Economics 470/570 - Monetary Theory and Policy

Practice Problem Set 3

Economics 470/570 
Winter 2014
Practice Problem Set 3

1. (a) Explain why the demand curve for reserves slopes downward. (b) Explain the shape of the supply curve for reserves.

2. Use the supply and demand model for bank reserves to explain and illustrate the effects of (a) an open market operation to buy bonds, (b) a decrease in the discount rate, (c) an increase in required reserves, and (d) a change in the interest rate paid on reserves.

3. Describe the three traditional tools available to the Fed for controlling the money supply. What tool has the Fed added to its aresenal recently, and why is this important?

4. What is meant by the phrase lender of last resort? Why is this important? Explain and show graphically how the Fed uses discount rate policy to act as a lender of last resort and how this limits the amount the federal funds rate can rise.

Lecture 7 on Tuesday 1/28/2014

Brief Outline of Topics Covered in Lecture 7

Chapter 15 Tools of Monetary Policy [cont.]

The Market for Reserves and the Federal Funds Rate

• Tools of monetary policy: Open Market Operations, Discount Policy, and Reserve Requirements

Chapter 19   Money Demand

Quantity Theory of Money

• Velocity of Money and Equation of Exchange
• Quantity Theory
• Quantity Theory of Money Demand

The Cambridge Approach

Is velocity a constant?

Keynes’s Liquidity Preference Theory

• Transactions Motive
• Precautionary Motive
• Speculative Motive
• Putting the Three Motives Together

Further Developments in the Keynesian Approach

Video:

Application:

Q&A: A Voice for an Activist Fed, NY Times: The Federal Reserve is often described as if it were a person – just one person – but it actually makes decisions by committee, and that committee is in flux. Only six of the 12 officials who voted on policy last January will still be voting when the Federal Open Market Committee holds its first meeting of 2014 this week.

Two new voters are likely to define the extremes of the debate as the committee charts the Fed’s continuing effort to revive the economy.

One is Narayana Kocherlakota, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, perhaps the last official who wants the Fed to expand its efforts to reduce unemployment. Meanwhile, Richard Fisher, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, is pressing for a faster retreat.

Mr. Kocherlakota and Mr. Fisher sat for separate interviews with The New York Times to talk about monetary policy and the economy this month before the media blackout that precedes each Fed meeting.

A transcript of Mr. Kocherlakota’s comments, edited for clarity, follows. [Mr. Fisher’s interview is in a separate post.]

...[continue to interview]...

Lecture 6 on Thursday 1/23/2014

Brief Outline of Topics Covered in Lecture 6

Chapter 14 Multiple Deposit Creation and the Money Supply Process [cont.]

The Money Supply Model and the Money Multiplier

• Deriving the Money Multiplier

Factors That Determine the Money Multiplier

• Changes in the Required Reserve Ratio, r
• Changes in the Currency Ratio, c = C/D
• Changes in the Excess Reserves Ratio, e = ER/D

Additional Factors That Determine the Money Supply

• Changes in the Nonborrowed Monetary Base, MB_n
• Changes in Borrowed Reserves, BR, from the Fed

Chapter 15 Tools of Monetary Policy

The Market for Reserves and the Federal Funds Rate

• Supply and Demand in the Market for Reserves
• Tools of monetary policy: Open Market Operations, Discount Policy, and Reserve Requirements

Video:

Application:

Why Do Banks Feel Discount Window Stigma?,by Olivier Armantier, Liberty Street, FRBNY: Even when banks face acute liquidity shortages, they often appear reluctant to borrow at the New York Fed’s discount window (DW) out of concern that such borrowing may be interpreted as a sign of financial weakness. This phenomenon is often called “DW stigma.” In this post, we explore possible reasons why banks may feel such stigma.

The problem of stigma has been a lingering issue throughout the history of the DW. Prior to 2003, banks in distress could borrow from the DW at a rate below the fed funds target rate. Because of the subsidized rate, the Fed was concerned about “opportunistic overborrowing” by banks. Accordingly, before accessing the DW, a bank had to satisfy the Fed that it had exhausted private sources of funding and that it had a genuine business need for the funds. Hence, if market participants learned that a bank had accessed the DW, then they could reasonably conclude that the bank had limited sources of funding. The old DW regime therefore created a legitimate perception of stigma.

