Edition - Dean Baker
- The Fed would be crazy to worry about runaway wages - Rex Nutting
Sunday, September 28, 2014
The Fed would be crazy to worry about runaway wages: Richard Fisher and Charles Plosser, the two biggest inflation hawks at the Federal Reserve, are retiring soon. But their pernicious ideas will stay alive at the Fed and elsewhere, threatening the middle class with another lost decade of underemployment and low wages.
Fisher, Plosser and the other hawks say inflation is becoming our greatest economic worry. They want the Fed to raise interest rates soon to keep the unemployment rate from dropping too far and to prevent American workers from getting a raise.
They would rather have you to stay jobless and poor.
You may think I’m exaggerating their views, but I’m not. ...
Acemoglu, Autor, Dor, Hansen, and Price (I've noted this paper once or twice already in recent months, but thought it worthwhile to post their summary of te work):
The rise of China and the future of US manufacturing, by Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson, and Brendan Price, Vox EU: The end of the Great Recession has rekindled optimism about the future of US manufacturing. In the second quarter of 2010 the number of US workers employed in manufacturing registered positive growth – its first increase since 2006 – and subsequently recorded ten consecutive quarters of job gains, the longest expansion since the 1970s. Advocating for the potential of an industrial turnaround, some economists give a positive spin to US manufacturing’s earlier troubles: while employment may have fallen in the 2000s, value added in the sector has been growing as fast as the overall US economy. Its share of US GDP has kept stable, an achievement matched by few other high-income economies over the same period (Lawrence and Edwards 2013, Moran and Oldenski 2014). The business press has giddily coined the term ‘reshoring’ to describe the phenomenon – as yet not well documented empirically – of companies returning jobs to the United States that they had previously offshored to low-wage destinations.
Before we declare a renaissance for US manufacturing, it is worth re-examining the magnitude of the sector’s previous decline and considering the causal factors responsible for job loss. The scale of the employment decline is indeed stunning. Figure 1 shows that in 2000, 17.3 million US workers were employed in manufacturing, a level that with periodic ups and downs had changed only modestly since the early 1980s. By 2010, employment had dropped to 11.5 million workers, a 33% decrease from 2000. Strikingly, most of this decline came before the onset of the Great Recession. In the middle of 2007, on the eve of the Lehman Brothers collapse that paralysed global financial markets, US manufacturing employment had already dipped to 13.9 million workers, such that three-fifths of the job losses over the 2000 to 2010 period occurred prior to the US aggregate contraction. Figure 1 also reveals the paltriness of the recent manufacturing recovery. As of mid-2014, the number of manufacturing jobs had reached only 12.1 million, a level far below the already diminished pre-recession level.
Figure 1. US employment , 1980q1-2014q3
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
We examine the reasons behind the recent decline in US manufacturing employment (Acemoglu et al. 2014). Our point of departure is the coincidence of the 2000s swoon in US manufacturing and a significant increase in import competition from China (Bernard et al. 2006). Between 1990 and 2011 the share of global manufacturing exports originating in China surged from two to 16% (Hanson 2012). This widely heralded export boom was the outcome of deep economic reforms that China enacted in the 1980s and 1990s, which were further extended by the country’s joining the World Trade Organization in 2001 (Brandt et al. 2012, Pierce and Schott 2013). China’s share in US manufacturing imports has expanded in concert with its global presence, rising from 5% in 1991 to 11% in 2001 before leaping to 23% in 2011. Could China’s rise be behind US manufacturing’s fall?
The first step in our analysis is to estimate the direct impact of import competition from China on US manufacturing industries. Suppose that the economic opening in China allows the country to realise a comparative advantage in manufacturing that had lain dormant during the era of Maoist central planning, which entailed near prohibitive barriers to trade. As reform induces China to reallocate labour and capital from farms to factories and from inefficient state-owned enterprises to more efficient private businesses, output will expand in the sectors in which the country’s comparative advantage is strongest. China’s abundant labour supply and relatively scarce supply of arable land and natural resources make manufacturing the primary beneficiary of reform-induced industrial restructuring. The global implications of China’s reorientation toward manufacturing – strongly abetted by inflows of foreign direct investment – are immense. China accounts for three-quarters of all growth in manufacturing value added that has occurred in low and middle income economies since 1990.
For many US manufacturing firms, intensifying import competition from China means a reduction in demand for the goods they produce and a corresponding contraction in the number of workers they employ. Looking across US manufacturing industries whose outputs compete with Chinese import goods, we estimate that had import penetration from China not grown after 1999, there would have been 560,000 fewer manufacturing jobs lost through 2011. Actual US manufacturing employment declined by 5.8 million workers from 1999 to 2011, making the counterfactual job loss from the direct effect of greater Chinese import penetration amount to 10% of the realised job decline in manufacturing.
These direct effects of trade exposure do not capture the full impact of growing Chinese imports on US employment. Negative shocks to one industry are transmitted to other industries via economic linkages between sectors. One source of linkages is buyer-supplier relationships (Acemoglu et al. 2012). Rising import competition in apparel and furniture – two sectors in which China is strong – will cause these ‘downstream’ industries to reduce purchases from the ‘upstream’ sectors that supply them with fabric, lumber, and textile and woodworking machinery. Because buyers and suppliers often locate near one another, much of the impact of increased trade exposure in downstream industries is likely to transmit to suppliers in the same regional or national market. We use US input-output data to construct downstream trade shocks for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. Estimates from this exercise indicate sizeable negative downstream effects. Applying the direct plus input-output measure of exposure increases our estimates of trade-induced job losses for 1999 to 2011 to 985,000 workers in manufacturing and to two million workers in the entire economy. Inter-industry linkages thus magnify the employment effects of trade shocks, almost doubling the size of the impact within manufacturing and producing an equally large employment effect outside of manufacturing.
Two additional sources of linkages between sectors operate through changes in aggregate demand and the reallocation of labour. When manufacturing contracts, workers who have lost their jobs or suffered declines in their earnings subsequently reduce their spending on goods and services. The contraction in demand is multiplied throughout the economy via standard Keynesian mechanisms, depressing aggregate consumption and investment. Helping offset these negative aggregate demand effects, workers who exit manufacturing may take up jobs in the service sector or elsewhere in the economy, replacing some of the earnings lost in trade-exposed industries. Because aggregate demand and reallocation effects work in opposing directions, we can only detect their net impact on total employment. A further complication is that these impacts operate at the level of the aggregate economy – as opposed to direct and input-output effects of trade shocks which operate at the industry level – meaning we have only as many data points to detect their presence as we have years since the China trade shock commenced. Since China’s export surge did not hit with full force until the early 1990s, the available time series for the national US economy is disconcertingly short.
To address this data challenge, we supplement our analysis of US industries with an analysis of US regional economies. We define regions to be ‘commuting zones’ which are aggregates of commercially linked counties that comprise well-defined local labour markets. Because commuting zones differ sharply in their patterns of industrial specialisation, they are differentially exposed to increased import competition from China (Autor et al. 2013). Asheville, North Carolina, is a furniture-making hub, putting it in the direct path of the China maelstrom. In contrast, Orlando, Florida (of Disney and Harry Potter World Fame), focuses on tourism, leaving it lightly affected by rising imports of manufactured goods. If the reallocation mechanism is operative, then when a local industry contracts as a result of Chinese competition, some other industry in the same commuting zone should expand. Aggregate demand effects should also operate within local labour markets, as shown by Mian and Sufi (2014) in the context of the recent US housing bust. If increased trade exposure lowers aggregate employment in a location, reduced earnings will decrease spending on non-traded local goods and services, magnifying the impact throughout the local economy.
