Category Archive for: Unemployment [Return to Main]

Monday, January 26, 2015

'Techno-Neutrality'

Dietz Vollrath:

Techno-neutrality: I’ve had a few posts in the past few months (here and here) about the consequences of mechanization for the future of work. In short, what will we do when the robots take our jobs?
I wouldn’t call myself a techno-optimist. I don’t think the arrival of robots necessarily makes everything better. But I do not buy the strong techno-pessimism that comes up in many places. Richard Serlin has been a frequent commenter on this blog, and he generally has a gloomy take on where we are going to end up once the robots arrive. I’m not bringing up Richard to pick on him. He writes thoughtful comments on this subject (and lots of others), and it is those comments that pushed me to try and be more clear on why I’m “techno-neutral”. ...

Friday, January 23, 2015

'Who is Moving Out of the U.S. Labor Force?'

Tyler Cowen:

Who is moving out of the U.S. labor force?: Read the recent testimony of Robert E. Hall (pdf):

Most of the decline in participation occurred among teenagers and young adults. The finding that these effects tend to be larger in more prosperous families points strongly away from much of a role for rising influence of benefit programs, because these programs, especially food stamps, are only available to families with incomes well below the median.

So what is going on here? Could it be “culture”? Hall cites, suggestively, time use surveys showing that sleep and personal consumption of video are up strongly.

Wednesday, January 21, 2015

'Rising Fears About Losing and Replacing Jobs'

Tim Taylor:

Rising Fears About Losing and Replacing Jobs: The General Social Survey is a nationally representative survey carried bout by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago and financially supported by grants from the National Science Foundation. Starting in 1977 and 1978, and intermittently over the years since then, it has included these two questions:

Thinking about the next 12 months, how likely do you think it is that you will lose your job or be laid off—very likely, fairly likely, not too likely, or not at all likely?

About how easy would it be for you to find a job with another employer with approximately the same income and fringe benefits you have now? Would you say it would be very easy, somewhat easy, or not easy at all?

Back in 1980, Charles Weaver wrote an article about the patterns of the answers in the first wave of this data. He updates the results and looks for patterns over time in "Worker’s expectations about losing and replacing their jobs: 35 years of change," in the January 2015 issue of the Monthly Labor Review, published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. ...

Both simple comparisons and more sophisticated analyses suggests that fear about losing and replacing jobs has been rising over time. Here's the simple comparison from Weaver: "Compared with workers in 1977 and 1978, workers in 2010 and 2012 expressed significantly less job security. They were more afraid of losing their jobs (11.2 percent versus the earlier 7.7 percent) and were less likely to think that they could find comparable work without much difficulty (48.3 percent versus the earlier 59.2 percent)."

The more detailed breakdown of the data shows which groups have seen their labor market fears increase the most. On the question how likely you are to lose your current job, the answer for the population as a whole rose 3.5 percentage points from 1977-78 to 2010-12. But for blue-collar craft workers the increase was 11.1 percentage points, and for blue collar operatives the rise was 9.7 percentage points. Also, from the early to the most recent survey, those in the age 50-59 age bracket were 8.2 percentage points more likely to think that they were likely to lose their job.

On the issue of whether workers expected to be able to find a comparable job, the answer for the population as a whole dropped 10.9 percentage points from 1977-78 to 2010-12. For those with "some college," but not a college degree, the expectation fell by 23.1 percentage points, and for white collar workers in clerical jobs it fell by 23.9 percentage points. Interestingly, for workers 60 and over the confidence in being able to fine a comparable job was actually 1.7 percentage point greater in the 2010-12 results than in the 1977-78 results.

An obvious question is whether the greater fears about losing jobs and replacing jobs are a relatively recent development--in particular, whether they happened only in the aftermath of the Great Recession--or whether this has been a steady trend over time. Stewart runs through a number of different statistical exercises to consider this point...

Stewart writes: "In 2010 and 2012, more workers feared losing their jobs, and far fewer workers said that it would be easy to find a comparable job, than in 1977 and 1978. ... Some may infer that the lower job security felt by Americans in 2010 and 2012 was an aberration, based upon the unusual conditions presented by the recent recession. But the reality is that the downward trend in feelings of job security has been going on for the last 35 years, apart from the “extra push” it has received from the “`Great Recession,' ..."

As I mentioned in yesterday's blog post, I think the most powerful fear in the current labor market is not about mass unemployment, but instead is a concern that the available alternative jobs may be of lower quality in terms of wages, benefits, work conditions, job security, and the prospect for a future career path.

Tuesday, January 13, 2015

Full Employment Alone Won’t Solve Problem of Stagnating Wages

I have a new column:

Full Employment Alone Won’t Solve Problem of Stagnating Wages: The most recent employment report brought mixed news. The unemployment rate continues its slow but steady downward path and now stands at 5.6 percent, but wages remain flat. In response, most analysts made two points. First, the lack of wage growth indicates that we are not yet close enough to full employment to generate upward pressure on wages, so policymakers should be patient in reversing attempts to stimulate the economy. Second, once we do get closer to full employment the picture for wages will change and the long awaited acceleration in labor compensation will finally materialize. 
I fear this trust that market forces will eventually raise wages will lead to disappointment. ...

Friday, January 09, 2015

Fed Watch: Wage Growth - or Lack of - Continues to Surprise

Tim Duy:

Wage Growth - or Lack of - Continues to Surprise, by Tim Duy: The December employment report, with its surprising combination of solid job gains and decelerating wage growth, leaves Fed policy up the air.
Headline nonfarm payrolls gained by 252k, while previous months were revised up a net 50k. Job growth continues to accelerate:

NFPa010915

Note the acceleration in aggregate hours worked:

NFPd010915

Such gains suggest the recent acceleration in GDP growth is real and likely to be sustained. From the household survey, we see that the unemployment rate continues to decline. Fed forecasts will once again soon be in jeopardy:

NFPc010915

In the context of indicators previously identified by Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen:

YELLENa010915

YELLENb010915

Overall, the story is one of ongoing improvement in labor markets, including metrics of underemployment. Wage growth, however, nosedived during the month:

NFPb010915

I would be wary of this read on wages - strikes me as an aberration that is likely to be violently reversed, but I also stick to what I wrote yesterday:
I believe that an acceleration of wage growth would do the trick, which is why this remains the data to watch in the employment report. If June rolls around with no inflation and no greater wage growth, the Fed will find it challenging to begin normalization. In that case, they would need to focus on the employment mandate or pivot to some financial stability story to justify a rate hike.
Bottom Line: Generally a very solid report. But the wage numbers present a dilemma for the Fed. Simply put, no wage growth means the Fed can't be particularly confident that inflation will trend toward target. Not that a rate hike was imminent in any event; Fed is still looking at June, but they need some more help from the data. Of course, June is still a long way off - we have five more employment reports before that meeting. Time enough for these numbers to turn around. Note that if the wage trend does reverse quickly, policy expectations would shift just as quickly.

'December Employment Report: 252,000 Jobs, 5.6% Unemployment Rate'

In case you missed the news. This is from Calculated Risk:

December Employment Report: 252,000 Jobs, 5.6% Unemployment Rate: From the BLS:

Total nonfarm payroll employment rose by 252,000 in December, and the unemployment rate declined to 5.6 percent, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Job gains occurred in professional and business services, construction, food services and drinking places, health care, and manufacturing.
...
The change in total nonfarm payroll employment for October was revised from +243,000 to +261,000, and the change for November was revised from +321,000 to +353,000. With these revisions, employment gains in October and November were 50,000 higher than previously reported.
...Eleven consecutive months over 200 thousand. Employment is now up 2.952 million year-over-year.  ... For total employment, 2014 was the best year since 1999.

For private employment, 2014 was the best year since 1997. ...

The Labor Force Participation Rate declined in December to 62.7%. ... A large portion of the recent decline in the participation rate is due to demographics.

The Employment-Population ratio was unchanged at 59.2%... The unemployment rate declined in December to 5,6%.

This was above expectations of 245,000, and with the upward revisions to prior months, this was another strong report.

I'll have much more later ...

Thursday, January 08, 2015

'The Link between High Employment and Labor Market Fluidity'

Laurent Belsie in the NBER Digest:

The Link between High Employment and Labor Market Fluidity: U.S. labor markets lost much of their fluidity well before the onset of the Great Recession, according to Labor Market Fluidity and Economic Performance (NBER Working Paper No. 20479). The economy's ability to move jobs quickly from shrinking firms to young, growing enterprises slowed after 1990. Job reallocation rates fell by more than a quarter. After 2000, the volume of hiring and firing - known as the worker reallocation rate - also dropped. The decline was broad-based, affecting multiple industries, states, and demographic groups. The groups that suffered the most were the less-educated and the young, particularly young men.
"The loss of labor market fluidity suggests the U.S. economy became less dynamic and responsive in recent decades," authors Steven J. Davis and John Haltiwanger conclude. "Direct evidence confirms that U.S. employers became less responsive to shocks in recent decades, not that employer-level shocks became less variable."

Many factors contributed to the decline in job and worker reallocation rates, among them a shift to older companies, an aging workforce, changing business models and supply chains, the effects of the information revolution on hiring, and government policies.
About a quarter of the decline in job reallocation can be explained by the decline in the formation of young firms in the U.S. From the early 1980s and until about 2000, retail and services accounted for most of the decline in job reallocation. This occurred even though jobs shifted away from manufacturing and toward retail, where job creation is normally more dynamic and worker turnover more pronounced. One reason for the slowdown in turnover was the growing importance of big box chains in the retail sector. The authors note that other studies find that jobs are more durable in larger retail firms, and their workers are more productive than workers at the smaller stores these retailers replaced.
Fewer layoffs and more employment stability are generally considered positive trends and natural outgrowths of an aging workforce. The flip side of this equation, however, is that slower job and worker reallocation mean slower creation of new jobs, putting the jobless, including young people, at a heightened risk of long-term unemployment. These developments also slow job advancement and career changes, which are associated with boosts in wages.
This is of particular significance since 2000, when the concentration of declines in job reallocation rates and the employment share of young firms shifted from the retail sector to high-tech industries.
"These developments raise concerns about productivity growth, which has close links to creative destruction and factor reallocation in prominent theories of innovation and growth and in many empirical studies," the authors write.
Government regulation also played a role in slowing job and worker reallocation rates. In 1950, under five percent of workers required a government license to hold their job; by 2008, the percentage had risen to 29 percent. Add in government certification and the share rises to 38 percent. Wrongful discharge laws make it harder to fire employees. Federal and state laws protect classes of workers based on race, religion, gender, and other attributes. Minimum-wage laws and the heightened importance of employer-provided health insurance also make job changes less frequent.
The authors study the effects of the decline in job and worker reallocation rates on employment rates by gender, education, and age, using state-level data. They find that states with especially large declines in labor market fluidity also experienced the largest declines in employment rates, with young and less-educated persons the most adversely affected.
"...if our assessment is correct," the authors conclude, "the United States is unlikely to return to sustained high employment rates without restoring labor market fluidity."

Tuesday, January 06, 2015

'Job Quality is about Policies, not Technology'

This was in the daily links not too long ago, but just in case it was missed (it is from the Growth Economics blog):

Job Quality is about Policies, not Technology, by Dietz Vollrath: Nouriel Roubini posted an article titled “Where Will All the Workers Go?”... The worry here is that technology will replace certain jobs (particularly goods-producing jobs) and that there will literally be nothing for those people to do. They will presumably exit the labor market completely and possibly need permanent income support.
Let’s quickly deal with the “lump of labor” fallacy sitting behind this. ... We’ve been creating new kinds of jobs for two hundred years. ... The economy is going to find something for these people to do. The question is what kind of jobs these will be.
Will they be “bad jobs”? McJobs at retail outlets... We can worry about the quality of jobs, but the mistake here is to confound “good jobs” with manufacturing or goods-producing jobs. Manufacturing jobs are not inherently “good jobs”. There is nothing magic about repetitively assembling parts together. You think the people at Foxconn have good jobs? There is no greater dignity to manufacturing than to providing a service. Cops produce no goods. Nurses produce no goods. Teachers produce no goods.
Manufacturing jobs were historically “good jobs” because they came with benefits that were not found in other industries. Those benefits – job security, health care, regular raises – have nothing to do with the dignity of “real work” and lots to do with manufacturing being an industry that is conducive to unionization. The same scale economies that make gigantic factories productive also make them relatively easy places to organize. ... To beat home the point, consider that what we consider “good” service jobs – teacher, cop – are also heavily unionized. Public employees, no less.
If you want people to get “good jobs” – particularly those displaced by technology – then work to reverse the loss of labor’s negotiating power relative to ownership. Raise minimum wages. Alleviate the difficulty in unionizing service workers.
You want to smooth the transition for people who are displaced, and help them move into new industries? Great. Let’s have a discussion about our optimal level of social insurance and support for training and education. ...
Any job can be a “good job” if the worker and employer can coordinate on a good equilibrium. Costco coordinates on a high-wage, high-benefit, high-effort, low-turnover equilibrium. Sam’s Club coordinates on a low-wage, low-benefit, low-effort, high-turnover equilibrium. Both companies make money, but one provides better jobs than the other. So as technology continues to displace workers, think about how to get *all* companies to coordinate on the “good” equilibrium rather than pining for lost days of manly steelworkers or making the silly presumption that we will literally run out of things to do.