To address such stigma concerns, the Fed fundamentally changed its DW policy in 2003. In Regulation A, as revised in 2003, the Fed classified DW loans into primary credit, secondary credit, and seasonal credit. Financially strong and well-capitalized banks can borrow under the primary credit program at a penalty rate above the target fed funds rate (rather than a subsidized rate, as in the past). Other banks can use the secondary credit program and pay a rate higher than the primary credit rate. Finally, seasonal credit is for relatively small banks with seasonal fluctuations in reserves. For banks eligible for primary credit, the new DW is a “no-questions-asked” facility. Namely, the Fed no longer establishes a bank’s possible sources and needs for funding to lend under the primary credit program. Instead, primary credit for overnight maturity is allocated with minimal administrative burden on the borrower. Hence, access to primary credit need not be motivated by pressing funding needs nor signal financial weakness. In other words, there’s no structural reason why stigma should be attached to the new DW.

Nevertheless, stigma concerns resurfaced in 2007 at the onset of the recent financial crisis. In fact, as adverse liquidity conditions in the interbank markets persisted at the end of 2007, the Fed had to put in place a temporary facility, the Term Auction Facility (TAF), which was specifically designed to eliminate any perception of stigma attached to borrowing from the DW. Further, as discussed in a previous post, there’s strong evidence that banks experienced DW stigma during the most recent financial crisis.

So why do banks still feel DW stigma? In a recent staff report, we explored different hypotheses related to factors that may exacerbate or attenuate DW stigma. To conduct our analysis, we compared the DW rate with the bids each bank submitted at the TAF between December 2007 and October 2008. As explained in our paper, it can be shown with a simple arbitrage argument that, absent DW stigma, a TAF bidder should never bid above the prevailing DW rate. We therefore interpreted a bank bidding above the DW rate as evidence of DW stigma. Then, we conducted an econometric analysis to identify a bank’s possible determinants of DW stigma. Among the various hypotheses we tested, we report here the most interesting.

• Banks outside the New York District: A necessary condition for DW stigma to exist is that banks must believe there’s a chance their identities will be made public soon after they borrow from the DW. Although central banks don’t immediately disclose the borrower’s identity, it’s been argued that DW borrowers may be identified from the Fed’s weekly public report, in which DW borrowings aggregated by Federal Reserve District are published. This identification channel may be especially relevant for banks in smaller Districts. Indeed, DW borrowing by an institution in a smaller District may be easier to detect. To test this hypothesis, our study focused on the Second Federal Reserve District (which covers the New York region) — the largest of the twelve Federal Reserve Districts in terms of the number of banks supervised. Consistent with the hypothesis, our results showed that banks in the New York District were 14 percent less likely to experience DW stigma than their counterparts in smaller Districts.

• Foreign banks: It’s also possible that foreign institutions with access to primary credit at the Fed are especially sensitive to DW stigma. Indeed, in contrast with their U.S. counterparts, foreign banks typically don’t have access to retail dollar deposits that are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. As a result, foreign banks must often rely on wholesale debt investors (such as money market funds), which are highly sensitive to credit risk. In other words, because their investors may be sensitive to any negative information, foreign banks may be particularly concerned about the risk of being detected taking a loan at the DW. Again, we found strong evidence to support this hypothesis. Specifically, our results suggested that branches and agencies of foreign banks were 28 percent more likely to experience DW stigma than their U.S. counterparts with otherwise similar characteristics.

• Herding effect: Intuitively, DW stigma may be expected to reflect a coordination problem. If an institution is the only one borrowing at the DW, then it’s likely to be stigmatized. However, the stigma from accessing the DW should be lower if many other institutions do so at the same time. However, we found no support for this hypothesis. Specifically, our results suggested that the stigma attached to borrowing at the DW didn’t decline when more banks accessed it during the 2007-08 period. To explore this question in more detail, we also tested whether there’s a form of herding or contagion effect, whereby a bank’s DW stigma declines when more banks within its own peer group (as measured by asset size) go to the DW. Again, the results from our regressions provided no evidence of such a herding effect.

