Worries that universal health care will hurt military recruiting:
Health’s Gain May Be Army’s Loss, by Floyd Norris, Commentary, NY Times:
Call it the law of unintended consequences. When you fix one thing, it messes up
other things.
If the Democrats win the election this year, and are able to enact a health
care plan that extends adequate coverage to all Americans, the loser could be
the Army. Getting enough people to enlist could become a major problem for the
next president. ...
Government polls show that the proportion of young people who think they
might enlist is roughly half what it was in the late 1980s. The military has
responded with more recruiters and higher cash enlistment bonuses, and has met
its goals. A significant factor for many recruits, it turns out, is the
military’s generous health benefits for dependants.
Michael Massing, writing in the April 3 issue of The New York Review of
Books, tells the story of one part-time college student from Brooklyn, who was
holding down two jobs but still going into debt. “Meanwhile, he got married, his
wife got pregnant, and he had no health care. From a brother in the military, he
had learned of the Army’s many benefits, and, visiting a recruiter, he heard
about Tricare, the military’s generous health plan.” He enlisted. ... All that
could change if the push for some kind of national health insurance program were
to be successful. ...
[I]f such a program were adopted, it seems likely that the military, and
particularly the Army, would feel the immediate effect. To expand the Army, as
all the candidates say they want to do, would require some other incentive for
enlistment... In the near term, it is possible that a recession will improve the
military’s recruiting success. ...
One partial solution to the negative effect on enlistment of a health care
plan for all could be a new G.I. education benefit. Both the House and Senate
have approved such a plan... President Bush is opposed to the legislation, which
its sponsors say would cost $50 billion over 10 years, and it is far from clear
it will be enacted. ...
Senator Jim Webb, a freshman Democrat and Vietnam veteran, is the principal
Senate sponsor of the legislation. He argued — with something less than precise
data — that passage of the bill would increase enlistment by 16 percent...
Senator McCain has proposed a less costly alternative that would provide
better benefits to those who stay in the military longer. He may have a point.
Last year about three-quarters of Army volunteers who completed their first term
of enlistment, and nearly as many marines, chose not to re-enlist. ...
If we get a real health care plan for all Americans, it might require
something like the Webb bill — or a very unpopular revival of the draft — just
to keep fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. The backers of health care legislation
do not want to hurt the Army, but that is what could happen.
Continuing a
discussion of this topic from not too long ago, the right way to do this is
to state the the goals we are trying to reach, then build incentives into the
polices that direct people toward those goals with as few negative
consequences as possible.
One possible goal is retention. If you want people to stay longer, deferred
compensation schemes are a way to accomplish that goal. We need to decide how
many people we want to stay for additional terms, and then set the compensation
incentives accordingly (these can be tweaked as needed, e.g. you can have
incentives for reenlistment at each decision point, or you can discourage
reenlistment after some number of terms if there is some reason to do so).
Yes, it may require that the government pay people serving in the military more,
at least those who stay longer, but that is simply what it will cost to reach
the goal, that's the price to command these resources. People who applaud the
ability of markets to value resources should understand that. If it costs too
much to induce sufficient reenlistment, i.e. if the costs of producing higher
retention rates are greater than the benefits, then it's not a very good policy
anyway.
But if the goals are different, e.g. if the goal is to provide educational
benefits to make up for lost opportunities in the private sector due to service
in the military, the the policy will, of course, be different as well. When evaluating a proposed policy to, for example, increase educational benefits all of the
consequences, including the effects on retention, should be
examined. But this is part of a cost benefit calculation. If the educational
benefit - the goal of the policy - exceeds the retention cost, then it's still
worthwhile.
And it may not be necessary to give up on the retention goal just
because you offer educational benefits, one does not have to be traded against the other. It's possible - if you are willing to pay the cost -
to offer both higher education benefits and higher deferred compensation so that
both goals are attained. More help for education is available for those who
choose to leave when their term ends, but since deferred compensation is higher
for those who reenlist, just as many stay as before. Whether it's worth it to do this is matter of comparing the costs and benefits, but increasing education benefits does not have to lower retention rates.
If national health care is enacted and that lowers the incentive to
enlist, or to reenlist, then the compensation levels will have to be adjusted to compensate,
but it doesn't have to change retention rates or the ability to provide
education benefits after people leave the military if we are willing to pay
what's needed to induce the desired behavior.