Our estimates of the net impact of aggregate demand and reallocation effects imply that import growth from China between 1999 and 2011 led to an employment reduction of 2.4 million workers. This figure is larger than the 2.0 million job loss estimate we obtain for national industries, which only captures direct and input-output effects. But it still likely understates the full consequences of the China shock on US employment. Neither our analysis for commuting zones nor for national industries fully incorporates all of the adjustment channels encompassed by the other. The national-industry estimates exclude reallocation and aggregate demand effects, whereas the commuting-zone estimates exclude the national component of these two effects, as well as the non-local component of input-output linkage effects. Because the commuting zone estimates suggest that aggregate forces magnify rather than offset the effects of import competition, we view our industry-level estimates of employment reduction as providing a conservative lower bound.
What do our findings imply about the potential for a US manufacturing resurgence? The recent growth in manufacturing imports to the US is largely a consequence of China’s emergence on the global stage coupled with its deep comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods. The jobs in apparel, furniture, shoes, and other wage-sensitive products that the United States has lost to China are unlikely to return. Even as China’s labour costs rise, the factories that produce these goods are more likely to relocate to Bangladesh, Vietnam, or other countries rising in China’s wake than to reappear on US shores. Further, China’s impact on US manufacturing is far from complete. During the 2000s, the country rapidly expanded into the assembly of laptops and cell-phones, with production occurring increasingly under Chinese brands, such as Lenovo and Huawei. Despite this rather bleak panorama, there are sources of hope for manufacturing in the United States. Perhaps the most encouraging sign is that the response of many companies to increased trade pressure has been to increase investment in innovation (Bloom et al. 2011). The ensuing advance in technology may ultimately help create new markets for US producers. However, if the trend toward the automation of routine jobs in manufacturing continues (Autor and Dorn 2013), the application of these new technologies is likely to do much more to boost growth in value added than to expand employment on the factory floor.
Acemoglu D, V Carvalho, A Ozdaglar, and A Tahbaz-Salehi (2012), “The Network Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations.” Econometrica, 80(5): 1977-2016.
Acemoglu D, D H Autor, D Dorn, G H Hanson, and B Price (2014), “Import Competition and the Great US Employment Sag of the 2000s.” NBER Working Paper No. 20395.
Autor, D H and D Dorn (2013), “The Growth of Low Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US Labor Market.” American Economic Review, 103(5), 1553-1597.
Autor D H, D Dorn, and G H Hanson (2013a) “The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States.” American Economic Review, 103(6): 2121-2168.
Bernard A B, J B Jensen, and P K Schott (2006), “Survival of the Best Fit: Exposure to Low-Wage Countries and the (Uneven) Growth of US Manufacturing Plants.” Journal of International Economics, 68(1), 219-237.
Bloom N, M Draca, and J Van Reenen (2012), “Trade Induced Technical Change? The Impact of Chinese Imports on Innovation, IT, and Productivity.” Mimeo, Stanford University.
Brandt L, J Van Biesebroeck, and Y Zhang (2012), “Creative Accounting or Creative Destruction? Firm-Level Productivity Growth in Chinese Manufacturing.” Journal of Development Economics, 97(2): 339-351.
Hanson, G (2012), “The Rise of Middle Kingdoms: Emerging Economies in Global Trade.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(2): 41-64.
Mian, A and A Sufi (2014), “What Explains the 2007-2009 Drop in Employment?” Econometrica, forthcoming.
Pierce, J R and P K Schott (2013), “The Surprisingly Swift Decline of US Manufacturing Employment.” Yale Department of Economics Working Paper, November.
Saturday, September 27, 2014
Paul Krugman reviews Jeff Madrick's book “Seven Bad Ideas: How Mainstream Economists Have Damaged America and the World”:
Seven Bad Ideas: The economics profession has not, to say the least, covered itself in glory these past six years. Hardly any economists predicted the 2008 crisis — and the handful who did tended to be people who also predicted crises that didn’t happen. More significant, many and arguably most economists were claiming, right up to the moment of collapse, that nothing like this could even happen.
Furthermore, once crisis struck economists seemed unable to agree on a response. They’d had 75 years since the Great Depression to figure out what to do if something similar happened again, but the profession was utterly divided when the moment of truth arrived.
In “Seven Bad Ideas: How Mainstream Economists Have Damaged America and the World,” Jeff Madrick — a contributing editor at Harper’s Magazine and a frequent writer on matters economic — argues that the professional failures since 2008 didn’t come out of the blue but were rooted in decades of intellectual malfeasance. ...
Looking at Productivity as a State of Mind: Policy makers often fret about the pace of worker productivity. But each of us also frets about the pace of our own individual productivity.
Type the phrase “being more” into Google: The autocomplete function suggests “being more productive” as the third-most-likely choice — right behind “being more assertive” and “being more confident.” That suggests that many people are searching for answers about productivity.
But there is a disconnect. When we look at worker productivity at the macro level, we tend to limit ourselves to issues like skill shortages, new technologies or appropriate incentives.
In our own lives, though, we see a personal struggle. Tomorrow we want to finish that memo, review several files and plan that project. We know that some of the work will be tedious, but benefits like career advancement, fulfillment or just sheer survival outweigh the costs. When tomorrow becomes today, though, we may discover that we have all kinds of pressing problems. The tedium we had anticipated suddenly feels very large. It is tempting to take a break and just let our minds wander. In our own lives self-control is a big problem — yet it is largely absent from high-level discussions about worker productivity.
And that raises an obvious question: By focusing so heavily on classic big-picture issues, are policy makers overlooking something that may be even more important? ...
- Obama and the economy: The woes of the average Joe - Economist
- The FRBNY DSGE Model Forecast - Liberty Street Economics
- Mismeasuring long-run growth - vox
- The entirely predictable recession - mainly macro
- Macrocomplaining vs. macrosplaining - Noahpinion
- The Rising Dollar and Macro and Policy Prospects - Econbrowser
- How Brussels' medicine is killing the 'French patient' - CER
- Entrepreneurial advice from the horse’s mouth - Digitopoly
- The FT and the undergraduate economics curriculum - longandvariable
- A Tale of Two States—Bringing Back Productivity Growth - iMFdirect
- An ASEAN Economic Community by 2015? - vox
- How to pull the eurozone out of the mire - CER
- Bubblethink - Stumbling and Mumbling
- Beyond Foreign Aid - Tim Taylor
Friday, September 26, 2014
Why the Fed Is So Wimpy, by Justin Fox: Regulatory capture — when regulators come to act mainly in the interest of the industries they regulate — is a phenomenon that economists, political scientists, and legal scholars have been writing about for decades. Bank regulators in particular have been depicted as captives for years, and have even taken to describing themselves as such.
Actually witnessing capture in the wild is different, though, and the new This American Life episode with secret recordings of bank examiners at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York going about their jobs is going to focus a lot more attention on the phenomenon. It’s really well done, and you should listen to it, read the transcript, and/or read the story by ProPublica reporter Jake Bernstein.
Still, there is some context that’s inevitably missing, and as a former banking-regulation reporter for the American Banker, I feel called to fill some of it in. Much of it has to do with the structure of bank regulation in the U.S., which actually seems designed to encourage capture. But to start, there are a couple of revelations about Goldman Sachs in the story that are treated as smoking guns. One seems to have fired a blank, while the other may be even more explosive than it’s made out to be. ...
Paul Krugman continues the conversation on New Classical economics::
The New Classical Clique: Simon Wren-Lewis thinks some more about macroeconomics gone astray; Robert J. Waldmann weighs in. For those new to this conversation, the question is why starting in the 1970s much of academic macroeconomics was taken over by a school of thought that began by denying any useful role for policies to raise demand in a slump, and eventually coalesced around denial that the demand side of the economy has any role in causing slumps.