• Market conditions: In times of financial crises, there’s often intense speculation about the health of various financial institutions. In particular, public news that may be considered negative (such as a bank visit to the DW that becomes public) is likely to be amplified beyond its informational content. As a result, banks may go to greater expense to avoid borrowing at the DW. One may therefore expect DW stigma to increase when financial markets become more stressed. To test this hypothesis, our study considered three variables that capture aggregate funding conditions and volatility in financial markets: the Libor-OIS spread, a stress indicator for the interbank and money markets; the VIX level, a measure of the forward-looking volatility of the U.S. stock market as implied by options prices; and the CDX IG index of CDS prices, a measure of economy-wide default probability. Consistent with the hypothesis, we found that DW stigma was positively related to each of the three measures of stress in financial markets.

In summary, our study provided a better understanding of the reasons why banks may feel DW stigma. In particular, we found that the incidence of DW stigma was higher for foreign banks, banks that could be identified more easily, and banks outside the New York Federal Reserve District, as well as after financial markets became stressed. In contrast, we found no evidence that DW stigma may be due to a lack of coordination among banks when accessing the DW.

Disclaimer
The views expressed in this post are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author.

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Olivier Armantier is an assistant vice president in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Research and Statistics Group.

Lecture 5 on Tuesday 1/21/2014

Brief Outline of Topics Covered in Lecture 5

Chapter 14 Multiple Deposit Creation and the Money Supply Process

Three Players in the Money Supply Process

The Fed’s Balance Sheet

• Liabilities
• Assets

Control of the Monetary Base

• Open Market Operations with Bank
• Open Market Operations with an Individual and shifts between

The Money Supply Model and the Money Multiplier

• Deriving the Money Multiplier

Factors That Determine the Money Multiplier

• Changes in the Required Reserve Ratio, r
• Changes in the Currency Ratio, c = C/D
• Changes in the Excess Reserves Ratio, e = ER/D

Additional Factors That Determine the Money Supply

• Changes in the Nonborrowed Monetary Base, MB_n
• Changes in Borrowed Reserves, BR, from the Fed
• Currency and Deposits

Video

Extra Reading:

Tim Duy:

The Week That Was, by Tim Duy: Plenty of data and Fedspeak to chew on last week, the sum total of which I think point in the same general direction. Economic activity is on average improving modestly, the Federal Reserve will push through with another round of tapering next week, and low inflation continues to hold back the threat of rate hikes.

After stripping out the auto component, retail sales were solid in December:

I think we are at or nearing the point where auto sales will generally move sideways and thus induce some additional volatility in the headline number. Consequently, it will be increasingly important to focus on core sales ("core" meaning less autos and gas). Looking at the three-month change, we see a modest acceleration in the back half of 2013:

Likewise, industrial production accelerated in the final months of 2013:

The initial read on consumer sentiment was modestly disappointing but not a cause for worry. In general, consumer sentiment has been weaker than what would be suggested by the pace of spending since the recovery began:

Housing starts stumbled in December after surging the previous month:

Housing activity continues to grind higher, with plenty of room left to climb. Increasingly, the gains seem likely to be coming from the single family side of the equation; multifamily has already experienced a solid rebound:

None of the above is meant to imply that we are experiencing runaway growth. Instead, the Beige Book probably sets the right tenor:

Reports from the twelve Federal Reserve Districts suggest economic activity continued to expand across most regions and sectors from late November through the end of the year. Nine Districts indicated the local economy was expanding at a moderate pace; among these, the Atlanta and Chicago Districts saw conditions improve compared with the previous reporting period. Boston and Philadelphia cited modest growth, while Kansas City reported the economy held steady in December. The economic outlook is positive in most Districts, with some reports citing expectations of "more of the same" and some expecting a pickup in growth.

The JOLTS report showed an uptick in the quits rate, something that will likely warm the heart of incoming Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen:

It's another quadrant of that chart that is showing improvement, which probably gives Fed officials confidence that they are moving in the right direction by slowly ending the asset purchase program. That said, inflation prevents the Fed from putting their foot on the brakes:

Until we see meaningfully higher inflation numbers, the Fed will be hesitant to deviate from their current expected rate trajectory. Putting aside any financial stability concerns, I am thinking the risk is that unemployment drops to closer to 5.5% when inflation starts to pick up, and policymakers respond with a steeper rate increase fearing they are behind the curve.

