Category Archive for: Monetary Policy [Return to Main]

Thursday, July 22, 2010

"Time for a Monetary Boost"

More on the Fed's wait and see approach to doing more to try to help the economy recover:

Time for a Monetary Boost, by Joseph E. Gagnon: In his testimony to the Congress this week, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke left the door open to further monetary stimulus but made it clear that such action is not imminent. ...
The Federal Reserve's own forecast shows that it will take at least three or four years for employment to return to its long-run sustainable level. This extended period of high unemployment represents a massive waste of productive labor and untold personal suffering of unemployed workers. The Fed should be aiming to get us back on track within two years. And the urgency of Fed action is all the more important because Congress has refused to provide more stimulus.
In addition, it is now apparent that deflation is a more serious risk for the US economy than inflation. The latest data show overall declines in consumer and producer prices..., core inflation has trended well below the 2-percent level that ... the Fed has adopted as its goal.
Clearly, the case for monetary stimulus is strong. But what form should it take? ... Three actions, in particular, would be helpful at this time.
First, the Fed should lower the interest rate it pays on bank reserves to zero. This is a small step, as the current rate is only 0.25 percent, but there is no reason to pay banks more than the rate paid by the closest substitute, short-term Treasury bills. Three-month Treasury bills currently yield 0.15 percent, and that rate, too, should be brought down to zero.
Second, the Fed should bring down the rates on longer-term Treasury securities by targeting the interest rate on 3-year Treasury notes at 0.25 percent and aggressively purchasing such securities whenever their yield exceeds the target. That is a 65-basis point reduction from the current rate of 0.90 percent. This step would ... reduce a wide range of private borrowing rates, encouraging business investment, supporting the housing market, and boosting exports through a weaker dollar. Moreover, pushing down yields on short- to medium-term Treasury securities is precisely the strategy for fighting deflation recommended by Ben Bernanke in 2002.
Finally, the Fed could bolster the stimulative effects of these actions by establishing a full-allotment lending facility to enable banks to borrow (with high-quality collateral) at terms of up to 24 months at a fixed interest rate of 0.25 percent.
These measures are all within the Federal Reserve's established powers. They pose essentially no risk to the Fed's balance sheet. They would reduce unemployment roughly as much as a 2-year $600 billion fiscal package and yet they would actually reduce the federal budget deficit. And they can be reversed quickly should the balance of risks shift from deflation to inflation.
Given the unsatisfactory outlook for unemployment and inflation and the lack of action by Congress, that is the right medicine for the US economy now.

As I've said before, there are reasons to worry that this won't provide enough of a boost, these policies provide incentives that may or may not be acted upon and that's why I've emphasized fiscal policy. But additional fiscal policy isn't going to happen unless there is a significant downturn in economic conditions, so this is our best hope.

Am I Being Unfair to the Fed, or is the Fed Being Unfair to Those Who Need Its Help?

Robin Harding at the Financial Times blog Money-Supply says I'm being unfair:

Why the Fed’s options are still under review, by Robin Harding: In his testimony today Ben Bernanke said that the Fed has not yet decided on its leading option in the event that it has to ease policy further. Mark Thoma asks, why?

After all this time, and after all the calls for the Fed to do more, they don’t even know what the leading options are? Bernanke says they are prepared to do more if conditions warrant it, but if there was a sudden disruption in financial markets tomorrow, they wouldn’t even know which policy option to prefer. I expected better than this from Bernanke and the rest of the Fed.

I don’t think that’s fair. I think the Fed knows exactly what it would do if there was a sudden disruption in financial markets tomorrow: liquidity programs like those we saw during the crisis and then probably asset purchases if they didn’t work.

I think the Fed is still pondering for a few reasons. First, the best response would depend on the conditions at the time, e.g. asset purchases will deliver better results if markets are stressed and the effect of communications will depend on the yield curve.

Second, the FOMC is quite split about the effectiveness of asset purchases, how much they distort markets, and the risks to the Fed’s credibility. Those debates are reasonable enough. It’s hard to expect a consensus to form unless it has to, because the Fed has decided to act (whether it should already be acting is a separate debate).

Third, I think the Fed is keen to keep revisiting all possible options, including those it has decided against in the past. That seems healthy enough to me.

I'll accept that the Fed may know what it would do if financial markets have a sudden breakdown tomorrow, but I'm not sure they know "exactly" what to do. That requires that they've worked out the uncertainties that plagued them the first time they faced a sudden financial crisis, and I don't think we know for sure that they have. But the point is that what the Fed needs to do in the case of a sudden financial disruption is different from what it needs to do to give a boost to an economy struggling to recover, and that they can know one without knowing the other. That's fair. But isn't it also fair to expect the Fed to be prepared for both?

So I don't accept that the Fed should not know what its best option is for dealing with the situation as it exists today. The first rationale for this given above, that the best response is state dependent (i.e. that it will depend upon the conditions at the time), is not an excuse for waiting to figure out what to do. If the Fed faces different possible future outcomes, then it should develop state contingent policy responses, i.e. it should know what it will do under all of the future scenarios it can imagine. It's a mistake to wait until you know what the conditions are before starting to figure out what to do. Instead, there should be a plan that says what the best response is to a variety of potential future states of the economy. A black swan could always appear and that would require policy to be developed on the fly, but the response to most potential future economic conditions should already be known.

The second objection, that the Fed is split, is not a very compelling excuse either. Policy splits are common, nothing new there. Take a vote or institute a process for resolving this. Better to get the disputes resolved now than trying to resolve them in the middle of a crisis when quick action is needed. The third excuse is that the Fed may discover a better policy as it revisits its options. The Fed should revisit its options, no disagreement there, and if a better option presents itself later, the Fed should certainly adopt it. But how does that stop the Fed from making the best choice given what it knows right now? There's always the possibility of finding a better solution in the future, and the Fed shouldn't stop trying to improve, but it should also know what the best options are given present conditions. Being able to say what they'd do if they had to act today doesn't seem to be too much to ask.

So the answer I expected from Bernanke was something like, "while we continue to try to fine-tune and improve policy, as always, we are fully prepared to react to a wide variety of future conditions, and could act today if we thought we needed to do so."

What this really says, to me anyway, is that the Fed does not believe conditions are bad enough right now, or can possibly get bad enough in the near future, to make the Fed feel the need to be ready to act. It also says that six months ago, or however long it takes to figure this out, they were convinced that the economy would not need more help today, so there was no need to be ready. But how did they know then that they wouldn't want to act today? Members of the Fed think they have plenty of time yet to weigh their options carefully, and in the unlikely event things really do get worse, measurably worse than they are now, then they'll figure out what to do. But, apparently there's no rush.

That they haven't even felt the need to be ready to react to conditions like we are seeing today -- unemployment staying persistently high, deflation month after month, and so on, conditions worse than the Fed expected six months ago -- is the disappointing part. The main problem I have with the Fed's position is that they haven't told us what they are so worried about if they do act now. Is it inflation? Even after recent data showing deflation? Is it credibility? The Fed has an obligation to address both inflation and unemployment, and it's a mistake to base their credibility on just one component of its dual mandate. The Fed is losing credibility with the public daily, and its not because of worries over inflation. They've tossed out a variety of possibilities regarding the things they are worried about, but the specifics have been lacking.

What, exactly is the cost if they do act now? Until the Fed has a good answer to that question, and so far I haven't heard it, I will continue to wonder not only why they aren't ready to act now, which is bad enough, but why they haven't tried to do more to help an economy that is clearly struggling. We're in danger of a lost decade or worse, and the Fed is not responding adequately to that threat.

Wednesday, July 21, 2010

Why are the Fed's Options Still under Review?

I'm in a bit of a rush, but I want to note this from Ben Bernanke:

Bernanke’s comments to Congress are largely as expected, but some may be a bit taken aback by his comments on shrinking the balance sheet, which doesn’t suggest much central bank appetite to provide additional stimulus to a troubled economy. ...
In the testimony, Sen. Shelby asks Bernanke what everyone wants to know: what more can the Fed do for the economy, if needed. Bernanke replies that the Fed has options from lowering the interest on reserves rate, to language changes in the FOMC outlook, to balance sheet tweaks.
He notes current policy is “already quite stimulative” and adds “we do still have options, but they are not going to be conventional options.”
Bernanke says any additional action is still under review, saying “we have not come to the point where we can tell you precisely what the leading options are.”

After all this time, and after all the calls for the Fed to do more, they don't even know what the leading options are? Bernanke says they are prepared to do more if conditions warrant it, but if there was a sudden disruption in financial markets tomorrow, they wouldn't even know which policy option to prefer. I expected better than this from Bernanke and the rest of the Fed.

The we could do more but aren't ready to do so just yet line from Bernanke is also puzzling. With unemployment as high as it is and with the projections for a very slow recovery -- if we can avoid a double dip -- why doesn't the Fed do more now? Why hasn't it done more already? That question has never been answered to my satisfaction.   [dual posted]

Sunday, July 18, 2010

Don't Expect Miracles from Monetary Policy

A recent post of mine at MoneyWatch:

Don't Expect Miracles from Monetary Policy, Maximum Utility: ...As I've said many times, I think the economy needs more help, particularly labor markets. But where will that help come from? Additional fiscal policy seems to be off the table due to worries about the deficit, worries I think are baseless, but I don't control the fiscal policy levers. That's the best thing to do right now, but it's not going to happen.

That leaves monetary policy, and the Fed is making noises about giving the economy more help. Though the Fed isn't willing to go this far yet, one thing they could do is to purchase long-term securities in an attempt to lower long-term interest rates. Or they could set a higher inflation target to try to lower long-term rates. The idea is that this will spur investment spending by businesses and new spending on durables by households.

Paul Krugman, in a relatively wonkish post, discusses the options the Fed has, and notes that when it comes to the purchase of long-term securities (also known as quantitative easing), we shouldn't expect too much:

But how strong would this effect be? Even if the Fed bought a couple of trillion dollars’ worth, probably not all that large. I’m not saying don’t do it, but don’t expect miracles.

He doesn't explain in detail why we shouldn't expect much, but here's the worry I would have. Lowering interest rates either through purchases of long-term securities or through a higher inflation target (another policy Krugman discusses) is just the first step in this policy, and some of the additional steps that are needed are problematic. With respect to the first step, there's no guarantee that the purchase of long-term securities will lower long-term rates, but most analysts think it could if it is carried out on a large enough scale (the necessary scale -- trillions -- is is one of the things causing resistance to this policy). So let's assume the Fed can lower rates by a point of two if it so desires, either through quantitative easing or through a higher inflation target.

For the policy to be effective, there is a second step that must occur. Firms and households must respond to this incentive by investing more in new plants and equipment and purchasing more durable consumer goods. But as this discussion at The Economist I took part in notes, firms are saving rather than investing right now, and the reason seems to be due to a poor outlook for the economy along with considerable existing excess capacity. Under those conditions, a poor outlook and lots of excess capacity, a point tor two fall in the interest rate is unlikely to spur much new activity (and households, who are still struggling with high unemployment rates, are unlikely to increase their purchase of durables enough to make up the difference). So I fully agree with Krugman. We should try this, the state of the economy demands that we try something even if it may not work, but we shouldn't expect miracles.

Thursday, July 15, 2010

Fed Watch: The Dance Continues

This is the second of three consecutive posts from Tim Duy. He said he had a lot of coffee today:

The Dance Continues. by Tim Duy: The Fed dance continued today with the release of the minutes. In most ways, the content of the minutes was largely expected, as reported by Free Exchange. Forecasts for growth and inflation were knocked down, while the forecast for unemployment was edged up. Overall, the Fed concluded that:

The economic outlook had softened somewhat and a number of members saw the risks to the outlook as having shifted to the downside. Nonetheless, all saw the economic expansion as likely to be strong enough to continue raising resource utilization, albeit more slowly than they had previously anticipated. In addition, they saw inflation as likely to stabilize near recent low readings in coming quarters and then gradually rise toward more desirable levels. In sum, the changes to the outlook were viewed as relatively modest and as not warranting policy accommodation beyond that already in place.

They did inject some uncertainty over the path of policy:

However, members noted that in addition to continuing to develop and test instruments to exit from the period of unusually accommodative monetary policy, the Committee would need to consider whether further policy stimulus might become appropriate if the outlook were to worsen appreciably

Still, the minutes read as if additional policy stimulus is a remote chance. As has been reported, recent Fedspeak has been decidedly more mixed.

Paul Krugman bemoans the fact that the Fed understands and is largely comfortable with meeting neither of its dual objectives. The minutes are quite clear on this point:

A number of participants expressed the view that, over the next several years, both employment and inflation would likely be below levels they consider to be consistent with their dual mandate, but they anticipated that, with appropriate monetary policy, both would rise over time to levels consistent with the Federal Reserve's objectives.

I guess you are not all that worried about high unemployment for "several years" when you have a 13 year appointment. Two additional gems in the minutes:

Participants also noted that several uncertainties, including those related to legislative changes and to developments in global financial markets, were generating a heightened level of caution that could lead some firms to delay hiring and planned investment outlays.

And:

Reportedly, employers were still cautious about adding to payrolls, given uncertainties about the outlook for the economy and government policies.

These two lines imply that some Fed members are buying the story that the lack of business confidence is due to all the uncertainty created by the Obama Administration. Convenient excuse to avoid additional stimulus. Nothing we can do, this is a problem caused by those silly fiscal policymakers.

And another point I find odd:

Participants also noted a risk that continued rapid growth in productivity, though clearly beneficial in the longer term, could in the near term act to moderate growth in the demand for labor and thus slow the pace at which the unemployment rate normalizes.

Rapid productivity growth should never be a problem. It is only a problem if policymakers hold demand unnecessarily low such that the additional potential output cannot be absorbed. Answer: Do more to stimulate demand.

Bottom Line: The minutes paint a picture of monetary policymakers slightly more concerned about an already questionable outlook, but not concerned enough to do anything about it. This stance appears a bit more vulnerable in light of flow of data since the last FOMC meeting, and that flow of data may be exactly what recently pushed some Fed officials to emphasize the "we can do more" story. In effect, a preemptive effort to alleviate the seemingly hawkish stance of the minutes. Hopefully, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke will provide additional clarity of the Fed's stance with regard to additional easing at next week's semi-annual testimony.

Helicopter Money

I sent an email to Brad DeLong. He gives me more credit than I deserve:

DeLong Smackdown Watch: Mark Thoma: Mark Thoma writes to inquire why I am endorsing a helicopter drop--a money printing-financed mass mailing of tax rebate checks--when a money printing-financed increase in government purchases dominates it from an economic point of view. Aren't I surrendering to the dysfunctionality of our political system rather than fighting it?

Mark Thoma snarks:

I am very simplistic.

When you trade money for bonds, it simply changes the composition of what people have in savings. Before it was bonds, now its cash. No effect on real activity. You need actual demand, or the prospect of it, to create expected inflation.

When you drop money from helicopters, the people who need it most scramble for it, and then rush to spend it before everyone else spends their money and drives up prices (expected inflation) or causes stock-outs. It has real effects. And I don’t think the people willing to fight for $100 bucks when the helicopter comes each day give a damn about future taxes.

But instead of simply dropping it, why not buy something on the first step? Print money, buy labor (the labor then spends the “found”, i.e. earned, money). Print money, buy goods and services. Because this is too slow. Deciding what labor should do, hiring, etc. takes way too much time and political effort, as does figuring out what to buy.

So save this time by just letting the money rain down on people and letting them figure out what to do with it. I’d guess that money falling in a city would begin to see effects on aggregate demand, oh, a matter of minutes, if that long.

But I know this is too simple.

Tuesday, July 13, 2010

Should You be Worried about Inflation? What about Deflation?

I have a new post a MoneyWatch:

Should You be Worried about Inflation? What about Deflation?

The post explains the tools at the Fed has at its disposal to offset inflationary and deflationary pressures, and why I am more worried about the response to short-run deflationary pressures than I am about the response to the possibility of inflation in the long-run.

"Sagging Global Growth Requires Us to Act"

Nouriel Roubini and Ian Bremmer are worried about the prospects for world economic growth:

Sagging global growth requires us to act, by Nouriel Roubini and Ian Bremmer, Commentary, Financial Times: It looks as if the global economy is heading for a serious slowdown this year. ... The most realistic scenario for global growth is painful, even if we avoid a double dip. ...

Politically, this second global slowdown could not have come at a more difficult time. In the US, Democrats and Republicans will soon retreat to their corners to prepare for November’s mid-term elections. Meanwhile, President Barack Obama must again persuade America’s taxpayers that a new surge in government spending is needed to protect a fragile recovery – and at a moment when voters are telling pollsters that America’s debt is as great a threat as terrorism.

So the president must also tell voters that the longer-term solution to America’s economic insecurity involves both austerity and sacrifice. But abroad he faces an even larger problem. Mr Obama has limited leverage ... to persuade European governments to shrug off fiscal worries. These countries seem unlikely to shift from their view that events of the past year in Greece, Spain and elsewhere – and fears of further crises to come – demand that the continent must learn to live within its means. Nor should we expect much from the next G20 meeting in Seoul in November. ...

Yet ... words matter. Plans to boost government spending in the near term, and to embrace austerity in the longer term, will only become more difficult if the president fails to explain the need for them. For their part, America’s Republicans need to accept that the path to a global recovery begins at home, with extended unemployment insurance and help for state and local governments.
Countries that save too much must also do their part for global demand. In particular, the Chinese leadership should recognize that failure to allow a more substantive revaluation of its currency will have serious consequences at home. ...
The eurozone needs fiscal austerity, but it also needs a level of growth best provided by an easing of monetary policy from the European Central Bank. Early debt-restructuring of insolvent members should also be on the agenda. Germany should postpone its fiscal consolidation for a couple of years to boost disposable income and consumption. Outside Europe, Japan must accelerate economic reforms.
These steps will take time. Even if all are undertaken properly, global growth will recover only slowly. But if they are not undertaken at all, the risk of a global double dip, and a new financial crisis, will grow sharply. Policymakers cannot keep kicking the can down the road for much longer.

Monday, July 12, 2010

Fed Watch: A Deepening Divide?

One more from Tim Duy:

A Deepening Divide?, by Tim Duy: Last week the Washington Post raised expectations that the Fed was seriously considering additional policy action:

Federal Reserve officials, increasingly concerned over signs the economic recovery is faltering, are considering new steps to bolster growth.

Today nonvoter Richmond Fed President Jeffrey Lacker pushed back hard on those expectations:

Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond President Jeffrey Lacker said any consideration of further monetary easing by U.S. central bankers “is very far away.”

“It would take a very substantial, unanticipated adverse shock” for further steps at stimulus to be appropriate, Lacker told reporters today in Richmond. “Consideration of further easing steps is very far away.”

And note this morning I concluded with:

My concern is that policymakers will view a retrenchment in growth as a natural "pause," simply a delay on the path the strong rebounds that have traditionally followed deep recessions.

This is not dissimilar to Lacker's interpretation of the data:

“I’m comfortable with rates where they are now,” Lacker, who doesn’t vote on rate decisions this year, said today at the opening of an exhibit at the Richmond Fed on the history of the central bank. “You have some surges, some slower periods. It’s just going to be a choppy recovery.”

Interestingly, he appeared to be joined by Governor Elizabeth Duke:

Separately, Fed Governor Elizabeth Duke said in an interview with CNBC that the central bank is “in the right place” on its monetary policy and that she sees a “moderate recovery” taking place.

It sounds as if a battle is brewing within the Fed, with the Washington Post's unnamed sources trying to keep monetary policy options open while another contingent is happy shutting down those options. Separately, Felix Salmon opines that the debate has already been decided:

Bernanke is a consensus builder, as Krugman knows, having been part of the Princeton economics department during Bernanke’s tenure as its head. And it may or may not make sense for the Fed to ease much more aggressively. But so long as that remains outside the general consensus, Bernanke’s not going to do it.

Salmon believes that Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke - a Republican - will not break from that party's consensus that too much has been done already. Some of Bernanke's defenders may find that paints a too narrow view of his motivations. But Salmon also notes that even Democrats are not eager for additional policy action. If the White House is not willing to push for more, why should Bernanke do so, especially when it will apparently require him to expend political capital internally?

If Salmon's thesis is correct, it is a particularly sad outcome given Bernanke's own words from 2002:

In short, Japan's deflation problem is real and serious; but, in my view, political constraints, rather than a lack of policy instruments, explain why its deflation has persisted for as long as it has. Thus, I do not view the Japanese experience as evidence against the general conclusion that U.S. policymakers have the tools they need to prevent, and, if necessary, to cure a deflationary recession in the United States.

Politics could be every bit a problem in the United States as it has been in Japan. More to the point, it already is.

Paul Krugman: The Feckless Fed

Frustration with the Fed:

The Feckless Fed, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: Back in 2002, a professor turned Federal Reserve official by the name of Ben Bernanke gave a widely quoted speech titled “Deflation: Making Sure ‘It’ Doesn’t Happen Here.” Like other economists, myself included, Mr. Bernanke was deeply disturbed by Japan’s stubborn, seemingly incurable deflation, which in turn was “associated with years of painfully slow growth, rising joblessness, and apparently intractable financial problems.” This sort of thing wasn’t supposed to happen to an advanced nation with sophisticated policy makers. Could something similar happen to the United States?
Not to worry, said Mr. Bernanke: the Fed had the tools required to head off an American version of the Japan syndrome, and it would use them if necessary.
Today, Mr. Bernanke is the Fed’s chairman — and his 2002 speech reads like famous last words. We aren’t literally suffering deflation (yet). But inflation is ... trending steadily lower; it’s a good bet that by some measures we’ll be seeing deflation by sometime next year. Meanwhile, we already have painfully slow growth, very high joblessness, and intractable financial problems. And what is the Fed’s response? It’s debating — with ponderous slowness — whether maybe, possibly, it should consider trying to do something..., one of these days.
The Fed’s fecklessness is, to be sure, not unique. It has been astonishing and infuriating, as the economic crisis has unfolded, to watch America’s political class... Washington seems to feel absolutely no sense of urgency. Are hopes being destroyed, small businesses being driven into bankruptcy, lives being blighted? Never mind, let’s talk about the evils of budget deficits.
Still, one might have hoped that the Fed would be different. For one thing, the Fed, unlike the Obama administration, ... doesn’t need 60 votes in the Senate; the outer limits of its policies aren’t determined by ... senators from Nebraska and Maine. Beyond that, the Fed was supposed to be intellectually prepared for this situation. Mr. Bernanke has thought long and hard about how to avoid a Japanese-style economic trap, and the Fed’s researchers have been obsessed for years with the same question.
But here we are, visibly sliding toward deflation — and the Fed is standing pat.
What should it be doing? Conventional monetary policy, in which the Fed drives down short-term interest rates..., has reached its limit:... short-term rates are already near zero... But the message of Mr. Bernanke’s 2002 speech was that there are other things the Fed can do. It can buy longer-term government debt. It can buy private-sector debt. It can try to move expectations by announcing that it will keep short-term rates low for a long time. It can raise its long-run inflation target, to help convince the private sector that borrowing is a good idea and hoarding cash a mistake.
Nobody knows how well any one of these actions would work. The point, however, is that there are things the Fed could and should be doing, but isn’t. Why not? ...
The closest thing I’ve seen to an explanation is a recent speech by Kevin Warsh of the Fed’s Board of Governors, in which he declared that doing what Mr. Bernanke recommended back in 2002 risked undermining the Fed’s “institutional credibility.” But how, exactly, does it serve the Fed’s credibility when it fails to confront high unemployment, while consistently missing its own inflation targets? How credible is the Bank of Japan after presiding over 15 years of deflation?
Whatever is going on, the Fed needs to rethink its priorities, fast. Mr. Bernanke’s “it” isn’t a hypothetical possibility, it’s on the verge of happening. And the Fed should be doing all it can to stop it.

Friday, July 09, 2010

How Close to Deflation are We?

Mike Bryan of the Atlanta Fed:

How close to deflation are we? Perhaps just a little closer than you thought, macroblog: Since last October, the consumer price index (CPI) has gone up an annualized 0.7 percent. On an ex-food and energy basis, the number is a little lower, at 0.5 percent. And the Cleveland Fed's trimmed-mean and median CPIs, at 0.7 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively, also put the recent trend in consumer prices in pretty low territory.
And this is before we take into account any potential mismeasurement, or "bias," in the construction of the CPI.
How big is the CPI's bias? Well, in 1996, the Social Security Administration commissioned a study on the accuracy of the CPI as a measure of the cost of living. This so-called "Boskin Commission Report" said the CPI was overstated by about 1.1 percentage points per year. The commission identified several sources of potential bias, but about half of the 1.1 percentage points resulted from new products and quality changes that were slow or otherwise imperfectly introduced into the price statistic.
Since that time, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has initiated a number of methodological changes that have reduced the CPI's mismeasurement bias. In a 2001 paper, Federal Reserve Board economists David Lebow and Jeremy Rudd put the CPI bias at only about 0.6 percentage points. And again, of this amount, the big share of the bias (about 0.4 percentage points) resulted from the imperfect accounting of new and improved goods.
Now, in an article (available to all in its working paper version) appearing in the latest issue of the American Economic Review, Christian Broda and David Weinstein say the earlier estimates of the new goods/quality bias may be a bit understated. The authors examine prices from the AC Nielsen Homescan database and conclude that between 1996 and 2003, new and improved goods biased the CPI, on average, by about 0.8 percentage points per year. If this estimate is accurate, consumer price increases since last October would actually be around zero, or even slightly negative, once we account for the mismeasurement of the CPI caused by new and improved goods.

But (oh, you just knew there was going to be a "but" in here, right?) the authors also point out that, because new goods are introduced procyclically, this bias tends to be larger during expansions and smaller during recessions. In other words, given the severity of the recession and the modest pace of the recovery, there may not be a whole lot of innovation going on right now in consumer goods. This is a bad thing for consumers, of course, but it would be a good thing for the accuracy of the CPI.

Given this and other indications of the economy's weakness, should monetary and fiscal policymakers do more? I think they should, but key policymakers don't share that view. In fact some say that despite recent data indicating trouble may be ahead, the recovery is proceeding normally and doesn't need any further help. Here's Richmond Fed President Jeffrey Lacker:

The recent spate of weaker economic data doesn’t mean the U.S. recovery is faltering, and the Federal Reserve continues to get closer to the time when it will need to raise interest rates... Lacker believes, like many other Fed officials, that the economy doesn’t yet need fresh support from the Fed. He put very low odds the Fed will come back into the market to buy mortgages, saying “I don’t think this is the time to shift gears again” and “we are a long way a ways from needing to think about starting up asset purchases again.”

What's he afraid of? Inflation?

Fed Watch: What is the Threshold For More Fed Action?

Tim Duy says the Fed talks a lot, but the threshold for action is pretty high:

What is the Threshold For More Fed Action?, by Tim Duy: Yesterday's Washington Post article suggesting the Fed was moving closer to additional policy action left me somewhat puzzled. It left out a critical piece. What is the threshold for additional action? Particularly any action of significance? Recent Fedspeak suggests the threshold is pretty high - financial crisis high. Otherwise, any action is likely to be more window dressing than anything else.

Neil Irwin at the Post claims:

Top Fed officials still say that the economic recovery is likely to continue into next year and that the policy moves being discussed are not imminent. But weak economic reports, the debt crisis in Europe and faltering financial markets have led them to conclude that the risks of the recovery losing steam have increased. After months of focusing on how to exit from extreme efforts to support the economy, they are looking at tools that might strengthen growth.

Note the rhetorical claim suggesting this article is sourced by "top Fed officials." But the only officials cited are St. Louis Fed President James Bullard and Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren. No one from the Board, interestingly. To be sure, Bullard is an intellectual heavy hitter. But Bullard can be difficult to read. He talks. A lot. But with Bullard, the Post reduces his quotes to pretty pedestrian stuff:

"If the economic situation changes, policy should react," James Bullard, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, said in an interview Wednesday. "You shouldn't sit on your hands. . . . I think there's plenty more we could do if we had to."

Surprising. I have to imagine that Bullard provided a lot of good quotes. And Irwin doesn't appear to challenge Bullard to explain how much the economic situation needs to change to prompt a policy change. But, luckily, Bullard gave an interview to Reuters at the end of June, and reporter Mark Felsenthal gave us a little more to work with. Yes, this is not new news. Just new for the Post.

For me, the Reuters piece had three main takeaways. First, Bullard and his colleagues underestimated the likelihood of a jobless recovery:

"We just started getting our job growth going three months ago, and then all of sudden we get a kind of a weaker number," said Bullard, who is a voter this year on the Fed's policy-setting panel. Nonfarm payrolls added a disappointing 41,000 private sector jobs in May, denting hopes for a speedy recovery.

Second, and related, the Fed actually believes we are experiencing a typical post-war recession in which output rapidly returns to trend:

Setting aside worries raised by softer economic indicators and Europe, the Fed continues to envision a moderate recovery, Bullard said.

"We would expect ... at some point start to gradually withdraw the accommodation and then things would continue to recover, and then eventually we would get back to normal," he said.

Does the Fed really fail to realize that the only reason the US economy returned to "normal" after the last recession was attributable to a housing bubble that was unsustainable? A topic for another time. Finally, the threshold for meaningful additional action is very, very high:

However, if the economy takes a decisive turn for the worse, the Fed would have to consider further stimulus, probably buying more Treasury securities to ease financial conditions, Bullard said.

"If things got really bad in some dimension and we were back in crisis mode, I think the FOMC wouldn't hesitate to do more if we had to, but I don't really think that that's the situation we're in right now," he said.

Note: "back in crisis mode." Note: "ease financial conditions." Nothing like "to ease the pain of unemployment." Did Bullard say the same thing to Irwin? We don’t know, because Irwin falls back on plain vanilla quotes.

Putting the pieces together, it appears the Fed is beginning to realize that economic activity will not bounce back rapidly, but there is little meaningful they are willing to do unless they are in crisis mode. And that analysis is based largely on interviews with a single Fed official. Other Fed officials appear even less likely to act. From Bloomberg over the weekend:

Two Federal Reserve policy makers differed on the strength of the U.S. consumer in Nikkei newspaper interviews, amid evidence that the recovery in the world’s largest economy is slowing.

Jeffrey Lacker, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, said consumer spending is “moderately strong” and along with business investment will help sustain the recovery, the Japanese newspaper quoted him as saying. Richard Fisher, president of the Dallas Fed, cited “cautious” households as a reason for a growth to cool in the second half.

The remarks reflect debate on the durability of the economy after reports last week showed private-sector payrolls rose less than forecast in June, consumer confidence slumped and manufacturing growth slowed. Fed officials last month retained a pledge to keep record-low interest rates for an “extended period” and signaled Europe’s debt crisis may harm growth.

Lacker said he was comfortable with the current level of interest rates, according to Nikkei. Later this year it will be a “legitimate question” whether to drop the ‘extended period’ language and “think about raising rates,” the newspaper reported him as saying.

Fisher said any tightening of monetary policy “depends on the course of the economy,” according to the report. He said on June 4 that while it’s not time for central bankers to tighten policy, they may be “getting closer” as the economy further expands this year.

Goodness, over the weekend, both Richmond Fed President Jeffrey Lacker and Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher were still looking forward to tightening policy. Of course, Fisher, similar to Bullard, likes to talk. Indeed, Fisher looks closer to Kansas City Fed President Thomas Hoenig:

Hoenig, 63, has been the sole policy maker to dissent this year from decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee, objecting four times to its pledge to keep interest rates at a record low for an “extended period.”

He also said the central bank should dispose of assets accumulated while fighting the crisis “as reasonably as we can, as quickly as we can.” While he has proposed raising the target for overnight loans among banks to 1 percent by September, Hoenig said in the interview that the timing “can be debated.”

Fisher indicated there’s little more the Fed can do after cutting interest rates to a record low in December 2008 and pumping more than $1 trillion into the financial system through asset purchases.

“We ought to be very careful about not going too far,” he said. “Interest rates are zero. It’s not the cost of money that’s the issue.”

One can only imagine what kind of crisis would prompt Hoenig for additional action. Something that would rapidly deteriorate to the guns and gold portfolio. Still waiting for someone from the Board to speak. Wait, yes they did. Fed Governor Kevin Warsh gave a rousing speech:

The Federal Reserve should be wary of the short-term allure of further asset purchases, said Fed governor Kevin Warsh on Monday. In a speech in Atlanta, Warsh set a high bar for his support of further asset purchases, saying he would need to be convinced the benefits of the purchases would outweigh the costs of "erosion of market functioning, perceptions of monetizing indebtedness, crowding-out of private buyers, or loss of central bank credibility."

Which gets to the crux of the issue. Realistically, to generate significant impacts at the zero bound, the Fed is going to have to commit to policies that look a lot like debt monetization. We are nowhere near that stage. Indeed, after two decades, the Bank of Japan is not there. Sure, maybe the Fed commits to a long term ZIRP (pretty much there already), buys mortgage backed assets to offset maturing securities, or, as a temporary response to a fresh crisis, expands the balance sheet a bit. But commit to a higher inflation target? Target long bond rates? Those actions likely require sustained, massive purchases of US Treasuries - a bridge too far to cross for policymakers who view central bank credibility as a one sided game. The only real policy error is inflation. Anything else is interesting, but not important.

A Response to Arnold Kling

Arnold Kling:

An Assignment for Mark Thoma: I would like for Mark or for Paul Krugman to write an essay on the topic of what would happen if tomorrow the Fed stopped paying interest on reserves. ... I would like for Mark or for Paul Krugman to write an essay on the topic of what would happen if tomorrow the Fed stopped paying interest on reserves.

I don't know if I can get a whole essay out of this. This is something the Fed is considering, but I don't think it would have a very large impact on economic activity. The reason is that I don't think the lack of investment activity, or loan activity more generally (a new report says consumer credit fell again), is due to a problem on the supply side. Banks have tightened up a bit as the economic outlook has deteriorated, but I believe the main problem is lack of loan demand. Here's one reason I hold this view:

How "discouraged" are small businesses? Insights from an Atlanta Fed small business lending survey, macroblog: ..[T]here is congressional debate going on about how to best aid small businesses and promote job growth. Many people have noted the decline in small business lending during the recession, and some have suggested proposals to give incentives to banks to increase their small business portfolios. But is a lack of willingness to lend to small businesses really what's behind the decline in small business lending? ...
We at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta have ... noted the paucity of data in this area and have begun a series of small business credit surveys. ... [T]he results of our April 2010 survey suggest that demand-side factors may be the driving force behind lower levels of small business credit. ...

Based upon this and other indications that this is primarily a demand side problem, I am not convinced that lowering the interest rate on reserves from one quarter of a percent to zero will have much of an effect on investment activity. What we need is a reason for firms to want to invest, and that will require a much improved outlook for the economy, something that could be aided by the government providing additional stimulus to aggregate demand.

Thursday, July 08, 2010

Don’t Expect Miracles from Monetary Policy

I have a new post at MoneyWatch:

Don’t Expect Miracles from Monetary Policy

It responds, briefly, to today's report on new claims for unemployment insurance, but the main discussion follows up on a post from Paul Krugman and looks at how effective further monetary policy initiatives might be.

Wednesday, July 07, 2010

"The Rising Threat of Deflation"

As I hope you already know, conservatives (update: and some misdirected liberals) aren't standing on very firm ground with their worries about inflation and their calls for austerity. In fact, merely saying the ground they are standing on is shaky is far too generous. But if you need further evidence that they are promoting bad ideas, note that they can't even get the American Enterprise Institute to agree with them:

The Rising Threat of Deflation, by John H. Makin, AEI, July 2010: As we enter the second half of 2010--the ... United States and Europe are heading toward--and Japan already suffers from--deflation, a classic prolonger of crises that boosts the real burden of debt and crushes profit margins.
U.S. year-over-year core inflation has dropped to 0.9 percent--its lowest level in forty-four years. ... Europe's year-over-year core inflation rate has fallen to 0.8 percent... Ireland's deflation rate is 2.7 percent. As commodity prices slip, inflation will become deflation globally in short order. Meanwhile in Japan,... the ... gross domestic product (GDP) deflator had fallen 2.8 percent, reflecting an accelerating pace of deflation in a country where the price level has been falling every year since 2004. ...
The financial crisis of 2008 prompted aggressive monetary and fiscal easing by most governments. ... Many market participants and policymakers have warned that such aggressive easing will lead to inflation. Contrary to those expectations, as noted above, core inflation has steadily moved lower... By later this year, persistent excess capacity will probably create actual deflation in the United States and Europe. Moreover, the recent appreciation of the dollar, especially against the euro, exacerbates the U.S. deflation threat. ...
Perhaps it is time for central banks, the ECB especially, to take note. Financial crises are usually deflationary. Pretending otherwise ... constitutes a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for a global depression. ... A persistent failure to respond to the dangers of further deflation, such as the premature removal of accommodative monetary policy apparently favored at the ECB or a sharp fiscal contraction favored by the European Monetary Union, would sharply elevate the risk of global deflation and depression.
At this point in the postbubble transition to deflation, fiscal rectitude and monetary stringency are a dangerous policy combination, as appealing as they may be to the virtuous instincts of policymakers faced with a surfeit of sovereign debt. ... The G20's shift toward rapid, global fiscal consolidation--a halving of deficits by 2013--threatens a public sector, Keynesian "paradox of thrift" whereby because all governments are simultaneously tightening fiscal policy, growth is cut so much that revenues collapse and budget deficits actually rise. ...
The link between volatile financial conditions and the real economy has been powerfully underscored by the events since mid-2007. Growth has suffered and subsequently recovered given powerful monetary and fiscal stimulus. And yet, the damaged financial sector, unable to supply credit; a jump in the precautionary demand for cash; and a persistent overhang of global production capacity have combined to leave deflation pressure intact. The G20's newfound embrace of fiscal stringency only adds to the extant deflation pressure. ...

Monday, June 28, 2010

Paul Krugman: The Third Depression

A failure of policy, in particular a "stunning resurgence of hard-money and balanced-budget orthodoxy," increases the likelihood that we are headed for a third depression:

The Third Depression, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: Recessions are common; depressions are rare. As far as I can tell, there were only two eras in economic history that were widely described as “depressions” at the time: the years of deflation and instability that followed the Panic of 1873 and the years of mass unemployment that followed the financial crisis of 1929-31.
Neither the Long Depression of the 19th century nor the Great Depression of the 20th was an era of nonstop decline — on the contrary, both included periods when the economy grew. But these episodes of improvement were never enough to undo the damage from the initial slump, and were followed by relapses.
We are now, I fear, in the early stages of a third depression. It will probably look more like the Long Depression than the much more severe Great Depression. But the cost — to the world economy and, above all, to the millions of lives blighted by the absence of jobs — will nonetheless be immense.
And this third depression will be primarily a failure of policy. Around the world ... governments are obsessing about inflation when the real threat is deflation, preaching the need for belt-tightening when the real problem is inadequate spending. ... After all, unemployment — especially long-term unemployment — remains at levels that would have been considered catastrophic not long ago, and shows no sign of coming down rapidly. And both the United States and Europe are well on their way toward Japan-style deflationary traps.
In the face of this grim picture, you might have expected policy makers to realize that they haven’t yet done enough to promote recovery. But no: over the last few months there has been a stunning resurgence of hard-money and balanced-budget orthodoxy.
As far as rhetoric is concerned, the revival of the old-time religion is most evident in Europe, where officials seem to be getting their talking points from the collected speeches of Herbert Hoover, up to and including the claim that raising taxes and cutting spending will actually expand the economy, by improving business confidence. As a practical matter, however, America isn’t doing much better. The Fed seems aware of the deflationary risks — but what it proposes to do about these risks is, well, nothing. The Obama administration understands the dangers of premature fiscal austerity — but because Republicans and conservative Democrats in Congress won’t authorize additional aid to state governments, that austerity is coming anyway, in the form of budget cuts at the state and local levels.
Why the wrong turn in policy? The hard-liners often invoke the troubles facing Greece and other nations around ... Europe to justify their actions. And it’s true that bond investors have turned on governments with intractable deficits. But there is no evidence that short-run fiscal austerity in the face of a depressed economy reassures investors. ...
It’s almost as if the financial markets understand what policy makers seemingly don’t: that while long-term fiscal responsibility is important, slashing spending in the midst of a depression, which deepens that depression and paves the way for deflation, is actually self-defeating.
So I don’t think this is really about Greece, or indeed about any realistic appreciation of the tradeoffs between deficits and jobs. It is, instead, the victory of an orthodoxy that has little to do with rational analysis, whose main tenet is that imposing suffering on other people is how you show leadership in tough times.
And who will pay the price for this triumph of orthodoxy? The answer is, tens of millions of unemployed workers, many of whom will go jobless for years, and some of whom will never work again.

Sunday, June 27, 2010

Should Monetary Policy be More Expansionary?

Martin Wolf:

Is monetary policy too expansionary or not expansionary enough?, by Martin Wolf: People with a free-market orientation believe that the economy has a strong tendency towards equilibrium. Over the long term money is “neutral”: a rise in the money supply merely raises the price level. In the short term, however, monetary policy may have a big impact on the economy. A big question, however, is over how to measure the impact of monetary policy in an environment such as the present one, when short-term interest rates are close to zero and the credit system is damaged.
The difficulty arises because of the huge divergence between what is happening to the monetary base (the monetary liabilities of the government, including the central bank) and what is happening to broader measures of money (principally the liabilities of the banking system). The former has exploded. But the growth rate of the latter is extremely low. ...
The ... inflationary impact of “money printing” can ... only happen if the overall money supply starts to grow rapidly. This is not now happening. Only the monetary base is expanding rapidly. Should such a broader expansionary impact emerge, monetary policy will have been successful, the central bank can then raise rates, thereby preventing a rapid growth in credit and so constraining the growth of broad money.
My conclusion is that what is happening to the balance sheet of the central bank is unimportant, except to the extent that it has prevented a collapse of credit and money. What matters is the overall supply of credit and money in economies. This continues to be stagnant in the developed world. Concern about an imminent outbreak of inflation is consequently a grave mistake. To the extent that there is a danger of “monetization” of debt, it will emerge only if we fail to return to growth, because that is the situation in which it is most likely that public sector deficits will fail to close. It follows that strong monetary tightening now may increase the long-term threat of inflation, rather than reduce it.
What do you think?

There is no evidence of worry over the threat of inflation in financial markets. To repeat a point that's been made here many, many times, increasing interest rates too soon would be a mistake since it will make it more difficult for the economy to recover. If anything, given the weakness that still exists in the economy, more ease is called for.

Wednesday, June 23, 2010

No Changes from the FOMC

As expected, the FOMC tells us how weak the economy is, and that it may be getting weaker. But it expresses confidence that the economy will somehow take care of itself, and decides to stay on hold rather than moving toward a more aggressive monetary policy stance. Here's the Press Release on the decision:

Continue reading "No Changes from the FOMC" »

Is the Fed's Caution Justified?

Why doesn't the Fed take more aggressive action to help the economy?:

When Caution Carries Risk, by David Leonhardt, NY Times: Ben Bernanke believes that he and his Federal Reserve colleagues have... “...considerable power to expand aggregate demand and economic activity, even when its accustomed policy rate is at zero,” as it is today. Mr. Bernanke also believes that the economy is growing “not fast enough”... He has predicted that unemployment will remain high for years and that “a lot of people are going to be under financial stress.”
Yet he has been unwilling to use his power to lift growth and reduce joblessness from near a 27-year high... How can this be? How can Mr. Bernanke simultaneously think that growth is too slow and that it shouldn’t be sped up? There is an answer — whether or not you find it persuasive. ...
Fed officials are ... not so much worried about inflation, the traditional source of Fed angst, as they are about upsetting the markets’ confidence in Washington. Yes, investors remain happy to lend the United States money at rock-bottom interest rates, despite our budget deficit and all of the emergency Fed programs that will eventually need to be unwound. But no one knows how long that confidence will last.
In effect, Mr. Bernanke and his colleagues have decided to accept ... high unemployment ... for years to come — rather than risk an even worse situation — a market panic, a spike in long-term interest rates and yet higher unemployment. As the last few years have shown, market sentiment can change unexpectedly and sharply.
Still, you have to wonder if the Fed is paying enough attention to the risks of its own approach. ... The main historical lesson of financial crises is that governments are usually too passive. They respond in dribs and drabs, as Japan did in the 1990s and Europe did in 2008. Or they remove support too quickly, as Franklin Roosevelt did in 1937, and then the economy struggles to escape its funk.
Look around at the American economy today. Unemployment is 9.7 percent. Inflation ... has been zero. States are cutting their budgets. Congress is balking at spending the money to prevent state layoffs. The Fed is standing pat, too. Bond investors, fickle as they may be, show no signs of panicking.
Which seems to be the greater risk: too much action or too little? ... In the end, Mr. Bernanke’s ... decision comes down to weighing the probabilities and the possible outcomes. Let’s just be clear about the risks and costs that the Fed has chosen. It is ... willing to accept a jobless rate of almost 10 percent, with all of the attendant human costs.
“About half of the unemployed have been unemployed for six months or more, which means that they are losing skills, they’re losing contact with the job market,” a prominent economist said at a public dinner in Washington this month. “If things go on and they simply sit at home or work very irregularly, when the economy gets back to a more normal state, they’re not going to be able to find good work.”
That economist happened to be Ben Bernanke, one of the few people with the power to do something about the situation.

I wish I had a better sense why the Fed is so worried about a market panic when there is no evidence indicating that financial markets are near the tipping point. Is there actual evidence that has them worried -- if there is, how about sharing it? -- or is it just some general sense that we must be getting near the threshold?

I think the economy needs more help, and that fiscal policy is the best choice right now. But given the present inclination toward policy timidity, I'll take what I can get, and I wish that the Fed would be more aggressive. However it doesn't look at all likely that monetary or fiscal policy policymakers are going to make any significant moves toward further stimulus, we'll be lucky if they don't do the opposite before the economy is ready, so it appears that Bernanke's forecast that unemployment will remain high for years may come true. But unworried financial markets -- and those who benefit the most from them -- won't have to worry about worrying.

Tuesday, June 22, 2010

Keynes and Social Democracy

Was Keynes in favor of big government? Do Keynesian policies necessarily lead to big government?:

Keynes and Social Democracy Today, by Robert Skidelsky, Commentary, Project Syndicate: For decades, Keynesianism was associated with social democratic big-government policies. But John Maynard Keynes’s relationship with social democracy is complex. Although he was an architect of core components of social democratic policy – particularly its emphasis on maintaining full employment – he did not subscribe to other key social democratic objectives, such as public ownership or massive expansion of the welfare state. ...
Until The General Theory was published in 1936, social democrats did not know how to go about achieving full employment. Their policies were directed at depriving capitalists of the ownership of the means of production. How this was to produce full employment was never worked out. ...
Keynes demonstrated that the main cause of bouts of heavy and prolonged unemployment was ... fluctuating prospects of private investment in an uncertain world. Nearly all unemployment in a cyclical downturn was the result of the failure of investment demand.
Thus, the important thing was not to nationalize the capital stock, but to socialize investment. Industry could be safely left in private hands, provided the state guaranteed enough spending power in the economy to maintain a full-employment level of investment. This could be achieved by monetary and fiscal policy: low interest rates and large state investment programs.
In short, Keynes aimed to achieve a key social democratic objective without changing the ownership of industry. Nevertheless, he did think that redistribution would help secure full employment. A greater tendency to consume would “serve to increase at the same time the inducement to invest.” ...
Moderate re-distribution was the more politically radical implication of Keynes’s economic theory, but the measures outlined above were also the limits of state intervention for him. As long as “the state is able to determine the aggregate amount of resources devoted to augmenting the instruments [i.e., the capital base] and the basic reward to those who own them,” there is no “obvious case” for further involvement. ...
Today, ideas about full employment and equality remain at the heart of social democracy. But the political struggle needs to be conducted along new battle lines. Whereas the front used to run between government and the owners of the means of production – the industrialists, the rentiers – now, it runs between governments and finance. ...
Being too big to fail simply means being too big. Keynes saw that “it is the financial markets’ precariousness which creates no small part of our contemporary problem of securing sufficient investment.” That rings truer today – more than 70 years later – than in his own day. ...
This, once again, calls for an activist government policy. ... Keynes’s main contribution to social democracy, however, does not lie in the specifics of policy, but in his insistence that the state as ultimate protector of the public good has a duty to supplement and regulate market forces. If we need markets to stop the state from behaving badly, we need the state to stop markets from behaving badly. Nowadays, that means stopping financial markets from behaving badly. That means limiting their power, and their profits.

On Keynesian policy and big government, as I've explained many times (e.g.), there is no necessary connection between the size of government and Keynesian stabilization policy. Want the government to grow? Then cure recessions by increasing spending, and pay for it by raising taxes during the good times. After a few business cycles under this policy, government will be larger. This is the strategy that Democrats are accused of playing.

Want the opposite result? No problem, just use tax cuts to stimulate the economy during a recession, then pay for the cuts by reducing government spending during the subsequent boom. A few cycles later, and government is much smaller. This is the Republican starve the beast strategy that they fully admit to playing (I am abstracting, of course, from the political difficulties with either strategy).

Want to keep government the same size? Then simply use the same policy tool on both sides of the business cycle. Increase government spending in a recession, then reverse it in the good times, or, alternatively, cut taxes during the bad times, then raise them when things improve.

Summarizing: Using a different policy tools on each side of as recession changes the size of government, while using the same policy tool does not. But the main point is that, contrary to what you may have been led to believe, there is nothing inherent in Keynesian economics that connects stabilization policy to the size of government. There are, I think, political considerations that make it easier to cut taxes or raise spending when times are bad than to do the opposite when things improve (e.g. the argument that it will kill job growth!). But there is nothing in the underlying economics that says Keynesian policy necessarily leads to a change in the size of government.

Sunday, June 20, 2010

Reducing the Influence Banks Have over Monetary Policy

I don't have anything to post, so until I do, here's something I posted at MoneyWatch a few days ago. The post addresses the latest proposal for financial reform, in particular the proposal to change the way the District Bank presidents are chosen in an attempt to reduce the power banks have over monetary policy. One part of the proposal was to have the NY Fed president chosen by the president rather than the NY Fed's Board of Directors because of the NY Fed's special role in the implementation of national monetary policy. One question I ask at the end of this post is whether the NY Fed needs to have a special role in monetary policy and be elevated above all other District Banks. Why can't the execution of monetary policy be housed in a separate agency under the control of the FOMC (or, alternatively, the Board of Governors)? There was a time when proximity to Wall Street was essential, but that has changed in the last 70 years, and, in any case, the agency could be located as close to Wall Street as needed. Communication with Washington, to the extent it's needed, could us digital technology. This would put the NY Fed on a more equal footing with the other Fed's, and solve the problem of how to represent both regional and national interests in the selection of the NY Fed president:

Reducing the Influence Banks Have over Monetary Policy: There's some news on the Dodd proposal for financial reform, something I wrote about when the details of the proposal initially came out.

Continue reading "Reducing the Influence Banks Have over Monetary Policy" »

Friday, June 18, 2010

"Name That Stimulus Proponent"

Suggestions?:

Name That Stimulus Proponent, by Motoko Rich, Economix: The raging debate over what to do about the deficit is now getting its own lingo.

Mark Thoma, who blogs at Economist’s View, has coined the catchy term “Austerians” for those deficit hawks who are exhorting governments to reduce their debt levels.

So what about the stimulus boosters on the other side? What shall we call them?

A few suggestions:

  • Stimulants
  • Stimubuffs
  • Stimu-plussers

What would you suggest?

Thursday, June 17, 2010

"Reducing the Influence Banks Have over Monetary Policy"

Here are some comments on the latest proposal to restructure the Fed:

Reducing the Influence Banks Have over Monetary Policy

At the end of the post, I suggest an alternative policy.

Wednesday, June 16, 2010

"Government to the Economic Rescue"

Alan Blinder says (correctly) that the "government—including two administrations, Congress, and the Fed" saved "us from falling into the abyss":

Government to the Economic Rescue, by Alan S. Blinder, Commentary, WSJ: ... It seems that more Americans believe that "Barack Obama's economic policies" (the pollsters' exact words) have made economic conditions worse (29%) than better (23%), and another 35% of Americans think his policies have "not had an effect so far." So only 23% of the public thinks the president's policies have helped while 64% thinks they have failed. ...
The 64% are wrong. You can certainly argue that the administration has not done enough, or that other policy choices would have been better. ... But to say that the president's policies either had no effect or were harmful flies in the face of both logic and fact. ...
While it's certainly too early for historical perspective on the stunning events of 2007-2009, I venture to guess that, when the history of the period is written, it will read something like this: For a host of reasons the U.S. economy was struck by a calamitous financial crisis followed by a vicious recession. The government—including two administrations, Congress, and the Fed—marshaled enormous resources to save the financial system and to fight the recession. It worked.
Specifically, I would point to three policy landmarks, two of which were and remain terribly unpopular—and which probably account for the negative polling results. The first was the much-maligned Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)... The second ... was the fiscal stimulus package that President Obama signed into law..., the third ... the "stress tests" of 19 big financial institutions...
So the next time you see Chairman Bernanke, congratulate him... And the next time you see members of the House and Senate who voted for TARP and the stimulus package, give them a hug and say thank you for taking two monumentally tough votes that helped keep us from falling into the abyss.

Monday, June 14, 2010

Rudebusch: The Fed's Exit Strategy for Monetary Policy

Glenn Rudebusch looks at the Fed's exit strategy for its special liquidity facilities, the lowering of short-term interest rates, and the increase in the Fed’s securities holdings. Along the way he tries to dispel worries about the "inflation monster"(see figure 4). The bottom line for interest rates is that "it seems likely that the Fed’s exit from the current accommodative stance of monetary policy will take a significant period of time." This is in contrast to Raghu Rajan who continues to argue that rates should go up, partly on the basis of the effects of low interest rates on countries like Brazil. This serves as a counterpoint to the argument that low interest rates will cause "dangerous financial imbalances, such as asset price misalignments, bubbles, or excessive leverage and speculation", e.g. see the discussion just before figure 2, as well as a more general counterpoint to the "we need to raise rates" argument:

The Fed's Exit Strategy for Monetary Policy, by Glenn D. Rudebusch, Economic Letter, FRBSF: As the financial crisis has receded, the Federal Reserve has scaled back its extraordinary provision of liquidity. Eventually, the Fed will remove all remaining monetary stimulus by raising the federal funds rate and shrinking its balance sheet. The timing of such renormalizations depends crucially on evolving economic conditions.

To many observers, the Federal Reserve’s extraordinary policy actions during the recent crisis averted a financial Armageddon and curtailed the depth and duration of the recession (Rudebusch 2009). To combat panic and dislocation in financial markets, the Fed provided an enormous amount of liquidity. To mitigate declines in spending and employment, it reduced the federal funds interest rate—its usual policy instrument—essentially to its lower bound of zero. To provide additional monetary stimulus, the Fed turned to an unconventional policy tool—purchases of longer-term securities—which led to an enormous expansion of its balance sheet.

As financial market strains eased and economic recovery began, discussion turned to how the Fed would unwind its actions (Bernanke 2010). Of course, after every recession, the Fed has to decide how quickly to return monetary conditions to normal to forestall inflationary pressures. This time, however, policy renormalization is especially challenging because of the unprecedented economic conditions and Fed actions. This Economic Letter describes various considerations in formulating an appropriate policy exit strategy. Such a strategy must unwind each of the Fed’s three key actions: the establishment of special liquidity facilities, the lowering of short-term interest rates, and the increase in the Fed’s securities holdings.

Continue reading "Rudebusch: The Fed's Exit Strategy for Monetary Policy" »

Sunday, June 13, 2010

"It's Not Fears About Inflation"

What should fiscal and monetary policymakers be worried about, inflation or economic growth? Jim Hamilton:

There's a common thread to all the above figures, and it's not fears about inflation. Instead it's worries about the level of real economic activity, showing up in a flight to safety.

The market is worried about growth. There are both monetary and fiscal policies measures that could help. So where are all the people who think policymakers should address market worries? Why aren't they calling for policymakers to do something to spur growth (and employment)? Do the market worries only count when they point to austerity?

Saturday, June 12, 2010

"Strange Arguments For Higher Rates"

Paul Krugman responds to Raghuram Rajan's latest defense of his view that the Fed should raise the target interest rate:

Strange Arguments For Higher Rates, by Paul Krugman: So Raghuram Rajan has posted a further explanation of his case for raising interest rates in the face of very high unemployment, presumably a response to Mark Thoma. It’s good to see Rajan put his cards on the table — but what he says only further confirms my sense that we’re talking about some kind of psychological desire to be tough...
Rajan’s argument boils down to two assertions:
1. Raising rates a bit wouldn’t significantly deter investment.
2. “Unnaturally low” interest rates are distorting asset prices.
The first thing to say about these two assertions is that they are essentially contradictory. If the difference between current rates and the rates Rajan wants is trivial — just a wafer thin mint — how can that same difference be leading to a major distortion in financial markets? Are we to believe that an interest rate change that matters not at all to firms making real investments somehow has huge effects on speculators? And actually, don’t asset prices themselves matter for real investment?
It might be worth noting, in this context, that just because the interest rate on safe bonds is near zero, that doesn’t mean that people making risky investments can borrow at near-zero rates.
Beyond all that, what does Rajan mean by “unnaturally low” rates? What makes them unnatural?
My take on the current economic situation is quite simple... Right now, we clearly don’t have enough demand to make full use of the economy’s productive capacity. This means that the real interest rate is too high. And so the “natural” thing is for the real rate to fall. Yes, that would mean a negative real rate. So?
The trouble is that getting that negative real rate isn’t easy, because the nominal rate can’t go below zero, and there’s no easy way to create expected inflation. If you ask what would happen if prices were completely flexible, the answer, as I figured out long ago, is that prices would fall so far now that people would expect them to rise in the future, creating expected inflation. Bur prices aren’t that flexible, which is why we turn to quantitative easing, fiscal policy, and more.
Surely, though, we want to get rates as close to their appropriate level as possible — which means a zero nominal rate. There’s nothing “unnatural” about it. On the contrary, the “natural rate of interest”, as Wicksell defined it, is clearly negative right now.
So why does Rajan feel that there must be something wrong with low rates (and he’s not alone)? I think his language, with its odd moral tone, is the giveaway: it’s the sense that economic policy is supposed to involve being tough on people, not giving money away cheap.
I actually understand the seductiveness of that posture; I can sort of understand how economists succumb to it. But right now, with the world desperately in need of clear thinking, is no time to give in to the subtle allure of inflicting economic pain.

I had the same response. If raising rates doesn't change investment, how does raising rates choke off risky (and distorted) financial investment which ultimately depends upon real investment activity?

(There is also an argument that high rates, not low rates, cause an increase in the proportion of investors taking high risks. When rates are high, only the riskiest, highest expected return projects will have a chance of being profitable, so these are the only projects that are pursued. In this case higher rates, not lower rates, lead to an increase in the fraction of risky investment. This is where Krugman's point that the interest rates people making risky investments actually face are not zero, and increasing these rates by another 2 to 2.5 percent, as recommended, will raise them even higher and potentially induce more risk-taking behavior. This doesn't directly overturn the argument the arguments Rajan is making, but it is a potential countervailing force.)

Let me also address this part of Raghu Rajan's response, which I assume is directed at the title and content of this post ("The Fed Should Raise Rates Because Brazil has Low Unemployment?"):

If the Federal Reserve were to accept the responsibilities of its role as central banker to much of the world, it would have to admit that its policy rates are too accommodative for the world as a whole. Does the Fed have responsibility to help the world while hurting its own economy (or as one commentator put it, am I advocating that the U.S. raise rates because Brazil is overheating)? Of course not! But when the benefits to its own economy are dubious, it should also give some thought to the global effects of its policies. For eventually, the consequences of its policies will come back to haunt it if they precipitate crises elsewhere.

That the benefits of low rates are dubious is an assertion, not a demonstrated fact. Rajan's post attempts to make the case that low rates have costs that exceed the benefits, i.e. that the net benefits are "dubious," but here he is assuming he has already proven his case. So, yes, if you assume that there is no cost to raising rates (which is what the debate is all about, so clearly I disagree with this assumption), assume that low rates will cause a crisis in Brazil or somewhere else (the argument is that these countries need to raise rates, but low rates in the US prevent them from doing so), and assume that a crisis in one of these countries will cause a crisis in the US (or at least significant troubles), then yes, I suppose we should take this into account. But it takes quite a few "dubious" assumptions to come to this conclusion, the contradictory "it won't change investment" among them, so I am not at all convinced by this argument.

Wednesday, June 09, 2010

Rodrik: Who Lost Europe?

Germany says it took the time and effort to build a solid house, just like the bric-house countries, and the pigs will have to fight the big bad financial wolves on their own. If Germany opens the its bric-house doors and lets the pigs in where they are safe, they'll never learn their lesson. They'll keep relying upon structures that collapse when the slightest financial wind blows against them.

What the bric house residents are forgetting, however, is the mutual dependence that exists. If the pigs perish, so will the source of income that pays for the bric house they live in. The other countries do need to build houses that are safe from the wolves, but that's a lesson that seems likely to be learned even if the bric-house residents open their doors and foot the bill required to provide safe shelter. Allowing the pigs to be completely destroyed is not in the bric-house country's best interest. (Or something like that, not sure if it's fair to characterize all of the pigs in this way -- some thought they had built strong houses -- the point is that it may not be in Germany's best long-run interest to refuse to help at all):

Who Lost Europe?, by Dani Rodrik, Commentary, Project Syndicate: ...Having suffered a deeper economic collapse in 2009 than the United States did, Europe’s economy is poised for a much more sluggish recovery... European leaders have so far offered no solution to the growth conundrum other than belt tightening. The reasoning seems to be that growth requires market confidence, which in turn requires fiscal retrenchment. As Angela Merkel puts it, “growth can’t come at the price of high state budget deficits.” 
But trying to redress budget deficits in the midst of a collapse in domestic demand makes problems worse, not better. ... In fact, it sets in motion a vicious cycle. The poorer an economy’s growth prospects, the larger the fiscal correction and deleveraging needed to convince markets of underlying solvency. But the greater the fiscal correction and private-sector deleveraging, the worse growth prospects become. The best way to get rid of debt (short of default) is to grow out of it.
So Europe needs a short-term growth strategy... The greatest obstacle to implementing such a strategy is the EU’s largest economy and its putative leader: Germany. ... What makes this perverse is that Germany runs a huge current-account surplus..., 5.5% of GDP in 2010,... not far behind China’s 6.2%. So Germany has to thank deficit countries like the US, or Spain and Greece in Europe, for propping up its industries and preventing its unemployment rate from rising further. ...Germany is not only failing to do its fair share, but is free-riding on other countries’...
Germany’s refusal to boost domestic demand and reduce its external surplus, along with its insistence on conservative inflation targets for the ECB, severely undercuts prospects for European prosperity and unity. It virtually guarantees that Greece, Spain, and others with large private and public debts will be condemned to years of economic decline and high unemployment. At some point, these countries may well choose to default on their external obligations rather than endure the pain.
Germany’s leaders may take comfort in lecturing other governments about their profligacy. And it is true that some, like the Greek government, ran too-high deficits during the good times and endangered their future. But what about Spain or Ireland, where the borrowers were not the government but the private sector? If others borrowed too much, doesn’t it follow that Germans lent excessively?
If Germany wants the rest of Europe to swallow the bitter pill of fiscal retrenchment, it will eventually have to recognize the implicit quid pro quo. It must pledge to boost domestic expenditures, reduce its external surplus, and accept an increase in the ECB’s inflation target. The sooner Germany fulfills its side of the bargain, the better it will be for everyone. 

[Kevin O'Rourke has also argued recently that a collapse in domestic demand makes problems worse, not better.]

Tuesday, June 08, 2010

The Fed Should Raise Rates Because Brazil has Low Unemployment?

Wow. Raghuram Rajan says the Fed should raise rates because hiring in Brazil is robust:

Moreover, even if corporations in the US are not hiring, corporations elsewhere are. Brazil’s unemployment rate, for example, is at lows not seen for decades. If the Fed were to accept the responsibilities of its de facto role as the world’s central banker, it would have to admit that its policy rates are not conducive to stable world growth.

The Fed has made it very clear that it worries about conditions in other countries only to the extent that they feed back upon conditions within the US. That is, while I think US should consider the welfare of other countries when implementing policy (though in this case, the effects of low interest rates on Brazil would not be much, if any, of a concern), the Fed has made it clear that's not how it operates. It's charter has different instructions and it must abide by them. Legislators would not stand for the Fed raising rates based upon conditions in Brazil and other countries in any case, that would be a sure way to lose independence.

Some parts of the essay are OK, e.g. the parts about the need to modernize the social safety net, but for the most part it is a complaint about the Fed holding rates too low:

Equally deleterious to economic health is the recent vogue of cutting interest rates to near zero and holding them there for a sustained period. It is far from clear that near-zero short-term interest rates (as compared to just low interest rates) have much additional effect in encouraging firms to create jobs when powerful economic forces make them reluctant to hire. But prolonged near-zero rates can foster the wrong kinds of activities.

His main arguments against low rates are that they distort investment toward high risk assets:

For example, households and investment managers, reluctant to keep money in safe money-market funds, instead seek to invest in securities with longer maturities and higher credit risk, so long as they offer extra yield. Likewise, money fleeing low US interest rates (and, more generally, industrial countries) has pushed up emerging-market equity and real-estate prices, setting them up for a fall (as we witnessed recently with the flight to safety following Europe’s financial turmoil).

The problems in Greece and other countries were caused by low interest rate policies? I'll have to think about that, but with respect to the flight into long duration, risky assets he discusses, I thought the current problem was an excess demand for safe assets, not an excess demand for risk.

He is also not much of a fan of fiscal policy:

Much of what is enacted as stimulus has little immediate effect on job creation, but does have an adverse long-term effect on government finances. For example, the 2009 stimulus package enacted by the Obama administration had many billions of dollars devoted to cancer research, though such research employs few people directly and is spent over a long time horizon – far beyond that of even a prolonged recovery.

I think it's a bit disingenuous -- and perhaps telling that he doesn't have much of an argument -- that he points to such a small portion of the stimulus package as his big example (the spending for cancer research was $1.26 billion of the $787 billion package). He is also making an assertion about "little effect on job creation" that is contrary to the evidence. The CBO says (and these numbers are consistent with a wide range of other estimates) the stimulus package generated 2 million jobs (1.2 million to 2.8 million is the range they report). It could have been better with a larger, better constructed package, but 2 million is far from "little immediate effect."

We need more fiscal policy not less, and more aggressive monetary policy to combat unemployment, not an increase in rates. Monetary policy should stay on hold if more aggressive policy is not possible for political reasons or because of objections within the FOMC, but we should not give in to the immediate increase in rates that Raghuram Rajan and others are calling for. That's not the best possible path to recovery.

Monday, June 07, 2010

Fed Watch: A Good Crisis, Wasted

Tim Duy is discouraged that policymakers have failed to use the crisis as an opportunity "to bring some sanity to the global financial architecture":

A Good Crisis, Wasted, by Tim Duy: It is official. The rest of the world assumes the economy can pick up were we left off in 2006, with the US as the driver of global demand. And it is apparent there is little US policymakers can or will do to counter the trend. Once again, crisis - and along with it the opportunity to rebalance global growth - is wasted.

The Greek debt crisis gave Europe's deficit hawks just the excuse they have needed to pull back on fiscal stimulus. From Bloomberg:

Chancellor Angela Merkel said Germany is poised for a “decisive” round of budget cuts that will shape government policy for years to come, fueling disagreement with U.S. officials who favor measures to step up growth.

Speaking at the start of two days of Cabinet talks in Berlin called to identify potential savings of 10 billion euros ($12 billion) a year, Merkel said Europe’s debt crisis underscores the need for budget tightening to ensure the euro’s stability.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel has a cheerleader at the ECB:

European Central Bank President Jean- Claude Trichet and Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner diverged on prescriptions to sustain growth, with Europe set to tighten budgets and the U.S. seeking stronger domestic demand.

The impact of narrower budget gaps “on growth could not be considered negative because it would improve confidence,” Trichet told reporters yesterday after meeting with Group of 20 finance chiefs in Busan, South Korea. The need for such action is clear in “old industrialized economies,” he said.

In the eyes of Trichet, the tragedy of the Greek crisis was that the ECB was pulled into the fray, forced to buy sovereign debt in a move that threatened the independence of Europe's central bank. Obviously, one way to prevent a repeat of this supposed travesty is simply to ensure that all EMU parties bring spending under control. Whether they really need to or not - no reason to go through that messy business of trying to differentiate between nations.

Elsewhere in the Euro zone, some are quite pleased to let the Euro sink:

“I see good news from the current euro-dollar rate,” French Prime Minister Francois Fillon told reporters in Paris June 4. President Nicolas Sarkozy “and I have been saying for years that the euro-dollar rate didn’t reflect reality and was penalizing our exports,” he said.

And the Chinese remain hesitant to change policy, so perhaps Europeans are wise to just throw in the towel:

“Something has to be done on the currency,” Strauss-Kahn told reporters in Busan. “The IMF still believes that the renminbi is substantially undervalued,” he said, using another term for China’s currency.

Perhaps it is naïve to believe Chinese policymakers would let the renminbi rise given their inability to manage their domestic economy. From the Wall Street Journal:

Government policy changes have thrown China's booming property market into a period of paralysis that some industry executives say will last for several months, weighing on global growth prospects already battered by the turmoil in Europe.

A rebound in China's property market has been central to the nation's rapid recovery from the financial crisis, but surging housing prices had led to increasingly open discontent from middle-class families in major cities. After months of indecision, Beijing in mid-April announced a package of policies intended to blow the froth out of the market by restricting speculative purchases.

Officials may have gotten more than they bargained for. Though still too recent for their effect to show up in official economic statistics, early indications are that the new measures have sharply cooled the property market. Arriving around the same time as the debt crisis in Greece, China's new restrictions caused many investors and businesses to question the strength of the global recovery. Domestic steel prices are down 7.4% since the April measures, and as of Thursday China's main stock market index is down 19.4%.

Chinese policymakers are not willing to upset the export cart at the same time they are dealing with start-stop internal issues. Where this all ends for the US is painfully obvious. US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner wrote in an open letter to the G20 finance ministers:

...achieving a strong and sustainable global recovery requires that we make further progress on rebalancing global demand. Given the broader shifts underway in the U.S. economy toward higher domestic savings, without further progress on rebalancing global demand, global growth rates will fall short of potential. In this context, we are concerned by the projected weakness in domestic demand in Europe and Japan. In keeping with the Pittsburgh Framework on Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth, the necessary shift toward higher savings in the United States needs to be complemented by stronger domestic demand growth in Japan and in the European surplus countries, and sustained growth in private demand, together with a more flexible exchange rate policy, in China.

Don Geithner, tilting at windmills. His battles are futile. Financial markets know it, sensing that the global growth cannot be sustained on the back of the US alone. Of course, this was always the case; demand in the US alone was never sufficient to recreate the fabled "V" recovery of the 1980s. Market participants also know that US policymakers have their finger in the dam of a tidal wave of competitive devaluations. The Dollar, for all its warts, remains the big dog of reserve currencies, and Geithner fears the global pandemonium that would result from an actual US response to the currency manipulation of others. Thus the postponed report on currency manipulators becomes another case of "extend and pretend."

In the end, why continue to hold the Euro on what is increasingly the myth of global rebalancing? It is clear European policymakers want a weaker Euro, and US policymakers are powerless to prevent a stronger dollar. At least we are getting cheaper oil as a result.

When it all shakes out, the US will actually be asked to do more, not less. Lower interest rates will discourage saving and diffuse a political barrier to enhance fiscal stimulus in the US. Goodness, as I write this, the yield on the 10 year is again below 3.20%. Clearly, the world is looking for more, not less AAA debt, and the US will eventually be the last nation willing to issue it. Moreover, eventually the persistent unemployment problem will weigh on politicians such that while they might bluster on about deficit spending, they will forced to do just that. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve claims to be prodding banks to lend more aggressively. From Bloomberg:

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke said he’s concerned about the costs U.S. joblessness is imposing on the economy and that the central bank is telling field examiners to encourage lending to creditworthy businesses.

“One particularly difficult issue is the continued high rate of unemployment,” Bernanke said today at a forum at the Chicago Fed’s Detroit office, calling joblessness among the “important concerns” for the recovery. “High unemployment imposes heavy costs on workers and their families, as well as on our society as a whole.”

Again, the jobs problem. A problem that will magically receive more attention as Wall Street flails. After all, an unemployed high school dropout won't be writing checks for $10,000 a plate campaign fundraisers, not like that nice man from the hedge fund.

Where does this all leave us? The rest of the world is intent on pursuing a begger thy neighbor strategy, with the US being the neighbor. I suspect US policymakers will eventually relent; it will be the only choice left. All we can do now is sit back and wait for the inevitable explosion in the US trade deficit, waiting idly by for the next crisis and the "chance" to bring some sanity to the global financial architecture.

Saturday, June 05, 2010

Things are Different at the Zero Bound

Here's a summary of a recent exchange with Tyler Cowen and Scott Sumner:

1. Tyler Cowen says that (New) Keynesians such as DeLong, Krugman, and Thoma advocate fiscal policy, but he thinks monetary policy is a better choice.

2. I respond by saying that monetary policy suffers from time-consistency problems that fiscal policy does not have, and that's one of the reasons I prefer fiscal policy. There are ways to revive monetary policy, but they are uncertain. I then note that fiscal policy has uncertainties too, and therefore my choice is not to rely exclusively on either policy tool, instead we should pursue both types of policies.

3. Scott Sumner responds by saying fiscal policy has problems too.

4. I respond by noting that the problems he is talking about are not problems in the model I am using. They may be problems in other models, and other people are free to use those models if they think they are better, but that does not change the fact that within the class of models I am using the problems are not present.

5. Scott Sumner responds by saying he was using a different model, one he made up on the spot yesterday when writing the original post. Unfortunately, the model in the original post is buried in a large amount of text, and the point being made is not as clear as it might have been (in response to one of his complaints, it's not always the reading that's the problem).

Using a different model is fine. I've already noted that the models I have been using have their problems, and that there can be a legitimate debate over what type of model is best. But at some point you have to commit to a specific model and use it to answer your questions, one that has hopefully been carefully specified and thoroughly investigated, and that does not change daily. Full awareness of the model's weak spots and limitations should be used to qualify the answers you give, but you cannot avoid committing to a model of some sort. The policy advice I have been advocating is based upon these models and is fully consistent with them. That doesn't mean that other models won't give different answers, but those aren't the models I am using.

Now, assuming I've unearthed it correctly, let me turn to Scott's specific objection. One way to impose Scott's objection on the models I am using is to assume the Fed is a strict inflation targeter, i.e. that it never let's the price level deviate from target if there is any way at all to avoid doing so (so inflation is always zero in the model unless the zero bound for the nominal interest rate gets in the way). I base this interpretation on the following statement Scott made in a follow-up to his original post:

if people begin to believe the Fed intends to keep core inflation at 1% per year for the next 10 years, there really isn’t much fiscal policy can do. 

Here's Woodford's description of what happens in this case during normal times, i.e. when the Fed pursues a strict inflation target and the interest rate is above zero:

As an example of another simple hypothesis about monetary policy, suppose that the central bank maintains a strict inflation target, regardless of the path of government purchases. (For conformity with the assumption made above about the long-run steady state, suppose that the inflation target is zero.) In the case of the Calvo model of price adjustment,... maintaining a zero inflation rate each period requires that pt = Pt each period... [U]nder this policy, aggregate output Yt will be the same function of Gt as in the case of flexible prices, and the multiplier will be given by (1.7). Again, this result does not depend on the precise details of the Calvo model of price adjustment. ...

Equation 1.7 is the multiplier in the classical model with full price adjustment, and it is necessarily less than one. So if the Fed is a strict inflation targeter and prices are sticky, the result is the same as if prices are fully flexible. Thus, under strict inflation targeting fiscal policy will not be very effective in times when the interest rate is above zero. When government spending goes up during normal times, inflation increases, and sharp increases in the real interest rate are needed to return inflation to its target value. The sharp increase in the real interest rate offsets the increase in output brought about by the increase in government spending, and this is what makes the multiplier small in this case. Under reasonable parametrizations, there "really isn’t much fiscal policy can do."

[More particularly, with strict inflation targeting, the multiplier is less than one. When the Fed follows a Taylor rule instead of strict inflation targeting, the multiplier is larger, but still less than one (though not always, it could even be less than the multiplier for strict inflation targeting under some conditions). If monetary policy maintains a constant real rate instead of following a Taylor rule, the multiplier is equal to one.

This means that during normal times, sticky price models predict fiscal policy multipliers of a magnitude less than or equal to one, with the exact magnitude depending upon the rule the Fed follows, i.e. how the real interest rate responds to fiscal policy changes. These values are much like those we see from actual estimates using data from time periods when the interest rate is above the zero bound. Thus, contrary to what many people believe, estimates of multipliers less than one obtained using data from time periods where the nominal interest rate is above zero (e.g. war periods) actually support New Keynesian models.]

The results above are only applicable when the interest rate is unconstrained by the zero bound. But things change when the zero bound is a constraint (as Scott seems to acknowledge in a subsequent post). It's no longer true that fiscal policy multipliers are relatively small. In general, at the zero bound fiscal policy multipliers are greater than one, and this remains true under strict inflation targeting. Woodford explains:

Note that if, as in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), it is assumed that the central bank pursues a strict zero inflation target as long as this is consistent with the zero lower bound, then the ... values computed here for the multipliers dYL/drL and dYL/dGL are the same under that simpler hypothesis.

The larger multiplier occurs because the increase in government spending increases inflation (more precisely it reduces the rate of deflation). If the crisis is expected to last another period with some probability, as it will in the model, then government spending is expected to persist as well and expected inflation will rise. The increase in expected inflation lowers the real interest rate when the zero bound is a constraint (even with strict inflation targeting), and the lower real interest rate generates additional economic activity.

Note that the source of the increase in expected inflation is the expected increase in government spending in the next time period. All that's required for expected inflation to rise is that fiscal policy is expected to persist another period. However, the Fed won't do anything in response to the rise in inflation expectations because under the assumptions of the model the target interest rate remains negative (and to go back to an earlier point in the discussion, the expected inflation is credible due to observable changes in fiscal policy in the present time period).

The bottom line is that despite recent claims to the contrary, when the economy is at the zero bound fiscal policy is still effective, i.e. it has a multiplier greater than one, even under strict inflation targeting.

If I've mischaracterized anyone, I'm sure I'll hear about it.

Friday, June 04, 2010

"The Case for More Monetary Stimulus Remains"

Joseph Gagnon says further monetary ease is needed and, furthermore, it does not rely on expected future policy rates or other purely expectational effects (I've argued recently that generating such effects might be difficult to do):

Still No Exit: The Case for More Monetary Stimulus Remains Strong, by Joseph E. Gagnon: Six months ago I wrote a policy brief [pdf] in which I argued for large additional purchases of long-term bonds by the central banks of the four largest advanced economies—the United States, the euro area, Japan, and the United Kingdom—to reduce long-term interest rates. That advice remains relevant today for three of these economies. In the United Kingdom, however, policy should remain on hold pending further developments in inflation.
The European sovereign debt crisis is causing euro area and UK politicians to tighten fiscal policy faster than expected, which will weigh on economic growth, and the spillover effects also will be negative for growth in Japan and the United States. This fiscal retrenchment makes it all the more important for monetary policy to support economic recovery.
Over the past six months, forecasts of economic activity have improved noticeably in Japan, supported by exports to developing Asia. However, the improved outlook is still far below Japan’s long-run sustainable economic path. Prices continue to fall in Japan so that, on balance, Japan needs monetary ease more urgently than any other economy.
Economic prospects in the euro area have been marked down from a level that was already far below potential. At the same time, core inflation fell to 0.7 percent in April,1 pointing to a dramatic undershooting of the European Central Bank’s 2 percent inflation target over the next few months now that energy prices have stabilized. The need for monetary ease has greatly increased in the euro area.
Forecasts of US growth have been marked up a bit over the past six months, but this improvement is threatened by the strengthening dollar. Moreover, the Federal Reserve’s latest forecast (compiled before the recent wave of bad news from Europe) continues to show unemployment far above its long-run level through the end of 2012. In addition, the news on inflation has been strikingly weak. The core consumer price index (CPI) rose only 0.9 percent in the 12 months to April and only 0.3 percent (annual rate) in the last six months. These rates are far below the Fed’s desired inflation rate of around 2 percent. With both employment and inflation below desired levels over the foreseeable future, the case for more monetary ease is strong.
The United Kingdom is the exception. At 3.2 percent, the UK core inflation rate in April was higher than expected and above the Bank of England’s target for headline inflation of 2 percent.2 With output still far below potential, inflation is likely to fall in coming months. Thus, the current low policy interest rate is appropriate, but the risk of a further unwelcome rise in inflation suggests that it may be prudent to wait for inflation to fall before easing policy further.
With short-term interest rates close to zero, the way to ease monetary policy now is by lowering longer-term interest rates. In a recent paper, my coauthors and I showed that Fed purchases of safe long-term bonds in 2009 lowered 10-year bond yields around 50 to 75 basis points. The latest inflation report of the Bank of England shows that similar purchases in the United Kingdom last year lowered long-term rates there, also. There is no reason to believe that such policies cannot work in the euro area and Japan. The Fed’s actions last year spurred record issuance of corporate bonds in the United States, supporting business investment and employment. We need even more this year.
Notes
1. Core inflation is the 12-month change in the harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP) excluding energy and unprocessed food. Excluding volatile food and energy prices provides a better measure of where inflation is trending.

2. Core inflation is the 12-month change in the CPI excluding energy and unprocessed food. This rate includes the effect of a value-added tax increase in January that appears to have temporarily boosted inflation by at least 1 percentage point.

Let me add that even with the lags in monetary policy, today's employment report reinforces that it could be a long, long time before labor markets recover fully, so there's plenty of time for policy to have a positive effect in boosting the recovery.

Thursday, June 03, 2010

"The Mankiw Rule Today"

Andy Harless says the Mankiw rule for monetary policy indicates is will be quite awhile before the Fed starts increasing the target interest rate:

US Monetary Policy in the 2010’s: The Mankiw Rule Today, by Andrew Harless: To make a short story even shorter, the Mankiw Rule suggests that the Zero Interest Rate Policy will continue for quite some time, barring dramatic changes in the inflation and/or unemployment rates.

“The Mankiw Rule” is what I call Greg Mankiw’s version of the Taylor Rule. “Taylor Rule” is now the general term for a rule that sets a monetary policy interest rate (usually the federal funds rate in the US case) as a linear function of an inflation rate and a measure of economic slack. ... Unfortunately, there are now many different versions of the Taylor Rule, which all lead to different conclusions. Not only are there many different measures of both slack and inflation; there are also an infinite number of possible coefficients that could be used to relate them to the policy interest rate. ...

Parsimony suggests that a good Taylor rule should have 3 characteristics: it should be as simple as possible; it should use robust, easily defined, and well-known measures of slack and inflation; and it should fit reasonably well to past monetary policy. Also, to have credibility, such a rule should have “stood the test of time” to some extent: it should fit reasonably well to some subsequent monetary policy experience after it was first proposed. The Mankiw Rule has all these characteristics. It uses the unemployment rate and the core CPI inflation rate as its measures, and it applies the same coefficient to both. This setup leaves it with only two free parameters, which Greg set in a 2001 paper (pdf) so as to fit the results to actual 1990’s monetary policy. As you can see from the chart below, the rule fits subsequent monetary policy rather well, although policy has tended to be slightly more easy (until 2008) than the rule would imply.

You will notice a substantial divergence, however, after 2008, between the Mankiw Rule and the actual federal funds rate. If the reason for this divergence isn’t immediately clear, you need to take a closer look at the vertical axis. ...

If we wanted to make a guess as to when the Fed will (or should) raise its target for the federal funds rate, a reasonable guess would be “when the Mankiw Rule rate rises above zero.” When will that happen? (Will it ever happen?) Nobody knows, of course, but the algebra is straightforward as to what will need to happen to inflation and unemployment. If the core inflation rate remains near 1%, the unemployment rate will have to fall to 7%. If the core inflation rate rises to 2%, the unemployment rate will still have to fall to 8%. Do you expect either of these things to happen soon? I don’t.

I don't either, but that doesn't mean the Fed can't deviate from its past pattern. Let's hope that the members of the FOMC are smart enough not to begin raising interest rates too soon. However, the hawkish statements coming from the Fed recently, particularly from presidents of the regional Federal Reserve banks, do make me wonder if the Fed will begin raising rates while unemployment remains substantially elevated. For example (and this relatively dovish overall compared to, say, this):

The implication is that the policy rate may have to begin to rise even while unemployment is considerably higher than before the recession. I'm very concerned about unemployment, and certainly employment trends should be a critical consideration in setting policy. But I accept that good policy, even in circumstances of unacceptable levels of unemployment, may incorporate higher interest rates.

Wednesday, June 02, 2010

"Does Washington Care About Unemployment"

Continuing the political economy discussion from yesterday, why is there so little urgency in Washington about the unemployment problem?:

Does Washington Care About Unemployment?, by Brad DeLong: We are live at The Week: ... The last time we had an oversupply of workers of this magnitude was 1983, during the Reagan-Volcker disinflation. ... The unemployment rate hit 10.5 percent. ... Washington, D.C. was in a panic. With high unemployment perceived as a genuine national emergency, the Federal Reserve embarked on a policy of massive monetary ease. The Reagan administration promised that the deficits created by its 1981 tax cuts and increased defense spending were the recipe for putting America back to work. Everybody had a plan to reduce unemployment. And every lobbyist or speculator with a scheme unrelated to jobs recast his pet project as a magic unemployment-reducing bullet.
Today, the unemployment rate is kissing 10 percent. ... Yet, unlike 1983, there is no sense of urgency in Washington. ...
The Federal Reserve has had its monetary throttle fully open for more than two years now. But it is no longer talking about further turbo-charging the engines of growth. Instead, deliberations within the Federal Open Market Committee appear preoccupied with how best to apply the brakes. A degree of panic would be more appropriate — along with a commitment to use that panic to drive job-creation. ...
The Obama administration and the Democratic majority in Congress passed a fiscal stimulus plan half the size recommended by Democratic economists fifteen months ago. Since then, they have been unable to assemble a political majority to finish the second half of the job. There seems to be no appetite for addressing ten percent unemployment.
Instead, we have the Obama administration calling for a three-year spending freeze on programs unrelated to national security. We have Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee chairman Chris van Hollen calling for deeper short-term spending cuts. We have an administration experiencing difficulty finding $23 billion to prevent additional teacher layoffs, even though maintaining — no, expanding — investment in education in a recession is the no-brainiest of no-brainers.
Why the enormous disconnect? ... I can’t help but think that ... a deep and wide gulf has grown between the economic hardships of Americans and the seeming incomprehension, or indifference, of courtiers in the imperial city.
Have decades of widening wealth inequality created a chattering class of reporters, pundits and lobbyists who’ve lost their connection to mainstream America? Has the collapse of the union movement removed not only labor’s political muscle but its beating heart from the consciousness of the powerful? Has this recession ... left the kind of people who converse with the powerful in Washington secure in their jobs and thus communicating calm while the unemployed are engulfed in panic? Are we passively watching an unrepresented underclass of the long-term unemployed created before our eyes?
I don’t know. But this unseemly calm does astonish me.

Tuesday, June 01, 2010

Tyler Cowen: Is There a General Glut?

Tyler Cowen argues that:

Is there a general glut?, by Tyler Cowen: ... Reading the Keynesian bloggers, one gets the feeling that it is only an inexplicable weakness, cowardice, stupidity, whatever, that stops policies to drive a more robust recovery.  The Keynesians have no good theory of why their advice isn't being followed, except perhaps that the Democrats are struck with some kind of "Republican stupidity" virus.  (This is also an awkward point for Sumner, who seems to suggest that Bernanke has forgotten his earlier writings on monetary economics.)  The thing is, that same virus seems to be sweeping the world, including a lot of parties on the Left.
Romer, Geithner, Summers, et.al. know all the same economics that Krugman and DeLong and Thoma do.  If a bigger AD stimulus would set so many things right, they'd gladly lay tons of political capital on the line to see it through and proclaim triumph at the end of the road.

Except they expect it would bring only a marginal improvement. ...

I still think they should try to do it -- through more aggressive monetary policy -- but it's a judgment call and that's why they are more or less staying put. ...

I don't get the claim that since the administration's economists are not pushing for a large, new stimulus package, it means they don't think it would work. In fact, I don't even agree with the basic premise that they have been silent on this issue. For example, I recently noted an op-ed by Christina Romer that appeared in the Washington Post where she argues for more fiscal stimulus, particularly measures that prevent teacher layoffs (but she also calls for more help generally when she says "Further targeted actions to speed the recovery and reduce unemployment... are good for the economy and good for families...") This was written at a time when Congress was considering a meager amount of additional stimulus. The politics were clear, Congress was not about to increase the amount of additional stimulus, instead they were considering reducing it. Romer was trying to stop them from doing this by pointing our how harmful such reductions would be, and if she is successful, it will be far from a "marginal improvement." So, contrary to the claim Tyler makes, the administration is pushing for more stimulus -- but, understandably, only when they think there is some chance it might do some good.

The mere fact that the administration can read the writing on Congressional walls, that the administration has decided that using political capital to push forcefully for more stimulus is tossing valuable political capital down a sinkhole, does not imply that the administration's economic advisors see no large benefit from further stimulus. Beating dead horses does not get you anywhere, it simply wastes valuable time and resources. It's not that they are unwilling to "Put their reputations behind policies which might backfire or irritate Congress" as Tyler suggests as one reason they are reluctant to push for more fiscal stimulus, it's that they don't think there's any real chance of getting the votes needed to pass the legislation. Call it ignorance among members of Congress, "weakness, cowardice, stupidity, whatever," but the votes simply aren't there.

As for Tyler's (and others') call for monetary policy instead of fiscal policy, here's the problem. It relies upon changing expectations of future inflation (which changes the real interest rate). You have to get people to believe that the Fed will actually be willing to create inflation in the future when it comes time to do so. However, it's unlikely that it will be optimal for the Fed to cause inflation when the time comes. Because of that, the best policy is to promise that you'll create inflation, then renege on the promise when it comes time to follow through. Since people know that, and expect the Fed will not actually carry through, it's hard to get them to change their expectations now. All that credibility the Fed has built up and protected concerning their inflation fighting credentials works against them here.

Fiscal policy does not have these problems. Maybe monetary policy would work in spite of the time consistency problems, I'm willing to try and there are creative ways around this problem that might work (see here for how to credibly commit to irresponsibility). But I'm not willing to put all my faith in this one policy basket, particularly since I think fiscal policy is the superior tool in deep recessions (but not in normal times). Fiscal policy must be part of the mix as well, and since the economy is not expected to return to full employment for several years, there's more than enough time for further fiscal stimulus directed specifically at job creation to work.

In a subsequent post, Tyler Cowen posts an excerpt from Kevin Drum:

Kevin Drum on fiscal stimulus, by Tyler Cowen:

But despite all this, there's one pretty good reason to think that Tyler is basically right: tax cuts. Lefty economists might generally believe that increasing spending is a more efficient way of stimulating consumption than reducing taxes, but they'd almost certainly accept a big tax cut as an almost-as-good substitute. And tax cuts have two big advantages over spending. On the substantive side, they work faster. Spending takes time to work its way through the economy, but a tax cut (for example, a payroll tax holiday) boosts the economy almost immediately. And on the political side it's quite doable. Republicans would be persuadable because they love tax cuts and Democrats would be persuadable because it would help the economy. For Obama, then, it would be the best of all worlds: a fast stimulus that gets bipartisan support, something that boosts the economy while dampening the inevitable criticism he'd get for blowing up the deficit.

But he's not pushing for this. Not even quietly. And this suggests that Tyler is right: Obama's advisors might be in favor of further fiscal stimulus, but not by much. And the best explanation for this is that lefty or not, they're genuinely afraid, as Tyler says, that it would bring only marginal improvements at the cost of significant problems down the road.

The full link is here.

First, a payroll tax cut is a supply-side policy that has demand side effects (as do all supply-side tax cuts). Increasing AS when AD is too low is a bad idea, it cause deflation which raises the real interest rate and slows the recovery. So the AS effects of these policies can be troublesome -- better to use AD side policies like government spending.

Second, what evidence is leading them to conclude that temporary tax cuts have a strong impact on demand? I argued that tax cuts can be helpful here, but not because they have large AD effects, the evidence suggests they are mostly saved (see the two graphs in the post). Better targeting could improve that, and I'm not opposed to well-targeted tax cuts being part of the mix (consistent with Drum's claim), but Congress has very poor aim and it's unlikely that tax cuts will be well-targeted. Again, we have several years before employment recovers -- even if tax cuts can produce an immediate impact, there's plenty of time for fiscal policy to be used as part of the mix.

Finally, again I don't understand how making a political calculation that there is no chance Congress will sign on to a package providing significantly more help implies that "they're genuinely afraid ... that it would bring only marginal improvements," and I certainly don't see why it implies that it would come at "the cost of significant problems down the road." Where's the evidence for that? And why aren't costs balanced against benefits? Is the worry that interest rates will go up? Then solve the medical cost escalation problem driving the long-run debt, further stimulus is a drop in the bucket compared to that. A credible plan for the deficit over the long-run is the key here, but that plan has little to do with whether or not more fiscal stimulus is put into place now and everything to do with how we rein in health care costs in the future.

There are probably all sorts of policies that the administration's economic advisors believe would be beneficial to the nation, but they know there's no chance that Congress will approve them so they don't even bother to bring them up. The mere fact that the administration's economists aren't out using up Obama's political capital says very little about what they think it the correct policy at this point. They are constrained by political advisors who determine what will and won't be pursued. The economists make their impassioned pleas behind closed doors, we do not get to witness this, and then decisions are made independently of them as to what they administration will and will not push for. It is not up to the economists to determine how political capital will be spent, and more than economics goes into this decision. Maybe Tyler's right and they don't think the policies will help much, or maybe they made an impassioned plea that more is necessary that, in the end, did not persuade the political advisors. Christina Romer's recent op-ed suggests that the administration's economists do see large benefits from further stimulus, but in any case, the fact that they are not out pushing for this forcefully does not tell us much about their beliefs concerning the benefits of further stimulus.

What the administration's economists truly believe I can only speculate about. But I know what I think. The economy, the labor market in particular, needs more help and fiscal policy -- and here I mean government spending targeted at job preservation and creation first and foremost -- has an important role to play in giving the economy the boost it needs.

[See also, Brad DeLong, Nick Rowe, and Scott Sumner.]

Monday, May 31, 2010

Paul Krugman: The Pain Caucus

The budget and inflation hawks are winning the battle to define the "conventional wisdom" over how policymakers should respond now that the economy is just setting out on the long road to recovery. The wisdom may be conventional, but it is not very wise:

The Pain Caucus, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: What’s the greatest threat to our still-fragile economic recovery? Dangers abound... But what I currently find most ominous is the spread of a destructive idea: the view that now, less than a year into a weak recovery from the worst slump since World War II, is the time for policy makers to stop helping the jobless and start inflicting pain.
When the financial crisis first struck, most of the world’s policy makers responded appropriately, cutting interest rates and allowing deficits to rise. And by doing the right thing, by applying the lessons learned from the 1930s, they managed to limit the damage: It was terrible, but it wasn’t a second Great Depression.
Now, however, demands that governments switch from supporting their economies to punishing them have been proliferating in op-eds, speeches and reports from international organizations. Indeed, the idea that what depressed economies really need is even more suffering seems to be the new conventional wisdom...
The extent to which inflicting economic pain has become the accepted thing was driven home to me by the ... Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development... The O.E.C.D. is a deeply cautious organization; what it says at any given time virtually defines that moment’s conventional wisdom. And what the O.E.C.D. is saying right now is that policy makers should stop promoting economic recovery and instead begin raising interest rates and slashing spending.
What’s particularly remarkable ... is that ... the O.E.C.D.’s own forecasts show no hint of an inflationary threat. So why raise rates? The answer, as best I can make it out, is that the organization believes that we must worry ... that markets might start expecting inflation, even though they shouldn’t and currently don’t...
A similar argument is used to justify fiscal austerity. Both textbook economics and experience say that slashing spending when you’re still suffering from high unemployment is a really bad idea — not only does it deepen the slump, but it does little to improve the budget outlook, because much of what governments save by spending less they lose as a weaker economy depresses tax receipts. And the O.E.C.D. predicts that high unemployment will persist for years. Nonetheless, the organization demands both that governments cancel any further plans for economic stimulus and that they begin “fiscal consolidation” next year.
Why do this? Again, to give markets something they shouldn’t want and currently don’t. Right now, investors don’t seem at all worried about the solvency of the U.S. government; the interest rates on federal bonds are near historic lows. ...
The best summary I’ve seen of all this comes from Martin Wolf..., who describes the new conventional wisdom as being that “giving the markets what we think they may want in future — even though they show little sign of insisting on it now — should be the ruling idea in policy.”
Put that way, it sounds crazy. And it is. Yet it’s a view that’s spreading. And it’s already having ugly consequences. Last week conservative members of the House, invoking the new deficit fears, scaled back a bill extending aid to the long-term unemployed — and the Senate left town without acting on even the inadequate measures that remained. As a result, many American families are about to lose unemployment benefits, health insurance, or both — and as these families are forced to slash spending, they will endanger the jobs of many more.
And that’s just the beginning. More and more, conventional wisdom says that the responsible thing is to make the unemployed suffer. And while the benefits from inflicting pain are an illusion, the pain itself will be all too real.

Sunday, May 30, 2010

Growth Policy versus Stabilization Policy

I posted this at Maximum Utility a few days ago:

Growth Policy versus Stabilization Policy, by Mark Thoma (with a few minor edits): In macroeconomics, there are two important policy questions, and our attention to one or the other changes with the economic events of each era. One question concerns stabilization policy -- keeping the economy as close as possible to the long-run growth path -- and the other is growth policy, i.e. policy that attempts to maximize the long-run growth rate. (There is also work on whether stability and growth are related. More stable economies could grow faster due to reduced uncertainty, but government intervention to stabilize the economy could also stifle growth according to some models, so the relationship is not clear a priori. In modern models, these are not strictly separable, but it is still a useful way to think about policy conceptually)

We could go back further than this, but let me pick the story up in the 1970s. A few economists were worried about growth at this time, but the main concern during the tumultuous 1970s and early 1980s was with how to do a better job of stabilizing the economy. The traditional Keynesian policies, which had not taken account of inflation or expectations in a satisfactory way, had failed to produce the desired stabilization. This led to the search for a new economic model that could provide better guidance. The result was the development of the New Classical model, replaced soon after by the New Keynesian model when the New Classical could not explain both the duration and magnitude of actual cycles, and it's implication that only unanticipated money matters appeared to be contradicted by actual data.

The New Keynesian model, and its new advice for stabilization policy concerning the use of interest rate rules, seemed to work and we entered into a period known as "The Great Moderation"  (stated compactly, the new policy involved targeting an interest rate with a Taylor rule that responds to output and inflation, where the response to inflation was more than one to one). This period, which began in the early 1980s, saw low and stable inflation rates, and a fall in the variation in GDP of around 50 percent. The result was the emergence of the view that the stabilization problem had been solved. By using the correct monetary policy, policymakers had produced the Great Moderation, and that left other policy tools such as fiscal policy free to pursue the maximum growth objective (and the result was supply-side fiscal policies such as cutting capital gains and dividend taxes justified by arguments about their contribution to growth).

Because of this, the profession moved on to growth theory and policy. Stabilization had been solved with monetary policy, and growth was now the major question to be solved. If the economy was still as jittery as it had been in the past, then stabilization policy would have also been of concern to academic economists, but developing optimal monetary policy rules from the New Keynesian structure seemed to have solved that problem.

Of course, recent events show us in no uncertain terms that the stabilization problem has not been solved, and questions about how to stabilize the economy ought to be coming to the forefront again. And they are, to some extent, but I'd argue that our ability to stabilize the economy has been limited by those who still think growth is the only important consideration for evaluating policy. For example, because of this, the stimulus package that was put into place had to be justified by its ability to stimulate long-run growth when its main concern should have been with how to stabilize the economy. That led us to concentrate on tax cuts (because conservatives believe tax cuts increase economic growth) and infrastructure spending. However, tax cuts of the type that were implemented are mostly saved, and infrastructure spending takes much too long to put into place (and may not generate as much employment per dollar as other types of spending). These are not optimal stabilization policies. Other types of spending, the types that get money into people's hands and puts people to work right away, might have worked faster and had a greater benefit in terms of moving the economy closer to trend, but since these policies were harder to justify in terms of their contribution to long-run growth. Therefore, they could not find the support they needed.

I believe that stability is important to people (i.e. that utility is lower when there is more economic uncertainty), and because of this stabilization policy can be justified on its own terms, there's no reason to insist that stabilization policy maximize growth. The policies that maximize growth are different in some cases from the polices that stabilize the economy, and insistence that all policies can be justified by their contribution to long-run growth causes us to sacrifice economic stability. The policies we put into place should pay attention to both goals, but I believe we have paid far too much attention to growth in formulating recent policy, and not nearly enough to stability.

Hopefully, recent events will begin to shift our thinking away from the "growth above all else" policies we've pursued since the early 1980s, and that we will devote more attention to stabilization policy. We can put people back to work faster than we did this time around, and we can do a better job of increasing aggregate demand early in the recession (thereby reducing the fall in GDP and employment). But to do so we have to realize that stabilization is an important policy goal, and that it does not always lead to the same policies that are needed to maximize growth. People's lives, or at least their livelihoods, depend on it.

Thursday, May 27, 2010

Maximum Utility: What Economic Policies Should Government Pursue During the Recovery?

[I am going to start reposting entries from my Maximum Utility blog a few days after they are posted at MoneyWatch. This one is a bit older than that, and it was first noted here.]

What Economic Policies Should Government Pursue During the Recovery?, Maximum Utility: Now that the economy appears to be turning around, how should the government react? What types of policies are needed for the recovery period?

1. Things look better now. Almost all economic indicators are beginning to point upward, but we don't know yet if the recovery will be strong or weak, or if we might be headed for a double dip. For that reason, don't pull back on monetary and fiscal stimulus too soon. It will be tempting to listen to the deficit and inflation hawks as things start to improve, but it's important that the stimulus not be withdrawn before the economy can stand on its own.

2. If the recovery seems to be very slow or stagnating, don't be afraid to give the economy the additional help it needs. Output is starting to grow, but labor markets are lagging behind. It's not yet clear if the lag will be as large as in the previous two recessions, but it's certainly something to keep an eye on.

3. Similarly, there is a huge jobs backlog -- millions and millions of people have lost jobs during this recession -- and it will take a considerable amount of time to reemploy these workers even under strong labor market conditions. Workers will still need unemployment compensation, help with health care, and other social services until they can find work. They are not lazy or playing the system, it's just that the applicant to jobs ratio will remain high until the backlog is cleared, so don't cut them off too soon.

4. If the government does try to take an active rather than a passive role in the recovery, try to anticipate what the post-recession economy will look like and help with the adjustment. For example, there is lots of structural unemployment due to the scaling down of the housing and financial industries. Where will these workers go and what can the government do to help them get there? Will we need to rely upon exports to a greater degree than before the recession in order to maintain robust growth? If so, what can the government do to help this sector to develop? I don't mean the the government should try to manage the economy with a heavy handed industrial policy approach, but when it's clear that change is coming to a particular sector, then the government should do what it can to help (or at least get out of the way).

5. As the economy recovers, it will be easy to forget about the problems we had and what caused them. Don't let exuberance over the recovery get in the way of making the changes that need to be made to try to prevent this from happening again. All of the promises to do better that are made when things are really bad are easily forgotten once things improve.

6. When the time comes -- but not a moment before that -- policy must be reversed. The fiscal policy measures involving both government spending and tax cuts were sold as "targeted, timely, and temporary."  We could have done better at the targeted and timely part, but it's not too late to make it temporary. It will be difficult to cut the stimulus once it's clear that the economy has recovered, there will be an outcry about the jobs that will be lost, the decline in growth, etc., but it's important that we do it. First, there are theoretical reasons to believe that temporary fiscal policy has a much larger effect than permanent changes within modern, New Keynesian structures. Second, we may need fiscal policy again someday. If we don't keep out promises and reverse the spending and tax cuts, the next time fiscal policy is needed nobody will believe that will actually be temporary no matter what is promised, and that will make it much more difficult to pursue the policy that is needed.

Update: 7. State and local governments are still having trouble, and are likely to continue to struggle at least through the next fiscal year. If they don't get more help, this create a big drag on the recovery.

This is surely incomplete. What else should be on the list?

Tuesday, May 25, 2010

Growth Policy versus Stabilization Policy

I have a new post at MoneyWatch:

Growth Policy versus Stabilization Policy: In economics, as in other disciplines, the important questions change over time. In macroeconomics, there are two big questions and our attention to one or the other changes with the economic events of each era. One question concerns stabilization policy -- keeping the economy as close as possible to the long-run growth path -- and the other is growth policy, i.e. policy that attempts to maximize the long-run growth rate. (There is also work on whether stability and growth are related. More stable economies could grow faster due to reduced uncertainty, but government intervention to stabilize the economy could also stifle growth according to some models, so the relationship is not clear a priori.)

We could go back further than this, but let me pick the story up in the 1970s. ...[continue reading]...

The argument is that we have paid too much attention to growth policy, and not enough to stabilization. Even if the growth policies do pay off in the long-run, the over emphasis on growth has caused a slower recovery and it's not at all evident that's a desirable trade off.

Friday, May 21, 2010

Fed Watch: Fed Disconnect

Tim Duy reacts to Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo's recent testimony on the European debt crisis:

Fed Disconnect, by Tim Duy: Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo's recent testimony on the European debt crisis illustrates a significant inconsistency with between the Fed's outlook and its policy.  Honestly, if Tarullo actually believes with he says, the Fed needs to be pursuing a much more aggressive policy.  But the FOMC is actually debating the opposite - when and how to reverse its swelling balance sheet.

Tarullo highlights the two obvious negative channels by which the European crisis will feed into the US economy.  The first is financial:

These effects on U.S. markets underscore the high degree of integration of the U.S. and European economies and highlight the risks to the United States of renewed financial stresses in Europe. One avenue through which financial turmoil in Europe might affect the U.S. economy is by weakening the asset quality and capital positions of U.S. financial institutions...

...In addition to imposing direct losses on U.S. institutions, a heightening of financial stresses in Europe could be transmitted to financial markets globally. Increases in uncertainty and risk aversion could lead to higher funding costs and liquidity shortages for some institutions, and forced asset sales and reductions in collateral values that could, in turn, engender further market turmoil. In these conditions, U.S. banks and other institutions might be forced to pull back on their lending, as they did during the period of severe financial market dysfunction that followed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.

 The second is via trade linkages:

Another means by which an intensification of financial turmoil in Europe could affect U.S. growth is by reducing trade. Collectively, Europe represents one of our most important trading partners and accounts for about one-quarter of U.S. merchandise exports. Accordingly, a moderate economic slowdown across Europe would cause U.S. export growth to fall, weighing on U.S. economic performance by a discernible, but modest extent. However, a deeper contraction in Europe associated with sharp financial dislocations would have the potential to stall the recovery of the entire global economy, and this scenario would have far more serious consequences for U.S. trade and economic growth. A resultant slowdown in the United States and abroad would likely also feed back into the health of U.S. financial institutions.

Tarullo acknowledges that the European crisis is largely a European problem, while the Fed is reduced to a limited supporting role.  What caught my attention was first this section regarding the potential for financial disruption:

The timing of such an event in the current instance would be unfortunate, as banks generally have only recently ceased tightening lending standards, and have yet to unwind from the considerable tightening that has occurred over the past two years. Moreover, aggregate bank lending, particularly to businesses, continues to contract. The result would be another source of risk to the U.S. recovery in an environment of still-fragile balance sheets and considerable slack. Although we view such a development as unlikely, the swoon in global financial markets earlier this month suggests that it is not out of the question.

The fact that aggregate bank lending continues to contract, that the Fed is obviously aware of this, and that, according to Tarullo, the European crisis has the potential to aggravate an already existing problem all clearly point toward a more aggressive quantitative easing program than in place.  Actually, what is happening is the Fed is considering a quantitative tightening program:

Meeting participants agreed broadly on key objectives of a longer-run strategy for asset sales and redemptions. The strategy should be consistent with the achievement of the Committee's objectives of maximum employment and price stability. In addition, the strategy should normalize the size and composition of the balance sheet over time. Reducing the size of the balance sheet would decrease the associated reserve balances to amounts consistent with more normal operations of money markets and monetary policy. Returning the portfolio to its historical composition of essentially all Treasury securities would minimize the extent to which the Federal Reserve portfolio might be affecting the allocation of credit among private borrowers and sectors of the economy.

Tarullo also presses for a hawkish fiscal stance:

The United States is in a very different position from that of the European countries whose debt instruments have been under such pressure. But their experience is another reminder, if one were needed, that every country with sustained budget deficits and rising debt--including the United States--needs to act in a timely manner to put in place a credible program for sustainable fiscal policies.

Interestingly, Tarullo seems to suggest that the US response to fiscal problem in Europe should be to tighten US fiscal policy on roughly the same timetable the Fed is looking forward to tightening US monetary policy.

To summarize, the Fed believes we are facing another threat to demand, either via financial or real trade linkages, at a time when lending activity continues to fall, suggesting that monetary policy is too tight to begin with.  But the Fed stance is to believe that monetary policy is on the verge of being too loose, and, if anything, planning needs to be made to tighten policy.  At the same time, Fed policymakers also believe fiscal policy needs to turn toward tightening as well. Meanwhile, unemployment hovers just below 10%, nor is it expected to decline rapidly,  and inflation continues to trend downward.

All of which together suggests that the Fed's policy stance is seriously out of whack with policymaker's interpretation of actual and potential economic developments.  And I have trouble explaining the disconnect.

Tuesday, May 18, 2010

"Ooooo...'out of thin air!'"

David Andolfatto reacts to Ron Paul's worries that the Fed can create money "out of thin air":

On Ron Paul and the Fed, by David Andolfatto: ...The Fed has the ability to create money "out of thin air!" Whenever I hear this expression, I chuckle. We all have the power to create debt out of "thin air." When Microsoft creates shares to finance an acquisition, it creates the shares "out of thin air." If you bum a beer from a friend and promise to repay him next week, you create a debt obligation "out of thin air." Ooooo..."out of thin air!" ...

Tuesday, May 11, 2010

Congress and the Fed: Why the Bark is Worse Than the Bite

New post at MoneyWatch in reaction to today's 96-0 vote in the Senate to audit the Fed:

Congress and the Fed: Why the Bark is Worse Than the Bite

I argue that Congress should try to look like it is being very tough on the Fed, but it's not in Congress' interest to take a big bite out of the Fed's authority.

"Banks Failing to Lend is Not the Problem"

Dean Baker takes on the "banks not lending" explanation for the persistence of the downturn and sluggish movement toward recovery:

Banks failing to lend is not the problem, by Dean Baker: One of the big myths of the current downturn is that the reason the slump persists is that banks are refusing to lend. The story goes that because the banks have taken such big hits to their capital as a result of the collapse of the housing bubble and record default rates, they no longer have the money to lend to small- and mid-sized businesses.
We then get the story about how small businesses are the engine of job creation, responsible for most new jobs. Therefore, if they can't get capital, we can't expect to see robust job growth.
This story of banks not lending is used to justify all sorts of special policies to help out small businesses and banks. In fact, the Obama administration has plans to make a special $30bn slush fund available to banks if they promise to lend it out to small businesses.
In reality, every part of this argument is completely wrong. First, small businesses are not special engines of job growth. Small businesses do create most new jobs, but they also lose most new jobs. Half of new businesses go under within four years after being started. Jobs do get created when the businesses start, but jobs are lost when the businesses fail.
The reality is that businesses of all sizes create jobs. There is no special reason to favor small businesses in promoting job creation. We should favor businesses that create good paying jobs with good benefits and conditions, regardless of their size.
The other parts of this story make even less sense. Let's hypothesize that many banks are crippled in their ability to lend because of the large hits to their balance sheets from bad mortgage debt. Well, not all banks got themselves over their heads with bad mortgages. There are banks with relatively clean balance sheets.
If it were the case that a substantial portion of banks are now unable to issue many new loans because of their inadequate capital, we would expect to see the healthy banks rushing in to fill the lending gap. There should be accounts of dynamic banks that are taking advantage of this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity and rapidly gaining market share.
While this may be happening, there certainly have not been many accounts in the media of banks that fit this description. In other words, it does not appear to be the view among banks, including those with plenty of capital, that there are many good potential customers who are unable to borrow money.
The other missing part of the story has to do with the nature of competition between small firms and their larger competitors. We know that large firms have no difficulty attracting capital at present. They can issue bonds at near record-low interest rates. They can also borrow short-term money at extraordinarily low interest rates in the commercial paper market.
If small and mid-sized companies were being prevented from expanding due to their inability to raise capital then we should be seeing larger companies rushing in to take market share. Retail stores should be opening up new outlets everywhere. Factories should be rapidly increasing output and transportation companies should be rushing into new markets.
Of course, we don't see any of this happening. If anything, most large businesses are expanding at a slower rate than they did before the crisis. If their competitors have been hamstrung due to a lack of credit, no one seems to have told Wal-Mart, Starbucks and the rest. They have both slowed the rate at which they are adding new stores, not sped it up as the credit-shortage story would imply.
There is truth to the credit-squeeze story, but it goes in the other direction. Stores that have seen their business plummet as a result of the downturn are, in fact, worse credit risks from the standpoint of banks. Many businesses that were profitable in 2006 and 2007 are now highly unprofitable and may not be able to stay in business. As a result, the banks that were happy to lend money just a few years ago are no longer willing to lend money to the same business. This drying up of credit happens in every downturn. It is just more serious this time because of the severity of the downturn.
The moral of this story is that we should not think that "fixing" the banks will get us out of the downturn. The problem is that we have to generate demand, which means having the government spend more money to stimulate the economy. Unfortunately, the politicians in Washington are scared to talk about larger deficits, so more spending seems off the table at the moment – therefore we get this nonsense about insufficient bank lending.
But hey, at the rate we created jobs in April, we should be back at full employment in seven years anyhow. Who could ask for anything more?

This is not a supply problem, banks are sitting on mountains of excess reserves (some of which are serving as insurance against unexpected contingencies, but even so the excess reserves in the system are voluminous). But the ample supply of loans available to be loaned out at the right terms does not automatically create a demand for them.

I think the problem is on both sides. Supply has tightened up due to poor economic conditions -- as noted above banks are unwilling to loan to firms who look shaky during the downturn, firms that might have looked very solid and worthy not all that long ago. But the demand for loans has fallen as well since firms have little reason to invest in such bad economic conditions. So if the goal is to generate more investment, the solution is twofold. First, the demand for loans must be present. Additional government spending as called for above can help, but so can measures such as an investment tax credit or other financial incentives for firms that undertake to new investment. Second, banks must have the money to lend and be willing to do so at reasonable terms. Available reserves are not the problem, it's the fear of losses due to poor economic conditions that is making banks hesitate. One way over this hurdle is for the government to share in losses that banks realize on these loans. With lower expected losses through the loss sharing arrangement, the banks would be more willing to part with funds.

But the big question for me is the desirability of promoting investments that the private sector does not think are a good idea. If the result of this intervention is a bunch of failed investments and wasted resources, then this is not the best way to stimulate the economy. If there's some sort of market failure that is preventing firms and banks from entering into productive deals, then there is clearly a role for government to step in and fix the problem. One could make an argument that, say, risk is artificially elevated (disconnected from its "fundamental" value) and hence some sort of intervention is needed to restore the market, and I think there's some merit to the market failure arguments. Still, rather than helping firms in this way, I'd prefer to have more help for those households suffering the most from the downturn, i.e. additional government spending, transfers, and job creation -- that means a far bigger stimulus program than we got -- and then let firms respond to the additional demand as they see fit.

Finally, this is a bit different -- it involves investment in basic research rather than investment by firms -- but some types of government intervention appear to be productive:

Federal investment in basic research yields outsized dividends -- innovation, companies, jobs, EurekAlert: How can the United States foster long-term economic growth? A new report suggests that one of the best ways is through investment in the basic research that leads to innovation and job creation. ...
"There is no question that the public benefit gained from funding basic research is exponentially greater than the initial investment," said Susan Desmond-Hellmann, Chancellor of University of California San Francisco. "The success stories highlighted in this report demonstrate that fact and are a reminder that the continued scientific and technological leadership of the United States – and our economic well-being – depends on consistent, strong funding for research." ...
These success stories include global industry leaders like Google, Genentech, Cisco Systems, SAS and iRobot, as well as relative newcomers such as advanced battery manufacturer A123 Systems; network security company Arbor Networks; AIDS vaccine developer GeoVax Labs; and Sharklet Technologies, which has developed a novel surface technology based on the qualities of shark skin to combat hospital-acquired infections.
The report illustrates the substantial economic benefits the U.S. reaps when companies are created as a result of discoveries in federally funded university laboratories. One example of this return on investment is TomoTherapy Incorporated, based in Madison, Wisconsin. A $250,000 grant from the National Institutes of Health's National Cancer Institute to two researchers at the University of Wisconsin-Madison enabled the development of ... a highly advanced radiation therapy system that targets cancerous tumors while minimizing exposure and damage to surrounding tissue. Each year the technology is used to help improve the outcomes of tens of thousands of difficult to treat cancer patients around the world.
"That original investment generates many times its value in salaries and taxes returned to both the U.S. and Wisconsin governments," says University of Wisconsin-Madison professor and TomoTherapy Co-founder and Chairman Rock Mackie. TomoTherapy employs 600 people. ...
"University-launched startups can be powerhouses for value creation, becoming public companies at a far greater rate than the average for new businesses," according to Krisztina "Z" Holly, vice provost for innovation at the University of Southern California (USC). "Higher education can play a crucial role not just in spurring pioneering ideas, but in creating entrepreneurs who turn breakthroughs into innovations." The results benefit everyone, she says. Holly points to 24 USC startup companies that currently employ 500 full-time workers, more than half of whom are in Los Angeles. Sixteen of these companies have raised at least $148 million in financing over the past two years, during the height of the recession. ...

Monday, May 10, 2010

"Checks and Balances at the Fed"

Jon Faust is worried that the Dodd proposal to change the selection process for members of the FOMC (the committee that sets monetary policy) will lead to too much political control of the Fed and all the problems that come with it:

Checks and Balances at the Fed, by Jon Faust, RTE: The financial crisis has provided, among other things, a civics lesson about the Federal Reserve. Some people have been surprised to learn that 5 of 12 votes on the Fed’s main policy committee–the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)–are cast people who are not politically appointed. The 7 politically appointed Fed Governors vote on the FOMC, but the remaining 5 votes rotate among the Reserve Bank Presidents, who are chosen by the Board’s of the Reserve Banks. People on those Boards are, themselves, mainly chosen by the member banks of the Federal Reserve System. Senator Dodd’s reform bill attempts to fix this problem.
This supposed fix is dangerously naïve and ignores the lessons of the last great financial crisis.
The bill as reported states: “To eliminate potential conflicts of interest at Federal Reserve Banks, the Federal Reserve Act is amended to state that no company, or subsidiary or affiliate of a company that is supervised by the Board of Governors can vote for Federal Reserve Bank directors…”
The current arrangement of the FOMC was framed as a response to the Great Depression. The framers viewed the conflicts of interest over Fed policy as fundamental and saw no way to eliminate them. Historical precedent suggested (and still suggests) that political control of a central bank leads to lack of discipline and inflation. But complete absence of political influence is also inappropriate in a Democracy.
Thus, the FOMC’s framers looked to the uniquely American solution of checks and balances. In particular, they called upon two widely despised groups during the depression—bankers and politicians—to balance each other’s worst impulses.
Representative Glass and Senator Steagall, of Glass-Steagall fame, fought tenaciously over the balance. Steagall proposed that only the politically-appointed governors would vote on the FOMC. Glass responded that Steagall was “without peer in his advocacy of inflation.” After heated debate, Congress arrived at the 7 to 5 split we have today. Senator Glass summarized the reasoning, “[The vote on the FOMC] will stand 5 to 7 giving the people of the country, as contradistinguished from private banking interest, control by a vote of 7 to 5…” There can be no doubt that the Congress sought to achieve a balance of fundamentally conflicting interests.
I am not arguing that Congress got the balance right, and the recent crisis is certainly reason enough to re-visit what the correct balance would be. But naively fiddling with the balance in the name of eliminating conflicts of interest misses the real civics lesson from the founding of the Fed’s FOMC.

I've written about this topic as well. This is from a post at Maximum Utility, my blog at CBS MoneyWatch:

What’s Wrong With the Dodd Proposal to Restructure the Fed?: A proposal from Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd changes the selection process for key positions within the Federal Reserve system. Unfortunately, this proposal makes the selection process worse, not better. If this proposal is passed into law, it would further concentrate power within the Federal Reserve system, and it would politicize the selection process, both of which are the opposite of where reform should take the system.
The Current Structure of the Federal Reserve System
The Federal Reserve System consists of a Central Bank in Washington and twelve Federal Reserve District (or regional) Banks. The Central Bank's authority resides with the seven member Board of Governors, one of which serves as chair (currently Ben Bernanke). Each of the District Banks has a nine member Board of Directors along with a bank President. It is the selection of the Board of Directors that is at issue.
Currently, the nine member Board of Directors at each of the District Banks consist of three Class A directors, three Class B directors, and three Class C directors. Class A directors are elected by member banks within the district and are professional bankers. Class B directors are also elected by member banks in the district, but these are business leaders, not bankers. Finally, Class C directors are appointed by the Board of Governors and are intended to represent the public interest.
Class B and Class C directors cannot be officers, directors, or employees of any bank, and Class C directors may not be stockholders of any bank. One Class C director is selected by the Board of Governors to serve as Chair of the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors selects the President of each District Bank, but the President must be approved by the Central Bank's Board of Governors.
What is the reasoning behind this structure? When the Fed was created in 1913, there was a concerted attempt to distribute power across geographic regions; between the public and private sectors; and across business, banking, and the public interests. The geographic distinctions were important because it's not unusual for economic conditions to differ regionally -- conditions can be booming in some places and depressed in others -- and the regions would favor different monetary policies. Thus, it's important to bring these different preferences to the table when policy is being determined so that the best overall strategy can be implemented.
Changes in the Distribution of Power over Time
In the early days of the Fed, power over monetary policy -- which at that time was mainly discount rate policy within each Federal Reserve District -- was shared between Washington and the District Banks, so the intent of the system was largely realized.
However, the shared power arrangement within the Federal Reserve system changed after the Great Depression. The Fed did not perform well during the great Depression and one of the problems, it seemed, was that the deliberative, democratic nature of the institution prevented it from taking quick, decisive action when it was most needed. Furthermore, the Fed did not have the tools it needed to deal with system-wide disturbances rather than problems with individual banks (the discount window is well-suited to help individual banks, but it's not an effective tool to combat system wide disruptions; on the other hand, open-market operations -- a policy tool the Fed obtained after the Great Depression -- can inject reserves system-wide and are much more useful to deal with system-wide problems).
The result was that after the Great Depression, power was concentrated in the Central Bank's Board of Governors in Washington D.C., and increasingly over time, in the hands of one person -- the Chair of the Federal Reserve. Thus, over time the Fed has evolved from a democratic, shared power arrangement at its inception to a system that functions, for all intents an purposes, as a single bank in Washington, D.C,. with twelve branches spread across the U.S.
The Dodd Proposal
How would the Dodd proposal change this? Under the proposal, the Board of Directors for each District Bank would be chosen by the Central Bank's Board of Governors (who are themselves chosen by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate). The chair of the Board of Directors at each District Bank would be chosen by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
This means that the key figures within each District Bank would be chosen by Washington, and unlike the present system, there is no attempt at all to represent geographic, business, banking, and public interests explicitly in this arrangement. In addition, it no longer has the explicit safeguards contained in the current rules to prevent bankers from dominating the directorships (e.g. under the new rules the Chair of the Board of Directors could be a banker, currently that can't happen). Given that the appointments are coming from Washington (as opposed to a vote of banks within the District for six of the nine positions on the Board like we have now), there is no guarantee that the District bank Boards won't be stacked with one special interest or another. Thus one of the main reasons given by Dodd for the change in the selection process -- to remove the influence of bankers -- is actually undermined by his proposal because it removes the safeguards against the Board being dominated by banking interests.
I believe that the current structure of the Fed already gives too much power to Washington and not enough to the District Banks, and this has helped to feed the perception that the Fed does not represent the interests of the typical person. Unfortunately, the Dodd proposal further concentrates power in Washington and adds more political elements to the selection process thereby making these problems even worse.
Thus, I agree with this:
Bullard, 48, the St. Louis Fed’s president since April 2008, said ... the Fed is ultimately controlled by political appointees as it stands... “We don’t want to put all the power into Washington and New York,” Bullard said. “That’s just the opposite of what this crisis is teaching us. So you want the input from around the country, and I think it’s really important for informing monetary policy.”
Richmond Fed President Jeffrey Lacker said ... “I wouldn’t want to see the reserve bank governance mechanism politicized in any way,”... Asked if Dodd’s plan would politicize the process, Lacker said: “I think it could.”
Finally, while the proposal claims to insulate the Fed's monetary policy decision from political pressure, this quote from the same article illustrates the dangers of political interference. The quote is in response to another part of the Dodd proposal that would take away some of the power the District Bank Presidents have in setting monetary policy (which is already much less than the power of the Board of Governors):
“I doubt very much that by a year from now Fed presidents are going to have as big a role as they now have,” Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank told reporters... He has said the presidents too often vote in favor of higher interest rates.
That last sentence means he believes the Fed has favored low inflation over low unemployment as it has set interest rate policy. That may or may not be true, but do we really want members of the House setting interest rate policy or changing the structure of the Fed whenever they disagree? I don't.
I fully agree that the selection process for the Directors and the District Bank Presidents could and should be changed (that includes redrawing geographic districts). It's not clear that the present system does the best possible job of representing the array of interests that have a stake in the outcome of policy decisions. But concentrating power in Washington is not the way to solve this problem. Instead we need to redistribute power over a wider range of interests, including geographic interests, and make sure the selection process for key positions within the Federal Reserve system brings those interests to the table when policy is determined.
[Update: See also Alan Blinder's "Threatening the Fed's Independence".]

And one more post from Maximum Utility:

Why The Federal Reserve Needs To Be Independent, by Mark Thoma: There are several bills that have been proposed in Congress directed at the Federal Reserve. The two most prominent proposals are Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd's bill to take away most of the Fed's regulatory authority, and Congressman Ron Paul's bill to force the Fed to allow its monetary policies to be audited by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
Many people worry, rightly in my opinion, that if these proposals or others like them are passed into law, then the Fed's independence would be threatened.
Political business cycles and inflation
Why is the Fed's independence so important? One reason is the control of inflation. As former Federal Reserve Governor Frederic Mishkin wrote this week in an op-ed coauthored with Anil Kashyup of the University of Chicago:
Economic theory and massive amounts of empirical evidence make a strong case for maintaining the Fed's independence. When central banks are subjected to political pressure, authorities often pursue excessively expansionary monetary policy in order to lower unemployment in the short run. This produces higher inflation and higher interest rates without lowering unemployment in the long term. This has happened over and over again in the past, not only in the United States but in many other countries throughout the world.
What Mishkin and Kashyup are referring to are "political business cycles." The idea is that monetary policy acts faster on output and employment than it does on inflation. To take a concrete example, suppose that the impact of a change in the money supply on output peaks about six months after the change in policy, and then fades after that. And also suppose that the impact of the change in the money supply on prices is delayed six months and is not fully felt until eighteen months after the policy change (these are roughly consistent with econometric estimates of the impact of changes in money on output and prices).
This situation opens up the possibility for a politician in control of the money supply to manipulate the economy in an attempt to increase the chances of getting reelected. If votes depend upon output growth, as they seem to, then the politician can pump up the money supply around six months before the election so that output will peak just as the election is held. Then, the politician could plan to reduce the money supply just after the election to avoid having inflation problems down the road.
So the politician implements this strategy, gets reelected, and now comes the time to cut back on the money supply. But there's a problem. Output peaked the month of the election, and has been falling ever since. Will the politician actually cut the money supply and raise interest rates to avoid inflation -- which would reduce output and employment growth even further, something that is sure to bring protests -- or decide to live with the inflation? The choice is often to live with inflation, and as the cycle repeats with each election, inflation slowly ratchets upward.
Budget deficits and inflation
But political manipulation of the money supply is not the problem most people are worried about, it's the expected increase in the government debt that is creating the inflation worry.
When the government purchases goods and services, those purchases must be financed in one of three ways--raising taxes, borrowing from the public (i.e., issuing government debt), or printing new money. Thus, if government spending is much larger than taxes, and if raising taxes is political poison, then the deficit must be financed by either printing money or issuing new government debt. However, increasing the government debt is often a bad choice politically, so when faced with this decision politicians often choose to increase the money supply rather than increase the debt, and the result is inflation. The inflation is a hidden tax--in essence the government spending is paid for by inflating away the value of the dollar, but the blame for the inflation can often be displaced onto things like oil and other commodity prices, and thus the political consequences are not as large as for changes in taxes or in the debt.
The hope is that an independent Fed can overcome the temptation to use monetary policy to influence elections, and also overcome the temptation to monetize the debt, and that it will do what's best for the economy in the long-run rather than adopting the policy that maximizes the chances of politicians being reelected.
Independence threatened
Many people are worried that if the US does not get its long-run debt problem under control, a problem driven mainly by escalating health care costs, then politicians worried about their reelection chances will begin pressuring the Fed to finance the debt by printing money. And if the Fed is uncooperative, its independence may be taken away legislatively.
I believe these threats are real, and as noted above, experience shows that once politicians get involved in monetary policy, inflation generally becomes a problem. For that reason, I am very opposed to anything that threatens the Fed's ability to assert its independence and keep the economy on the best long-run path.

(For more discussion of the pros and cons of Fed independence, see here; for more on the degree of the Fed's independence in the U.S., see the bottom of this post.)

Wednesday, May 05, 2010

Fed Watch: Still Unbalanced

Tim Duy on the prospects for global rebalancing:

Still Unbalanced, by Tim Duy: The recent flow of data is interesting to say the least. While headline numbers are generally solid, the underlying story looks shaky. Shaky enough that disinflationary trends remain firmly entrenched in the US, whereas inflationary risks appear to be growing in emerging markets. The former suggests the Fed is set to remain on hold, while the latter will push foreign central banks to tighten. In a perfect world, that combination would put downward pressure on the Dollar and support a shift to a more balanced pattern of growth for both the world in general and the US in particular. Yet we persistently fall short of a perfect world. Will this time be any different? The Greek crisis is saying it won't.

Manufacturing remains a clear bright spot in the economic environment, a point reiterated by the most recent ISM survey. The headline 60.4 was the strongest since 2004, and the underlying details were solid. Employment continues to expand, providing at least a modicum of relief for the beleaguered labor market. The inventory drain became apparent, with more firms than not reporting stockpiles as too low. This suggests further room for manufacturing expansion. The proportion of firms reporting rising prices edged up again, not unexpected considering the complete lack of pricing power and drop in commodity prices at the low point of the recession. Note too that the strength in the ISM numbers is consistent with the solid manufacturing report, with a strong gain in new orders for nonair, nondefense capital goods.

Although the positive tenor to manufacturing is welcome, the first quarter read on GDP reveals a more uneven pattern of recovery, and more worrisome, a recovery that looks a little too dependent on US households. Consumer spending gained 3.6%, contributing 2.55 percentage points to the headline 3.2% gain. The sustainability of such spending, however, remains in doubt. Note that spending growth was heavily supported by falling savings rates, while income growth less transfer payment remains stagnant. This suggests that consumers are once again leveraging up the balance sheets while the deleveraging outside of housing was likely not as deep as initially believed, once bank loan write-offs are accounted for. In short, it looks like we have come full circle. The US economy is again excessively dependent on consumer spending, and that spending is fueled by anything but organic income growth.

The next largest contributor was inventories, which add 1.57 percentage points - clearly part and parcel of the manufacturing revival. Also supportive of that sector was the 13.4% gain in equipment and software category, down from the previous quarter. But a closer look reveals that category, a small part of overall spending, contributed only 0.83 percentage points to growth, and the bulk of that was information technology; industrial and transportation were basically flat. Residential and nonresidential structures were both a drag on growth, illustrating the ongoing weakness of both sectors - weakness that prevents a true V-shaped recovery. Growth, yes, and even sustainable growth. But growth that leaves the economy limping along, heavily dependent on policies to stimulate consumer spending.

With overall investment still falling short of fully supportive of recovery, attention turns to the export story. And, yes, export growth is supportive. The problem is the import drag swamped the export push, leaving the external sector a net negative for growth, sapping 0.61 percentage points from the headline number. This drag throws a wrench into hope that external growth will support the recovery or a rebalancing of global activity. We need to acknowledge the possibility (likelihood) that outsourcing during the past twenty years has left the US structurally dependent on trade deficits. Fueling consumer spending simply translates into a substantially offsetting import increase, thereby preventing the external sector from contributing to growth on net.

Presumably, what we need is policy supportive of a real rebalancing, in which the US consumer is comparatively subdued, keeping a lid on import growth, while the rest of the world is firing on most cylinders. And here is where exchange rate adjustment is important. Faster growth abroad should translate into higher foreign interest rates, which should in turn be Dollar negative. Part of that story is in play. From the Wall Street Journal:

Prices across Asia are rising faster than expected, highlighting the region's strong recovery compared with the West and raising the likelihood for tighter monetary policy.

South Korea and Indonesia reported higher-than-expected inflation Monday, coming a day after China raised banking reserve requirements in a bid to cool its economy. In a sign that inflation is becoming entrenched, core prices, which exclude volatile food and energy, are ticking up.

Meanwhile, the Fed last week reiterated its commitment to ultra-low rates, which should come as no surprise given the uneven and inventory cycle dependent nature of US growth so far - note that real final sales posted another anemic reading of 1.6% in the first quarter. There is simply not enough growth to rapidly alleviate stress in the labor market, thereby keeping disinflation in play. The March read on core-PCE inflation confirmed the downward trend:

FW050510

A declining Dollar is the signal to shift production to US shores and alleviate inflationary pressures abroad (while stimulating such pressure domestically), thereby limiting the need for foreign monetary policymakers to hit the brakes so fast that they stifle growth. There is no such thing as immaculate adjustment; a Dollar decline is critical to this process.

It should be a nice, textbook story. Alas, the US external adjustment is anything but textbook. The challenges I see to this adjustment:

  1. Export supporting foreign policymakers. Foreign policymakers could attempt to simply shift demand away from internal sources and to the US by raising rates while accelerating reserve accumulation (and sterilizing the subsequent domestic money growth). Indeed, emerging Asian nations would be hesitant to hobble their exporting industries, more so if China does not first revalue the renminbi.

  2. The Greek crisis. The Greek drama is obviously far from over; it is not clear that the threat of contagion is even significantly reduced, let alone eliminated. Nor would it be until all the PIIGS committed to a growth sapping fiscal stance, which the Greek public are finding hard to accept. That stance, while perhaps necessary, weighs against global growth and tends to strengthen the Dollar, slowing the rebalancing process. Moreover, I find it difficult if not impossible to believe that the impacted nations can adjust without a significant devaluation. Which suggests the Euro has further to fall. But it is reasonable to believe that, given the German weight in the Eurozone, any decline in the Euro would fall short of what is necessary for the PIIGS to fully adjust. Are we really down to just two choice then? Either Northern Europe commits to perpetual fiscal transfers to Southern Europe (not going to happen), or the Eurozone shrinks? Both suggest a weaker Euro, but the latter points to an outright collapse.

  3. The size of the Dollar adjustment. Given the substantial fixed costs of offshoring, it is possible that very large adjustments in the Dollar are necessary to give a lift to importing competing industries in particular. Policymakers may not have the stomach for such an adjustment, resulting in a slow pace of Dollar decline that the support provided net growth is almost negligible.

  4. The dependence of everyone on the US consumer. Any rebalancing requires the importance of the US consumer to decline from the current 71% of US GDP. Yet US officials welcome the consumer recovery, and would be hesitant to accept renewed consumer weakness without a clear offset (which they could provide via increase public investment, if they wanted to). And foreign officials, faced with a political class of exporters dependent on US consumers, would be hesitant to risk angering that constituency with a substantial adjustment (see point 1 above).

These are challenges, and are not meant to imply that adjustment cannot occur. Only that so far that recovery has seen precious little such adjustment, with net exports subtracting from growth two of the last three quarters. The combination of tepid US consumer growth, rapid foreign growth, and a steady although not disruptive decline in the Dollar - the combination of factors that present in 2006 and early 2007 - appears difficult to achieve and sustain. I fear it requires a much more substantial global commitment to rebalancing than we have seen to date. And that commitment will be sorely lacking given the Greek crisis. Where the American-led financial crisis forced global policymaker to pull together, the European crisis may push them back apart.

Friday, April 30, 2010

Paul Krugman: The Euro Trap

Deficit hawks are trying to use the "euro-mess" to support their case for austerity. But that's not the real lesson of the European crisis:

The Euro Trap, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: Not that long ago, European economists used to mock their American counterparts for having questioned the wisdom of Europe’s march to monetary union. ... Oops..., right now it does seem to have been a bad idea for exactly the reasons the skeptics cited. And as for whether it will last — suddenly, that’s looking like an open question.
To understand the euro-mess — and its lessons for the rest of us — you need to see past the headlines. Right now everyone is focused on public debt, which can make it seem as if this is a simple story of governments that couldn’t control their spending. But that’s only part of the story for Greece, much less for Portugal, and not at all the story for Spain.
The fact is that three years ago none of the countries now in or near crisis seemed to be in deep fiscal trouble. ... And all of the countries were attracting large inflows of foreign capital, largely because markets believed that membership in the euro zone made Greek, Portuguese and Spanish bonds safe investments.
Then came the global financial crisis. Those inflows of capital dried up; revenues plunged and deficits soared; and membership in the euro ... turned into a trap.
What’s the nature of the trap? During the years of easy money, wages and prices in the crisis countries rose much faster than in the rest of Europe. Now that the money is no longer rolling in, those countries need to get costs back in line.
But that’s a much harder thing to do now than it was when each European nation had its own currency. Back then, costs could be brought in line by adjusting exchange rates... Now..., however, the only way to reduce Greek relative costs is through ... deflation. ...
The problem is that deflation — falling wages and prices — is always and everywhere a deeply painful process. It invariably involves a prolonged slump with high unemployment. And it also aggravates debt problems, both public and private, because incomes fall while the debt burden doesn’t.
Hence the crisis. ... All this is exactly what the euro-skeptics feared. Giving up the ability to adjust exchange rates, they warned, would invite future crises. And it has.
So what will happen to the euro? Until recently, most analysts, myself included, considered a euro breakup basically impossible, since any government that even hinted that it was considering leaving the euro would be inviting a catastrophic run on its banks. But if the crisis countries are forced into default, they’ll probably face severe bank runs anyway... This would open the door to euro exit.
So is the euro itself in danger? In a word, yes. If European leaders don’t start acting much more forcefully, providing Greece with enough help to avoid the worst, a chain reaction that starts with a Greek default and ends up wreaking much wider havoc looks all too possible.
Meanwhile, what are the lessons for the rest of us?
The deficit hawks are already trying to appropriate the European crisis, presenting it as an object lesson in the evils of government red ink. What the crisis really demonstrates, however, is the dangers of putting yourself in a policy straitjacket. When they joined the euro,... governments ... denied themselves the ability to do some bad things, like printing too much money; but they also denied themselves the ability to respond flexibly to events.
And when crisis strikes, governments need to be able to act. That’s what the architects of the euro forgot — and the rest of us need to remember.

Thursday, April 29, 2010

Fed Watch: We Can't All Be (Net) Exporters

Tim Duy:

We Can't All Be (Net) Exporters, by Tim Duy: The Greek crisis, which helped further extend the Dollar's uptrend in place since the beginning of the year, is a reminder that global imbalances are still with us - and, if not corrected, will eventually threaten the sustainability of the global recovery. Indeed, how sustainable can any recovery be if the vast majority of nations are pursuing an export oriented growth strategy? After all, clearly that is not a game all can play - there needs to be a net importer to offset the net exports. Who wants to fill that role? If the US is pushed into filling that role, we have simply come full circle over the past three years.

The Administration is clearly aware of this challenge, but concerns are growing that any action will fall short of what is necessary to bring about real change. From Sudeep Reddy at the Wall Street Journal:

President Barack Obama's goal of doubling U.S. exports over the next five years will be difficult to meet, business leaders and economists say, because of the lack of momentum on demolishing trade barriers and the shift by more American companies toward producing overseas.

U.S. exporters want Washington to put more pressure on trading partners to eliminate tariffs, crack down on intellectual-property violations and take a harder line on trading partners' currency policies. American firms say stronger action by the federal government could substantially boost prospects for U.S. exports.

Policymakers argue that it is far too early to admit defeat:

Christina Romer, chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, calls the administration's export target "an ambitious but reasonable goal."

"Going up 100% over a five-year period is not such a radical idea when you think about historical experience," she said, noting that exports increased more than 75% between 2003 and 2008. "It is going to be a gradual process. We are just starting the concrete steps in terms of what we can do to lower the fixed costs associated with exporting through trade promotion and commercial diplomacy."

Am I the only one that finds the Administration's focus on doubling exports somewhat disingenuous? Economic growth depends on net exports - doubling exports is a fine goal, as long as import growth is contained, such that the net effect is positive. But with the economy bouncing back, will import growth remain contained? Recent signs are not supportive - the recovery so far has ended the improvement in the real trade gap:

FW042910

Moreover, Romer claims the process will be "gradual." Will it be so gradual that US firms will resume expansion of overseas capacity at the expense of domestic production? Back to the Wall Street Journal:

But the shift by more U.S. companies toward producing goods overseas is one of the factors that makes doubling exports tougher. These firms have built more factories in fast-growing foreign countries to serve emerging markets, so they often supply the goods and services from an overseas arm—not by loading shipping containers in the U.S.

American businesses say they must contend with a long list of disadvantages, from higher tax rates than in many countries to rising costs for benefits such as health care. U.S. producers also say an artificially low Chinese currency makes Chinese goods especially cheap in foreign markets and therefore tougher competitors for American goods.

Once that production leaves, I suspect it is largely gone for good, barring a very large, sustained, and broad-based shift in the value of the Dollar. To be sure, the Administration is pressing China to revalue the renminbi, but the pace of any appreciation is likely to disappoint. Moreover, the uptrend in the Dollar raises a new concern. From Yves Smith:

A further source of trouble is political. If the euro continues on its expected slide and the pound is devalued, the dollar’s strength will put a major dent in the US ambitions to increase exports. Moreover, the rise in the greenback relative to other currencies will no doubt make China much more reluctant to revalue the renminbi against the dollar

Also, further pressure on the Euro is likely necessary to compensate for the fiscal drag of deficit containment in the PIIGS. Note too that recent events are driving capital to the US, holding down interest rates. From the Wall Street Journal:

Mortgage rates stayed flat last week, rising just slightly to 5.08% from 5.04% one week earlier, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association. So far, the big rise in rates that some had expected when the Federal Reserve ended its mortgage-backed securities purchase program last month hasn’t materialized.

In fact, the instability in Europe amid looming debt woes for Greece and Portugal on Tuesday sent investors looking for safer assets such as the 10-year Treasury, to which fixed-rate mortgages are closely tied. That has helped to keep rates down.

Sustained low rates will help keep US demand from waning, so much the better for to fuel the flow of imports necessary to meet the needs and wants of US consumers (it is not coincidence that the trade deficit began improving when the faltering housing market took the steam off consumer spending). And, intriguingly, Japan looks ready to resume the export push. Also from the Wall Street Journal:

As many Japanese enjoy their annual "Golden Week" holidays starting Thursday, some of Japan's economic ministers will be traveling to the U.S. and Asia to pitch what they hope will become a new driver of the nation's growth: infrastructure exports.

Transport Minister Seiji Maehara will spend Thursday and Friday in Washington to promote Japan's superfast bullet-train system as it chases part of President Barack Obama's high-speed railway project, which has an initial $8 billion price tag. Central Japan Railway Co. is among the hopefuls on some projects.

Meanwhile, Economic Strategy Minister Yoshito Sengoku will be wooing officials in Vietnam to choose a consortium of Japanese nuclear-power companies over French and South Korean rivals. Vietnam last year approved a resolution to build its first two nuclear-power plants, estimated to cost about $10.5 billion at current rates.

"In the past, Japanese ministers were too proud to go out there and cheer for our companies as they worried about failing to deliver successful results," Mr. Maehara said. "I intend to play the role of the top salesman for Japanese companies as their success equals the nation's economic growth."

Tokyo has begun a push to help Japanese companies win multibillion-dollar infrastructure projects abroad as its domestic economy continues to slump and a population decline threatens to sink demand further.

At the same time, rising environmental concerns in developed nations and rapid expansion of emerging economies are resulting in bumper crops of projects in areas like railways, nuclear power and clean energy.

"There is no growth for Japan unless we enhance exports," says Hiroki Mitsumata, director of nuclear-energy policy at the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. "No matter how superior our technology is, if it's confined within Japan, it will become obsolete like the species in the Galapagos."

Given the consistent global policy theme of "more exports," at least one US firm recognizes the potential for disappointment with the Administration's goal:

Todd Teske, chief executive of Briggs & Stratton Corp., a Wauwatosa, Wis.-based small-engine maker, says he is partly counting on more exports to rebuild his sales after the recent downturn. Briggs & Stratton already receives about a fifth of its $2 billion in revenue from sales abroad, particularly in Europe. Mr. Teske calls the U.S. goal of doubling exports a "lofty goal" and one worth pursuing. But he's realistic. "It seems like every country or region wants to fuel their recovery plan with exports," he said.

Bottom Line: My gut tells me that in any battle for export oriented growth, the US will come up the loser. When push comes to shove, the US will do nothing in response to the accumulation of dollar assets abroad. Ultimately, nations need to do more to support domestic demand to drive economic growth. But the risk is that as the broad global financial crisis continues to fade, nations will increasingly attempt to withdraw fiscal support for their economies - even more so with the Greece example now so vivid - and attempt to rely on external growth to compensate. It is not a game everyone can win. But if it deteriorates into competitive devaluations, it is a game everyone can lose.

Wednesday, April 28, 2010

The Fed at a Crossroads

Here's the video from The Fed at a Crossroads panel discussion that I said I'd post:

The FOMC Holds the Target Interest Rate "at 0 to 1/4 Percent"

Since, at the moment, I'm listening to Vincent Reinhart talk about when the Fed will tighten in a session entitled The Fed at a Crossroads -- he says rates will stay low for an "extended period" -- I should note that the FOMC announced today that rates will stay low for, again, an extended period. (Reinhart was more specific and said he thinks rates will start to increase late this year or, more likely, early in 2011 -- Update: at the end of the session, he gave May 2011 as the most likely date.)

One side note: Jon Hilsenrath of the WSJ noted that the phrase "extended period" was coined by Reinhart when he was the Director of the Division of Monetary Affairs at the Federal Reserve Board.

[I'll post the video from this session later. Update: Posted here.]

Thursday, April 22, 2010

Is the Six Percent Rise in Producer Prices a Signal that Inflation is Coming?

At MoneyWatch, why the 6 percent headline inflation number for producer prices announced this morning does not signal that inflation is imminent, and why core inflation rate of .9 percent is a better measure to look at:

Is the Six Percent Rise in Producer Prices a Signal that Inflation is Coming?, by Mark Thoma: Many news reports are noting the six percent increase in the producer price index on a year over year basis and wondering if it signals that inflation is back. However, this report should not be read as a warning that inflation is just around the corner.

Why? The pass through from producer prices to consumer prices is less than 100 percent in any case, and in some cases it is close to zero. Pass through to consumer prices is smaller when the change in producer prices is temporary, and core inflation measures indicate that most of the rise in producer prices was due to a rise in food and energy prices. Once the temporary changes in food and energy prices are stripped out, the core inflation rate only increased .9 percent over the previous year, and that isn't much different from previous measures.

But which measure of inflation should we pay attention to if we want to predict future inflation? Why do we use core inflation instead of "headline" inflation for this purpose?...[...continue reading...]...