I was a grad student and then an assistant professor as this was happening, albeit doing international economics – and international macro went in a different direction, for reasons I’ll get to in a bit. So I have some sense of what was really going on. And while both Wren-Lewis and Waldmann hit on most of the main points, neither I think gets at the important role of personal self-interest. New classical macro was and still is many things – an ideological bludgeon against liberals, a showcase for fancy math, a haven for people who want some kind of intellectual purity in a messy world. But it’s also a self-promoting clique. ...
Targeting Two: In the Washington Post, Jared Bernstein asks why the Fed's inflation target is 2 percent. "The fact is that the target is 2 percent because the target is 2 percent," he writes. Bernstein refers to a paper by Laurence Ball suggesting that a 4% target could be preferable by reducing the likelihood of the economy running up against the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.
Paul Krugman chimes in, adding that a 2 percent target:
"was low enough that the price stability types could be persuaded, or were willing to concede as a possibility, that true inflation — taking account of quality changes — was really zero. Meanwhile, as of the mid 1990s modeling efforts suggested that 2 percent was enough to make sustained periods at the zero lower bound unlikely and to lubricate the labor market sufficiently that downward wage stickiness would have minor effects. So 2 percent it was, and this rough guess acquired force as a focal point, a respectable place that wouldn’t get you in trouble.
The problem is that we now know that both the zero lower bound and wage stickiness are much bigger issues than anyone realized in the 1990s."
Krugman calls the target "the terrible two," and laments that "Unfortunately, it’s now very hard to change the target; anything above 2 isn’t considered respectable."
Dean Baker also has a post in which he explains that Krugman's discussion of the 2 percent target "argues that it is a pretty much arbitrary compromise between the idea that the target should be zero (the dollar keeps its value constant forever) and the idea that we need some inflation to keep the economy operating smoothly and avoid the zero lower bound for interest rates. This is far too generous... Not only is there not much justification for 2.0 percent, there is not much justification for any target."
I'll add three papers, in reverse chronological order, that should be relevant to this discussion. ...
The long-term unemployed need more help than they are getting:
Long-term Unemployed Struggle as Economy Improves: While the unemployment rate for people out of work for six months or less has returned to prerecession levels, the levels of unemployment for workers who remain jobless for more than six months is among the most persistent, negative effects of the Great Recession, according to a new national study at Rutgers. In fact, one in five workers laid off from a job during the last five years are still unemployed and looking for work, researchers from the John J. Heldrich Center for Workforce Development found.
Among the key findings of "Left Behind: The Long-term Unemployed Struggle in an Improving Economy":
- Approximately half of the laid-off workers who found work were paid less in their new positions; one in four say their new job was only temporary.
- Only one in five of the long-term unemployed received help from a government agency when looking for a job; only 22 percent enrolled in a training program to develop skills for a new job; and 60 percent received no government assistance beyond unemployment benefits.
- Nearly two-thirds of Americans support increasing funds for long-term education and training programs, and greater spending on roads and highways in order to assist unemployed workers.
As of last August, 3 million Americans, nearly one in three unemployed workers, have been unemployed for more than six months and more than 2 million Americans have been out of work for more than a year...
This research provides a detailed record of the enduring effects of the Great Recession on the unemployed and long-term unemployed five years after the economy started growing again in June 2009.
The survey also found that:
- More than seven in 10 long-term unemployed say they have less in savings and income than they did five years ago.
- More than eight in 10 of the long-term unemployed rate their personal financial situation negatively as only fair or poor.
- More than six in 10 unemployed and long-term unemployed say they experienced stress in family relationships and close friendships during their time without a job.
- Fifty-five percent of the long-term unemployed say they will need to retire later than planned because of the recession, while 5 percent say the weak economy forced them into early retirement.
- Nearly half of the long-term unemployed say it will take three to 10 years for their families to recover financially. Another one in five say it will take longer than that or that they will never recover.
..."These long-term unemployed workers have been left behind to fend for themselves as they struggle to pull their lives back together."
When it comes to the wealthy, is this time different?:
The Show-Off Society, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: Liberals talk about circumstances; conservatives talk about character.
This intellectual divide is most obvious when the subject is the persistence of poverty... Liberals focus on the stagnation of real wages and the disappearance of jobs offering middle-class incomes, as well as the constant insecurity that comes with not having reliable jobs or assets. For conservatives, however, it’s all about not trying hard enough. ...
Let us, however, be fair: some conservatives are willing to censure the rich, too. ... Peggy Noonan writes about our “decadent elites”... Charles Murray, whose book “Coming Apart” is mainly about the alleged decay of values among the white working class, also denounces the “unseemliness” of the very rich, with their lavish lifestyles and gigantic houses.
But has there really been an explosion of elite ostentation? ...
I’ve just reread a remarkable article titled “How top executives live,” originally published in Fortune in 1955 and ... it turns out that the lives of an earlier generation’s elite were, indeed, far more restrained, more seemly if you like ... And why had the elite moved away from the ostentation of the past? ... The large yacht, Fortune tells us, “has foundered in the sea of progressive taxation.”
But that sea has since receded. ... And there’s no mystery about what happened to the good-old days of elite restraint. ... Extreme income inequality and low taxes at the top are back. ...
Is there any chance that moral exhortations, appeals to set a better example, might induce the wealthy to stop showing off so much? No.
It’s not just that people who can afford to live large tend to do just that. As Thorstein Veblen told us long ago, in a highly unequal society the wealthy feel obliged to engage in “conspicuous consumption”... And modern social science confirms his insight. For example, researchers at the Federal Reserve have shown that people living in highly unequal neighborhoods are more likely to buy luxury cars... Pretty clearly, high inequality brings a perceived need to spend money in ways that signal status.
The point is that while chiding the rich for their vulgarity may not be as offensive as lecturing the poor on their moral failings, it’s just as futile. Human nature being what it is, it’s silly to expect humility from a highly privileged elite. So if you think our society needs more humility, you should support policies that would reduce the elite’s privileges.
- Cartoon: Unemployment isn't a bug -- it's a feature - Tom the Dancing Bug
- Assessment of the FRBNY DSGE Model's Forecasts, 2010-13 - Liberty Street
- Long-term unemployed struggle as economy improves - EurekAlert
- Measuring Misallocation across Firms - Growth Economics
- Retirement, saving, and the rate of interest - Nick Rowe
- Stop risking public pensions on hedge funds - David Cay Johnston
- Fairer markets that will serve us all - FT.com
- Asymmetric Monetary Risks - Paul Krugman
- Unseemly Notes - Paul Krugman
- The Terrible Two - Paul Krugman
- Mansion Tax: bugs & features - Stumbling and Mumbling
- The usual comment on Wren-Lewis - Robert's Stochastic Thoughts
- The preference whisperer - Fresh economic thinking
- Connecting “the Dots”: Disagreement in the FOMC - Liberty Street
- How Does Bitcoin Work - Tim Taylor
Thursday, September 25, 2014
Brad DeLong wants to know if he is off his rocker (on this particular point):
What Should Monetary Policy Be?: Chicago Federal Reserve Bank President Charles Evans’s position seems to me to be the position that ought to be the center of gravity of the Federal Open Market Committee’s thoughts right now, with wings on all sides of it taking different views as part of a diversified intellectual portfolio. ... Yet Evans is out there on his own–with perhaps Narayana Kocherlakota beside him. ...
As I see it:
The past decade has demonstrated that to properly reduce the risks of hitting the zero nominal lower bound on safe short-term interest rates, we need not a 5%/year but at least a 6.5%/year business-cycle peak safe short nominal rate.1 With a 3%/year short-term peak real natural interest rate, we need not a 2%/year but a 3.5%/year inflation target instead.