Dallas Federal Reserve President Richard Fisher offered-up another colorful speech stressing financial stability concerns. He also revealed he wanted to see the Fed cut asset purchases by $20 billion a month:

I was pleased with the decision to finally begin tapering our bond purchases, though I would have preferred to pull back our purchases by double the announced amount. But the important thing for me is that the committee began the process of slowing down the ballooning of our balance sheet, which at year-end exceeded $4 trillion. And we began—and I use that word deliberately, for we have more to do on this front—to clarify our intentions for managing the overnight money rate.

For all the concerns that the hawks will be persistent policy dissenters, Fisher does not appear to be a likely dissent just yet. For him, it is important just to know the program will end this year.

On the other side of the coin is Minneapolis Federal Reserve President Narayana Kocherlakota. In an interview with Robin Harding at the Financial Times, Kocherlakota makes clear his disappointment with the current policy trajectory:

“We’re running the risk of being content with inflation running consistently below our target. That’s inappropriate,” said Narayana Kocherlakota, who votes on Fed monetary policy this year, in an interview with the Financial Times. “Right now we’re sitting with an outlook for inflation that even by 2016 . . . is not getting back to 2 per cent.”

Importantly, he offers an alternative to the defunct Evans rule:

“We would say we intend to keep the Fed funds rate extraordinarily low in that interval between 6.5 and 5.5 per cent as long as the medium-term outlook for inflation stays sufficiently close to 2 per cent,” he said. “I definitely feel it is important to be numerical about it. Words are always subject, I think, to multiple interpretations.”

The idea of an "interval" gives some insight into the general consensus at the Fed. There does not seem to be considerable support for changing the threshold to 5.5%. Kocherlakota knows this and hopes that he can disguise changing the threshold by calling it an interval. But once you cross 6.5%, the idea of an interval is irrelevant. 5.5% becomes the focus, just as if the threshold has been changed.

Moreover, notice also the change in the inflation threshold from 2.5% to "sufficiently close" to 2%. My sense is that such a change would be interpreted hawkishly. But I think also reveals why policymakers are opposed to changing the unemployment threshold. I am thinking that below 6.5% unemployment, they are less willing to tolerate 2.5% inflation because they worry about falling behind the curve.

I think it is easier to see Kocherlakota dissenting than any of the hawks. It is clear that policy is moving fundamentally in the wrong direction in his opinion:

Mr Kocherlakota said he would not refight the Fed’s decision to taper asset purchases by about $10bn a month. “My point is simply we need to do more. If the committee chose to do that through more asset purchases that’d be fine with me. But we have to be doing more.”

The hawks might want a more rapid end to asset purchases, but at least for them policy is heading in the right direction.

San Francisco Federal Reserve President John Williams questioned the role of asset purchases as part of the Federal Reserve toolkit. Victoria McGrane at the Wall Street Journal has the story here. Williams highlights the uncertain impacts of quantitative easing:

Mr. Williams, who has been supportive of the Fed’s three rounds of bond purchases, said the measures “have proven a potent but blunt tool, with uncertain effects on financial markets and the economy.” The Fed’s bond-buying program, also known as quantitative easing, or QE, aims to lower long-term interest rates in hopes that will spur borrowing, hiring and investment.

Surveying the body of research on such bond purchases, Mr. Williams found that studies consistently find that the purchases have a significant impact on long-term bond yields but it’s harder to tell if they’re doing much to help the overall economy.

“Estimating the effects of large-scale asset purchases on the economy – as opposed to financial markets – is inherently much harder to do and is subject to greater uncertainty,” he said.

WIlliams also acknowledges the difficulties of implementing forward guidance:

“Experience has shown that it is impossible to convey the full reach of factors that influence the future course of policy. As a result, forward guidance ends up being overly simplified and prone to misinterpretation,” Mr. Williams said in his paper. What’s more, markets may not believe promises about policy made several years in advance since the policymakers making those statements could leave, he noted.

Again, isn't the Evans rule something of an oversimplification that has resulted in confusion? Perhaps a simpler target is needed:

A new framework such as nominal GDP-targeting could, in theory, could work better at communicating the Fed’s policy plans than the current approach, he said, but it might have costs as well.

And then comes the third rail of central banking:

Finally, Mr. Williams also said new research should address whether the Fed and other central banks with a 2% inflation target should aim higher. “[D]oes the 2 percent inflation target … provide a sufficient cushion to allow monetary policy to successfully stabilize the economy and inflation in the future?” he asked in his paper.

All of which sums up to: We are still learning from the crisis and thus we will see consideration of even more innovations to central banking going forward.

And last but not least, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke made another victory lap at the inaugural event of the new Hutchins Center on Monetary Policy at the Brookings institute (also where Williams presented). For those of you with four hours to set aside, video is here.

Bottom Line: The US economy is grinding forward. Policymakers are generally comfortable with the pace of tapering at $10 billion per meeting. That could be reconsidered if we see sustained weakness in future data, but I don't think that should be the base case. Not everyone is happy at the Fed, however, and arguably the center has shifted toward the hawks as the doves are clearly not pleased that both asset purchases are ending and the Evans rule does not have an heir apparent. I think it is reasonable to believe the primary conflict at the next FOMC meeting is not over asset purchases, but on the communications strategy. The direction and nature of "enhanced forward guidance" is becoming a contentious issue now that the unemployment rate is just a breath away from the 6.5% threshold.

Practice Problem Set 2

Economics 470/570 
Winter 2014
Practice Problem Set 2

1. Briefly describe the major functions of Federal Reserve district banks.

2. How do member banks differ from other banks? How did the difference change in 1980?

3. Who is on the FOMC? What does the FOMC do?

4. Describe the structure of Federal Reserve districts and Federal Reserve banks.

5. Describe the structure and function of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

6. How has the power structure of the Federal Reserve System shifted over time?

7. How independent is the Fed? What factors contribute to independence? What factors work against independence? Discuss arguments for and against the independence of the Fed.

8. Use t-accounts to show that the Fed can control the monetary base better than it can control either currency or reserves. What does this result tell us?

9. Suppose that a bank has $100,000 in excess reserves that it loans out. Assuming that the required reserve ratio is 20%, use t-accounts to illustrate the multiple deposit creation process. Use this to obtain the simple deposit multiplier.

10. Explain why the multiplier falls when people hold currency or when banks hold excess reserves.

11. Suppose that the required reserve ratio is 20%, the currency to deposit ratio is .25, the excess reserve to deposit ratio is .05, and the monetary base is 1,000. (a) Find the money supply. (b) Let open market operations increase the monetary base by 200. Use the money multiplier to find the new value of the money supply.

12. Explain how and why the money multiplier changes when (a) the required reserve ratio increases, (b) the currency to demand deposit ratio increases, and (c) the excess reserve to demand deposit ratio increases. Who determines each of these quantities?

Lecture 4 on Thursday 1/16/2014

Brief Outline of Topics Covered in Lecture 4

Chapter 13 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System [continued]

Informal Structure of the Federal Reserve System

• How Power Has Been Centralized Over Time

How Independent is the Fed?

Should The Fed Be Independent?

• The Case for Independence
• The Case Against Independence

Chapter 14 Multiple Deposit Creation and the Money Supply Process

Three Players in the Money Supply Process

The Fed’s Balance Sheet

• Liabilities
• Assets

Control of the Monetary Base

• Open Market Operations with Bank
• Open Market Operations with an Individual and shifts between

The Money Supply Model and the Money Multiplier

• Deriving the Money Multiplier

Factors That Determine the Money Multiplier

• Changes in the Required Reserve Ratio, r
• Changes in the Currency Ratio, c = C/D
• Changes in the Excess Reserves Ratio, e = ER/D

Additional Factors That Determine the Money Supply

• Changes in the Nonborrowed Monetary Base, MB_n
• Changes in Borrowed Reserves, BR, from the Fed
• Currency and Deposits

Video

Materials related to class:

Central Bank Independence and Inflation

From "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," by Alberto Alesina and Lawrence H. Summers, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 25, No. 2. (May, 1993), pp. 151-162  (the link will work on UO net, but I don't expect you to read the paper as it is a bit technical):

This has changed with the adoption of inflation targeting by central banks. Note also that Adam Posen casts doubt on whether causality runs from central bank independence to improved macroeconomic performance in Central Bank Independence and Disinflationary Credibility: A Missing Link?, NY Fed Staff Report, May 1995.