'Grown-Up Business Cycles' and Jobless Recoveries

An hypothesis about jobless recoveries:

 Grown-up business cycles, by Benjamin Pugsley and Aysegul Sahin, FRBNY: We document two striking facts about U.S. firm dynamics and interpret their significance for aggregate employment dynamics. The first observation is the steady decline in the firm entry rate over the last thirty years, and the second is the gradual shift of employment from younger to older firms over the same period. Both observations hold across industries and geographies. We show that, despite these trends, firms’ life-cycle dynamics and business-cycle properties have remained virtually unchanged. Consequently, the reallocation of employment toward older firms results entirely from the cumulative effect of the thirty-year decline in firm entry. This “start-up deficit” has both an immediate and a delayed (by shifting the age distribution) effect on aggregate employment dynamics. Recognizing this evolving heterogeneity is crucial for understanding shifts in aggregate behavior of employment over the business cycle. With mature firms less responsive to business cycle shocks, the cyclical component of aggregate employment growth diminishes with the increasing share of mature firms. At the same time, the trend decline in firm entry masks the diminishing cyclicality during contractions and reinforces it during expansions, which generates the appearance of jobless recoveries where aggregate employment recovers slowly relative to output. [Download Full text.]

This may be part of the explanation for jobless recoveries, but I suspect there is more to it than this.

Monday, January 05, 2015

FRBSF Economic Letter: Why Is Wage Growth So Slow?

Mary Daly and Bart Hobijn of the SF Fed:

Why Is Wage Growth So Slow?, by Mary C. Daly and Bart Hobijn, FRBSF Economic Letter: Abstract: Despite considerable improvement in the labor market, growth in wages continues to be disappointing. One reason is that many firms were unable to reduce wages during the recession, and they must now work off a stockpile of pent-up wage cuts. This pattern is evident nationwide and explains the variation in wage growth across industries. Industries that were least able to cut wages during the downturn and therefore accrued the most pent-up cuts have experienced relatively slower wage growth during the recovery.
A prominent feature of the Great Recession and subsequent recovery has been the unusual behavior of wages. In standard economic models, unemployment and wage growth are tightly connected, moving at nearly the same time in opposite directions: As unemployment rises, wage growth slows, and vice versa. Since 2008 this relationship has slipped. During the recession, wage growth slowed much less than expected in response to the sharp increase in unemployment (Daly, Hobijn, and Lucking 2012). And so far in the recovery, wage growth has remained slow, despite substantial declines in the unemployment rate (Daly, Hobijn, and Ni 2013).
One explanation for this pattern is the hesitancy of employers to reduce wages and the reluctance of workers to accept wage cuts, even during recessions, a behavior known as downward nominal wage rigidity. Daly and Hobijn (2014) argue that this behavior affected the aggregate relationship between the unemployment rate and wage growth during the past three recessions and recoveries and has been especially pronounced during and after the Great Recession.
This Economic Letter examines whether the effects of wage rigidities over the recent recession and recovery can also be seen across industries. In particular, we consider whether industries with higher or lower degrees of wage flexibility have seen different evolutions of wage growth and unemployment. Our findings suggest that industries with the most downwardly rigid wage structures before the recession have seen the slowest wage growth during the recovery, conditional on changes in unemployment. In contrast, industries with fairly flexible wage structures have seen unemployment and wage growth move more closely together. These findings provide cross-industry evidence that downward nominal wage rigidities have played an important role in the modest recovery of wages in recent years.
Downward nominal wage rigidities, wage growth, and unemployment
Downward nominal wage rigidities are a well-documented feature of the U.S. labor market (see, for example, Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry 1996 and Card and Hyslop 1996). With that in mind, Daly and Hobijn (2014) introduce a model to illustrate how such rigidities can affect the relationship between unemployment and wage growth. Downward rigidities prevent businesses from reducing wages as much as they would like following a negative shock to the economy. This keeps wages from falling, but it also further reduces the demand for workers, contributing to the rise in unemployment. Accordingly, the higher wages come with more unemployment than would occur if wages were flexible and could be fully reduced.
As the economy recovers, the situation reverses and the pressure to cut wages dissipates. However, the accumulated stockpile of pent-up wage cuts remains and must be worked off to put the labor market back in balance. In response, businesses hold back wage increases and wait for inflation and productivity growth to bring wages closer to their desired level. Since it takes some time to fully exhaust the pool of wage cuts, wage growth remains low even as the economy expands and the unemployment rate declines. Daly and Hobijn (2014) show that this mechanism causes a bending of the wage Phillips curve—the curve that characterizes the relationship between unemployment and wage growth.

Figure 1
Wage Phillips curve for all civilian workers, 2008–14

Wage Phillips curve for all civilian workers, 2008–14
Figure 1 shows that the bending of the Phillips curve in our model matches the data for the United States during the Great Recession and subsequent recovery. This same pattern has held in the past three recessions (Daly and Hobijn 2014). The figure shows the relationship between wage growth on the vertical axis, measured as the four-quarter moving average of the four-quarter growth rate of wages and salaries in the employment cost index, and the 12-month moving average of the unemployment rate on the horizontal axis. The figure covers the period from the first quarter of 2008 through the third quarter of 2014. The arrows show the path of the observations over time, and the size of the dots is proportional to the fraction of workers that report no wage changes over the past year.
The first part of the curve shows the behavior of wage growth and the unemployment rate during the recession, when the unemployment rate increased by about 5 percentage points and wage growth slowed by about 2 percentage points. The second part of the curve shows that during the subsequent recovery wage growth did not increase as much as it declined during the downturn. The result is that the most recent reported wage growth was 1 percentage point lower than it was at the same level of the unemployment rate when unemployment was rising. This difference is the result of the bending of the Phillips curve, which can be generated by wage rigidity as described in Daly and Hobijn (2014). The recent flattening of the Phillips curve is one reason wage growth has remained sluggish during the recent recovery despite substantial declines in unemployment.

Figure 2
Share of workers with frozen wages over past year

Share of workers with frozen wages over past year

Source: FRBSF Wage Rigidity Meter.

Rigidity and wage growth across industries
If downward nominal wage rigidities are an important explanation for recent slow wage growth, we should see differential effects across industries. Although all industries have some rigidity in wages, the degree of rigidity varies greatly. Figure 2 shows the difference between two industries most affected by the Great Recession: construction and finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE). The figure plots the 12-month moving average of the share of workers who had their wages fixed over the last year—the standard measure of wage rigidity taken from the FRBSF Wage Rigidity Meter: http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/nominal-wage-rigidity/.
As the figure shows, both industries have some degree of frozen wages that move up and down over the business cycle, just like the national data. However, the level in the construction sector is almost always higher than in FIRE. In fact, with the exception of the late 1990s, the fraction of workers with their wages fixed from one year to the next, zero change, is substantially smaller in FIRE than in construction.

Figure 3
Wage Phillips curves by industry, 2008–14

Wage Phillips curves by industry, 2008–14: A. ConstructionWage Phillips curves by industry, 2008–14: B. FIRE

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The question for our analysis is whether such sectoral differences can further illuminate the relationship between wage growth and unemployment during the Great Recession and subsequent recovery. To examine this we turn again to the wage Phillips curve. Figure 3 shows the wage Phillips curves for the construction and FIRE sectors for 2008 through 2014. As in Figure 1, wage growth in each sector from the employment cost index is on the vertical axis and the industry-specific unemployment rate is on the horizontal axis. The arrows show the path of the observations over time and the size of the markers reflects the share of workers that report no wage change over the past year.
Comparing the two shows that large wage stagnation in the construction sector changed the relationship between wage growth and labor market slack relative to the FIRE sector. More rigid wages in construction created a bend in the curve, consistent with the theory. This bend represents the fact that, while wage growth slowed when the unemployment rate rose, it has moved little as unemployment has declined. More specifically, although the 12-month moving average of the unemployment rate in the construction sector has declined from 20.9% in mid-2010 to 9.5% in the third quarter of 2014, wage growth has risen only 0.6 percentage point over the same period and currently stands at 1.4% per year.
One way to assess how much construction deviates from the normal relationship between unemployment and wage growth is to consider what wage growth was in construction at a comparable level of unemployment during the labor market downturn. This difference is shown in the figure as the red dashed line, which indicates that the most recent wage growth is 2.3 percentage points lower than at the beginning of the recession. This gap is a measure of the degree to which the wage Phillips curve is bent.
Notably, the shape of the curve in construction stands in stark contrast with that in FIRE, where wages are more flexible. FIRE wage growth fell precipitously as the unemployment rate rose. Once unemployment in the sector started to decline, wage growth accelerated. As of the third quarter of 2014, wage growth was actually 0.4 percentage point higher than it was the last time the unemployment rate was so low. Hence, FIRE does not show the curve bending associated with downward wage rigidities.

Figure 4
Wage rigidities and the bending of the Phillips curve

Wage rigidities and the bending of the Phillips curve
The relationship between the shape of the wage Phillips curve and the level of the pre-recession wage rigidities for construction and FIRE is indicative of a pattern that holds across the 15 major private industries for which we have wage growth data, shown in Figure 4. The figure plots the size of the wage growth gaps (vertical axis), which we used in Figure 3 to measure the degree of bending of the curve, in the third quarter of 2014 against the degree of wage rigidity in 2007 (horizontal axis). The figure confirms what the theory implies: Sectors where wages are more downwardly rigid are the ones with the largest bends in their wage price Phillips curves.
Importantly, this relationship between the level of wage rigidity and the degree of curve bending across industries is statistically significant. The dashed line plots the fitted regression line for this relationship, with each industry weighted by its size in terms of number of payroll employees. Cross-industry variation in the level of wage rigidity in 2007 accounts for 60% of the variation in the bending of the wage Phillips curve across sectors in this weighted regression. This industry-level evidence is consistent with the idea that the reluctance of employers to cut wages during the downturn has had a significant impact on the dynamics of wage growth and unemployment during the recovery.
Conclusion
National and cross-industry evidence shows that pent-up wage cuts reflecting downward nominal wage rigidities have been an important force during the Great Recession and subsequent recovery. The rigidity of wages in a number of sectors has shaped the dynamics of unemployment and wage growth and is likely to continue to do so until labor markets have fully returned to normal.
Mary C. Daly is a senior vice president in the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Bart Hobijn is a senior research advisor in the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
References
Akerlof, George A., William T. Dickens, and George L. Perry. 1996. “The Macroeconomics of Low Inflation.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1996(1).
Card, David, and Dean Hyslop. 1996. “Does Inflation ‘Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market’?” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 5538. 
Congressional Budget Office. 2012. The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2012 to 2022. Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office. 
Daly, Mary C., and Bart Hobijn. 2014. “Downward Nominal Wage Rigidities Bend the Phillips Curve.” FRB San Francisco Working Paper 2013-08. 
Daly, Mary C., Bart Hobijn, and Brian Lucking. 2012. “Why Has Wage Growth Stayed Strong?” FRBSF Economic Letter 2012-10 (April 2).
Daly, Mary C., Bart Hobijn, and Timothy Ni. 2013. “The Path of Wage Growth and Unemployment” FRBSF Economic Letter 2013-20 (July 15).

Tuesday, December 30, 2014

'Musings on 25-54 Employment-to-Population Rates and the Macroeconomy'

Brad DeLong:

Musings on 25-54 Employment-to-Population Rates and the Macroeconomy: (1) If the US economy were operating at its productive potential, the share of 25 to 54-year-olds who are employed ought to be what it was at the start of 2000. Back then there were few visible pressures leading to rising inflation in the economy.
Does anybody disagree with that?
(2) Right now, 25 to 54-year-olds–both male and female–are employed at a rate lower by 5%-age points then they were at the start of 2000. That’s 6.5%, or 1/15, more 25-54 labor at work than we have today.
Does anybody disagree with that? ...

That's just the start (too hard to excerpt effectively -- there are three more points followed by two questions, five more points, then two more questions).

Wednesday, December 17, 2014

A Big Safety Net and Strong Job Market Can Co-Exist. Just Ask Scandinavia.