It is likely that the safe natural real rate of interest has fallen by 1%-point/year. That means that a healthy economy properly distant from the ZLB requires not a 3.5%/year but a 4.5%/year inflation target.
It is very important when the economy hits the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates that expectations be that the time spent at the ZLB will be short. To build those expectations, it is important that when the economy emerges from the ZLB it undergo a period in which the long-run inflation target is overshot.
The likelihood is that downward movements in labor force participation that are cementing into structural impediments to employment can be reversed if high demand pulls workers back into the labor force before the cement has set, but only with difficulty otherwise. The benefit-cost analysis thus calls for an additional inflation overshoot in order to satisfy the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate.
If the Federal Reserve aims at a 2%/year inflation target and fails to raise interest rates sufficiently early, it may wind up with 4%/year inflation and have to raise short-term real interest rates to 6%/year–a nominal interest rate of 10%/year–to return the economy to its inflation target. If the Federal Reserve prematurely raises interest rates, it may wind up with 0%/year inflation and wish to lower short-term real interest rates to -2%/year to return the economy to its inflation rate. With inflation at 0%/year, it cannot do that. Thus the risks are asymmetric: raising interest rates later than optimal under perfect foresight carries much lower risks than does raising interest rates earlier than optimal.
Since 1979 the Federal Reserve has built up enormous credibility as the guardian of price stability and has wrecked whatever credibility it had as the guardian of low unemployment. A situation in which the general expectation is that the Federal Reserve will do too little to guard against high unemployment is worse than a situation in which the general expectations is that the Federal Reserve will too little to guard against inflation–”it is worse, in an impoverished world, to provoke unemployment than to disappoint the rentier”.2
The PCE price index is now undershooting its pre-2008 trend by fully 5%: the proper optimal-control response to a large negative real demand shock is not a price level track that falls below but rather one that rises above the previously-anticipated trend path.
IMHO, you need to reject all 7 of the above points completely in order to think that the FOMC’s goal of returning inflation to 2%/year and keeping it there is anywhere close to an optimal-control path for an institution governed by its dual mandate. I really do not see how you can reject all seven.
Moreover, financial markets right now believe that the Federal Reserve’s policy is not going to attain 2%/year inflation–not now, not over the next five years. Since June the on-track-to-recovery Confidence Fairy–to the extent that she was present–has flown away...
Thus right now justifying the Federal Reserve’s policy track seems to me to require rejecting all seven of the points above, plus rejecting the financial markets’ read on monetary policy, plus rejecting the consideration that depressed financial markets–even irrationally-depressed financial markets–should be offset with additional demand stimulus.
Yet only two of the seventeen FOMC participants are with me. Am I off my rocker? Have they been consumed by groupthink? How am I to understand all this?
- Patience Is a Virtue When Normalizing Monetary Policy - Charles Evans
- Fighting Inflation Is a War to Ensure That Real Wages Never Grow - EPI
- Developing a Narrative: The Great Recession - Liberty Street Economics
- Comments on New Home Sales - Calculated Risk
- Seeking housing supply logic - Fresh economic thinking
- Attack of the Techno-Libertarians! - MaxSpeak
- Charlatans and Cranks Forever - Paul Krugman
- Study: Online classes really do work - MIT News
- Forget the deficit? - Chris Dillow
Wednesday, September 24, 2014
Where macroeconomics went wrong: In my view, the answer is in the 1970/80s with the New Classical revolution (NCR). However I also think the new ideas that came with that revolution were progressive. I have defended rational expectations, I think intertemporal theory is the right place to start in thinking about consumption, and exploring the implications of time inconsistency is very important to macro policy, as well as many other areas of economics. I also think, along with nearly all macroeconomists, that the microfoundations approach to macro (DSGE models) is a progressive research strategy.
That is why discussion about these issues can become so confused. New Classical economics made academic macroeconomics take a number of big steps forward, but a couple of big steps backward at the same time. The clue to the backward steps comes from the name NCR. The research program was anti-Keynesian (hence New Classical), and it did not want microfounded macro to be an alternative to the then dominant existing methodology, it wanted to replace it (hence revolution). Because the revolution succeeded (although the victory over Keynesian ideas was temporary), generations of students were taught that Keynesian economics was out of date. They were not taught about the pros and cons of the old and new methodologies, but were taught that the old methodology was simply wrong. And that teaching was/is a problem because it itself is wrong. ...
Hungry Children in America: One child in five in the United States lives in a "food insecure" household. Craig Gundersen and James P. Ziliak lay out the evidence in "Childhood Food Insecurity in the U.S.: Trends, Causes, and Policy Options," a Fall 2014 Research Report written for The Future of Children. ...
Unsurprisingly, families that are poor are more likely to experience food insecurity. But perhaps more surprisingly, the connection from poverty to food insecurity is by no means ironclad. After all, the U.S. spends over $100 billion on food-related programs for the poor, including food stamps, school lunches and breakfasts and others. As the authors write:Clearly, the risk for child food insecurity drops quickly with income. But even at incomes two and three times the poverty level, food insecurity is quite high. Moreover, almost 60 percent of children in households close to the poverty line are in foodsecure households. This suggests that income is only part of the story and that other factors also contribute to children’s food security.
As the authors dig into the data on children living in food-insecure households, the theme that keeps emerging is the quality of parenting the children receive. ...
The takeaway lesson, at least for me, is that food stamps and school lunches do help to reduce food insecurity, as do programs that provide income support to those with low incomes. But when the adults in a household are having trouble managing their own lives, children end up suffering. The answers here are straightforward to name, if not always easy to do, like finding ways to get food to children directly (perhaps by expanding school food programs to the summers and weekends) and to help parents in low-income households learn how to stretch their limited resources. As I have argued before on this website, for many children, the parenting gap they experience may be limiting their development even from a very young age.
Having It and Flaunting It: David Brooks is getting some ribbing for suggesting that the wealthy should “follow a code of seemliness”, not living the lavish lifestyles they can afford. ...I want to talk a bit about the economics of flaunting your wealth...
The first thing to say is that expecting the rich not to flaunt their wealth is, of course, unrealistic..., for many of the rich flaunting is what it’s all about. ... So it’s largely about display — which Thorstein Veblen could, of course, have told you. ...
Wait, there’s more. If you feel that it’s bad for society to have people flaunting their relative wealth, you have in effect accepted the view that great wealth imposes negative externalities on the rest of the population — which is an argument for progressive taxation that goes beyond the maximization of revenue.
And one more thing: think about what this says about economic growth. We have an economy that has become considerably richer since 1980, but with a large share of the gains going to people with very high incomes — people for whom the marginal utility of a dollar’s worth of spending ... comes largely from status competition, which is a zero-sum game. So a lot of our economic growth has simply been wasted, doing nothing but accelerating the pace of the upper-income rat race. ...
From the past, my view of what wealth is for:
What is Rich?: ...When I was a little kid, being rich meant being able to buy the stuff I wanted without having to worry about how much it costs.
But as I got older -- and maybe this explains my choice of jobs -- being rich was much more about the ability to do what I wanted with my time. In this sense, you can have considerable wealth, but still not be rich. In fact, the quest for more and more stuff gets in the way (though it depends in part on what you want to do with your free time, if it's to play golf at an expensive club, sufficient wealth is a necessary condition).
Some of the richest people I know are quite poor in terms of having "stuff", but free of the rat race, and as far as I can tell, they are generally happy. I think a lot of people are actually looking for freedom as they accumulate wealth -- they imagine being able to do whatever they want -- but don't realize that working longer and longer hours until there is no time left for anything else is not the best the way to get the freedom they are looking for. ...