Extra Reading:

How the Fed Prepares Its Minutes, by Kristina Peterson, WSJ: Minutes for Federal Open Market Committee meetings are prepared with meticulous care. Central bank officials and staff know that the public will scrutinize every word and the minutes are carefully crafted to convey a certain message.

The process commences even before the meeting begins with a Board of Governors staffer writing up a summary of the staff’s economic and financial analyses, which are delivered at the start of each meeting.

Several senior staff members collaborate to plan the write-up of the meaty part of the meeting: the Fed officials’ policy negotiations. They discuss the meeting’s “major themes” and how they should be covered in the minutes, according to an article in the spring 2005 issue of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.

One officer from the Board’s Division of Monetary Affairs, chosen on a rotating basis, writes up the policy discussion, in part relying on a transcript that is ready by the day after the meeting. Other staff members review the summary before sending it to Fed officials during the week following the meeting.

The Fed’s chairman is the first policy maker to review the minutes. After receiving the Fed chief’s approval, the minutes are sent to all meeting participants for comments and a revised draft is prepared by the following week.

The final draft is ready by the end of the second week. The Fed officials who can vote on interest-rate moves–the seven-person Board of Governors and five of the 12 regional bank presidents–have about four calendar days to vote to approve the minutes. The voting period ends at noon the day before the minutes are released, 21 days after the meeting.

The Fed decided to start releasing minutes three weeks after policy meetings in late 2004. Before that, the minutes were released with a longer lag. In its earliest days, the Fed kept its minutes confidential and only released a “Record of Policy Actions” once a year. Over time, the Fed decided to release more information on a more-frequent basis.

The central bank now releases full transcripts of meetings with a five-year lag.

Lecture 3 on Tuesday 1/14/2014

Brief Outline of Topics Covered in Lecture 3

Chapter 13 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System

Origins of the Federal Reserve System

• Distribute power to geographic regions, the public sector, the private sector, the business sector, and the financial sector

Formal Structure of the Federal Reserve System

• Federal Reserve Banks
• Member Banks
• Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
• Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
• The Federal Advisory Council (FAC)

Informal Structure of the Federal Reserve System

• How Power Has Been Centralized Over Time

How Independent is the Fed?

Should The Fed Be Independent?

• The Case for Independence
• The Case Against Independence

Chapter 13 Multiple Deposit Creation and the Money Supply Process [Probably won't get this far]

Four Players in the Money Supply Process

The Fed’s Balance Sheet

• Liabilities
• Assets

Control of the Monetary Base

• Open Market Operations with Bank
• Open Market Operations with an Individual and shifts between Currency and Deposits

Not yet available

Materials from class:

The Twelve Federal Reserve Districts
Addresses and phone numbers Banks Branches Boston  New York  Philadelphia  Cleveland  Richmond  Atlanta  Chicago  St. Louis  Minneapolis  Kansas City  Dallas  San Francisco  Board

Decision Making within the Federal Reserve System

Extra Reading: Ben Bernanke: Five Questions about the Federal Reserve and Monetary Policy

Five Questions about the Federal Reserve and Monetary Policy, Speech, Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, At the Economic Club of Indiana, Indianapolis, Indiana, October 1, 2012: Good afternoon. I am pleased to be able to join the Economic Club of Indiana for lunch today. I note that the mission of the club is "to promote an interest in, and enlighten its membership on, important governmental, economic and social issues." I hope my remarks today will meet that standard. Before diving in, I'd like to thank my former colleague at the White House, Al Hubbard, for helping to make this event possible. As the head of the National Economic Council under President Bush, Al had the difficult task of making sure that diverse perspectives on economic policy issues were given a fair hearing before recommendations went to the President. Al had to be a combination of economist, political guru, diplomat, and traffic cop, and he handled it with great skill.