Neil Irwin:

A Big Safety Net and Strong Job Market Can Co-Exist. Just Ask Scandinavia: It is a simple idea supported by both economic theory and most people’s intuition: If welfare benefits are generous and taxes high, fewer people will work. ... Here’s the rub, though: The idea may be backward.
Some of the highest employment rates in the advanced world are in places with the highest taxes and most generous welfare systems, namely Scandinavian countries. The United States and many other nations with relatively low taxes and a smaller social safety net actually have substantially lower rates of employment. ...
In short, more people may work when countries offer public services that directly make working easier, such as subsidized care for children and the old; generous sick leave policies; and cheap and accessible transportation. ...
And this analysis may leave out some other factors... Robert Greenstein, the president of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, notes that wages for entry-level work are much higher in the Nordic countries than in the United States, reflecting a higher minimum wage, stronger labor unions and cultural norms that lead to higher pay. ... Perhaps more Americans would enter the labor force if even basic jobs paid that well, regardless of whether the United States provided better child care and other services. ...

Friday, December 12, 2014

'Why America’s Middle Class is Lost'

Part 1 of Tankersley's series on the problems facing the middle class ("Liftoff & Letdown: The American middle class is floundering, and it has been for decades. The Post examines the mystery of what’s gone wrong, and shows what the country must focus on to get the economy working for everyone again. Monday: The devalued American worker."):

Why America’s middle class is lost, by Jim Tankersley, Washington Post: ... Yes, the stock market is soaring, the unemployment rate is finally retreating after the Great Recession and the economy added 321,000 jobs last month. But all that growth has done nothing to boost pay for the typical American worker. Average wages haven’t risen over the last year, after adjusting for inflation. Real household median income is still lower than it was when the recession ended.
Make no mistake: The American middle class is in trouble.
That trouble started decades ago, well before the 2008 financial crisis, and it is rooted in shifts far more complicated than the simple tax-and-spend debates that dominate economic policymaking in Washington. ...
In this new reality, a smaller share of Americans enjoy the fruits of an expanding economy. This isn’t a fluke of the past few years — it’s woven into the very structure of the economy. And even though Republicans and Democrats keep promising to help the middle class reclaim the prosperity it grew accustomed to after World War II, their prescriptions aren’t working. ...
The great mystery is: What happened? Why did the economy stop boosting ordinary Americans in the way it once did?
The answer is complicated, and it’s the reason why tax cuts, stimulus spending and rock-bottom interest rates haven’t jolted the middle class back to its postwar prosperity. ...

Sunday, December 07, 2014

'Decline in the Labor Force Participation Rate: Mostly Demographics and Long Term Trends'

Bill McBride at Calculated Risk:

Decline in the Labor Force Participation Rate: Mostly Demographics and Long Term Trends: For several years, I've been arguing that "most of the recent decline in the participation rate" was due to demographics and other long term structural trends (like more education).  Clearly this was an important issue because if most of the decline had been due to cyclical weakness, then we'd expect a significant increase in participation as the economy improved. If the decline was due to demographics and other long term trends, then the participation rate might keep falling (or flatten out for a period before declining again) as the economy improves. ...
Most of the recent research supports my view. ...

After going through lots of evidence, including the reasons for the decline in the participation rate for prime age workers (how much is due to the recession?), he concludes:

The bottom line is that the participation rate was declining for prime working age workers before the recession, there are several reasons for this decline (not just recent "economic weakness") and many estimates of "missing workers" are probably way too high.

Saturday, December 06, 2014

'Comparing Postmodern Recoveries'

In my very first piece for CBS news back in early November of 2009, almost a year and a half into the "recovery", I wrote an article saying that unemployment may not fully recover until 2013, four years later. The editors (who were different at the time than they are now) asked me a couple of times if I really wanted to be that pessimistic, and I said yes, I did. I honestly thought it would take that long, I wasn't just trolling (it was based in large part on an SF Fed forecast that output would recover in 2012 which turned out to be overly optimistic). And I kept warning from then on (as I had even before then here) that the recovery would be slow.

In the article I said:

... The reason for the slow recovery is partly due to the depth of the recession -- the deeper the hole, the longer it takes to crawl out of it -- but it's also because of the large amount of structural change that the economy must go through before it can recover. Prior to the recession we had too many resources in the housing, finance, and auto industries, and it will take time to move the people and resources who used to work in these industries into areas of the economy where they can be employed productively. And as new productive activities outside these areas arise, firms will install the best technology available. This technology will, in general, be more capital-intensive than before, and so we will need to surpass the pre-recession level of output before the demand for labor will return to its previous level. In addition, firms typically reorganize their job assignments after layoffs and discover that the same work can be performed with fewer workers and this, too, can slow the recovery period for employment relative to output.

The bottom line is that there's still a long road ahead, particularly for labor, and for that reason I am very much in favor of additional government policy targeted directly at the employment problem. In addition, given the record levels of long-term unemployment we are experiencing (those unemployed 27 weeks or more now constitute 35.6 percent of the unemployed; see here for a graphical representation of the situation), the recent vote to extend unemployment benefits was overdue and very welcome.

I also emphasized the delayed peak of unemployment relative to the trough for output in the previous recessions, and expected that to contribute to the slow recovery, but that didn't happen this time -- so I got that particular detail wrong (though not the more general idea of a jobless recovery like the previous two). And as time progressed, I began to also emphasize the problems households have in recovering from the losses they incur in a "balance sheet recession" -- that takes a long time -- but that was not part of this argument.

In the end, while I thought I was being pessimistic, four years to recover?, I was not pessimistic enough (though the pessimism was updated over time) and we are still waiting for full recovery.

On that note, Paul Krugman says today:

Comparing Postmodern Recoveries: Very early on — in fact, long before the 2007 recession was either declared officially, or admitted as reality by those still touting a Bush Boom — some of us warned that recovery would be slow, and initially jobless. Why? Because this was a postmodern business cycle, brought on not by monetary tightening but by private-sector overreach, and hence harder to turn around than, say, the 1979-82 slump. Nonetheless, as Menzie Chinn notes, a constant talking point on the right has been that slow growth showed the damage done by Obama policies. And not just at Heritage or whatever; people like Ed Lazear or John Taylor demonstrated the reality of the hack gap by asserting that the private sector wasn’t creating jobs because Obama was looking at them funny; also Obamacare.
How could you test this? Well, when I began talking about postmodern recessions, I argued that the 2007 slump was the third such example — that 1990-91 and 2001 were also postmodern recessions, followed by jobless recoveries. I’ll leave 1990-91 aside for now, because I’m lazy, and just note that we now have enough information to make a clear comparison between the recovery that began in 2001 and the one that began in 2009. ...
By any standard I can think of, the Obama-era job recovery has been stronger than the Bush-era job recovery. Now, I don’t think that reflects excellent policies; and I would argue that in some ways the depth of the preceding slump set the stage for a faster recovery. But the point is that the usual suspects have been using the alleged uniquely poor performance under Obama to claim uniquely bad policies, or bad attitude, or something. And if that’s the game they want to play, they have just scored an impressive own goal.

Friday, December 05, 2014

'Economy Adds 321,000 Jobs, Strongest Gain in Almost Three Years'

Dean Baker on today's jobs report. Not his concluding paragraph:

Economy Adds 321,000 Jobs, Strongest Gain in Almost Three Years: Over the last three months wages grew at a 1.8 percent annual rate.
The economy added 321,000 jobs in November, the strongest gain since it added 360,000 in January of 2012. With upward revisions to the prior two months data, the average job gain over the last three months has been 275,000. The household survey showed unemployment unchanged at 5.8 percent, with the employment-to-population ratio (EPOP) also unchanged at 59.2 percent.
The gains were widely spread across sectors. ...
Other news in the establishment survey was also positive. The average workweek increased by 0.1 hour to 34.6, the longest since May of 2008 and wages reportedly rose by 9 cents. The one-month jump was in large part an anomaly; over the last three months wages have risen at just a 1.8 percent annual rate compared with the prior three months. There is little evidence of any wage acceleration in any major sector.

jobs-2014-12

While the overall employment and unemployment numbers changed little in November, there was some positive news in the household survey. The number of people involuntarily employed part time fell by 200,000. It is now almost 900,000 below the year-ago level. By contrast, the number of people voluntarily choosing to work part-time rose by 297,000. It is now more than 1 million higher than the year-ago level. This is almost certainly the result of the Affordable Care Act, which has allowed people to get insurance outside of employment so that many people no longer have to work full-time jobs to get insurance for themselves or their families.
In another positive sign, the percent of the unemployed who had voluntarily quit their job rose to 9.1 percent. This measure of confidence in the labor market is at its highest level in the recovery, albeit well below the 11-12 percent range in the pre-recession period. The median duration of unemployment spells and the share of long-term unemployed both fell to their lowest level in the recovery, although the average duration rose slightly. Black teen employment rate rose to 21.8 percent, the highest since January of 2008, while unemployment fell to 28.1 percent, the lowest since April of 2008.
Interestingly, the recovery seems to be disproportionately benefiting workers with less education. Over the last year, the unemployment rate for workers without a high school degree fell 2.1 percentage points and for workers with just a high school degree by 1.7 percentage points. By contrast, the unemployment rate for college grads has only dropped by 0.2 percentage points. The unemployment rate for college grads is still more than a percentage point above its pre-recession level.
Overall, this is a very positive report, but it still must be understood in the context of the hole created by the downturn. It would take two and half years at this growth rate to restore demographically adjusted pre-recession levels of the employment to population ratio.

Paul Krugman issues a warning:

On Not Counting Chickens: A genuinely good employment report this morning... But — you knew there would be a but — good news can turn into bad news if it encourages complacency.
There will, predictably, be calls to respond to the good news by normalizing monetary policy, raising interest rates soon. And we will want to raise rates off zero at some point. But it’s important to say that (a) we are still highly uncertain about the underlying strength of the economy (b) the risks remain very asymmetric, with much more danger from tightening too soon than from tightening too late. ...
So still: the Fed should wait until it sees the whites of inflation’s eyes — and by inflation I mean inflation clearly above 2 percent, and if I had my way higher than that.

See also Calculated Risk (here and here).

Thursday, December 04, 2014

'Who Pays for the Minimum Wage?'

Via Owen Zidar:

Who Pays for the Minimum Wage?: From Attila Lindner and  Péter Harasztosi:
This paper analyzes the effects of a large (~60%) and persistent increase in the minimum wage instituted in Hungary in 2001. We propose a new approach to estimating the employment effects of a minimum wage increase that exploits information on the distribution of wages before and after the policy change. We infer the number of jobs destroyed by comparing the number of pre-reform jobs below the new minimum wage to the excess number of jobs paying at (and above) the new minimum wage. Our estimates imply that the higher minimum wage had at most a small negative effect on employment, and so the main effect was pushing up wages. We then use data on a large panel of firms to evaluate the economic incidence of the minimum wage increase. Contrary to theoretical models that attribute the small employment effects of minimum wage changes to monopsonistic wage setting, we find no evidence that the rise in the minimum wage led to lower profitability among low-wage employers. Instead, we find that the costs of the minimum wage were largely passed through to consumers.

Wednesday, December 03, 2014

'Return of Focus Hocus Pocus'

Paul Krugman:

Return of Focus Hocus Pocus: I’ve been getting correspondence from people saying that I need to respond to Tom Edsall channeling Chuck Schumer on how health reform was a mistake, Obama should have focused on the economy.
The thing is, I responded to this argument four years ago, and everything I said then still applies. When people say that Obama should have “focused” on the economy, what, specifically, are they saying he should have done? Enacted a bigger stimulus? Maybe he could have done that at the very beginning, but that wouldn’t have conflicted with the effort to pass health reform — and anyway, I don’t hear many of the “focus” types saying that. So what do they mean? Obama should have gone around squinting and saying “I’m focused on the economy”? What would that have done?
Look, governing is not just theater. For sure the weakness of the recovery has hurt Democrats. But “focusing”, whatever that means, wouldn’t have delivered more job growth. What should Obama have done that he actually could have done in the face of scorched-earth Republican opposition? And how, if at all, did health reform stand in the way of doing whatever it is you’re saying he should have done?
I have seen no answer to these questions.

I am going to have to disagree slightly. Politics is, in large part, about identity and I don't think Obama did nearly enough to show he identifies with the working class. Fighting for their needs publicly and loudly probably wouldn't have made any difference in terms of fiscal policy, but doing more to signal that he identifies with their struggles might have helped at the ballot box. I don't see how it could have hurt. Yes, various jobs programs were proposed along the way, and nothing came of them for the most part, but there just wasn't enough fist-pounding on this issue by the administration.

Update: See also Robert Waldmann.

Wednesday, November 26, 2014

Some Good News for the Unemployed

At MoneyWatch:

Some Good News for the Unemployed: There has been considerable discussion of the “hollowing out” of middle class jobs in recent years, a trend that started before the Great Recession. But where do those who have lost their jobs go? Do they end up with low paying service jobs, McJobs as they are sometimes called, or do they move up the ladder to higher paying jobs?
Many people believe that most people who lose middle class jobs end up worse off than before, but recent research by Ellie Terry and John Robertson of the Atlanta Fed finds some surprising results. ...

Monday, November 24, 2014

'And the Winner Is...Full-Time Jobs!

This is from "Julie Hotchkiss, a research economist and senior policy adviser at the Atlanta Fed":

And the Winner Is...Full-Time Jobs!: Each month, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) surveys about 60,000 households and asks people over the age of 16 whether they are employed and, if so, if they are working full-time or part-time. The BLS defines full-time employment as working at least 35 hours per week. This survey, referred to as both the Current Population Survey and the Household Survey, is what produces the monthly unemployment rate, labor force participation rate, and other statistics related to activities and characteristics of the U.S. population.
For many months after the official end of the Great Recession in June 2009, the Household Survey produced less-than-happy news about the labor market. The unemployment rate didn't start to decline until October 2009, and nonfarm payroll job growth didn't emerge confidently from negative territory until October 2010. Now that the unemployment rate has fallen to 5.8 percent—much faster than most would have expected even a year ago—the attention has turned to the quality, rather than quantity, of jobs. This scrutiny is driven by a stubbornly high rate of people employed part-time "for economic reasons" (PTER). These are folks who are working part-time but would like a full-time job. Several of my colleagues here at the Atlanta Fed have looked at this phenomenon from many angles (here, here, here, here, and here).
The elevated share of PTER has left some to conclude that, yes, the economy is creating a significant number of jobs (an average of more than 228,000 nonfarm payroll jobs each month in 2014), but these are low-quality, part-time jobs. Several headlines have popped up over the past year or so claiming that "...most new jobs have been part-time since Obamacare became law," "Most 2013 job growth is in part-time work," "75 Percent Of Jobs Created This Year [2013] Were Part-Time," "Part-time jobs account for 97% of 2013 job growth," and as recently as July of this year, "...Jobs Report Is Great for Part-time Workers, Not So Much for Full-Time."
However, a more careful look at the postrecession data illustrates that since October 2010, with the exception of four months (November 2010 and May–July 2011), the growth in the number of people employed full-time has dominated growth in the number of people employed part-time. Of the additional 8.2 million people employed since October 2010, 7.8 million (95 percent) are employed full-time (see the charts). ...
During the Great Recession (until about October 2010), the growth in part-time employment clearly exceeded growth in full-time employment, which was deep in negative territory. The current high level of PTER employment is likely to reflect this extended period of time in which growth in part-time employment exceeded that of full-time employment. But in every month since August 2011, the increase in the number of full-time employed from the year before has far exceeded the increase in the number of part-time employed. This phenomenon includes all of the months of 2013, in spite of what some of the headlines above would have you believe.
So, in the post-Great Recession era, the growth in full-employment is, without a doubt, way out ahead.

Thursday, November 20, 2014

'Encouraging Work: Tax Incentives or Social Support?'

Tim Taylor:

Encouraging Work: Tax Incentives or Social Support?: Consider two approaches to encouraging those with low skills to be fully engaged in the workplace. The American approach focuses on keeping tax rates low and thus providing a greater financial incentive for people to take jobs. The Scandinavian approach focuses on providing a broad range of day care, education, and other services to support working families, but then imposes high tax rates to pay for it all. In the most recent issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Henrik Jacobsen Kleven contrasts these two models in "How Can Scandinavians Tax So Much?" (28:4, 77-98). Kleven is from Denmark, so perhaps his conclusion is predictable. But the analysis along the way is intriguing.
As a starting point, consider what Kleven calls the "participation tax rate." When an average worker in a country takes a job, how much will the money they earn increase their standard of living? The answer will depend on two factors: any taxes imposed on what they earn, including, income, payroll, and sales taxes; and also the loss of any government benefits for which they become less eligible or ineligible because they are working. In the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, this "participation tax rate" is about double what it is in the United States. ...
A standard American-style prediction would be that countries where gains from working are so low should see a lower level of participation in the workforce. That prediction does not hold true in cross-country data among high-income countries. ...
What explains this pattern? Kleven argues that just looking at the tax rate isn't enough, because it also matters what the tax revenue is spent on. For example, the Scandinavian countries spend a lot of money on universal programs for preschool, child care, and elderly care. Kleven calls these "participation subsidies," because they make it easier for people to work--especially for people who otherwise would need to find a way to cover or pay for child care or elder care. The programs are universal, which means that their value expressed as a share of income earned means much more to a low- or middle-income family than to a high-income family. ...
Any direct comparisons between the United States (population of 316 million) and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark (6 million), Norway,  (5 million) and Sweden (10 million) is of course fraught with peril. Their history, politics, economies, and institutions differ in so many ways. You can't just pick up can't just pick up long-standing policies or institutions in one country, plunk them down in another country, and expect them to work the same way.
That said, Kleven basic conceptual point seems sound. Provision of good-quality preschool, child care and elder care does make it easier for all families, but especially low-income  families with children, to participate in the labor market.   In these three Scandinavian countries, the power of these programs to encourage labor force participation seems to overcome the work disincentives that arise in financing and operating them. This argument has nothing to do with whether preschool and child care programs might help some children to perform better in school--although if they do work in that way, it would strengthen the case for taking this approach.
So here is a hard but intriguing hypothetical question: The U.S. government spends something like $60 billion per year on the Earned Income Tax Credit, which is a refundable tax credit providing income mainly to low-income families with children, and almost as much on the refundable child tax credit. Would low-income families with children be better off, and more attached to the workforce, if a sizeable portion of the 100 billion-plus spent for these tax credits--and aimed at providing financial incentives to work--was instead directed toward universal programs of preschool, child care, and elder care?

Or we could raise taxes on the wealthy, cut defense spending, etc., etc. and then ask which if the two programs it would be better to enhance (or in what proportions), the EITC and other tax credits or the "universal programs of preschool, child care, and elder care." If the programs are complementary and insufficient, as I believe they are, then neither should be cut to enhance the other (though I would choose the Scandinavian model if I had to pick on of the two to augment).

Macroblog: For Middle-Skill Occupations, Where Have All the Workers Gone?

Ellie Terry and John Robertson of the Atlanta Fed:

For Middle-Skill Occupations, Where Have All the Workers Gone?: Considerable discussion in recent years has concerned the “hollowing out of the middle class.” Part of that story revolves around the loss of the types of jobs that traditionally have been the core of the U.S. economy: so-called middle-skill jobs.
These jobs, based on the methodology of David Autor, consist of office and administrative occupations; sales jobs; operators, fabricators, and laborers; and production, craft, and repair personnel (many of whom work in the manufacturing industry). In this post, we don't examine why the decline in middle-skill jobs has occurred, just how those workers have weathered the most recent recession. But our Atlanta Fed colleague Federico Mandelman offers an explanation of why this has occurred.
So how have workers in middle-skill occupations fared during the last recession and recovery? Let's examine a few facts from the Current Population Survey from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Only employment in middle-skill occupations remains below prerecession levels ...
Those in middle-skilled occupations were most likely to become unemployed...
Underemployment has improved only slowly at all skill levels...
Ready for some good news?
Those who held middle-skill jobs are more likely to obtain high-skill jobs than before the recession
Currently, of those in middle-skill occupations who remain in a full-time job, about 83 percent are still working in a middle-skill job one year later (see chart 4). What types of jobs are the other 17 percent getting? Mostly high-skill jobs; and that transition rate has been rising. The percent going from a middle-skill job to a high-skill job is close to 13 percent: up about 1 percent relative to before the recession. The percent transitioning into low-skill positions is lower: about 3.4 percent, up about 0.3 percentage point compared to before the recession. This transition to a high-skill occupation tends to translate to an average wage increase of about 27 percent (compared to those who stayed in middle-skill jobs). In contrast, those who transition into lower-skill occupations earned an average of around 24 percent less. ...
In summary, the number of middle-skill jobs declined substantially during the last recession, and that decline has been persistent—especially for full-time workers. Many of the workers leaving full-time, middle-skill jobs became unemployed, and some of that decline is the result of an increase in part-time employment. But others gained full-time work in other types of occupations. In particular, they are more likely than in the past to transition to higher-skill occupations. Further, the transition rate to high-skill occupations has gradually risen and doesn't appear directly tied to the last recession.

Wednesday, November 19, 2014

The Long-Term and Short-Term Unemployed are Remarkably Similar

At MoneyWatch:

The Long-Term and Short-Term Unemployed are Remarkably Similar

Or, as I said here, we shouldn't ignore the long-term unemployed.

Monday, November 17, 2014

'Measuring Labor Market Slack: Are the Long-Term Unemployed Different?'

We shouldn't ignore the long-term unemployed:

Measuring Labor Market Slack: Are the Long-Term Unemployed Different?, by Rob Dent, Samuel Kapon, Fatih Karahan, Benjamin W. Pugsley, and Ayşegül Sahin, Liberty Street Economics: [First in a three-part series] There has been some debate in the Liberty Street Economics blog and in other outlets, such as Krueger, Cramer, and Cho (2014) and Gordon (2013), about whether the short-term unemployment rate is a better measure of slack than the overall unemployment rate. As the chart below shows, the two measures are sending different signals, with the short-term unemployment rate back to its pre-recession level while the overall rate is still elevated because of a high long-term unemployment rate. One can argue that the unemployment rate is exaggerating the extent of underutilization in the labor market, based on the premise that the long-term unemployed are, in practice, out of the labor force and likely to exert little pressure on earnings. If this is indeed the case, inflationary pressures might start building up sooner than suggested by the overall unemployment rate. In a three-part series, we study the available evidence on the long-term unemployed and argue against this premise. The long-term unemployed should not be excluded from measures of labor market slack.
In today’s post, we consider several important characteristics of long-term unemployed workers and compare them to the characteristics of three other groups of potential workers: the short-term unemployed, nonparticipants who report that they want a job, and nonparticipants who do not want a job (whom we refer to as “other nonparticipants”). ...
Finally, we consider the occupation and industry composition of short- and long-term unemployed workers, classified by their former jobs..., they are remarkably similar.
On the basis of these observable characteristics, we find that long-term unemployed workers are not less attached to the labor market than short-term unemployed workers. If anything, the long-term unemployed group has the largest share of prime-age workers, the age group likely to have the strongest labor force attachment. We also see that long-term unemployment is an economy-wide phenomenon, spread across industries and occupations. While there may be unobservable characteristics of long-term unemployed workers that make them less attached to the labor force, when looking at their observable characteristics, it’s hard to argue that they should not be considered as part of labor market slack. ...
[Disclaimer: The views expressed in this post are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.]

Saturday, November 15, 2014

'The Quantity of Labor Demanded is Not Always Equal to the Quantity Supplied'

Roger Farmer:

Repeat After Me: The Quantity of Labor Demanded is Not Always Equal to the Quantity Supplied: I've been teaching a class on intermediate macroeconomics this quarter. Increasingly, over the past twenty years or more, intermediate macro classes at UCLA (and in many other top schools), have focused almost exclusively on economic growth. That reflected a bias in the profession, initiated by Fynn Kydland and Ed Prescott, who persuaded macroeconomists to use the Ramsey growth model as a paradigm for business cycle theory. According to this Real Business Cycle view of the world, we should think about consumption, investment and employment 'as if' they were the optimal choices of a single representative agent with super human perception of the probabilities of future events. 
Although there were benefits to thinking more rigorously about inter-temporal choice, the RBC program as a whole led several generations of the brightest minds in the profession to stop thinking about the problem of economic fluctuations and to focus instead on economic growth. Kydland and Prescott assumed that labor is a commodity like any other and that any worker can quickly find a job at the market wage. In my view, the introduction of the shared belief that the labor market clears in every period, was a huge misstep for the science of macroeconomics that will take a long time to correct. ...
Ever since Robert Lucas introduced the idea of continuous labor market clearing, the idea that it may be useful to talk of something called 'involuntary unemployment' has been scoffed at by the academic chattering classes. It's time to fight back. The concept of 'involuntary unemployment' does not describe a loose notion that characterizes the sloppy work of heterodox economists from the dark side. It is a useful category that describes a group of workers who have difficulty finding jobs at existing market prices. ...
Repeat after me: the quantity of labor demanded is not always equal to the quantity supplied.

[There is quite a bit more detail and explanation in the full post.]

Thursday, November 13, 2014

'The Number of Unemployed Exceeds the Number of Available Jobs Across All Sectors'

About that skills mismatch story:

The Number of Unemployed Exceeds the Number of Available Jobs Across All Sectors, by Elise Gould, EPI: The figure below shows the number of unemployed workers and the number of job openings in September, by industry. This figure is useful for diagnosing what’s behind our sustained high unemployment. If today’s labor market woes were the result of skills shortages or mismatches, we would expect to see some sectors where there are more unemployed workers than job openings, and others where there are more job openings than unemployed workers. What we find, however, is that unemployed workers exceed jobs openings across the board. ...
This demonstrates that the main problem in the labor market is a broad-based lack of demand for workers—not, as is often claimed, available workers lacking the skills needed for the sectors with job openings. ...

Thursday, October 23, 2014

'Does Raising the Minimum Wage Hurt Employment? Evidence from China'

This was in today's links (which were posted later than usual):

Does Raising the Minimum Wage Hurt Employment? Evidence from China, by Prakash Loungani, iMFDirect: ...China accounts for nearly 25 percent of the global labor force...
Our study is the first to use data on minimum wage changes for over 2400 counties in China. We combine the information on minimum wages changes with employment data from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms, which covers over 70 percent of China’s manufacturing employment. While China instituted a minimum wage system in 1994, enforcement of compliance with the law was significantly tightened only in 2004; the results described below are based on post-2004 data.
So what does the evidence show? On average across all firms, we find that an increase in the minimum wage leads to a small decline in employment: a 10% percent increase in the minimum wage lowers employment by a little over 1% percent.
The impact differs across firms, being greater in low-wage firms than in high-wage firms. ... In the decile of firms with the lowest wages, a 10% increase in minimum wages lowers employment by nearly 1.8%. The impact declines steadily such that for the decile of firms with the highest wages, the impact is 0.6%.
We also find that the impact of the minimum wage on a firm’s wages depends on where the firm stands in the distribution of wages. On average, an increase in the minimum wage raises wages by about 1%. But ... in the lowest decile, the increase is about 2.5%. The effect declines steadily and there is essentially no impact for the highest decile. ...

Saturday, October 18, 2014

Changes in Labor Force Participation

LF-Part
[more here]

Wednesday, October 15, 2014

''The Long-Term Unemployment Rate is NOT 'Sticky' or 'Stubborn'''

Josh Bivens has an adjective quibble:

Adjective Quibble: The Long-Term Unemployment Rate is NOT “Sticky” or “Stubborn”: A Wall Street Journal blog post this morning describes an Obama administration initiative to combat long-term unemployment. In the opening sentence, the author follows a too-common convention in describing the long-term unemployment rate as “sticky.” Sometimes the adjective is “stubborn.”
I know that this will sound like quibbling, but in this case adjectives really matter for understanding the problem. As a paper I co-wrote shows pretty clearly, the long-term unemployment rate (LTUR) has not been sticky or stubborn for years. In fact, the LTUR has fallen faster than one would expect given the overall pace of labor market improvement. It is true that the LTUR remains too high, but that is because it skyrocketed during the Great Recession and in the six months after its official end. But the LTUR has since then not become resistant to wider labor market improvement.
The concrete policy implication of recognizing this is that by far the most important thing that can be done to lower the still too-high LTUR is to maintain support for economic recovery more broadly. In today’s far too narrow macroeconomic policy debate, this simply means the Fed should not boost short-term interest rates until the labor market is much, much healthier (including a much lower LTUR). ...

And it's still far from too late for fiscal policy -- infrastructure spending for example -- to make a difference. But don't get your hopes up...

Tuesday, October 14, 2014

'The Mythical Phillips Curve?'

An entry in the ongoing debate over the Phillips curve:

The mythical Phillips curve?, by Simon Wren-Lewis, mainly macro: Suppose you had just an hour to teach the basics of macroeconomics, what relationship would you be sure to include? My answer would be the Phillips curve. With the Phillips curve you can go a long way to understanding what monetary policy is all about.
My faith in the Phillips curve comes from simple but highly plausible ideas. In a boom, demand is strong relative to the economy’s capacity to produce, so prices and wages tend to rise faster than in an economic downturn. However workers do not normally suffer from money illusion: in a boom they want higher real wages to go with increasing labour supply. Equally firms are interested in profit margins, so if costs rise, so will prices. As firms do not change prices every day, they will think about future as well as current costs. That means that inflation depends on expected inflation as well as some indicator of excess demand, like unemployment.
Microfoundations confirm this logic, but add a crucial point that is not immediately obvious. Inflation today will depend on expectations about inflation in the future, not expectations about current inflation. That is the major contribution of New Keynesian theory to macroeconomics. ...[turns to evidence]...

Is it this data which makes me believe in the Phillips curve? To be honest, no. Instead it is the basic theory that I discussed at the beginning of this post. It may also be because I’m old enough to remember the 1970s when there were still economists around who denied that lower unemployment would lead to higher inflation, or who thought that the influence of expectations on inflation was weak, or who thought any relationship could be negated by direct controls on wages and prices, with disastrous results. But given how ‘noisy’ macro data normally is, I find the data I have shown here pretty consistent with my beliefs.

Tuesday, October 07, 2014

'It’s Not a Skills Gap That’s Holding Wages Down: It's the Weak Economy, Among Other Things'

Jared Bernstein:

It’s Not a Skills Gap That’s Holding Wages Down: It's the Weak Economy, Among Other Things: The inadequate quantity and quality of American jobs is one of the most fundamental economic challenges we face. It’s not the only challenge: Poverty, inequality, and stagnant mobility loom large, as well. But in a nation like ours, where wages and salaries are key to the living standards of working-age households, all these challenges flow from the labor market problem.
OK, but this is a supposed to be an article about technology. What’s the linkage between technology and this fundamental problem? As a D.C.-based economist who’s been working on the issue of jobs and earnings for almost 25 years, trust me when I tell you that most policy makers believe the following:
“Yes, there’s a problem of job quantity and quality, but it’s largely a skills problem. Because of recent technological advances, most notably computerization, an increasing share of the workforce lacks the skills to meet the demands of today’s workplaces.
What’s more, the pace at which technology is replacing the inadequately skilled is accelerating—think robotics and artificial intelligence. These dynamics explain growing wage stagnation, wage inequality, and the structural unemployment of those without college degrees.”
Problem is, most of that is wrong.
Technology and employers’ skill demands have played a critical role in our job market forever, but they turn out to be of limited use in explaining the depressed incomes of today, or of the past decade. ...

This is part of a post from three years ago when people were making similar arguments about the skills gap (another way of saying the problem is structural, not cyclical):

I wish I'd remembered point three when I wrote recently about the difficulty of separating cyclical and structural unemployment. I was saying, essentially, the same thing that Peter Diamnond says here (via):

...Third, I am skeptical of the value of attempting to separate cyclical from structural unemployment over a business cycle.... The tighter the labor market and the more valuable the filling of a vacancy, the more a firm is willing to hire a worker who is a less good match, who may need more training.... [A] worker who might be viewed as structurally unemployed, as facing serious mismatch in the current state of the economy, may be readily employable in a tight labor market. The common practice of thinking about the extent of unemployment as a sum of frictional, structural and cyclical parts misses the point.... [D]irect measures of frictional or structural unemployment... dependent on the tightness of the labor market... have limited relevance for the role of demand stimulation policies. The idea that the US economy is not adaptable and capable of dealing with the need for skills and jobs to adapt to each other is peculiar, given the long history of unemployment going up and down. When the labor market is tight and firms have trouble finding workers, they reach out to places they have not looked before and extend training in order to find workers who can fill their needs. ...

Here's (part of) the post of mine referred to above:

Cyclical and structural unemployment can be hard to tell apart. For example, suppose that a business owner would like to hire someone to operate a complicated piece of machinery, and needs someone with experience. The owner offers $10 per hour, but, unfortunately, no one applies. Interviewed by the local paper, the owner complains that qualified workers simply aren't available.
However, that is not true. There is an unemployed worker who has been running that kind of machine for 10 years. He's good at it, and only lost his job due to the fact that the place he had worked for the last 10 years shut its doors in the recession. At $15 per hour, or more, he would have taken the job. But $10 is just not enough to pay the bills and save the house, and he decides to hold out and hope that something better comes along.
So whose fault is it? Should be blame the worker for being unwilling to take a decent job due to the fact that it doesn't pay enough (perhaps unemployment compensation is helping the worker to wait for a job that will pay enough to support the household)? Should we blame the store owner for not paying enough to attract workers with families to support? Neither, the problem is lack of demand.
If times were better, i.e. demand were stronger, the business owner could afford to pay $15, and would -- problem solved. So, all that is needed is an increase in demand for the products the business sells (demand that would exist if the worker and others like him had jobs). But at current demand levels, which are depressed, it is not worth it to pay that much. The business owner would be losing money.
So is the problem cyclical or structural?  It will look like structural unemployment in the data, the owner can't find anyone who is qualified who will take the job at the wage being offered, but the heart the problem is a lack in demand. ...

Or, as I've told the story at other times, there is a worker in another city who is unemployed, well--trained for this job, but the wage that is offered does not provide enough income to justify moving. At a higher wage, it might. Again, a problem that looks structural is actually due to lack of demand. With more demand, and the ability to pay a higher wage, the firm would find the skilled worker it seeks.

But I like the way Peter Diamond said it best.

Fed Watch: The Labor Market Conditions Index: Use With Care

Tim Duy:

The Labor Market Conditions Index: Use With Care, by Tim Duy: I was curious to see how the press would report on the Federal Reserve Board's new Labor Market Conditions Index. My prior was that the reporting should be confusing at best. My favorite so far is from Reuters, via the WSJ:
Fed Chairwoman Janet Yellen has cited the new index as a broader gauge of employment conditions than the unemployment rate, which has fallen faster than expected in recent months. The index’s slowdown over the summer could bolster the argument that the Fed should be patient in watching the economy improve before raising rates.
But its pickup last month could strengthen the case that the labor market is tightening fast and officials should consider raising rates sooner than widely expected. Many investors anticipate the Fed will make its first move in the middle of next year, a perception some top officials have encouraged.
Translation: We don't know what it means.
Now, this is not exactly the fault of the press. The Fed appears to want you to believe the LCMI is important, but they really don't give you reason to believe it should be important. They don't even release the LCMI - the charts on Business Week and US News and World Report are titled erroneously. The Fed releases the monthly change of the LCMI, as noted by Business Insider. But wait, no that's not right either. They actually release the six-month moving average of the LCMI, which means we really don't know the monthly change.1 What the Fed releases might actually be more impacted by what left the average six months ago than the reading from the most recent month. And you should recognize the danger of the six-month moving average - the longer the smoothing process, the more likely to miss turning points in the data. Unless of course the Fed released the raw data to follow as well. Which they don't.
The LCMI becomes even more confusing because it has been impressed upon the financial markets that it must have a dovish interpretation. From Business Insider:
The index was first "made famous" by Fed Chair Janet Yellen in her speech at Jackson Hole, when she said, "This broadly based metric supports the conclusion that the labor market has improved significantly over the past year, but it also suggests that the decline in the unemployment rate over this period somewhat overstates the improvement in overall labor market conditions."
Recall that at Jackson Hole, Yellen spoke about the labor market puzzle of a steadily declining unemployment rate and strong payroll gains against the backdrop of declining labor force participation and flat wages.
Consider this in light of this from the Fed:

LMCI2

The first part of the associated commentary:
Table 2 reports the cumulative and average monthly change in the LMCI during each of the NBER-defined contractions and expansions since 1980. Over that time period, the LMCI has fallen about an average of 20 points per month during a recession and risen about 4 points per month during an expansion. In terms of the average monthly changes, then, the labor market improvement seen in the current expansion has been roughly in line with its typical pace...
If you look closely, the average monthly change during this expansion is faster than every recovery since the 1980-81 expansion. How does this fit with the conventional wisdom that we are experiencing a slow labor market recovery? Indeed, look at the chart:

LMCI1

According to this measure, the pace of improvement in this recovery exceeds than much of the 1990's. Think about that.
Moreover, consider the next sentence of the commentary:
...That said, the cumulative increase in the index since July 2009 (290 index points) is still smaller in magnitude than the extraordinarily large decline during the Great Recession (over 350 points from January 2008 to June 2009).
OK - so the Fed thinks the cumulative change is important. They think it is relevant that the LCMI has not retraced all of its losses. Let's take this idea further. Rather than using the recession dating, consider the even larger move from peak to trough. Between May 2007 to June 2009, the cumulative decrease in the LCMI was 398.4. Since then, the cumulative increase is 300.7, so the LCMI has retraced 75% of its losses.
Now consider the unemployment rate. The unemployment rate increased 5.6 percentage points from a low of 4.4% to a high of 10%. SInce then it has retraced 4.1 percentage points of that gain to last month's 5.9% rate. 4.1 is 73% of 5.6. In other words, the unemployment rate has retraced 73% of it losses.
The LCMI has retraced 75% of its losses. The unemployment rate has retraced 73% of it losses. So the LCMI shows the exact same amount of improvement in labor market conditions peak to trough as implied by the retracement of the unemployment rate.
You see the problem. The LCMI (or the data made available to the public) suggests the same amount of improvement in labor market conditions as implied by the unemployment rate. The LCMI suggests a faster pace of improvement than that seen in the previous three recoveries. So how exactly does Yellen reach the conclusion that "the decline in the unemployment rate over this period somewhat overstates the improvement in overall labor market conditions"? I am not seeing it on the basis of the data provided. Indeed, where exactly is the research showing the LCMI has some policy relevance?
Then again, this could be exactly why Yellen uses the modifier "somewhat" in the above quote. Perhaps she has no conviction that the LCMI provides information not already in the unemployment rate. If that's the case, then expect the LCMI to die on the vine, eventually relegated to be computed by whoever still has the p-star model on their list of assignments.
Bottom Line: Use the Fed's new labor market index with caution. Extreme caution. They are not releasing the raw data. They don't appear to have research explaining its policy relevance. Yellen's halfhearted claim that it provides information above and beyond the unemployment rate is questionable with a simple look at the cumulative change of the index compared to that of unemployment. And her halfhearted claims are even more telling given that she was the impetus for the research. If it was policy relevant, you would think she would be a little more enthusiastic (think optimal control). Moreover, the faster pace of recovery of the index compared to previous recessions - as clearly indicated by the Fed - seems completely at odds with the story it is supposed to support. Simply put, the press and financial market participants should be pushing the Fed much harder to explain exactly why this measure is important.
1. The LCMI data provided by the Fed is described as the "average monthly change." I am not sure why they don't explicitly provide the span of the averaging, but the website describes it as "Chart 1 plots the average monthly change in the LMCI since 1977. Except for the final bar, which covers the first quarter of 2014, each of the bars represents the average over a six-month period."