But for many it seems the accumulation of "stuff" and the envy of people who cannot afford it is more important than freedom from the never ending job of status competition.
- Productivity Pessimism from Productivity Optimists - Growth Economics
- The Hidden Benefits of Mitigating Climate Change - NYTimes.com
- Dallas Fed's Fisher Doesn't Want Real Wages to Increase - Brad DeLong
- A Bird’s Eye View of the FRBNY DSGE Model - Liberty Street Economics
- The Bank of Canada vs the bond market - Nick Rowe
- Interpreting the Yield Curve: Some Pictures - Econbrowser
- Will lack of tax hikes crash the Japanese economy? - Noahpinion
- Taxation vs. Expropriation - Why Nations Fail
- Inventories of goods and money (I=S again) - Nick Rowe
- Crushing the competition – at any price - Tim Harford
- Temporary Equilibrium One More Time - Uneasy Money
- How to attack Labour leaders - Stumbling and Mumbling
- Comment on Krugman - Angry Bear
- No hard landing yet in China - Gavyn Davies
- A little more conversation - Digitopoly
- Let it roll! - mainly macro
Tuesday, September 23, 2014
"Credibility": At the end of an interview with Ed Balls this morning, Sarah Monague (02h 22m in) gave us a wonderful example of the ideological presumptions of supposedly neutral BBC reporting. She asked Nick Robinson: "It's about economic credibility here, isn't it?"
What's going on here is a double ideological trick.
First, "credibility" is defined in terms of whether Labour's plans are sufficiently fiscally tight*. This imparts an austerity bias to political discourse. There's no necessary reason for this. We might instead define credibility in terms of whether the party is offering enough to working people, and decry the derisory rise in the minimum wage as lacking credibility from the point of view of the objective of improving the lot of the low-paid.
Which brings me to a second trick. Credible with whom? We might ask: are Balls' policies credible with bond markets - the guys who lend governments money - or will they instead cause a significant rise in borrowing costs? Or we could ask: are they credible with working people? ... The judges of what's credible seem to be her and Nick themselves - who, not uncoincidentally, are wealthy, public school-educated people.
This poses the question: what is the origin of this double bias? ...
Fisher on Wages, by Tim Duy: Dallas Federal Reserve President Richard Fisher said Friday the US economy was threatend by higher wages. Via Reuters:
Fisher said on Friday he worries that further declines in unemployment nationally could lead to broader wage inflation. To head that off, and also to address what he called rising excesses in financial markets, Fisher said he prefers to raise rates by springtime, sooner than many investors currently anticipate.
After a snarky tweet, I wondered if he was not misquoted or misinterpreted. But he definitely warns that wage growth is set to accelerate in his Fox News interview (begin at the 3:50 mark). The crux of his argument is that wage growth accelerates when unemployment hits 6.1% and he uses strong wage growth in Texas as an example. He seems genuinely concerned that wage growth is negative outcome - that wage growth in Texas is a precursor to a terrible outcome for the US economy as a whole.
His entire tone is odd, and I feel compelled to clean up his argument, at least as much as is possible.
Fisher says that he presented evidence at the last FOMC meeting that 6.1% was the tipping point for wage acceleration. I can't disagree - I said as much this past March. The updated chart:
It is reasonable to expect that wage growth will accelerate as unemployment moves below 6%. I believe this is something of a test of the hypothesis that alternative measures of under-utilization more accurately convey information about the degree of slack. If that hypothesis is correct, then wage growth should not accelerate.
That said, why should Fisher fear wage growth? I don't see how one can expect real wages to rise in the absence of nominal wage growth in excess of inflation. And once you accept the possibility of real wage growth, you recognize the link between wage growth and inflation could be very weak. And so it is:
Note the period of disinflation that pulls inflation down to it's range since the mid-90s across a wide-variety of wage growth rates. The past 20 years give no reason to believe that 4% wage inflation cannot happily coexist with 2% price inflation.
So if wage inflation does not necessarily translate into price inflation, why worry at all? Why is Fisher even worried about wages? The key is really just this quote:
This is like duck hunting, you shot ahead of the mallard rather than try to get it from behind, otherwise you can't hit it.
It is all about the timing. I think his argument might be more effective is he said this:
- The reason low unemployment does not cause inflation - or, essentially, why the Phillips curve is now flat - is that policymakers remove financial accommodation ahead of actual inflation. This is implicit in the Summary of Economic Projections. The reason inflation stabilizes near target is because unemployment settles near its natural rate, guided there by higher interest rates.
- To judge the appropriate timing and magnitude of financial market accommodation, the Federal Reserve traditionally used the unemployment rate as a key indicator of slack in the economy. Accommodation would be reduced as the unemployment rate moved close to its natural rate, and conditions tightened has unemployment moved below the natural rate.
- The Texas experience suggests that these traditional measures remain relevant - this should be his key point. Low unemployment rates stoke wage inflation as firms compete for workers, just as it has in the past.
- Rather than act disgusted by higher wage growth, he should say that the Fed needs to ensure that such growth translates into real wage growth, and the Fed accomplishes this by adjusting accommodation to maintain its price inflation target. The Fed wants to hold unemployment in a zone consistent with both real wage growth and low and stable inflation. This requires nominal wage growth in excess of 2%.
- It follows then that given the unemployment rate is already near 6%, it is not reasonable for the Fed to suggest that the first rate hike is a "considerable period" off in the future. The Fed traditionally moves ahead of inflation, and higher wage growth, which will soon be at hand, will be evidence that the first rate hike needs to be pulled forward.
Stated like this, I suspect a large portion of the FOMC would be sympathetic. For example, recall San Francisco Federal Reserve President John Williams from this past March:
“At that point if we don’t start to adjust monetary policy there’d be a risk of overshooting,” he said. “You don’t wait until you’re at full employment before you start to raise interest rates from zero.”
That said, most members lack Fisher's certainty that wages gains are set to accelerate and indicate that labor market slack has dwindled to the point that it is appropriate to remove financial accommodation. There remains the concern that the unemployment rate is not the best measure of labor market slack. They would prefer to wait until they have firm evidence of the absence of labor market slack and risk a small overshoot of inflation.
Moreover, as we now know, showing their anti-inflationary resolve did not do the Fed any favors in 2006 and 2007. As a whole, the Fed is acutely aware of this result. It has not gone unnoticed that the while the economy has suffered from repeated recessions since the great Moderation began, it has not suffered from a bout of inflation. It is reasonable to thus conclude that on average, the Fed has been too tight, not too loose. Hence again why the FOMC is willing to be patient in the normalization process.
Bottom Line: Fisher suggests that wage inflation by itself is a concern and needs to be brought to a halt. This is of course incorrect. Fisher sees an inflation threat in any and all data. Indeed, there could really be no other reason to be concerned about wage inflation. I suspect that Fisher has pivoted to concerns about wage inflation because his much feared price inflation has never emerged. That said, there is an element of truth here as well. Unemployment is nearing a range that is typically associated with faster wage growth. The Fed will respond to reduced slack in labor markets with less accommodation, and they will see accelerating wage growth as a signal that slack has largely been eliminated. But they are in no rush to do so any faster than necessary. Hence the slow taper and the subsequent delay in hiking rates. The balance of risks may be in the direction of tighter than expected policy, but the Fed needs to see more convincing data before they actually move in that direction.