My topic today is "Five Questions about the Federal Reserve and Monetary Policy." I have used a question-and-answer format in talks before, and I know from much experience that people are eager to know more about the Federal Reserve, what we do, and why we do it. And that interest is even broader than one might think. I'm a baseball fan, and I was excited to be invited to a recent batting practice of the playoff-bound Washington Nationals. I was introduced to one of the team's star players, but before I could press my questions on some fine points of baseball strategy, he asked, "So, what's the scoop on quantitative easing?" So, for that player, for club members and guests here today, and for anyone else curious about the Federal Reserve and monetary policy, I will ask and answer these five questions:

1. What are the Fed's objectives, and how is it trying to meet them?
2. What's the relationship between the Fed's monetary policy and the fiscal decisions of the Administration and the Congress?
3. What is the risk that the Fed's accommodative monetary policy will lead to inflation?
4. How does the Fed's monetary policy affect savers and investors?
5. How is the Federal Reserve held accountable in our democratic society?

What Are the Fed's Objectives, and How Is It Trying to Meet Them?
The first question on my list concerns the Federal Reserve's objectives and the tools it has to try to meet them.

As the nation's central bank, the Federal Reserve is charged with promoting a healthy economy--broadly speaking, an economy with low unemployment, low and stable inflation, and a financial system that meets the economy's needs for credit and other services and that is not itself a source of instability. We pursue these goals through a variety of means. Together with other federal supervisory agencies, we oversee banks and other financial institutions. We monitor the financial system as a whole for possible risks to its stability. We encourage financial and economic literacy, promote equal access to credit, and advance local economic development by working with communities, nonprofit organizations, and others around the country. We also provide some basic services to the financial sector--for example, by processing payments and distributing currency and coin to banks.

But today I want to focus on a role that is particularly identified with the Federal Reserve--the making of monetary policy. The goals of monetary policy--maximum employment and price stability--are given to us by the Congress. These goals mean, basically, that we would like to see as many Americans as possible who want jobs to have jobs, and that we aim to keep the rate of increase in consumer prices low and stable.

In normal circumstances, the Federal Reserve implements monetary policy through its influence on short-term interest rates, which in turn affect other interest rates and asset prices.¹ Generally, if economic weakness is the primary concern, the Fed acts to reduce interest rates, which supports the economy by inducing businesses to invest more in new capital goods and by leading households to spend more on houses, autos, and other goods and services. Likewise, if the economy is overheating, the Fed can raise interest rates to help cool total demand and constrain inflationary pressures.

Following this standard approach, the Fed cut short-term interest rates rapidly during the financial crisis, reducing them to nearly zero by the end of 2008--a time when the economy was contracting sharply. At that point, however, we faced a real challenge: Once at zero, the short-term interest rate could not be cut further, so our traditional policy tool for dealing with economic weakness was no longer available. Yet, with unemployment soaring, the economy and job market clearly needed more support. Central banks around the world found themselves in a similar predicament. We asked ourselves, "What do we do now?"

To answer this question, we could draw on the experience of Japan, where short-term interest rates have been near zero for many years, as well as a good deal of academic work. Unable to reduce short-term interest rates further, we looked instead for ways to influence longer-term interest rates, which remained well above zero. We reasoned that, as with traditional monetary policy, bringing down longer-term rates should support economic growth and employment by lowering the cost of borrowing to buy homes and cars or to finance capital investments. Since 2008, we've used two types of less-traditional monetary policy tools to bring down longer-term rates.

The first of these less-traditional tools involves the Fed purchasing longer-term securities on the open market--principally Treasury securities and mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The Fed's purchases reduce the amount of longer-term securities held by investors and put downward pressure on the interest rates on those securities. That downward pressure transmits to a wide range of interest rates that individuals and businesses pay. For example, when the Fed first announced purchases of mortgage-backed securities in late 2008, 30-year mortgage interest rates averaged a little above 6percent; today they average about 3-1/2 percent. Lower mortgage rates are one reason for the improvement we have been seeing in the housing market, which in turn is benefiting the economy more broadly. Other important interest rates, such as corporate bond rates and rates on auto loans, have also come down. Lower interest rates also put upward pressure on the prices of assets, such as stocks and homes, providing further impetus to household and business spending.

The second monetary policy tool we have been using involves communicating our expectations for how long the short-term interest rate will remain exceptionally low. Because the yield on, say, a five-year security embeds market expectations for the course of short-term rates over the next five years, convincing investors that we will keep the short-term rate low for a longer time can help to pull down market-determined longer-term rates. In sum, the Fed's basic strategy for strengthening the economy--reducing interest rates and easing financial conditions more generally--is the same as it has always been. The difference is that, with the short-term interest rate nearly at zero, we have shifted to tools aimed at reducing longer-term interest rates more directly.

Last month, my colleagues and I used both tools--securities purchases and communications about our future actions--in a coordinated way to further support the recovery and the job market. Why did we act? Though the economy has been growing since mid-2009 and we expect it to continue to expand, it simply has not been growing fast enough recently to make significant progress in bringing down unemployment. At 8.1 percent, the unemployment rate is nearly unchanged since the beginning of the year and is well above normal levels. While unemployment has been stubbornly high, our economy has enjoyed broad price stability for some time, and we expect inflation to remain low for the foreseeable future. So the case seemed clear to most of my colleagues that we could do more to assist economic growth and the job market without compromising our goal of price stability.

Specifically, what did we do? On securities purchases, we announced that we would buy mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by the government-sponsored enterprises at a rate of $40 billion per month. Those purchases, along with the continuation of a previous program involving Treasury securities, mean we are buying $85 billion of longer-term securities per month through the end of the year. We expect these purchases to put further downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, including mortgage rates. To underline the Federal Reserve's commitment to fostering a sustainable economic recovery, we said that we would continue securities purchases and employ other policy tools until the outlook for the job market improves substantially in a context of price stability.

In the category of communications policy, we also extended our estimate of how long we expect to keep the short-term interest rate at exceptionally low levels to at least mid-2015. That doesn't mean that we expect the economy to be weak through 2015. Rather, our message was that, so long as price stability is preserved, we will take care not to raise rates prematurely. Specifically, we expect that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economy strengthens. We hope that, by clarifying our expectations about future policy, we can provide individuals, families, businesses, and financial markets greater confidence about the Federal Reserve's commitment to promoting a sustainable recovery and that, as a result, they will become more willing to invest, hire and spend.

Now, as I have said many times, monetary policy is no panacea. It can be used to support stronger economic growth in situations in which, as today, the economy is not making full use of its resources, and it can foster a healthier economy in the longer term by maintaining low and stable inflation. However, many other steps could be taken to strengthen our economy over time, such as putting the federal budget on a sustainable path, reforming the tax code, improving our educational system, supporting technological innovation, and expanding international trade. Although monetary policy cannot cure the economy's ills, particularly in today's challenging circumstances, we do think it can provide meaningful help. So we at the Federal Reserve are going to do what we can do and trust that others, in both the public and private sectors, will do what they can as well.

What's the Relationship between Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy?
That brings me to the second question: What's the relationship between monetary policy and fiscal policy? To answer this question, it may help to begin with the more basic question of how monetary and fiscal policy differ.

In short, monetary policy and fiscal policy involve quite different sets of actors, decisions, and tools. Fiscal policy involves decisions about how much the government should spend, how much it should tax, and how much it should borrow. At the federal level, those decisions are made by the Administration and the Congress. Fiscal policy determines the size of the federal budget deficit, which is the difference between federal spending and revenues in a year. Borrowing to finance budget deficits increases the government's total outstanding debt.

As I have discussed, monetary policy is the responsibility of the Federal Reserve--or, more specifically, the Federal Open Market Committee, which includes members of the Federal Reserve's Board of Governors and presidents of Federal Reserve Banks. Unlike fiscal policy, monetary policy does not involve any taxation, transfer payments, or purchases of goods and services. Instead, as I mentioned, monetary policy mainly involves the purchase and sale of securities. The securities that the Fed purchases in the conduct of monetary policy are held in our portfolio and earn interest. The great bulk of these interest earnings is sent to the Treasury, thereby helping reduce the government deficit. In the past three years, the Fed remitted $200 billion to the federal government. