Category Archive for: Saving [Return to Main]

February 29, 2008

Mortgaging the Nest Egg

This is not a good sign. A lot of people are borrowing from their retirement accounts to pay off debt:

Borrowing from the Nest Egg, by Lane Kenworthy: This news is discouraging, but hardly unexpected. According to a “Marketplace” report, a survey by the Transamerica Center for Retirement Studies (pdf here) finds that the share of workers borrowing from their 401(k) retirement funds increased from 11% in 2006 to 18% in 2007. Nearly half of those taking out such loans in 2007 cited the need to pay off debt, compared to a quarter in 2006.

Stagnant wages and salaries, most spouses already employed, rising health care and college tuition costs, higher mortgage debt loads, and falling home values mean lots of American households — including many middle-income ones — are pinched financially. The late 1990s economic boom lessened the strain for a while. Then home equity loans helped. More recently, credit card usage has jumped. Borrowing against retirement savings is the logical next step.

See more discussion here, here, and here.

This is why I wonder about the long-term participation rate in "opt out" retirement accounts that are being promoted as a way to deal with the retirement security problem. How many people will opt out of these accounts when economic conditions for the household deteriorate temporarily for some reason? And once they opt out, will they opt back in? People who are motivated enough to borrow against their retirement accounts - almost one fifth in 2007 - would also be motivated enough to opt out of an automatic savings plan. Many of the studies, at least the ones I have seen, do not track people over long periods of time where this type of deterioration would be present, and they do not follow people through a recession when the pressure to opt out would be greatest. I'm not saying we shouldn't have these programs, they do help some people save, and even if some people opt out at least they have a source of funds to use when times get tough. The point, though, is that the people most likely to opt out are the very ones we would like to see participate in savings programs so that they have more than just Social Security available during their retirement years. Because of that, we should be careful not to place too much emphasis on opt-out types of mechanisms for solving the retirement security problem. These accounts may not provide as much of a boost as we hope to key segments of the population.

Update: Megan McArdle follows up with comments on forced saving as a solution to this problem.

November 19, 2007

Richard Baldwin: Feldstein’s View on the Dollar

Richard Baldwin reviews Martin Feldstein's May 2007 predictions about the fate of the dollar, predictions he says are "looking pretty good at the moment":

Feldstein’s view on the dollar, by Richard Baldwin, Vox EU: President Kennedy said “Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan.” If the dollar’s slide is a defeat, then contrary to Kennedy’s wisdom, this defeat has a thousand fathers. Any number of observers now tell us that it was inevitable. One of my hobbies is to go back and see who saw it coming. Not from a pure forecasting perspective, but from an economic logic perspective. Who understood the key economic factors in advance and had the conviction to write them down? Marty Feldstein is one of those and this column presents my interpretation of the economic reasoning in his May 2007 paper.[1]

Continue reading "Richard Baldwin: Feldstein’s View on the Dollar" »

September 13, 2007

"Supplementing Social Security"

Rahm Emanuel has a proposal to increase personal savings:

Supplementing Social Security, by Rahm Emanuel, Commentary, WSJ: ...In the past two years, America's personal savings rate reached its lowest level since the Great Depression. And in comparison to other industrialized countries, the United States ranked second to last in personal savings.

Most people intuitively understand the importance of saving as a way to finance education or a dignified retirement, but the benefits to the overall economy are also important. An increase in savings enlarges the pool of capital...

Every American who works ought to have the chance to save. But today ... nearly half the work force ... lack[s] access to an employer-sponsored savings plan ... for retirement. At the same time, too many who have access to a savings plan contribute too little or don't participate... In addition, Americans don't start saving early enough. ...

Over the past 30 years, we have offered a blizzard of tax initiatives to encourage individuals to save for their retirement. .... Yet the national savings rate has plummeted. ...

In the last Congress, I proposed legislation that took a different approach. Instead of offering a new tax subsidy, my proposal helped companies automatically enroll employees in their 401(k) plans, rather than relying on workers to fill out the forms necessary to participate in a plan. ... If we make saving simple by limiting the amount of time, effort and decisions that people have to make, we can dramatically increase the number of people who save. In short, simplicity trumps choice.

Making saving easy is half the battle. The next step is to make saving universal. ... Republicans have long advanced the idea of personal accounts inside of Social Security. An accounts-based system that supplements, not supplants, Social Security can work. Democrats have argued that 401(k)s and personal savings are important supplements to Social Security, but we should ensure that fees are low and that lower-income Americans have the same opportunity to save that upper-income Americans enjoy. ...

I believe we should create Universal Savings Accounts. Like 401(k)s, the accounts would supplement Social Security. Employers and employees would contribute 1% of paychecks on a tax-deductible basis. Additional contributions could be made to the accounts at the discretion of the company or individual worker.

To ensure low management fees, these accounts would be managed by the private sector but overseen by a quasi-public board that would be given fiduciary responsibility for the types of investment options that workers could select. This system is used by the successful federal 401(k) program, or Thrift Savings Plan, where ... fees have averaged 30 cents for every $1,000 invested. By comparison, the typical mutual fund charges $15.50 per $1,000 invested. ...

To help achieve universal participation and simplicity, employers would automatically enroll their employees in these accounts, allowing employees to opt out if they ... did not want to participate. ... Since low-income workers have the hardest time saving for retirement, we should provide ... a federal tax credit that matches savings put into retirement accounts.

I believe that this type of approach ... is a necessary pre-condition to reforming Social Security. ... American people like the security that comes with Social Security. In order for us to tackle the problems of Social Security, Washington must provide solutions that make the American people feel more financially secure. If this anxiety is not addressed first, neither party will be given the opportunity to constructively address the challenges facing Social Security.

My approach protects the sanctity of the Social Security... It also expands individual savings opportunities outside of Social Security... Strengthening Social Security for the long term will take a sustained commitment to fiscal discipline and bipartisanship, commodities that can become scarce as we head into the presidential election season. But while Americans wait for long-term answers on Social Security, we should act now to give them more ways to start building retirement savings of their own.

I doubt this has much of a chance of going anywhere. I have no objection to the proposal, though the motivation used to sell the program - the implication that Social Security is headed for disaster if something isn't done - is overwrought. I also believe that these types of programs can easily turn from "add-ons" to "carve-outs" down the road which undermines their attractiveness, and I don't think these programs will increase savings as much as people predict once they become widespread and opting out is as simple as checking a box on a computer screen the first time finances get tight.

[Update: Andrew Samwick: A New Approach on Social Security Reform?]

June 13, 2007

Savings Glut or Money Glut?

Martin Wolf returns to the question of whether global imbalances and other features of the international economy are due to a “savings glut” or a “money glut”:

Villains and victims of global capital flows, by Martin Wolf, Commentary, Financial Times: Fast growth, huge current account “imbalances”, low real interest rates and risk spreads, subdued inflation and easy access to finance characterise the world economy. ...

The two interesting alternative explanations are the “savings glut” and the “money glut”. ... The “savings glut” hypothesis is associated with Ben Bernanke... A substantial excess of savings over investment  ... predominantly in China and Japan and the oil exporters ... has led to low global real interest rates and huge capital flows towards the world’s most creditworthy and willing borrowers, above all, US households. The short-term effect is an appreciation of real exchange rates and soaring current account deficits in destination countries. To sustain output in line with potential, domestic demand in those countries must also be substantially higher than gross domestic product. A country must choose fiscal and monetary policies that bring this result about.

Not only has the US absorbed 70 per cent of the rest of the world’s surplus capital, but consumption has accounted for 91 per cent of the increase in gross domestic product in this decade. Thus excess saving in one part of the world has driven excess consumption in another. ...

In the savings-glut world, governments are responsible for much of the capital outflow. This is either because domestic residents are not allowed to hold foreign assets (as in China) or because most of the export revenue accrues to governments (as in the oil exporters). Either way, governments end up with vast foreign currency assets as the counterpart of domestic excess savings.

In this world, the US is passive victim, excess savers are the villains and the Federal Reserve is the hero. In the money-glut world, however, the world’s savers are passive victims, profligate Americans are villains and the Federal Reserve is an anti-hero. In this world the US central bank is a serial bubble-blower...

The argument is that US monetary excess causes low nominal and, given subdued inflationary expectations, real interest rates. This causes rapid credit growth to consumers and a collapse in household savings. The excess spending floods across the frontiers, generating a huge trade deficit and a corresponding outflow of dollars.

The outflow weakens the dollar. Floating currencies are forced up to uncompetitive levels. But pegged currencies are kept down by open-ended foreign currency intervention. This leads to a massive accumulation of foreign currency reserves... It also creates difficulties with sterilising the impact on money supply and inflation.

In this view of the world economy, savings are not a driving force, as in the savings-glut hypothesis, but a passive result of excess money creation by the system’s hegemonic power. ... Governments of countries that possess the huge trade surpluses ... follow the fiscal and monetary policies that sustain the excess savings needed to curb excessive demand and inflation.

It is no surprise that the Federal Reserve is a believer in the savings-glut hypothesis. But many Asians blame their present predicament on “dollar hegemony”, which is the core of the “money-glut” hypothesis. The big questions, however, are which is true and whether it matters.

My answer ... is that the savings-glut hypothesis is truer, [and]... it does matter. If we live in the savings-glut world, the US current account deficit is protecting the world from deep recession. If we live in the money-glut world, that very same deficit is threatening the world with a dollar collapse and, ultimately, even a return of worldwide inflation.

The savings-glut view is far more comforting. Excess savers will learn to spend, in the end – sooner rather than later, if US spending were to weaken dramatically. But if we live in the money-glut world, the great gains in monetary stability of the past quarter century are at risk. Either way, the present world cannot continue indefinitely...

I will just add that it's possible to have both a high level of savings and a high level of liquidity growth at the same time.

May 22, 2007

FRB New York: How Worrisome Is a Negative Saving Rate?

Charles Steindel of the New York Fed asks if we should be worried by the negative personal saving rate. The NY Fed's summary gives his answer:

Charles Steindel explains that when the U.S. personal saving rate took a negative turn in second-quarter 2005, it raised concerns that Americans may have to curtail spending and accept a lower standard of living as they pay off rising debts.

However, the risks to household well-being may be overstated, says Steindel. Taking a closer look at saving trends, he argues that the surge in energy costs may have temporarily dampened saving, while the accounting of household income from stock holdings may be skewing saving estimates. In addition, broad measures of saving have remained positive, and household wealth—assets such as stocks and homes, less debt—is on the rise.

Still, Steindel cautions, low levels of household, private and especially national saving may take a toll over the long run and thus bear watching now.

Here's the entire report:

How Worrisome Is a Negative Saving Rate?, by Charles Steindel, Current Issues in Economics and Finance, May 2007  Volume 13, Number 4, FRB NY: The U.S. personal saving rate’s negative turn in 2005 has raised concerns that Americans may have to curtail their spending and accept a lower standard of living as they pay off rising debts. However, a closer look at saving trends suggests that the risks to household well-being are overstated.

Continue reading "FRB New York: How Worrisome Is a Negative Saving Rate?" »

May 02, 2007

We Need More Saving, But Not Right Now

Kash Mansori looks at personal income and saving and doesn't particularly like what he sees:

Personal Income and Spending, by Kash Mansori: Yesterday the BEA gave us some new data about personal income and spending for March of 2007. You can find the news release here, but what I want to focus on today are the reasons why I am worried about the prospects for consumption growth in the coming months.

Actually, my concerns can be summarized in a picture. The following graph shows the annual growth in consumption and in labor compensation, with both series adjusted for inflation using the PCE deflator. The red line then shows the savings rate for US households.

As I've discussed before, income growth for households that get their income through their labor has been sluggish during this economic recovery. Profits have been strong, and the income of people who get a lot of their income from their ownership of US corporations has done well...

Consumption growth, on the other hand, has been considerably and consistently stronger. How is that possible? There are three ways. First, households have spent an ever-growing portion of their income... so much so that by 2005 the savings rate actually turned consistently negative for the very first time. Second, some American households have enjoyed strong income growth from non-labor sources. I'm referring mostly to those profits that I mentioned above. Third, many households have used mortgage equity withdrawals to finance their consumption. ... But there are good reasons to guess that all three of these supports for consumption are running out.

The end of the housing boom and concomitant MEW phenomenon has been well documented by others (yes, I'm talking about Calculated Risk), so that source of money is drying up. Corporate profits have grown amazingly well in recent years, but probably can't continue that pace for much longer.

That leaves changes in the savings rate. But if anything, it is starting to seem like we are entering a phase where households will be more interested in moving their savings rate back toward zero, rather than allow it to become more negative. However, to bring the savings rate back toward zero (not to mention positive) households will have to allow several period elapse with rates of consumption growth below the rate of income growth.

Put it all together, and it seems quite likely to me that we're in for a period of slower consumption growth. And given the importance of consumption in the US's economic growth right now, that does not spell good news for the economy as a whole.

Worries about consumption didn't stop Ben Bernanke from calling for a higher savings rate. Here's Brad DeLong with details of his comments at the press conference after yesterday's speech:

Ben Bernanke Repudiates Bush Administration Deficit-Spending Fiscal Policy: From the Wall Street Journal's Washington Wire:

Washington Wire - WSJ.com: Bernanke Advocates More Saving: Brian Blackstone reports on Bernanke’s speech in Montana.

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke said that U.S. lawmakers should aim economic policies at boosting U.S. savings, the lack of which is the primary source of the U.S. trade deficit. “Saving is critical,” Bernanke said in response to questions after a speech at Montana Tech. He said the trade deficit isn’t a reflection of the quality of U.S. goods and services but rather a result of the fact that the U.S. invests more than it saves and the rest of the world is a “net saver.”

“That saving is sloshing around the world,” Bernanke said, and is one reason that U.S. real long-term interest rates remain “very, very low.” “We won’t always have that,” Bernanke said in reference to the high rates of foreign saving that are coming into the U.S. That’s why it’s important for the U.S. to find ways to boost domestic saving, he said.

"That the U.S. invests more than it saves" is economist-speak for (a) American households and businesses don't save very much, and (b) the government spends a honking amount more than it collects in taxes. "Aiming economic policies at boosting U.S. savings" is economist-speak for (a) raising taxes, (b) cutting government spending, and (c) encouraging households to save more.

While all of those are healthy long-run developments, in the short-run they would slow output growth and this is not the time to be pushing output downward. This is the problem with cutting taxes instead of paying off debts when times are good.