- The Temporary-Equilibrium Method - Paul Krugman
- Q&A: The Conservative Case for a Carbon Tax - National Geographic
- Universities to revamp economics courses - FT.com
- How Much Do Medicare Cuts Reduce Inflation? - FRBSF
- ECB and Fed: Separated at Birth? - Cecchetti & Schoenholtz
- An Open Letter to Heckman and Prescott (via MR) - Ljungqvist and Sargent
- Fed's Plosser, Dissenting Hawk, to Step Down in March - WSJ
- Einstein's "Time Dilation" Prediction Verified - Scientific American
- Guess Who’s Leading on Paid Leave? (Hint: Not Us) - Dept of Labor
- The Fed's Abandonment of its 1923 Principles (NBER) - Julio Rotemberg
- Delinquency Rate on Credit Card Loans at Historical Low - St. Louis Fed
- Prelude to a Mind-Blowing (Optimal Prediction) Result - No Hesitations
- Unbanked households: Evidence of supply-side factors - vox
- Time for the ‘reform’ mantra to be modernised - Club Troppo
- Micro evidence on Chinese outward direct investment - vox
- Aggregation in Production Functions - A Fine Theorem
- Short-Term Benefits of Climate Change Policy - Tim Taylor
- Returns to education over the life cycle - vox
- Misleading a country - mainly macro
- Credibility - Chris Dillow
Monday, September 22, 2014
The NY Fed hopes that someday the FRBNY DSGE model will be useful for forecasting. Presently, the model has "huge margins for improvement. The list of flaws is long..." (first in a five-part series):
Forecasting with the FRBNY DSGE Model, by Marco Del Negro, Bianca De Paoli, Stefano Eusepi, Marc Giannoni, Argia Sbordone, and Andrea Tambalotti, Liberty Economics, FRBNY: The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) has built a DSGE model as part of its efforts to forecast the U.S. economy. On Liberty Street Economics, we are publishing a weeklong series to provide some background on the model and its use for policy analysis and forecasting, as well as its forecasting performance. In this post, we briefly discuss what DSGE models are, explain their usefulness as a forecasting tool, and preview the forthcoming pieces in this series.
The term DSGE, which stands for dynamic stochastic general equilibrium, encompasses a very broad class of macro models, from the standard real business cycle (RBC) model of Nobel prizewinners Kydland and Prescott to New Keynesian monetary models like the one of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans. What distinguishes these models is that rules describing how economic agents behave are obtained by solving intertemporal optimization problems, given assumptions about the underlying environment, including the prevailing fiscal and monetary policy regime. One of the benefits of DSGE models is that they can deliver a lens for understanding the economy’s behavior. The third post in this series will show an example of this role with a discussion of the forces behind the Great Recession and the following slow recovery.
DSGE models are also quite abstract representations of reality, however, which in the past severely limited their empirical appeal and forecasting performance. This started to change with work by Schorfheide and Smets and Wouters. First, they popularized estimation (especially Bayesian estimation) of these models, with parameters chosen in a way that increased the ability of these models to describe the time series behavior of economic variables. Second, these models were enriched with both endogenous and exogenous propagation mechanisms that allowed them to better capture patterns in the data. For this reason, estimated DSGE models are increasingly used within the Federal Reserve System (the Board of Governors and the Reserve Banks of Chicago and Philadelphia have versions) and by central banks around the world (including the New Area-Wide Model developed at the European Central Bank, and models at the Norges Bank and the Sveriges Riksbank). The FRBNY DSGE model is a medium-scale model in the tradition of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans and Smets and Wouters that also includes credit frictions as in the financial accelerator model developed by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist and further investigated by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno. The second post in this series elaborates on what DSGE models are and discusses the features of the FRBNY model.
Perhaps some progress was made in the past twenty years toward empirical fit, but is it enough to give forecasts from DSGE models any credence? Aren’t there many critics out there (here is one) telling us these models are a failure? As it happens, not many people seem to have actually checked the extent to which these model forecasts are off the mark. Del Negro and Schorfheide do undertake such an exercise in a chapter of the recent Handbook of Economic Forecasting. Their analysis compares the real-time forecast accuracy of DSGE models that were available prior to the Great Recession (such as the Smets and Wouters model) to that of the Blue Chip consensus forecasts, using a period that includes the Great Recession. They find that, for nowcasting (forecasting current quarter variables) and short-run forecasting, DSGE models are at a disadvantage compared with professional forecasts. Over the medium- and long-run terms, however, DSGE model forecasts for both output and inflation become competitive with—if not superior to—professional forecasts. They also find that including timely information from financial markets such as credit spreads can dramatically improve the models’ forecasts, especially in the Great Recession period.
These results are based on what forecasters call “pseudo-out-of-sample” forecasts. These are not truly “real time” forecasts, because they were not produced at the time. (To our knowledge, there is little record of truly real time DSGE forecasts for the United States, partly because these models were only developed in the mid-2000s.) For this reason, in the fourth post of this series, we report forecasts produced in real time using the FRBNY DSGE model since 2010. These forecasts have been included in internal New York Fed documents, but were not previously made public. Although the sample is admittedly short, these forecasts show that while consensus forecasts were predicting a relatively rapid recovery from the Great Recession, the DSGE model was correctly forecasting a more sluggish recovery.
The last post in the series shows the current FRBNY DSGE forecasts for output growth and inflation and discusses the main economic forces driving the predictions. Bear in mind that these forecasts are not the official New York Fed staff forecasts; the DSGE model is only one of many tools employed for prediction and policy analysis at the Bank.
DSGE models in general and the FRBNY model in particular have huge margins for improvement. The list of flaws is long, ranging from the lack of heterogeneity (the models assume a representative household) to the crude representation of financial markets (the models have no term premia). Nevertheless, we are sticking our necks out and showing our forecasts, not because we think we have a “good” model of the economy, but because we want to have a public record of the model’s successes and failures. In doing so, we can learn from both our past performance and readers’ criticism. The model is a work in progress. Hopefully, it can be improved over time, guided by current economic and policy questions and benefiting from developments in economic theory and econometric tools.
Why are conservatives are blaming the victims of the recession despite "evidence and logic" to the contrary?:
Those Lazy Jobless, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: Last week John Boehner, the speaker of the House, explained to an audience at the American Enterprise Institute what’s holding back employment in America: laziness. People, he said, have “this idea” that “I really don’t have to work. I don’t really want to do this. I think I’d rather just sit around.” Holy 47 percent, Batman!
It’s hardly the first time a prominent conservative has said something along these lines. Ever since a financial crisis plunged us into recession it has been a nonstop refrain on the right that the unemployed aren’t trying hard enough, that they are taking it easy thanks to generous unemployment benefits, which are constantly characterized as “paying people not to work.” And the urge to blame the victims of a depressed economy has proved impervious to logic and evidence.
But it’s still amazing — and revealing — to hear this line being repeated now. For the blame-the-victim crowd has gotten everything it wanted: Benefits, especially for the long-term unemployed, have been slashed or eliminated. So now we have rants against the bums on welfare when they aren’t bums — they never were — and there’s no welfare. Why? ...
Is it race? That’s always a hypothesis worth considering in American politics. It’s true that most of the unemployed are white, and they make up an even larger share of those receiving unemployment benefits. But conservatives may not know this, treating the unemployed as part of a vaguely defined, dark-skinned crowd of “takers.”
My guess, however, is that it’s mainly about the closed information loop of the modern right. In a nation where the Republican base gets what it thinks are facts from Fox News and Rush Limbaugh, where the party’s elite gets what it imagines to be policy analysis from the American Enterprise Institute or the Heritage Foundation, the right lives in its own intellectual universe, aware of neither the reality of unemployment nor what life is like for the jobless. You might think that personal experience — almost everyone has acquaintances or relatives who can’t find work — would still break through, but apparently not.