Friday, October 03, 2014

'Comments on Employment Report: Party Like it's 1999!'

Bill McBride on today's employment report:

Comments on Employment Report: Party Like it's 1999!: Earlier: September Employment Report: 248,000 Jobs, 5.9% Unemployment Rate

This was a solid report with 248,000 jobs added and combined upward revisions to July and August of 69,000. As always we shouldn't read too much into one month of data, but at the current pace (through September), the economy will add 2.72 million jobs this year (2.64 million private sector jobs). Right now 2014 is on pace to be the best year for both total and private sector job growth since 1999.

A few other positives: the unemployment rate declined to 5.9% (the lowest level since July 2008), U-6 (an alternative measure for labor underutilization) was at the lowest level since 2008, the number of part time workers for economic reasons declined slightly (lowest since October 2008), and the number of long term unemployed declined to the lowest level since January 2009.

Unfortunately wage growth is still subdued. From the BLS: "Average hourly earnings for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls, at $24.53, changed little in September (-1 cent). Over the year, average hourly earnings have risen by 2.0 percent. In September, average hourly earnings of private-sector production and nonsupervisory employees were unchanged at $20.67."

With the unemployment rate at 5.9%, there is still little upward pressure on wages. Wages should pick up as the unemployment rate falls over the next couple of years, but with the currently low inflation and little wage pressure, the Fed will likely remain patient.

A few more numbers...

[Dean Baker's comments are here.]

Wednesday, October 01, 2014

The Unemployment Rate is an 'Inadequate Measure of Slack'

Jared Bernstein says there's more slack in the labor market than you'd think from just looking at the unemployment rate:

...So why not just look at the unemployment rate and call it a day? Because special factors in play right now make the jobless rate an inadequate measure of slack. In fact, at 6.1 percent last month, it’s within spitting distance of the rate many economists consider to be consistent with full employment, about 5.5 percent (I think that’s too high, but that’s a different argument).
There are at least two special factors that are distorting the unemployment rate’s signal. First, there are over seven million involuntary part-time workers, almost 5 percent of the labor force, who want, but can’t find, full-time jobs. That’s still up two percentage points from its pre-recession trough. Importantly, the unemployment rate doesn’t capture this dimension of slack at all...
The second special factor masking the extent of slack as measured by unemployment has to do with participation in the labor force. Once you give up looking for work, you’re no longer counted in the unemployment rate, so if a bunch of people exit the labor force because of the very slack we’re trying to measure, it artificially lowers unemployment, making a weak labor market look better.
That’s certainly happened over the recession and throughout the recovery...

There's still plenty of room, and plenty of time for fiscal policymakers to do more to help the unemployed (and with infrastructure, our future economic growth at the same time). Unfortunately, Congress has been captured by other interests. As for monetary policy, let's hope that the FOMC listens to Charles Evans' call for patience. Raising rates too late and risking a temporary outbreak of inflation is far less of a mistake than raising them too early and slowing the recovery of employment. And there's this too: Unemployment Hurts Happiness More Than Modest Inflation.

Sunday, September 28, 2014

'The rise of China and the Future of US Manufacturing'

Acemoglu, Autor, Dor, Hansen, and Price (I've noted this paper once or twice already in recent months, but thought it worthwhile to post their summary of te work):

The rise of China and the future of US manufacturing, by Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson, and Brendan Price, Vox EU: The end of the Great Recession has rekindled optimism about the future of US manufacturing. In the second quarter of 2010 the number of US workers employed in manufacturing registered positive growth – its first increase since 2006 – and subsequently recorded ten consecutive quarters of job gains, the longest expansion since the 1970s. Advocating for the potential of an industrial turnaround, some economists give a positive spin to US manufacturing’s earlier troubles: while employment may have fallen in the 2000s, value added in the sector has been growing as fast as the overall US economy. Its share of US GDP has kept stable, an achievement matched by few other high-income economies over the same period (Lawrence and Edwards 2013, Moran and Oldenski 2014). The business press has giddily coined the term ‘reshoring’ to describe the phenomenon – as yet not well documented empirically – of companies returning jobs to the United States that they had previously offshored to low-wage destinations. 
Before we declare a renaissance for US manufacturing, it is worth re-examining the magnitude of the sector’s previous decline and considering the causal factors responsible for job loss. The scale of the employment decline is indeed stunning. Figure 1 shows that in 2000, 17.3 million US workers were employed in manufacturing, a level that with periodic ups and downs had changed only modestly since the early 1980s. By 2010, employment had dropped to 11.5 million workers, a 33% decrease from 2000. Strikingly, most of this decline came before the onset of the Great Recession. In the middle of 2007, on the eve of the Lehman Brothers collapse that paralysed global financial markets, US manufacturing employment had already dipped to 13.9 million workers, such that three-fifths of the job losses over the 2000 to 2010 period occurred prior to the US aggregate contraction. Figure 1 also reveals the paltriness of the recent manufacturing recovery. As of mid-2014, the number of manufacturing jobs had reached only 12.1 million, a level far below the already diminished pre-recession level.

Figure 1. US employment , 1980q1-2014q3

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics.

We examine the reasons behind the recent decline in US manufacturing employment (Acemoglu et al. 2014). Our point of departure is the coincidence of the 2000s swoon in US manufacturing and a significant increase in import competition from China (Bernard et al. 2006). Between 1990 and 2011 the share of global manufacturing exports originating in China surged from two to 16% (Hanson 2012). This widely heralded export boom was the outcome of deep economic reforms that China enacted in the 1980s and 1990s, which were further extended by the country’s joining the World Trade Organization in 2001 (Brandt et al. 2012, Pierce and Schott 2013). China’s share in US manufacturing imports has expanded in concert with its global presence, rising from 5% in 1991 to 11% in 2001 before leaping to 23% in 2011. Could China’s rise be behind US manufacturing’s fall?
The first step in our analysis is to estimate the direct impact of import competition from China on US manufacturing industries. Suppose that the economic opening in China allows the country to realise a comparative advantage in manufacturing that had lain dormant during the era of Maoist central planning, which entailed near prohibitive barriers to trade. As reform induces China to reallocate labour and capital from farms to factories and from inefficient state-owned enterprises to more efficient private businesses, output will expand in the sectors in which the country’s comparative advantage is strongest. China’s abundant labour supply and relatively scarce supply of arable land and natural resources make manufacturing the primary beneficiary of reform-induced industrial restructuring. The global implications of China’s reorientation toward manufacturing – strongly abetted by inflows of foreign direct investment – are immense. China accounts for three-quarters of all growth in manufacturing value added that has occurred in low and middle income economies since 1990.
For many US manufacturing firms, intensifying import competition from China means a reduction in demand for the goods they produce and a corresponding contraction in the number of workers they employ. Looking across US manufacturing industries whose outputs compete with Chinese import goods, we estimate that had import penetration from China not grown after 1999, there would have been 560,000 fewer manufacturing jobs lost through 2011. Actual US manufacturing employment declined by 5.8 million workers from 1999 to 2011, making the counterfactual job loss from the direct effect of greater Chinese import penetration amount to 10% of the realised job decline in manufacturing.
These direct effects of trade exposure do not capture the full impact of growing Chinese imports on US employment. Negative shocks to one industry are transmitted to other industries via economic linkages between sectors. One source of linkages is buyer-supplier relationships (Acemoglu et al. 2012). Rising import competition in apparel and furniture – two sectors in which China is strong – will cause these ‘downstream’ industries to reduce purchases from the ‘upstream’ sectors that supply them with fabric, lumber, and textile and woodworking machinery. Because buyers and suppliers often locate near one another, much of the impact of increased trade exposure in downstream industries is likely to transmit to suppliers in the same regional or national market. We use US input-output data to construct downstream trade shocks for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. Estimates from this exercise indicate sizeable negative downstream effects. Applying the direct plus input-output measure of exposure increases our estimates of trade-induced job losses for 1999 to 2011 to 985,000 workers in manufacturing and to two million workers in the entire economy. Inter-industry linkages thus magnify the employment effects of trade shocks, almost doubling the size of the impact within manufacturing and producing an equally large employment effect outside of manufacturing.
Two additional sources of linkages between sectors operate through changes in aggregate demand and the reallocation of labour. When manufacturing contracts, workers who have lost their jobs or suffered declines in their earnings subsequently reduce their spending on goods and services. The contraction in demand is multiplied throughout the economy via standard Keynesian mechanisms, depressing aggregate consumption and investment. Helping offset these negative aggregate demand effects, workers who exit manufacturing may take up jobs in the service sector or elsewhere in the economy, replacing some of the earnings lost in trade-exposed industries. Because aggregate demand and reallocation effects work in opposing directions, we can only detect their net impact on total employment. A further complication is that these impacts operate at the level of the aggregate economy – as opposed to direct and input-output effects of trade shocks which operate at the industry level – meaning we have only as many data points to detect their presence as we have years since the China trade shock commenced. Since China’s export surge did not hit with full force until the early 1990s, the available time series for the national US economy is disconcertingly short.
To address this data challenge, we supplement our analysis of US industries with an analysis of US regional economies. We define regions to be ‘commuting zones’ which are aggregates of commercially linked counties that comprise well-defined local labour markets. Because commuting zones differ sharply in their patterns of industrial specialisation, they are differentially exposed to increased import competition from China (Autor et al. 2013). Asheville, North Carolina, is a furniture-making hub, putting it in the direct path of the China maelstrom. In contrast, Orlando, Florida (of Disney and Harry Potter World Fame), focuses on tourism, leaving it lightly affected by rising imports of manufactured goods. If the reallocation mechanism is operative, then when a local industry contracts as a result of Chinese competition, some other industry in the same commuting zone should expand. Aggregate demand effects should also operate within local labour markets, as shown by Mian and Sufi (2014) in the context of the recent US housing bust. If increased trade exposure lowers aggregate employment in a location, reduced earnings will decrease spending on non-traded local goods and services, magnifying the impact throughout the local economy.
Our estimates of the net impact of aggregate demand and reallocation effects imply that import growth from China between 1999 and 2011 led to an employment reduction of 2.4 million workers. This figure is larger than the 2.0 million job loss estimate we obtain for national industries, which only captures direct and input-output effects. But it still likely understates the full consequences of the China shock on US employment. Neither our analysis for commuting zones nor for national industries fully incorporates all of the adjustment channels encompassed by the other. The national-industry estimates exclude reallocation and aggregate demand effects, whereas the commuting-zone estimates exclude the national component of these two effects, as well as the non-local component of input-output linkage effects. Because the commuting zone estimates suggest that aggregate forces magnify rather than offset the effects of import competition, we view our industry-level estimates of employment reduction as providing a conservative lower bound.
What do our findings imply about the potential for a US manufacturing resurgence? The recent growth in manufacturing imports to the US is largely a consequence of China’s emergence on the global stage coupled with its deep comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods. The jobs in apparel, furniture, shoes, and other wage-sensitive products that the United States has lost to China are unlikely to return. Even as China’s labour costs rise, the factories that produce these goods are more likely to relocate to Bangladesh, Vietnam, or other countries rising in China’s wake than to reappear on US shores. Further, China’s impact on US manufacturing is far from complete. During the 2000s, the country rapidly expanded into the assembly of laptops and cell-phones, with production occurring increasingly under Chinese brands, such as Lenovo and Huawei. Despite this rather bleak panorama, there are sources of hope for manufacturing in the United States. Perhaps the most encouraging sign is that the response of many companies to increased trade pressure has been to increase investment in innovation (Bloom et al. 2011). The ensuing advance in technology may ultimately help create new markets for US producers. However, if the trend toward the automation of routine jobs in manufacturing continues (Autor and Dorn 2013), the application of these new technologies is likely to do much more to boost growth in value added than to expand employment on the factory floor.
References
Acemoglu D, V Carvalho, A Ozdaglar, and A Tahbaz-Salehi (2012), “The Network Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations.” Econometrica, 80(5): 1977-2016.
Acemoglu D, D H Autor, D Dorn, G H Hanson, and B Price (2014), “Import Competition and the Great US Employment Sag of the 2000s.” NBER Working Paper No. 20395.
Autor, D H and D Dorn (2013), “The Growth of Low Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US Labor Market.” American Economic Review, 103(5), 1553-1597.
Autor D H, D Dorn, and G H Hanson (2013a) “The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States.” American Economic Review, 103(6): 2121-2168.
Bernard A B, J B Jensen, and P K Schott (2006), “Survival of the Best Fit: Exposure to Low-Wage Countries and the (Uneven) Growth of US Manufacturing Plants.” Journal of International Economics, 68(1), 219-237.
Bloom N, M Draca, and J Van Reenen (2012), “Trade Induced Technical Change? The Impact of Chinese Imports on Innovation, IT, and Productivity.” Mimeo, Stanford University.
Brandt L, J Van Biesebroeck, and Y Zhang (2012), “Creative Accounting or Creative Destruction? Firm-Level Productivity Growth in Chinese Manufacturing.” Journal of Development Economics, 97(2): 339-351.
Hanson, G (2012), “The Rise of Middle Kingdoms: Emerging Economies in Global Trade.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(2): 41-64.
Mian, A and A Sufi (2014), “What Explains the 2007-2009 Drop in Employment?” Econometrica, forthcoming.
Pierce, J R and P K Schott (2013), “The Surprisingly Swift Decline of US Manufacturing Employment.” Yale Department of Economics Working Paper, November.

Friday, September 26, 2014

'Long-term Unemployed Struggle as Economy Improves'

The long-term unemployed need more help than they are getting:

Long-term Unemployed Struggle as Economy Improves: While the unemployment rate for people out of work for six months or less has returned to prerecession levels, the levels of unemployment for workers who remain jobless for more than six months is among the most persistent, negative effects of the Great Recession, according to a new national study at Rutgers. In fact, one in five workers laid off from a job during the last five years are still unemployed and looking for work, researchers from the John J. Heldrich Center for Workforce Development found.

Among the key findings of "Left Behind: The Long-term Unemployed Struggle in an Improving Economy":

  • Approximately half of the laid-off workers who found work were paid less in their new positions; one in four say their new job was only temporary.
  • Only one in five of the long-term unemployed received help from a government agency when looking for a job; only 22 percent enrolled in a training program to develop skills for a new job; and 60 percent received no government assistance beyond unemployment benefits.
  • Nearly two-thirds of Americans support increasing funds for long-term education and training programs, and greater spending on roads and highways in order to assist unemployed workers.

As of last August, 3 million Americans, nearly one in three unemployed workers, have been unemployed for more than six months and more than 2 million Americans have been out of work for more than a year...

This research provides a detailed record of the enduring effects of the Great Recession on the unemployed and long-term unemployed five years after the economy started growing again in June 2009.

The survey also found that:

  • More than seven in 10 long-term unemployed say they have less in savings and income than they did five years ago.
  • More than eight in 10 of the long-term unemployed rate their personal financial situation negatively as only fair or poor.
  • More than six in 10 unemployed and long-term unemployed say they experienced stress in family relationships and close friendships during their time without a job.
  • Fifty-five percent of the long-term unemployed say they will need to retire later than planned because of the recession, while 5 percent say the weak economy forced them into early retirement.
  • Nearly half of the long-term unemployed say it will take three to 10 years for their families to recover financially. Another one in five say it will take longer than that or that they will never recover.

..."These long-term unemployed workers have been left behind to fend for themselves as they struggle to pull their lives back together."

Monday, September 22, 2014

Paul Krugman: Those Lazy Jobless

Why are conservatives are blaming the victims of the recession despite "evidence and logic" to the contrary?:

Those Lazy Jobless, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: Last week John Boehner, the speaker of the House, explained to an audience at the American Enterprise Institute what’s holding back employment in America: laziness. People, he said, have “this idea” that “I really don’t have to work. I don’t really want to do this. I think I’d rather just sit around.” Holy 47 percent, Batman!
It’s hardly the first time a prominent conservative has said something along these lines. Ever since a financial crisis plunged us into recession it has been a nonstop refrain on the right that the unemployed aren’t trying hard enough, that they are taking it easy thanks to generous unemployment benefits, which are constantly characterized as “paying people not to work.” And the urge to blame the victims of a depressed economy has proved impervious to logic and evidence.
But it’s still amazing — and revealing — to hear this line being repeated now. For the blame-the-victim crowd has gotten everything it wanted: Benefits, especially for the long-term unemployed, have been slashed or eliminated. So now we have rants against the bums on welfare when they aren’t bums — they never were — and there’s no welfare. Why? ...
Is it race? That’s always a hypothesis worth considering in American politics. It’s true that most of the unemployed are white, and they make up an even larger share of those receiving unemployment benefits. But conservatives may not know this, treating the unemployed as part of a vaguely defined, dark-skinned crowd of “takers.”
My guess, however, is that it’s mainly about the closed information loop of the modern right. In a nation where the Republican base gets what it thinks are facts from Fox News and Rush Limbaugh, where the party’s elite gets what it imagines to be policy analysis from the American Enterprise Institute or the Heritage Foundation, the right lives in its own intellectual universe, aware of neither the reality of unemployment nor what life is like for the jobless. You might think that personal experience — almost everyone has acquaintances or relatives who can’t find work — would still break through, but apparently not.
Whatever the explanation, Mr. Boehner was clearly saying what he and everyone around him really thinks, what they say to each other when they don’t expect others to hear. Some conservatives have been trying to reinvent their image, professing sympathy for the less fortunate. But what their party really believes is that if you’re poor or unemployed, it’s your own fault.

Monday, September 15, 2014

'Polanyi's Paradox and the Shape of Employment Growth'

"A key observation of the paper is that journalists and expert commentators overstate the extent of machine substitution for human labor and ignore the strong complementarities":

Polanyi's Paradox and the Shape of Employment Growth, by David Autor, NBER Working Paper No. 20485, September 2014 [open link]: In 1966, the philosopher Michael Polanyi observed, “We can know more than we can tell... The skill of a driver cannot be replaced by a thorough schooling in the theory of the motorcar; the knowledge I have of my own body differs altogether from the knowledge of its physiology.” Polanyi’s observation largely predates the computer era, but the paradox he identified—that our tacit knowledge of how the world works often exceeds our explicit understanding—foretells much of the history of computerization over the past five decades. This paper offers a conceptual and empirical overview of this evolution. I begin by sketching the historical thinking about machine displacement of human labor, and then consider the contemporary incarnation of this displacement—labor market polarization, meaning the simultaneous growth of high-education, high-wage and low-education, low-wages jobs—a manifestation of Polanyi’s paradox. I discuss both the explanatory power of the polarization phenomenon and some key puzzles that confront it. I then reflect on how recent advances in artificial intelligence and robotics should shape our thinking about the likely trajectory of occupational change and employment growth. A key observation of the paper is that journalists and expert commentators overstate the extent of machine substitution for human labor and ignore the strong complementarities. The challenges to substituting machines for workers in tasks requiring adaptability, common sense, and creativity remain immense. Contemporary computer science seeks to overcome Polanyi’s paradox by building machines that learn from human examples, thus inferring the rules that we tacitly apply but do not explicitly understand.

Sunday, September 07, 2014

'Few US 'Reshorings' Go Ahead'

What they say is not necessarily the same as what they do:

Few US ‘reshorings’ go ahead, study finds, by Robert Wrigh, FT: “Relatively few” of companies’ announced “reshorings” of manufacturing to the US have actually gone ahead and the trend’s effect on employment has been a “drop in the bucket,” research by a Massachusetts Institute of Technology academic suggests.
The work, by Jim Rice, deputy director of MIT’s Center for Transportation and Logistics, throws into doubt expectations that the US economy might enjoy significant growth in manufacturing employment through job repatriation. ...

Saturday, September 06, 2014

Peter Diamond: The Beveridge Curve

Peter Diamond on his new research on the Beveridge curve ("casts doubt on everything I've written on the Beveridge curve," "shifts in the Beveridge curve are not very informative"):

Abstract: Debates about higher structural unemployment occur when unemployment has stayed high. With monthly publication of the US Beveridge curve (the relationship between the unemployment and vacancy rates), the recent debate has focused on the shift in the Beveridge curve and whether the shift will be lasting long enough to move the full-employment point. The curve appears stable through the NBER identified business cycle through in June 2009 or possibly the month of the maximal unemployment rate in October 2009. This shift in the Beveridge curve, with the economy experiencing a higher level of unemployment than before for the same level of the vacancy rate, suggests a deterioration in the matching/hiring process in the economy. It is tempting to interpret this decline as a structural change in the way that the labor market works and thus assume that it is orthogonal to changes in aggregate demand. Indeed, an assumption that a shift in the curve is structural has been a staple of the academic literature since at least 1958. This interpretation has an obvious policy implication: however useful aggregate stabilization policies while unemployment is very high, they are likely to fail in lowering the unemployment rate all the way to the levels that prevailed before the recession, since the labor market is structurally less efficient than before in creating successful matches. This lecture reviews the theory underlying the Beveridge curve and US evidence on the ability to draw an inference of structural change from its shift or a shift in the hiring (matching) function.

His lecture (video) is here. (The discussion of how to interpret shifts in the Beveridge curve starts at around the 12:30 mark. Switching to low quality helps the video to stream better. His view is that there is still substantial slack in the labor market.) My interview with him, which spends quite a bit of time on the Beveridge curve, is here.

Friday, September 05, 2014

'Pace of Job Growth Slows Further in August'

The Employment Report for August was released this morning. From the BLS:

Total nonfarm payroll employment increased by 142,000 in August, and the unemployment rate was little changed at 6.1 percent...
The change in total nonfarm payroll employment for June was revised from +298,000 to +267,000, and the change for July was revised from +209,000 to +212,000. With these revisions, employment gains in June and July combined were 28,000 less than previously reported.

Dean Baker:

Pace of Job Growth Slows Further in August: The pace of growth slowed sharply to 142,000 in August. Coupled with downward revisions to June's data, this brings the average rate of job growth over the last three months to 207,000. The economy had been adding jobs added jobs at a 267,000 monthly rate between March and June.
The falloff was widespread across industries. Manufacturing employment was flat after adding an average of 21,000 jobs a month in the prior three months. Retail employment fell by 8,400 in August after adding an average of 22,700 jobs in the prior three months. Transportation added just 1,200 jobs, down from an average 16,400 in the prior three months. Job growth in professional and technical services (16,800) and restaurants (21,100) was also somewhat weaker than its recent pace.
In percentage terms motion pictures continues to be a big job loser, shedding 6,000 jobs in August, 2.0 percent of total employment. Jobs in the sector have fallen by 18.6 percent over the last two years. On the opposite side, health care added 34,000 jobs, the third biggest rise in the last five years. This is likely an anomaly that will be offset by weaker growth in the months ahead.
There is little evidence that the strengthening labor market is leading to wage pressures. Over the last three months, the average hourly wage has risen at a 2.3 percent annual rate, virtually identical to the 2.1 percent rate over the last year. In fact, almost no sectors show evidence of substantial wage growth. Only three sectors, mining, information, and leisure and hospitality have seen hourly wage growth in excess of 2.5 percent over the last year. A 3.5 percent rate of wage growth is consistent with the Fed’s 2.0 percent inflation target (assuming 1.5 percent productivity growth), only mining at 4.1 percent and information at 3.8 percent cross this threshold. 
On the household side there was little new in the August data. The unemployment rate edged down slightly to 6.1 percent, but the employment to population ratio remained stable at 59.0 percent.
By education level, college grads don't seem to be faring well at this point in the recovery. Their unemployment edged up to 3.2 percent, while their EPOP fell 0.2 pp to 72.2 percent. Over the last year their unemployment rate has fallen by just 0.3 pp, while the EPOP of college grads is actually down by 0.6 pp. By comparison, those with some college have seen a drop of 0.7 pp in their unemployment rate and a rise of 0.4 pp in their EPOP.
The unemployment duration measures all declined in August, with the share of long-term unemployed falling to 31.2 percent, the lowest level since June of 2009. By comparison, long-term unemployment accounted for more than 22 percent of unemployment from June 2003 to June 2004. The number of people involuntarily working part-time fell by 197,000 and now stands 562,000 below its year ago level.  Voluntary part-time employment is up 271,000 from its year ago level, although down 152,000 from July.
Employment growth continues to be less skewed toward older workers. Workers over age 55 accounted for 108.2 percent of total employment growth in the first four years of the recovery. By contrast they accounted for just 29.4 percent of employment growth over the last year. This is consistent with a scenario in which many older but pre-Medicare age workers no longer feel as much need to work now that they can get health care insurance through the exchanges. Workers in the 25-34 age group appear to be the gainers, accounting for 37.1 percent of employment growth over the last year.
While the slower pace of job growth in this report is a surprise to many analysts, the stronger rate in the first half of this year really was not consistent with the rate of GDP growth that we have been seeing or is generally forecast for the near future. If the economy is growing in a 2.5 percent range then we should expect to see job growth of around 1.0 percent or 1.4 million a year. Unless the economy grows far more rapidly than is general expected, we should expect to see job growth well under 200,000 a month.

Thursday, September 04, 2014

'Are the Job Prospects of Recent College Graduates Improving?'

My students worry about this:

Are the Job Prospects of Recent College Graduates Improving?, by Jaison R. Abel and Richard Deitz: This post is the fourth in a series of four Liberty Street Economics posts examining the value of a college degree. The promise of finding a good job upon graduation has always been an important consideration when weighing the value of a college degree. In our final post of this week’s blog series, we take a look at the job prospects of recent college graduates. While unemployment among recent graduates has continued to fall since 2011, underemployment has continued to climb—meaning that fewer graduates are finding jobs that make use of their degrees. Do these trends mean that there has been a decline in the demand for those with college degrees? Using data on online job postings, we show that after falling sharply during the Great Recession, the demand for college graduates rebounded during the early stages of the recovery, but has been flat for the past year and a half, suggesting that the demand for college graduates has leveled off. All in all, while finding a job has become easier for recent college graduates over the past few years, finding a good job has not, and doing so is likely to remain a challenge for some time to come. ...

Wednesday, September 03, 2014

The Cause of Sagging Job Growth Since 2000

I have another article at MoneyWatch:

Sagging job growth: It's not a skills gap, by Mark Thoma: Many economists believe the rise in inequality can be explained by factors that have increasingly rewarded college-educated workers over those without a college degree. This "skills premium" has caused the middle class to shrink and polarized the labor market. The solution to these problems is the often-heard call for improved education and retraining programs that will give workers the skills they need to thrive in modern economies.
Employment in manufacturing industries has been hit particularly hard over the last few decades, and economists have pointed to work by David Autor, an economics professor at MIT, and others suggesting that this has resulted more from technological change than from globalization and declining bargaining power of workers (e.g. due to the power of unions).
According to this view, outsourcing is not the main problem. ... However, new work by Autor and several prominent co-authors calls this into question...

Wednesday, August 27, 2014

'On the Relationships between Wages, Prices, and Economic Activity'

This is from Edward S. Knotek II and Saeed Zaman of the Cleveland Fed:

On the Relationships between Wages, Prices, and Economic Activity: Labor costs and labor compensation have garnered considerable attention from economists in the wake of the financial crisis and recession. Across a range of measures, wage growth slowed sharply during the recession. Recently, wage growth has remained near historically low levels despite improvements in the labor market.
Subdued wage growth has been variously seen as both a cause and a consequence of the slow pace of economic growth and persistently low inflation rates. It also may have contributed to rising inequality. In some forecast narratives, a pickup in wage growth is viewed as a necessary condition for a stronger recovery and rising inflation. In others, it is a natural consequence of a tightening labor market.
This Commentary takes a closer look at the relationships between wages, prices, and economic activity. It finds that the connections among wages, prices, and economic activity are more akin to a tangled web than a straight line. In the United States, wages and prices have tended to move together, and causal relationships are difficult to identify. We do find that wages are sensitive to economic activity and the level of slack in the economy, but our forecasting results suggest that the ability of wages to help predict future inflation is limited. Thus, wages appear to be useful in assessing the current state of labor markets, but not necessarily sufficient for thinking about where the economy and inflation are going. ...

So even if wages do finally begin rising, policymakers shouldn't panic about inflation (wishful thinking).

Tuesday, August 26, 2014

A Reason to Question the Official Unemployment Rate

[Still on the road ... three quick ones before another long day of driving.]

David Leonhardt:

A New Reason to Question the Official Unemployment Rate: ...A new academic paper suggests that the unemployment rate appears to have become less accurate over the last two decades, in part because of this rise in nonresponse. In particular, there seems to have been an increase in the number of people who once would have qualified as officially unemployed and today are considered out of the labor force, neither working nor looking for work.
The trend obviously matters for its own sake: It suggests that the official unemployment rate – 6.2 percent in July – understates the extent of economic pain in the country today. ... The new paper is a reminder that the unemployment rate deserves less attention than it often receives.
Yet the research also relates to a larger phenomenon. The declining response rate to surveys of almost all kinds is among the biggest problems in the social sciences. ...
Why are people less willing to respond? The rise of caller ID and the decline of landlines play a role. But they’re not the only reasons. Americans’ trust in institutions – including government, the media, churches, banks, labor unions and schools – has fallen in recent decades. People seem more dubious of a survey’s purpose and more worried about intrusions into their privacy than in the past.
“People are skeptical – Is this a real survey? What they are asking me?” Francis Horvath, of the Labor Department, says. ...

Thursday, August 21, 2014

A Conversation with Peter Diamond

Tuesday, August 19, 2014

'Very Confused About Cyclical Recovery'

Brad DeLong tries to make sense of the labor market:

Over at Equitable Growth: In Which I Make Myself Very Confused About Cyclical Recovery: Will somebody please tell me that I have made a gross arithmetic error in what is below, and can be much more optimistic? ...
I really do not understand the triumphalism of the very sharp Steve Braun et al. from the CEA...
So the labor market is, they say, 5/6 of the way back to normal--the current unemployment rate of 6.2% is 3.8%-points down from the peak of 10.0%, and has only 0.8%-point left to go before it hits a pre-crisis NAIRU of 5.4%. When it does, we will attain a "cyclically normal" labor market with a participation rate at 63.4%, 0.5%-points higher than today's 62.9%, and an associated employment-to-population ratio of 60.0%.
By that metric, we have done 3/4 of the work of cyclical recovery: from a 5.5%-point gap between employment and participation at the trough to a 3.9%-point gap now and a 3.4%-point gap at NAIRU. We will have made 1.7%-points back from the trough on the employment-to-population ratio when cyclical recovery is complete. The permanent damage to employment from the Great Recession Lesser Depression appears to be less than 0.9%-points of participation because there are also ongoing "cohort effects unrelated to aging" that reduce participation.
Let me stress that this is not senior and not-so-senior White House officials under pressure from political operatives putting as positive a spin on things as they can without actually losing their... No: what I mean to say is this: this is what the CEA's Steven Braun, John Coglianese, Jason Furman, Betsey Stevenson, and Jim Stock actually believe is true about the world--that the labor market is recovering successfully and strongly from the disaster of 2008-9.
But I look at 25-54. The employment rate is down from 79.9% in 2007 to 76.6% in July 2014--3.3%-points less, compared to 4.0%-point a fall from 63% to 59% over the entire population. The participation rate is down from 80.8% in July 2014 compared to 83.1% for 2007--2.3%-points, compared to the 3.1%-point fall from 66.0% to 62.9% over the entire population.
A normal NAIRU spread would put the 25-54 employment-to-population ratio at 78.7%, 2.5%-points below the 81.2% cyclically-adjusted 25-54 participation ratio. When cyclical recovery is complete, we would then expect to make back 3.7%-points back from the trough on the 25-54 employment-to-population ratio. So far we have made back only 1.0%-point.
So which is it? Has hysteresis done 1.8%-points of damage to 25-54 employment or 0.9%-points to total employment? Have we done 3/4 of the work of recovery relative to the proper labor force-trend share benchmark? Or have we done only 1/3 of the work of recovery?
The 25-54 data and the economy-wide aging trend-adjusted data used by the CEA appear to be telling us very different things both about the cyclical state of the labor market and about the damage done by hysteresis. How to reconcile? Which is right?

Monday, August 18, 2014

'Understanding the Decline in the Labor Force Participation'

[Long, long travel day today, so just a few quick ones before hitting the road.]

Steven Braun, John Coglianese, Jason Furman, Betsey Stevenson, and Jim Stock:

Understanding the decline in the labour force participation rate in the United States, by Steven Braun, John Coglianese, Jason Furman, Betsey Stevenson, and Jim Stock, Vox EU: The labour force participation rate in the US has fallen dramatically since 2007. This column traces this decline to three main factors: the ageing of the population, cyclical effects from the Great Recession, and an unexplained portion, which might be due to pre-existing trends unrelated to the first two. Of these three, the ageing of the population plays the largest role since it is responsible for half of the decline. Taken together, these factors suggest a roughly stable participation rate in the short-term, followed by a longer-term decline as the baby boomers continue to age. However, policy can play a meaningful role in mitigating this trend. ...

Saturday, August 16, 2014

'The Skills Gap is Most Evident in Retail Trade and Restaurants'

About that skills gap -- this is from Dean Baker:

The Skills Gap is Most Evident in Retail Trade and Restaurants: Floyd Norris has an interesting column comparing the numbers of job openings, hirings, and quits from 2007 with the most recent three months in 2014. The most striking part of the story is that reporting openings are up by 2.1 percent from 2007, while hirings are still down by 7.5 percent. 
While Norris doesn't make this point, some readers may see this disparity as evidence of a skills gap, where workers simply don't have the skills for the jobs that are available. If this is really a skills gap story then it seems that it is showing up most sharply in the retail and restaurant sectors. (Data are available here.) Job openings in the retail sector are up by 14.6 percent from their 2007 level, but hires are down by 0.7 percent. Job opening in the leisure and hospitality sector are up by 17.0 percent, while hiring is down by 7.4 percent.
If the disparity between patterns in job openings and hires is really evidence that workers lack the skills for available jobs then perhaps we need to train more people to be clerks at convenience stores and to wait tables.

Friday, August 15, 2014

'Persistently Below-Target Inflation Rate is a Signal That the U.S. Economy is Not Taking Advantage of all of its Available Resources'

Narayana Kocherlakota, President of the Minneapolis Fed:

..I’m a member of the Federal Open Market Committee—the FOMC—and, as a monetary policymaker, my discussion will be framed by the goals of monetary policy. Congress has charged the FOMC with making monetary policy so as to promote price stability and maximum employment. I’ll discuss the state of the macroeconomy in terms of these goals.
Let me start with price stability. The FOMC has translated the price stability objective into an inflation rate goal of 2 percent per year. This inflation rate target refers to the personal consumption expenditures, or PCE, price index. ... That rate currently stands at 1.6 percent, which is below the FOMC’s target of 2 percent. In fact, the inflation rate has averaged 1.6 percent since the start of the recession six and a half years ago, and inflation is expected to remain low for some time. For example, the minutes from the June FOMC meeting reveal that the Federal Reserve Board staff outlook is for inflation to remain below 2 percent over the next few years.
In a similar vein, earlier this year, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicted that inflation will not reach 2 percent until 2018—more than 10 years after the beginning of the Great Recession. I agree with this forecast. This means that the FOMC is still a long way from meeting its targeted goal of price stability.
The second FOMC goal is to promote maximum employment. What, then, is the state of U.S. labor markets? The latest unemployment rate was 6.2 percent for July. This number is representative of the significant improvement in labor market conditions that we’ve seen since October 2009, when the unemployment rate was 10 percent. And I expect this number to fall further through the course of this year, to around 5.7 percent. However, this progress in the decline of the unemployment rate masks continued weakness in labor markets.
There are many ways to see this continued weakness. I’ll mention two that I see as especially significant. First, the fraction of people aged 25 to 54—our prime-aged potential workers—who actually have a job is still at a disturbingly low rate. Second, a historically high percentage of workers would like a full-time job, but can only find part-time work. Bottom line: I see labor markets as remaining some way from meeting the FOMC’s goal of full employment.
So I’ve told you that inflation rates will remain low for a number of years and that labor markets are still weak. It is important, I think, to understand the connection between these two phenomena. As I have discussed in greater detail in recent speeches, a persistently below-target inflation rate is a signal that the U.S. economy is not taking advantage of all of its available resources. If demand were sufficiently high to generate 2 percent inflation, the underutilized resources would be put to work. And the most important of those resources is the American people. There are many people in this country who want to work more hours, and our society is deprived of their production. ...