April 23, 2007

William Poole: Changing World Demographics and Trade Imbalances

William Poole has a perspective that differs from most on global imbalances and the low personal saving rate in the U.S. After briefly reviewing seven explanations for global imbalances and differences in cross-country saving rates, he concludes there's little to worry about since most of it can be explained by the life-cycle hypothesis combined with demographic differences between countries. In fact, he will argue that "to a large extent, the current situation is not fundamentally an imbalance but rather a condition that is conducive to coping with the major demographic changes that are occurring throughout the world." I agree demographics is part of the explanation, but I'm not convinced it is as important as he has concluded, particularly if it means we become complacent about the potential for a sudden rebalancing of global accounts:

Changing World Demographics and Trade Imbalances, by William Poole, President, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: ...The world economy is characterized by three highly unusual conditions. First, the capital flow into the United States from the rest of the world and accompanying rest-of-world current account surplus—the U.S. current account deficit—is very large and persistent. Second, the U.S. personal saving rate has been falling and past year became negative for the first time since 1933. Third, high-income countries are just now beginning a demographic transition in which the fraction of retired persons in the total population will rise to levels never before experienced. The idea I will explore with you is that these three conditions are connected; the first two, I believe, are to a considerable extent a consequence of the third.

Today’s topic on the connection between demographic changes and trade balances certainly is important. My analysis combines demographic and economics facts with economic theory to provide some insights into the connections between demographic changes and international trade. ... I especially want to highlight my unease with using the term “imbalances” to characterize the current situation. That term almost begs for a policy response—how can policymakers allow imbalances to persist? Unfortunately, policy responses could well involve damaging protectionist measures. I will argue that, to a large extent, the current situation is not fundamentally an imbalance but rather a condition that is conducive to coping with the major demographic changes that are occurring throughout the world...

Current Account Balances: Facts and Explanations Large and persistent current account surpluses and deficits are common in the global economy today, as illustrated in Figure 1 [note: in text links are to originals]. Since early 1998, the U.S. current account has trended downward, a fact that has attracted much attention not only in the United States but also throughout the world. As a share of U.S. GDP, the U.S. current account deficit has increased from roughly 2 percent to a level exceeding 6.5 percent in 2006. ... It is clear that today’s U.S. current account deficit substantially exceeds any other such deficits during the second half of the last century.

Fig142307

The United States, however, is not the only country with a current account deficit that is a relatively large share of its gross domestic product. In fact, certain European nations fit such a description. Figure 2 ... shows this ratio for the European Union and for selected European countries, some of which have current account deficits relative to GDP larger than the United States. For example, both Spain and Portugal have current account deficits that are close to 10 percent of GDP.

Continue reading "William Poole: Changing World Demographics and Trade Imbalances" »

January 23, 2007

Are Inheritances Booming?

How much do baby-boomers stand to inherit from their parents and is it enough to make a material difference during their retirement years? Growth in the value of intergenerational asset transfer would, of course, provide additional assets that could be used in retirement, but unfortunately it looks like bequests won't provide much help to the typical household:

Boomers' big inheritance: Is it enough?, by Mark Trumbull, The Christian Science Monitor: The coming cycle of inheritances is billed as the greatest wealth transfer in US history. But don't expect it to finance the retirement of baby boomers or their children.

The reality, according to one new survey, is that when people do receive an inheritance, it's typically well under $100,000. And most people will receive no inheritance at all.

It's true that US households are richer than ever. ... But even as the pool of wealth has risen, the cost of retirement has been rising. Longer life spans, coupled with the rising cost of medical care, mean that many older Americans will use their wealth rather than pass it on to children.

"In many cases, because of increasing longevity ... it goes the other way. Instead of inheriting wealth the children wind up having to spend considerable wealth taking care of their parents," says Zvi Bodie, an expert on personal finance at Boston University. ...

Among the survey's findings:

•Only 24 percent of adult Americans expect to get an inheritance. And of those adults who have received an inheritance, the median amount received is $37,700.

•For working Americans over age 45 who have living parents, half are providing some assistance to their parents. Often it's nonfinancial – helping with chores and the like. But just as often these boomer kids are spending money on their parents.

•For workers over 45 who have grown children (over 25), one-fourth have a child living at home with them, and even more are providing financial support to those children – something most of them didn't expect to do.

The consequence: Less money is piling up in retirement funds than many workers wish. ...

This savings shortfall has gotten a good bit of media attention in recent years. But other news articles have drawn attention to a large pool of wealth that is expected to pass from older Americans – especially the World War II generation, to their offspring.

As far back as 1990, Fortune magazine talked about "the biggest intergenerational transfer of wealth in US history," in which middle-class Americans will "for the first time, inherit significant assets en masse." ...

Such reports have never promised that everyone will get an inheritance, let alone a large amount. ... America's wealth is concentrated heavily among the richest families.

"Only about 20 percent of households receive inheritances of any note," says Edward Wolff, a New York University economist who studies the distribution of wealth. "It may rise over time," he says, but "it's still going to be a minority of households." ...

Last year, an analysis done for AARP confirmed that, so far at least, boomers haven't reaped a mass windfall. Of those who have already received inheritances, the median amount as of 2004 totaled $64,000...

January 19, 2007

Shiller: Philanthropic Finance

Robert Shiller on how we might help the poor save more:

Laying a retirement lifeline for the poor, by Robert Shiller, Project Syndicate: ...Today's huge companies and the financial wizards who lead them -- or buy and sell them -- may be generous to their churches, favorite charities, and families and friends, but their professional lives are defined solely by the relentless pursuit of profits.

That perception may be largely true, but not entirely so. Consider Muhammad Yunus, who won the Nobel Peace Prize last October. His Grameen Bank ... has offered tiny loans to some of the poorest people in the world, helping to lift many borrowers out of poverty. The bank made a profit and grew over the years...

But was money Yunus' ultimate motive? In interviews, he reveals that he was actually motivated by a deep sympathy for the plight of the poor in his country. ... He tried to make a profit ... to prove the creditworthiness of these neglected people...

Paradoxically, while Yunus was pursuing profit, he was apparently not doing it for the money. ... Indeed, the history of financial institutions for low-income people is largely a history of philanthropic or idealistic movements...

Continue reading "Shiller: Philanthropic Finance" »

October 04, 2006

China’s Huge Corporate Savings

Martin Wolf identifies the source of China's high savings rate - "huge corporate savings" - and he explains how both saving and the current account surplus can be reduced through government action:

Beijing should dip into China’s corporate bank, by Martin Wolf, Commentary, Financial Times: China represents something new in the history of the modern world: a developing country that has a vast global impact. This is why Hank Paulson, the US treasury secretary, has ... call[ed] for it to be a “responsible stakeholder”. But China will behave as the US wants only if it perceives that this is in its own interests. ...

At present, the most vexed issue between the two countries is the payments “imbalances”. Many in the US complain that China is manipulating its currency, to preserve excessive competitiveness. Certainly, China has a large current account surplus... No other country has as big a surplus.

The starting point then must be whether it makes sense for a poor country to export so much capital. The answer, I would argue, is “no”. But we must then also ask why China is running such large surpluses. ... Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the frugality of Chinese households is not the chief explanation for China’s surplus savings ..., the principal explanation is China’s huge corporate savings.

Between 2000 and 2005, ... some 70 per cent of the increase in gross savings was generated by the rising profitability of the corporate sector... Certainly, Chinese household savings are high by international standards ... an impressive 32 per cent of household disposable income in 2004. Nevertheless, household savings generate only a third of China’s overall savings. The undistributed profits of corporations are far more important. ...

Now consider the big question: does it make sense for China to save so much or, for that matter, to invest so much? After all, consumption – public and private – is no more than half of GDP, while private consumption is only 40 per cent of GDP. The answer, I suggest, is “no”. China can probably grow as fast with lower investment. It certainly does not need to accumulate more foreign assets. Higher consumption today would surely be desirable, particularly if it were consumption by – or on behalf of – the hundreds of millions of rural poor.