Whatever the explanation, Mr. Boehner was clearly saying what he and everyone around him really thinks, what they say to each other when they don’t expect others to hear. Some conservatives have been trying to reinvent their image, professing sympathy for the less fortunate. But what their party really believes is that if you’re poor or unemployed, it’s your own fault.
Hawkish Undertone, by Tim Duy: The Fed co«ntinuous to moves toward policy normalization.
Slowly. Very slowly.
They believe they are making every effort to avoid a premature withdrawal of accommodation. Every step is sequenced. And that sequencing did not allow for the removal of the considerable period language just yet.
That said, Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen noted in the associated press conference that, considerable period or not, the statement does not represent a promise to maintain a particular policy path. Moreover, the ambiguous definition of "considerable time" gives the Fed sufficient flexibility without breaking a promise in any event. Assuming asset prices end in October as the Fed expects, even a rate hike as early as March could still be considered a "considerable period." So too arguably would be a hike as early as January. It seems then that the considerable period language could survive longer than I anticipated.
Of course, if the statement is not a promise and "considerable period" has no fixed meaning, then the path of policy is strictly data dependent. And that is the idea now emphasized repeatedly by Yellen and Co. If the economy performs better than expected, rates hikes will come sooner and faster currently anticipated. If worse, the withdrawal of monetary accommodation will be delayed.
This is where the dot-plot comes into play. If we combine the midpoint of the economic estimates with the median of the rate expectations, you see the central tendency of the FOMC is to still expect a considerable period of time until rate normalization:
Normalization is coming. But slowly. Very slowly. They have yet to see sufficient evidence to believe that policy will need to be considerably more aggressive than expected.
But where must the FOMC believe the balance of risks lies? Given the progress toward goals already achieved, and the wide spread between traditional metrics of appropriate policy and expected actual policy, it is reasonable to believe the FOMC is cautious that the risks are balanced toward tighter than expected policy. Indeed, the slow but steady increases in federal funds rate projections suggests that the data are indeed moving in such a direction. Hence, the Fed wants to disabuse market participants of the notion that the statement represents a promise. It is an only a policy expectation dependent on a particular set of assumptions. When those assumptions change, so too will the expectation.
Simply put, the Fed believes the statement accurately conveys their expectations given the current state of knowledge. It must then be somewhat disconcerting to the FOMC that while the possibility of a tighter than anticipating policy path is very real, financial market participants appear to believe the risks are weighted in the opposite direction. That, at least, is the message delivered by the San Francisco Federal Reserve in a well-publicized research note. The note also suggested much less uncertainty about the rate outlook than that of the FOMC. See also the Financial Times:
The FOMC’s median rate for the fed funds rate by the end of 2015 was raised to 1.375 per cent from 1.125 per cent, with the key overnight borrowing rate seen reaching 2.875 per cent, rather than 2.50 per cent by the end of 2016.In contrast, the bond market expects a funds rate of 0.76 per cent by the end of 2015 and 1.82 per cent a year later.
When asked about these divergent expectations, Yellen suggested that other research found more aligned expectations. And even if the expectations did differ, they can be explained by different forecasts:
They are taking into account the possibility that there can be different economic outcomes, including--even if they're not very likely--ones in which outcomes will be characterized by low inflation or low growth and the appropriate path of rates will be low. So, differences in probabilities of different outcomes can explain part of that.
I would suggest another explanation. Financial market participants are attempting to find Yellen's dots as an indicator of the median policy expectation (note that Jon Hilsenrath of the Wall Street Journal asked her to reveal her dots during the press conference). The focus has fallen on the lower sets of dots in recognition of her reputation as a policy doves and, I think, the view that she repeatedly made an explicit policy promise with her optimal control framework. Specifically:
No policy liftoff until 2016 - a rate path that is more consistent with the lower or lowest set of dots in the Fed's SEP than the median policy expectation. The assumption is that Yellen's dots are bigger in practice than the other dots, hence an emphasis on expecting a more prolonged period of low rates than the median FOMC participant.
It would be helpful if Yellen revisited her optimal control theory now that unemployment is hovering near 6%. But it is reasonable to believe that she is less certain of her previously suggested path of monetary policy now that the Fed is closer to meeting its stated goals. Hence the ambiguity in her message beginning with Jackson Hole. She is telling us that the time of commitment to low interest rates is drawing to an end. The data now take precedence. As long as the data cut in the direction of what are believed to be Yellen's dots, then those dots will yield a fairly accurate forecast. But if the data cut in a more positive direction, then more hawkish dots will have been the better forecast.
And, importantly, the Federal Reserve wants market participants to figure this out on there own. Policymakers believe they have sent sufficient signals regarding their likely reaction function. Now they want to see participants adjust pricing according to that reaction function, not on the basis of some promise that was never really a promise in the first place. Or, in Yellen's own words:
What can I say is that it is important for market participants to understand what our likely response or reaction function is to the data and our job is to try to communicate as clearly as we can the way in which our policy stance will depend on the data, and I promise to try to do that.
Bottom Line: The outcome of last week's meeting had little impact on my policy outlook. I continue to expect a rate hike in the middle of next year, with my distribution of risks weighted toward second over third quarter outcomes. And note that the second quarter would include a June meeting - still nine months away. I anticipate a generally positive pace of activity that will push the unemployment rate well below 6% by that time. As the unemployment rate moves below 6%, the FOMC will simply worry that accommodation is straying too far past traditional metrics to be consistent with stable inflation. They would not want this to come as a surprise, hence the emphasis on the ambiguity of the forecast. An ultra-low rate future is not guaranteed. The Fed is emphasizing the uncertainty of the forecast to ensure that market participants recognize another future is possible - and even perhaps more likely - than the lowest set of dots, as suggested by the upward drift in median rate projections. If that upward drift is prescient, don't say the Fed didn't warn you. Follow the data, just as the Fed is telling you.
- Ordinary People Bear Economic Risks, Donald Trump Doesn't - Robert Reich
- Economic security and “the great disturbing factors of life” - MaxSpeak
- Meanwhile, in the Annals of Citizenship - Economic Principals
- China risks ‘balance-sheet recession’ as stimulus impact wanes - FT.com
- Why is Thomas Piketty's 700-Page Book a Bestseller? - Brad DeLong
- Krugman on Minsky, IS-LM and Temporary Equilibrium - Uneasy Money
- That referendum was fun. Shall we do it again? - mainly macro
- Conservative Canadian Cockroach - Paul Krugman
- Financial Policy - Roger Farmer
- Piketty’s Fence - Jeffrey Frankel
Sunday, September 21, 2014
Climate Realities: ...It is true that, in theory, we can avoid the worst consequences of climate change with an intensive global effort over the next several decades. But given real-world economic and, in particular, political realities, that seems unlikely..., let’s look at the sobering reality.
The world is now on track to more than double current greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere by the end of the century. This would push up average global temperatures by three to eight degrees Celsius and could mean the disappearance of glaciers, droughts in the mid-to-low latitudes, decreased crop productivity, increased sea levels and flooding, vanishing islands and coastal wetlands, greater storm frequency and intensity, the risk of species extinction and a significant spread of infectious disease.
The United Nations has set a goal of keeping global temperatures from rising by no more than two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels. ... Meeting this goal would require a worldwide reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 40 to 70 percent by midcentury, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. That’s an immense challenge. ...
Of course, the political climate in the United States presents its own challenges. It will require immense effort — and profound good fortune — to find political openings that can resolve the debilitating partisan divide on climate change. But if destructive politics have been at the heart of the problem, the best hope may be that creative politics and leadership can help provide a solution.
He also talks about the cost of climate change (saying it will be large), as do Peter Dorman (in response to Paul Krugman) and John Quiggin. See also Scientists Report Global Rise in Greenhouse Gas Emissions.
Capitalism & the low-paid: Is capitalism compatible with decent living standards for the worst off*? This old Marxian question is outside the Overton window, but it's the one raised by Ed Miliband's promise to raise the minimum wage to £8 by 2020. ...
* Note for rightists: As Adam Smith said, the notion of what's decent rises as incomes rise. And the fact that capitalism has massively improved workers' living standards in the past does not guarantee it will do so in future. As Marx said, a mode of production which increases productive powers can eventually restrain them. And as Bertrand Russell pointed out, inductive reasoning can go badly wrong. ...
- How to see into the future - Tim Harford
- Climate Realities - Robert Stavins
- Why Federal College Ratings Won’t Rein In Tuition - NYTimes.com
- Return of the Bums on Welfare - Paul Krugman
- The (Non-) Standard Asymptotics of Dickey-Fuller Tests - Dave Giles
- After 30,000 posts... - Barry Ritholtz
- The lessons of student debt - FT.com
- US skill gaps, shortages, and mismatches - vox
- Yellen on the poverty of the poor - John Cochrane
- How scared of deflation were you, in 2008? - Nick Rowe
- Economists as food experts - Stumbling and Mumbling
- The State of Macro - askblog
Saturday, September 20, 2014
Joanne Lindley and Steven McIntosh:
Finance sector wages: explaining their high level and growth, by Joanne Lindley and Steven, Vox EU: Individuals who work in the finance sector enjoy a significant wage advantage. This column considers three explanations: rent sharing, skill intensity, and task-biased technological change. The UK evidence suggests that rent sharing is the key. The rising premium could then be due to changes in regulation and the increasing complexity of financial products creating more asymmetric information. ...
- John Boehner's Theory of the Leisure Class - Paul Krugman
- Systemic risk in Europe - vox
- New York Fed Takes Aim at Bank Culture - WSJ
- Wishful thinking and economics - mainly macro
- How the GOP stopped caring about you - The Washington Post
- Least Squares, Perfect Multicollinearity, & Estimable Functions - Dave Giles
- The Contractionary[?] Federal Reserve Policies of 2013-2014 - Brad DeLong
- Finance at the speed of light - vox
- Defending markets - Stumbling and Mumbling
- What Explains the Spike in Treasury Settlement Fails? - Liberty Street
Friday, September 19, 2014
Since I posted the original, it's only fair to post the response:
The political economy of a universal basic income, by Steve Waldman, Interfluidity: So you should read these two posts by Max Sawicky on proposals for a universal basic income, because you should read everything Max Sawicky writes. (Oh wait. Two more!) Sawicky is a guy I often agree with, but he is my mirror Spock on this issue. I think he is 180° wrong on almost every point. ...
Home Free?, by James Surowiecki: In 2005, Utah set out to fix a problem that’s often thought of as unfixable: chronic homelessness. The state had almost two thousand chronically homeless people. Most of them had mental-health or substance-abuse issues, or both. At the time, the standard approach was to try to make homeless people “housing ready”: first, you got people into shelters or halfway houses and put them into treatment; only when they made progress could they get a chance at permanent housing. Utah, though, embraced a different strategy, called Housing First: it started by just giving the homeless homes.
Handing mentally ill substance abusers the keys to a new place may sound like an example of wasteful government spending. But it turned out to be the opposite: over time, Housing First has saved the government money. ...
Don't pay any attention to "the prophets of climate despair":
Errors and Emissions, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: This just in: Saving the planet would be cheap; it might even be free. But will anyone believe the good news?
I’ve just been reading two new reports on the economics of fighting climate change: a big study by a blue-ribbon international group, the New Climate Economy Project, and a working paper from the International Monetary Fund. Both claim that strong measures to limit carbon emissions would have hardly any negative effect on economic growth, and might actually lead to faster growth. This may sound too good to be true, but it isn’t. These are serious, careful analyses. ...
Enter the prophets of climate despair, who wave away all this analysis and declare that the only way to limit carbon emissions is to bring an end to economic growth.
You mostly hear this from people on the right, who normally say that free-market economies are endlessly flexible and creative. But when you propose putting a price on carbon, suddenly they insist that industry will be completely incapable of adapting to changed incentives. Why, it’s almost as if they’re looking for excuses to avoid confronting climate change, and, in particular, to avoid anything that hurts fossil-fuel interests, no matter how beneficial to everyone else.
But climate despair produces some odd bedfellows: Koch-fueled insistence that emission limits would kill economic growth is echoed by some who see this as an argument not against climate action, but against growth. ... To be fair, anti-growth environmentalism is a marginal position even on the left, but it’s widespread enough to call out nonetheless.
And you sometimes see hard scientists making arguments along the same lines, largely (I think) because they don’t understand what economic growth means. They think of it as a crude, physical thing, a matter simply of producing more stuff, and don’t take into account the many choices — about what to consume, about which technologies to use — that go into producing a dollar’s worth of G.D.P.
So here’s what you need to know: Climate despair is all wrong. The idea that economic growth and climate action are incompatible may sound hardheaded and realistic, but it’s actually a fuzzy-minded misconception. If we ever get past the special interests and ideology that have blocked action to save the planet, we’ll find that it’s cheaper and easier than almost anyone imagines.
- The Importance of Asset Building - Janet Yellen
- Social norms and the enforcement of laws - vox
- Negative interest rates not absurd – and might work - FT.com
- FOMC statement and the new normal - John Cochrane
- In Search of Better Credit Assessments - Cecchetti & Schoenholtz
- The Fed and Inequality - Dean Baker
Thursday, September 18, 2014
[Travel day -- heading south for the winter -- so just a few quick ones before hitting the road.]
National Attitudes on International Trade: Americans, who are sometimes caricatured as being especially supportive of free trade, are actually among those most opposed. People from the low-income countries of the world, far from feeling oppressed by international trade, are often among its stronger supporters. The Pew Research Center has a new survey out--"Faith and Skepticism about Trade, Foreign Investment"--on the responses of people in 44 nations to questions about the effects and consequences of international trade. Here is a sampling of the evidence...
What's so bad about monopoly power?: Google (GOOG) has been negotiating with European regulatory authorities since 2010 in an attempt to settle an antitrust case concerning its search engine, and its third attempt to settle the case has been rejected. Google may also face new antitrust problems over its Android mobile operating system, and it's not alone in facing tough antitrust scrutiny in Europe. Microsoft (MSFT) has also been the subject of a long-running battle in Europe over market dominance issues. But what's motivating this scrutiny from European regulators? What's so bad about a company amassing monopoly power? ....
[Also, from yesterday, What do economists mean by "slack"?]
More on the new work from William Gale and Andrew Samwick (I've posted on this before, but given the strength of beliefs about tax cuts, it seems worthwhile to highlight it again):
Tax Cuts Can Do More Harm Than Good: Tax cuts are the one guaranteed path to prosperity. Or so politicians have told Americans for so long that the claim has become a secular dogma.
But tax cuts can do more harm than good, a new report shows. It draws on decades of empirical evidence analyzed with standard economic principles used in business, academia and government.
What ultimately matters is the way a tax cut is structured and how it affects behavior. A well-designed tax cut can help increase future prosperity, but a poorly structured one can result in a meaner future with fewer jobs, less compensation and higher costs to society.
William G. Gale of the Brookings Institution, a nonprofit Washington policy research house, and Andrew Samwick, a Dartmouth College professor, last week issued the report, “Effects of Income Tax Changes on Economic Growth.”
Gale said he expects emailed brickbats from those who have incorporated the tax cut dogma into their views without really understanding the issue. ...