Moreover, as the World Bank has argued, the government has a simple way of achieving this outcome. It can ask the companies it notionally owns to pay dividends instead of keeping all the profits for themselves. Suppose it took 5 per cent of GDP from these companies in this way and spent this money on valuable social programmes: public health, for example. Other things being equal, the gross savings rate and current account surplus would fall. The welfare of the Chinese today would rise...

Now consider, instead, what might happen if gross investment were reduced, as those fearful of overheating and excessive investment suggest, but without cutting savings. Then the current account surplus would explode upwards. This would be globally disruptive and would bring no obvious benefit to China itself.

I would argue that the government needs not a policy to cut investment, but one to cut savings. Moreover, it can easily achieve this aim, because it is itself directly or indirectly responsible for the bulk of these savings. Above all, such a change is in the interest of the Chinese people. All the government needs do is exercise its rights of ownership. This, not a change in exchange-rate policy, is the most important step towards external adjustment...

September 20, 2006

An Interview with Martin Feldstein

This interview with Marty Feldstein covers its share of controversial topics. The interview is fairly long, so if you want to pick and choose the section headers are: The Art of Monetary Policy, Time Consistency in Fiscal Policy, Social Security Reform, European Social Insurance, European Union, The Return of Saving, The Economics of Health and Health Care, Executive Compensation, Supply-Side Economics, Tax Reform Panel, and The NBER:

Interview with Martin S. Feldstein, by Douglas Clement, Interview on July 10, The Region, September 2006: As a Harvard professor for nearly 40 years, Martin Feldstein has taught economics to thousands of young students, many of whom later became quite influential in their own right—as Treasury secretaries, presidential advisers, corporate leaders, even Fed governors.

As a policy adviser, he chaired the Council of Economic Advisers during the Reagan years, and landed on the cover of Time magazine in 1984 for his controversial opposition to a growing budget deficit. He has a lower profile in Washington these days but remains extremely influential, helping the current administration develop its tax cut initiatives, for instance.

And as president of the National Bureau of Economic Research, the nation's preeminent economics think tank, Feldstein has shaped the course of economic scholarship for almost three decades: identifying key issues, encouraging empirical research, creating opportunities for cooperation and disseminating working papers of leading economists long before they appear in academic journals.

But years from now it is likely that Feldstein will be best remembered as a prescient public citizen, a scholar who identified some of the most serious economic predicaments of our time, developed pragmatic solutions to those problems and then pressed policymakers—persistently—to implement them.

Social Security. Health insurance. Distortionary taxes. Unemployment insurance. The current account deficit. These are the issues that Feldstein has pushed to the forefront of popular and policy agendas decade after decade. Through a prolific stream of professional articles, newspaper columns and scholarly books, as well as frequent speeches and media interviews, he maintains a stark spotlight on crises that others try to ignore.

Educated at Harvard and then Oxford, Feldstein returned to Harvard as an assistant professor in 1967 and two years later became one of the youngest economists granted tenure by the university. In 1977, he won the John Bates Clark award as the best American economist under 40.

Numerous achievements and awards have followed, but Feldstein seems most gratified by close collaboration with colleagues. In the following interview, held during a break from the NBER's 2006 Summer Institute, a three-week gathering in Cambridge of about 1,400 economists, Feldstein notes that earlier in the day Paul Samuelson compared the Institute to Niels Bohr drawing atomic physicists to Copenhagen in the 1920s. “I thought that was a nice sentiment,” Feldstein comments quietly. His smile suggests that he could hardly conceive of higher praise.

Continue reading "An Interview with Martin Feldstein" »

September 03, 2006

Hi, My Name's Uncle Sam, and I'm a Debtaholic

Does the IMF have the ability to reduce the risk of a hard-landing posed by global imbalances?:

Can the IMF avert a global meltdown?, by Ken Rogoff, Project Syndicate: When world financial leaders convene in Singapore on Sept 18 for the joint World Bank/International Monetary Fund meetings, they must confront one singularly important question. Is there any way to coax the IMF's largest members, especially the United States and China, to help reduce the risks posed by the world's massive trade imbalances? ... Incredibly, the US is now soaking up roughly two-thirds of all global net saving, a situation without historical precedent.

While this borrowing binge might end smoothly, ... most world financial leaders are rightly worried... Indeed, if policymakers continue to sit on their hands, it is not hard to imagine a sharp global slowdown or even a devastating financial crisis. ...

Though the comparison is unfair, it is hard not to recall the old quip about the IMF's relative, the United Nations: When there is a dispute between two small nations, the UN steps in and the dispute disappears. When there is a dispute between a small nation and a large nation, the UN steps in and the small nation disappears. When there is a dispute between two large nations, the UN disappears.

Fortunately, the IMF is not yet in hiding, even if some big players really don't like what it has to say. The IMF's head, Rodrigo Rato of Spain, rightly insists that China, the US, Japan, Europe and the major oil exporters (now the world's biggest source of new capital) all take concrete steps towards alleviating the risk of a crisis. ...

[S]uch steps might include more exchange-rate flexibility in China, and ... a promise from the US to show greater commitment to fiscal restraint. Oil exporters could, in turn, promise to increase domestic consumption expenditure, which would boost imports.

Likewise, post-deflation Japan could promise never again to resort to massive intervention to stop its currency from appreciating. Europe, for its part, could agree not to shoot its recovery in the foot with ill-timed new taxes such as those that Germany is currently contemplating.

Will the IMF be successful in brokering a deal? The recent catastrophic collapse of global trade talks is not an encouraging harbinger. ... Fortunately for Mr Rato, addressing the global imbalances can be a win-win situation. The same proposed policies for closing global trade imbalances also, by and large, help address each country's domestic economic concerns.

For example, China needs a stronger exchange rate to help curb manic investment in its export sector, and thereby reduce the odds of a 1990s-style collapse. As for the US, a sharp hike in energy taxes on gasoline and other fossil fuels would not only help improve the government's balance sheet, but it would also be a way to start addressing global warming. What better way for new US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, a card-carrying environmentalist, to make a dramatic entrance onto the world policy stage? ...

If today's epic US borrowing does end in tears _ and if world leaders fail to help the IMF get the job done _ history will not treat them kindly. Instead, they will be blamed for not seeing an impending catastrophe that was staring them in the face.

Let's hope that on this occasion in international diplomacy, the only thing that disappears are the massive global trade imbalances, and not the leaders and institutions that are supposed to deal with them.

Interventions don't usually work. Those with addictions don't usually seek help until they "hit bottom." You can give them advice, explain rationally why they must change, and they may even nod their head and agree with you at some level. But until a crisis forces them to reconsider their ways, they will not hear the message and they will not take actions to forestall the hard-landing they are likely to have.

The IMF can keep nagging, but it's up to the countries involved to become serious about reform. While I hope that countries can be more rational in their approach than addicted individuals and avoid hitting bottom before reforming, so far it's difficult to detect a serious effort to address the underlying problems.

A Mystery

Nobody knows how many workers have accepted lower pay and benefits to keep their jobs:

Here, Take Back Some of My Pay, It’s Too Much, by Louis Uchitelle, NY Times: A number is missing. No one knows how many American workers have agreed to accept, however reluctantly, a cut in their wages or benefits or both in recent years.

The government tracks unemployment, job creation, layoffs, hours worked, average hourly pay and various other aspects of employment. But it doesn’t add up the number of people who have forfeited big chunks of their pay and benefits, and neither do unions or academic researchers.

That was true of layoffs until the early 1980’s, when the Rust Belt experience, and the devastating loss of blue-collar factory jobs, became a political issue. Congress, in response, asked the Bureau of Labor Statistics to count the layoffs in national surveys. ...

Keeping a job, but losing 15 or 20 percent of a salary and most of a pension, is a painful experience — and certainly not good for consumer spending. Still, there has not been enough political pressure for an accurate count of those affected. That is partly because many workers and unions have agreed to the concessions to preserve jobs.

Is there a ballpark number? Piecing together union data shows that it is probably above two million people in this decade alone. But no one knows. ... “None of our earnings surveys show these concessions,” said Thomas L. Nardone, an assistant commissioner at the Bureau of Labor Statistics. “We just don’t track that number.”

That would be useful to know. This is one of a series of short articles:

[F]ive New York Times reporters each set out to find one statistic, often overlooked, that said something important about the economic health of the American worker

Here's another entry on debt accumulation in recent years:

Borrowers We Be By, by Steven Greenhouse, NY Times: With their raises often lower than the inflation rate, millions of Americans have embraced the same strategy to maintain their living standards — borrowing and then borrowing some more.

As a result, debt payments now consume 19.4 percent of the income of the average American family, and 23 percent of the families in the bottom two-fifths of families by income devote at least 40 percent of their income to debt payments. With debt burdens so high, some economists fear a new wave of foreclosure and personal bankruptcies now that interest rates have climbed. ...

Household debt rose to 132 percent of disposable income last year, partly because many Americans have pushed their credit card debt to the max and because many, including many high-income Americans, have piled on the mortgage debt. Last year, for the first time since the Depression, the personal savings rate for the nation fell below zero, meaning that Americans are spending more than they are earning (and are saving no money on a net basis).

“There are really two types of households out there,” Mr. Zandi said. “High-income households have balance sheets about as good as I’ve ever seen, while lower-income households have balance sheets about as bad as I’ve ever seen them — complete tatters. These households are on the financial edge, and if there’s any slight disruption, like a car breaking down, it can be a real disaster for them financially.”

August 25, 2006

The Difference in Saving Rates between China and the U.S.

Robert Shiller explains the difference in saving rates between China and the U.S.:

Growth rate gulf result of opposite approach to saving, by Robert Shiller, Project Syndicate: The saving rate in China is the highest of any major country. China's gross saving rate ..., which includes both public and private saving, is around 50 percent.

By contrast, the saving rate in the United States is the lowest of any major country - roughly 10 percent of GDP. Differences in saving rates must be a major reason that China's annual economic growth rate is a full six percentage points higher than in the US. ... Unfortunately, explaining saving rates is not an exact science.

Ingrained habits probably explain more about China's saving rate. When incomes are growing rapidly, as they are in China, it is easier to save because people are not yet accustomed to a higher standard of living. They also tolerate enterprise or government policies that encourage high saving.

Continue reading "The Difference in Saving Rates between China and the U.S." »

August 08, 2006

You Are Pre-Approved

According to the Fed, all those credit offers we get in the mail are good for us:

Love That Junk Mail, Washington Wire, by Christopher Conkey: Think most people hate all those pre-approved offers for credit that jam your mailbox every week? Think again.

The Federal Reserve Monday released results from consumer surveys it undertook in 2004 and 2005, and one of the more interesting findings relates to the way people view pre-approved credit offers. While more than half of cardholders said they receive six or more offers a week, and less than half of the people receiving such solicitations actually open them, more than 70% of cardholders said the government should not outlaw pre-approved offers. ...

The authors of the Fed report say there’s a good reason for this: All those annoying, mailbox-clogging offers are actually good for us. The “prevalence of prescreened solicitations is useful in disseminating pricing information and encouraging competitive conditions in markets for credit cards generally, even if only a small minority of recipients actually responds,” the report said.

The authors also found evidence of an “other guy effect”...: 85% said they think pre-approved offers cause other people to use more credit, but only 15% admitted doing so themselves.

I wonder if the U.S. government gets offers in the mail from Asian and oil producing countries telling them they are pre-approved for billions and billions more in credit. More seriously, I wonder to what extent the knowledge that credit is available quickly if and when you need it through the internet, pre-approved mail offers, or other means has reduced precautionary and other types of saving.

July 20, 2006

The Savings Glut

Was there and is there still a savings glut? Ben Bernanke thinks so. This is from David Altig at macroblog:

macroblog: The Chairman Speaks: The Savings Glut Persists: More from Chairman Bernanke's exchange with Senator Bennett during yesterday's testimony:

BENNETT: Do you still believe there's a global savings glut and that we can expect people to continue to want to put their money here?

BERNANKE: I think there still is a global savings glut. It may have moderated somewhat because of increased growth in some of our trading partners. But on the other hand, there's also been, of course, these large revenues that the oil producers are accumulating because of the high price of oil. They are not able to absorb - - use those revenues at home very quickly. So they are taking that money and putting it back into the global financial system. And so that's contributing to this overall global savings glut...

So I think there has been some change, but the broad idea that the global savings glut is out there I think is still valid.

Of what Mr. Bernanke speaks, in pictures:

Middle_east

Ni_asia

Developing_asia

Still looking pretty gluttish.  The data, if you are interested:

Download savings_glut.ppt

UPDATE: Shame on me.  I should have added this part of the discussion:

BENNETT: So you're suggesting that foreign investment in the United States is not about to dry up at any point soon?

BERNANKE: I don't think it's going to dry up. I do think that over a period of time we should become more reliant on our own saving and reduce the current account deficit.

Emphasis added.

Like the word bubble, glut has a new meaning. To me, the term glut conveys a disequilibrium condition -- a time when aggregate demand is deficient, there is involuntary unemployment, goods are piling up on store shelves (that's the glut, lots of goods, nobody to buy them), and for some reason prices aren't moving to clear the market (e.g. the Malthus-Say debate where Malthus said, essentially, that gluts are caused by high profits leading to excessive capital accumulation and a mismatch between saving and investment; Say responded by saying that gluts were impossible because supply creates its own demand, i.e. with Say's law).

So every time I hear savings glut I have to remind myself of how the term is being used. I don't think Bernanke means that the supply of savings exceeds the demand for savings at the current interest rate even though I'm certain he is well aware of this interpretation of a glut. He means increases in supply are holding interest rates down as they move to clear the market. Thus, a glut simply means a large supply driving down equilibrium prices, not a disequilibrium condition where supply exceeds demand.

June 29, 2006

A Nickel Saved Through Opt-Out and Matching Grants is a Nickel the Government Won't Have to Give You

Having used Hal Varian's little blue book as one of my micro texts in graduate school, I have no doubt about his skills as a microeconomist. My complaint about this article examining policies to encourage low-income Americans to save more is that those skills are not used to identify the market failure the policies address.

To say, as in the opening line, that "Economists are in almost universal agreement that Americans save too little," and to follow with suggestions that the government intervene in the marketplace implies these markets do not produce the right incentives to save, that the market outcome is one of too little saving. The article does mention different savings rates as an explanation for differences in asset accumulation over time, but that is a behavioral statement, not a specific market failure. If we don't know what the problem is, how will we know what solution is best? My preference is to start by identifying the problem, then proceeding to find a solution. But whatever the problem is, the argument Varian makes is that these programs appear to work:

Looking for the Incentives That Will Prompt Americans to Save More, by Hal Varian, Economic Scene, NY Times: Economists are in almost universal agreement that Americans save too little, and several policies have been proposed with the goal of encouraging them to save more.

The Bush administration favors increasing contribution limits on tax-deferred savings accounts like I.R.A.'s. Critics argue that there would be little impact on total savings ... since wealthy households would simply transfer assets from taxable accounts to tax-sheltered accounts.

Leaving aside the behavior of high-income households, responsible members of both parties recognize that providing better incentives to low-income people is the most challenging problem. How can we get this group to save more?

It is possible for low- and middle-income groups to increase savings. After a detailed examination of the financial circumstances of people close to retirement, two economists, Stephen F. Venti ... and David A. Wise ..., concluded that the primary reason for differences in retirement assets was differences in propensities to save. ...

One promising proposal has been to set ... 401(k) plans so that employees are automatically enrolled in an appropriate plan unless they explicitly choose otherwise. ...[T]his simple policy increases participation rates dramatically.

Another suggestion is to provide matching grants to low-income individuals. ...("Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families: Evidence From a Field Experiment With H&R Block"; ... nontechnical summary ...) In this experiment, ... low- and middle-income families ... were offered a 20 percent match on their contributions to an I.R.A., a 50 percent match or no match at all...

Only 3 percent of the individuals who had no match — the control group — contributed to an I.R.A. But 8 percent of those with a 20 percent match rate contributed, and 14 percent of those with a 50 percent match contributed. The amount contributed was four times as much as the control group for the 20 percent match rate and seven times as much for the 50 percent match rate. ... And most people stuck with their plans: four months after the initial contribution, over 90 percent of the individuals still kept the money in their I.R.A.'s.

These effects are far larger than those of the Saver's Credit, an existing program that provides a tax credit based on the amount of tax-deferred savings. The problem is that a tax credit is useful only if you pay taxes, and many low-income individuals have little or no tax liability after other deductions and credits are applied. Furthermore, the Saver's Credit is complicated and hard to understand. A matching contribution to a savings program is much easier to comprehend. ...

As the authors put it, "Taken together, our results suggest that the combination of a clear and understandable match for saving, easily accessible savings vehicles, the opportunity to use part of an income tax refund to save, and professional assistance could generate a significant increase in contributions to retirement accounts, including among middle- and low-income households."

Matching grants also have a long and venerable history as an American institution. They were invented by none other than Benjamin Franklin in conjunction with his fund-raising efforts for the Pennsylvania Hospital, the first public hospital in America, established in 1751.

Franklin persuaded the legislature to participate by indicating that it would receive "the credit of being charitable without the expense" and explained to the donors that "every man's contribution would be doubled." No doubt the sage of Philadelphia would heartily approve of his innovation being used to encourage the virtue of thrift.

June 19, 2006

Consumer Debt

These writers from Fred Alger Management argue that the current level of consumer debt is not a problem:

Alive and well under a mountain of debt, by Zachary Karabelland and Dan Chung, Commentary, Financial Times: Remember the scene in Monty Python and the Holy Grail where two men push a wheelbarrow through a plague-afflicted village shouting: “Bring out your dead”? A family heaves a body on to the pile, whereupon it lifts his head and says: “But I’m not dead yet!” One man whacks him with a cudgel and says: “Now you are.” That is the perfect metaphor for the American consumer on the one hand and strategists, commentators and economists on the other. They keep trying to bury the consumer under a mountain of debt, even though he is alive and kicking.

There is an understandable cultural prejudice against debt. For most of history, the risks outweighed the costs. If you calculated wrongly, you did not just go bankrupt: you lost your business, home and possessions. ... Low interest rates, securitisation and bankruptcy law have changed the nature of debt.

Our prejudice against debt no longer makes sense. In March, Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke said as much when he suggested that the substitution of mortgage debt for credit card and automobile debt had been a rational decision by consumers to shift leverage into lower-rate obligations. But his assessment is at odds with attitudes on Main Street and Wall Street, especially in light of global agitation over inflation and excess liquidity.

There is no denying that the absolute amount of consumer debt is higher than ever. ...  a total of $11,500bn. Big numbers, yes, and big numbers are easily turned into a harbinger of crisis. But take the financial net worth of US households (which excludes the value of homes): $26,500bn, an all-time high. With home value included, that rises to $52,000bn – more than four-and-a-half times household debt. ...

Even with the Fed tightening, the absolute level of rates is low by historical standards, so low that for all the refinancing and home-equity extraction we have seen, we can still see more. The average mortgage rate for a 15-year loan is around 6 per cent. In 2000, it was 7.72 per cent. Even though conventional wisdom says that consumers are tapped out, they can continue to use their homes as piggy banks. Even if rates go up another 50 basis points, it is likely that consumers will extract hundreds of billions of dollars in cash-out refinancing this year.

Furthermore, the amount that households must spend to service their debts is manageable. That should be the central concern: not how much debt, but whether it is affordable. In 2001, households spent 12.9 per cent of income to service their debts; by the end of 2005, that had risen to nearly 14 per cent. Again, the key issue is rates: if rates are at or near a peak, debt-financed spending can continue. If not, we will face a credit crunch, especially since average incomes are barely rising.

Anyone who defends current [debt] levels risks being labelled as blind not only to structural imbalances but to the struggles faced by families who are taking on debt to meet basic obligations such as homes, medical costs and education. We are not making a judgment about the wisdom of individual consumers, about the struggles they face or about an American culture that overemphasises consumption and encourages excessive spending. We are making a structural argument that the economy can sustain far higher levels of consumer debt than in the past. Even if more individuals face a credit squeeze, the system overall is in no jeopardy.

In addition, many consumers may be using debt more wisely than commentators give them credit for. The increasing array of financial instruments means that people can take on more debt when they are young and their career outlooks are improving. ...

Stripped of its stigma, debt is a neutral tool. Used prudently, it generates economic activity; taken on foolishly, it is a recipe for problems. The question is: what is the tipping point? Prudence, say the sceptics, dictates cutting back now. But is that prudence, or fear? ...

In a world of low rates and less structural risk, the definition of moderation – and risk – must change. The fear debt arouses once protected people from stupid decisions, but today it impedes a rational assessment of costs and benefits. ...

Recent evidence indicates:

"On average, debt burdens appear to be at manageable levels, and delinquency rates on consumer loans and home mortgages have been low," Mr. Bernanke said...

While consumers are managing their finances fairly well so far, I am not as willing as the authors to declare household debt a worry free zone, particularly in the event of a sudden downturn in the economy.

June 11, 2006

"I'd Gladly Pay You Tuesday for a Hamburger Today"

Are we being Wimpy when we worry about household and government debt? This post looks at U.S. indebtedness today and some of the associated risks, and the post that follows examines how attitudes toward debt have changed over time:

Reasons to Worry, by Niall Ferguson, NY Times Magazine: ...[A] question for economists is whether the United States is capable of evolving out of its present excessive indebtedness. Or could the global economic environment change so drastically as to threaten ... decline relative to smaller, more dynamic economies?...

Since becoming president, George Bush has presided over one of the steepest ... rises ever in the federal debt. The gross federal debt now exceeds $8.3 trillion. There are three reasons for the post-2000 increase: reduced revenue during the 2001 recession, generous tax cuts for higher income groups and increased expenditures not only on warfare abroad but also on welfare at home. And if projections from the Congressional Budget Office turn out to be correct, we are just a decade away from a $12.8 trillion debt — more than double what it was when Bush took office.

Big public debts are not always bad, to be sure. It could be argued that in his first term Bush wisely used fiscal policy to boost aggregate demand and counter the impact of the dot-com bust. Public borrowing also allows "tax smoothing" by spreading out over time the cost of big one-off expenses like wars, three of which the United States has fought since 1999.

On the other hand, by requiring larger interest payments, big public debts devour revenue that could be spent on other programs. They may crowd out private investment by pushing up long-term interest rates. They may also have a regressive distributional impact, transferring economic resources from taxpayers to bondholders or from future generations to the present generation. ...

Continue reading ""I'd Gladly Pay You Tuesday for a Hamburger Today"" »

Was There a Golden Age of Thrift?

Does the high indebtedness of households signal a moral decline relative to previous generations? Not according to this look at how consumer indebtedness has changed over time:

The American Way of Debt, by Jackson Lears, NY Times: Americans are awash in red ink. Consumer indebtedness is soaring, the savings rate is down to zero and people are filing for bankruptcy at record rates. To many observers, these are symptoms of cultural decline, from sturdy thrift to flabby self-gratification...

The equation of debt and decline assumes that once upon a time Americans lived within their means and saved for what they bought. This is fantasy: there never was a golden age of thrift. Debt has always played an important role in Americans' lives — not merely as a means of instant gratification but also as a strategy for survival and a tool for economic advance.

Yet our moral traditions have concealed this complexity. "Owe no man anything," St. Paul warned... Indebtedness signified a sin against the Protestant ethic of self-control; it also threatened the ideal of independent manhood that underwrote the founders' vision... The indebted man "must smile on those he hates, he must extend his hand where he would strike, he must speak pleasantly with a curse in his throat," a Harper's contributor wrote in 1894. "He wears dependence like a yoke." Benjamin Franklin coined similar lessons..: "The Borrower Is a Slave to the Lender." "Be frugal and free." The link with lost freedom was more than metaphorical: you could still be imprisoned for debt in many places (including New York City) down to the early 1900's.

Still, the case against debt was more principled than practical. Every generation of moralists imagined the same fall... In their novel "The Gilded Age" (1873), Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner mourned the disappearance of the antebellum "horror of debt"...  In 1924, the editor of The Saturday Evening Post complained that "the firmly rooted aversion to debt ... has almost completely evaporated." In 1958, John Kenneth Galbraith noticed that "there has been an inexplicable but very real retreat from the Puritan canon that required an individual to save first and enjoy later."

In fact, debt is as American as cherry pie. ... Among ... rural folk, through most of the 19th century, cash was scarce, and country-store ledgers carried local peoples' debts for years, sometimes forever. Factory workers and laborers used debt to make ends meet, resorting to pawnshops, loan sharks, relatives and friends. Even moralists admitted distinctions between good ("productive") debt and bad ("consumptive") debt. ...

After 1900, the proliferation of mass-marketed products encouraged a more open tolerance for consumer debt. By the 1920's, millions of middle-class Americans bought durable goods on time payments — sewing machines, washing machines, radios, automobiles, houses. Lenders acquired legitimacy...

Indebtedness could discipline workers, keeping them at routinized jobs in factories and offices, graying but in harness, meeting payments regularly. Good consumers would be good producers. The economist who proposed this idea was Simon Nelson Patten, in "The New Basis of Civilization" (1907). ... He predicted that workers' desires for things would not undermine their capacity for disciplined achievement, as generations of moralists had claimed...

Patten was onto something. The disciplining power of debt was undeniable. Even during the Depression, while Americans cut back on new borrowing, they also denied themselves food and clothing to avoid repossession of refrigerators or real estate. ... In 1932, a Harper's contributor observed that the middle-class homeowner "no longer has possessions but only obligations." This homeowner did not exactly represent an ethos of self-gratification.

The true fulfillment of Patten's vision depended on an economically secure working population. These conditions awaited the rise of strong industrial unions and the comparative prosperity of the post-World War II era. The acquisition of appliances, cars and houses was often financed on the installment plan or with the assistance of government agencies like the Federal Housing Administration. Thanks largely to union power, more fortunate workers could depend on steady wages that allowed them to pay off big-ticket items over time. Patten would have been pleased.

The upward spiral of earning and spending survived until the 1970's, when the midcentury ideal of corporate citizenship evaporated in the harsher climate of renewed international competition. Fearing foreign rivals, American business ended its implicit social contract with unions by seeking cheap labor in overseas markets.

During the 1980's, ... Reagan's rhetorical refusal of limits combined with the deregulation of the lending industry to detach dreams of luxury from previous constraints. As money worship mounted, job security disappeared and inequalities widened, pundits spoke of a new Gilded Age.

By the 1990's, bloated icons of affluence proliferated: the gargantuan pseudo-military vehicle, the 10,000-square-foot hacienda. A bigger standard package of household goods demanded deeper debt and accelerated the pace of the consumer treadmill. No one wanted to look like a "loser."

But for many borrowers, debt has not been just about keeping up appearances. Less-affluent Americans have resorted to borrowing for groceries as well as cars. Public policies have intensified their plight. The freezing of the minimum wage, the tightening of unemployment insurance and workmen's compensation programs, the shifting of the tax burden from the rich to the rest — these changes have starved public services while leaving ordinary Americans more dependent than ever on debt. One of the most consistent statistical findings of recent years is that about half of all personal bankruptcies have been caused by medical bills. Whatever else our current indebtedness may signify, it is hardly a riot of hedonism.

May 30, 2006

Hitting It Big for Retirement

Given the amount of tax revenue that states raise regressively through legalized gambling such as lotteries and video poker, I thought this was an interesting table. It compares the expected earnings in constant dollars from investing various amounts in an S&P 500 index fund versus using the money to play the lottery. The reason for looking at this is that, according to the Tax Foundation article:

A recent survey conducted by Opinion Research Corporation ... and ... reported in a MarketWatch article, found that Americans are, for the most part, pessimistic about their ability to save for retirement—so pessimistic, in fact, that 21 percent of respondents said playing the lottery is “the most practical strategy for accumulating several hundred thousand dollars” for retirement.

The MarketWatch article continues saying "...with 38% of those who earn less than $25,000 pointing to the lottery as a solution." This table looks at the expected losses from pursuing such a strategy over a 40 year time period:

Table 1. Rate of Return on Lottery vs. Rate of Return on Stocks over a Forty-Year Period in 2006 Dollars

Average Amount Spent or Invested per Month
Total Spent or Invested over 40 Years Expected. Return from Lottery(a)
Expected Return from S&P 500 Increased Retirement Savings from Investing Rather than Playing Lottery
$1 $761.37 $178.14 $1,622.17 $1,444.03
$5 $3,806.85 $890.72 $8,110.85 $7,220.13
$10 $7,613.70 $1,781.44 $16,221.69 $14,440.26
$25 $19,034.26 $4,453.59 $40,554.23 $36,100.64
$50 $38,068.52 $8,907.18 $81,108.46 $72,201.29
$100 $76,137.03 $17,814.35 $162,216.92 $144,402.57
$150 $114,205.55 $26,721.53 $243,325.39 $216,603.86
$200 $152,274.07 $35,628.70 $324,433.85 $288,805.14
$250 $190,342.59 $44,535.88 $405,542.31 $361,006.43
$300 $228,411.10 $53,443.05 $486,650.77 $433,207.72

Note: Calculations assume a constant 2 percent inflation rate, 7 percent return on S&P 500 average, and monthly compounding. Lottery spending is not adjusted for life cycle or income cycle.
(a) Based on a 53% cumulative payout rate for all lotteries from 1964 through 2003. ... [Source: Tax Foundation]

Interesting difference in expected returns, but I'm not convinced that people would invest much more if lotteries and other forms of legalized gambling did not exist. The more important concern is, of course, the highly regressive nature of this form of "voluntary" taxation that provides false hope for those in dire economic conditions. Lotteries are easy politically, but they impose large and inequitable costs on some segments of the population. The state should get out of the gambling business and raise taxes by some other means. Nobody has to pay a dollar more and no services have to be cut, just levy the taxes directly so that the tax burden is clear rather than having it obscured through lotteries and other devices.

May 25, 2006

Interest Rates and Saving

Martin Feldstein says:

The Federal Reserve has reversed its low interest rate policy... It will only be a matter of time until the household saving rate is at least back to the 2.4 per cent level of 2002.

I was curious about this so I plotted the 3-month T-Bill rate against the personal saving rate since 1980 to get a rough idea of the association between the two variables:

Saving52606
Click to enlarge

February 18, 2006

High Household Saving in China

In China, factors such as underdeveloped financial markets and fear of large future expenditures due to both economic insecurity and expected inflation cause households to accumulate large savings balances:

High prices are eroding consumer confidence, by Zhang Shunyi, Shanghai Daily: Mounting household savings in China's banks is not necessarily the good thing it seems. According to the People's Bank of China, domestic individual bank deposits... hit 14 trillion yuan (US$1.72 trillion) by the end of 2005. The record-breaking amount of deposits indicates that the Chinese people are much wealthier on the whole. However, rapid accumulation of deposits also shows that people are reluctant to spend as the consumption rate has been on the decline for five consecutive years...

Last year, loans issued by China's banks only accounted for 53 percent of the total money they collected. Part of the other 47 percent was stored in the PBOC as the excess reserve. To make a comparison, loans took up 91 percent of the total a decade ago... Basically, there are two ways to deal with the problem of excessive household savings. One is to further encourage consumer spending thus reduce the deposits. The other, as was mentioned above, is to find more channels, which are profitable and safe, to digest the deposits. Easier said than done.

Both of these two measures require fundamental adjustments in the system of social and banking mechanism. The importance of results brought by these changes can never be understated - it links directly with economic stability. Why are people reluctant to spend? Chinese people are well-known for the habit of hoarding up valuable things. But under the current climate, worry about high prices is perhaps the most cited reason.

"What many people see is the rising price of seeing a doctor or studying in a good school. That makes them feel less safe," said Sun Lijian, a professor at Fudan University's School of Economics. According to a recent survey from Horizon Research, expensive medical services and changes in the pension scheme are listed among the top concerns that trouble Chinese people. If people lose their job, suddenly become ill, want to buy an apartment or hope to deliver better education to their kids, they have to splash out a great deal of money on those things.

The housing price provides a case in point. Even in second-tier cities such as Hangzhou, Wenzhou or Ningbo, people have to save their disposable income for 27 years to buy an 80-square-meter apartment on average. And compared with 1999, the cost of fees for a college student has jumped from 51,000 yuan to 131,000 yuan...

Reducing interest rates to induce people to spend money is difficult. "The PBOC is very prudent about making any more changes to the interest rate. It is nearly impossible to reduce the rate when it already stands at such low a level," said Wu. Perhaps the most important thing to do is to give people confidence about their basic life.

In addition to the measures to enhance economic security, it is also important to develop the financial services industry so that it doesn't take decades of saving to, for example, buy an apartment. In order to reduce its dependence on exports and aid in global rebalancing, China must increase domestic consumption. The "fundamental adjustments in the system of social and banking mechanism" won't happen overnight supporting Bernanke's view that it could be as long as ten years before imbalances are resolved.

February 03, 2006

The Bigger the Oil Price Shock, the Harder We'll Fall

Martin Feldstein is worried that if oil prices go up again and depress economic activity, a falling saving rate won't to bail us out this time:

America will fall harder if oil prices rise, by Martin Feldstein, Commentary, Financial Times: The price of imported oil in the US doubled between summer 2003 and summer 2005, reducing consumers’ purchasing power by more than 1 per cent of gross domestic product. Nevertheless, the economic slowdown that was widely expected never occurred. Consumers kept spending and businesses kept investing. ... The continued strong growth contrasts sharply with the economic weakness that occurred after almost every previous significant rise in the oil price. How do we explain this remarkable difference? And what are the implications for the likely response to a future rise in oil prices?

The key to the economy’s strength in 2004 and 2005 was that household saving declined dramatically while the price of oil rose. ... This shift ...in the annual rate of saving far outstripped the fall in income caused by the higher cost of oil. This fall in saving allowed households to raise consumption spending on non-oil goods and services while paying for the higher cost of imported oil. The primary cause of this dramatic shift was the fall in interest rates and the resulting rise in mortgage refinancing. Homeowners who refinanced their mortgages took out cash and reduced their monthly payments at the same time. Much of the cash obtained by refinancing was spent on consumer durables, home improvements and the like. The lower monthly payments permitted a higher level of sustained spending on all non-durable categories. ...

The faster increase in consumer spending caused businesses to invest more and raised the rate of growth of GDP. Faster GDP growth caused an accelerated rise in employment and a fall in the rate of unemployment. Mortgage interest rates were falling because the Federal Reserve’s fear of deflation had caused it to lower the short-term federal funds rate ... to the extremely low level of 1.0 per cent in 2003 and to leave it there in the first half of 2004 before beginning a very gradual process of rate increases. ... The lower mortgage rates induced refinancing and the subsequent gradual rise in rates induced additional refinancing by homeowners who wanted to borrow before rates rose further.

The powerful effect of mortgage refinancing on consumer spending was a very happy coincidence for the American economy at a time when oil prices were depressing consumers’ real incomes. If oil prices were to rise again in 2006 or 2007, the adverse effect on consumers’ real incomes would not be offset by increased mortgage refinancing. Mortgage refinancing has now peaked and is declining. The Federal Reserve is raising interest rates again to counter the inflationary pressures that remain from the rise in energy costs. And individuals no longer have the large amounts of household equity against which to borrow.

A rise in the oil price could happen again at any time. There is little spare capacity in global oil production and oil demand is rising rapidly in China and other Asian countries. A shock that reduced the production or shipping of oil could drive its price sharply higher. Speculative forces could compound this problem. The US was lucky after 2003 to escape the contractionary effect of an oil price rise even without an explicit change in monetary or fiscal policy. It would not be so lucky if a big oil price increase happened again now.

I don't always agree with Feldstein, but I do here.

December 22, 2005

Impatience and Savings

I haven't followed this literature closely, but it looks interesting and many of the papers noted below have been posted here ( 1, 2, and 3, the last has links to seven papers). It's an analysis of savings behavior starting from a biological perspective. On another note, I'm very literally off to grandma's house in a few minutes - lots of rivers to pass over and lots of woods to pass through - so I won't be able to post or comment until tonight:

Impatience and Savings, NBER Reporter: Research Summary Fall 2005, by David Laibson: When making decisions with immediate consequences, economic actors typically display a high degree of impatience. Consumers choose immediate pleasures instead of waiting a few days for much larger rewards. Consumers want "instant gratification." However, people do not behave impatiently when they make decisions for the future. Few people plan to break their diets next week. Instead, people tend to splurge today and vow to exercise/diet/save tomorrow. From today's viewpoint, people prefer to act impatiently right now but to act patiently later.

Data from neuroscience experiments provide a potential explanation for these observations: short-run decisions engage different brain systems from long-run decisions. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Samuel McClure, George Loewenstein, Jonathan D. Cohen, and I have shown that decisions that involve at least some short-run tradeoffs recruit both analytic and emotional brain systems, whereas decisions that only involve long-run tradeoffs primarily recruit analytic brain systems. These findings suggest that people pursue instant gratification because the emotional brain system - the limbic system - values immediate rewards but only weakly responds to delayed rewards.

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November 10, 2005

"The Rabbit is Indeed in the Middle of the Python"

The theme of the next few posts is global imbalances, so let's start things off with two articles about China. First, The Financial Times wonders if China's rapidly aging population will cause slower economic growth in the future:

Why China stands to grow old before it gets rich, by David Willetts, Commentary, Financial Times: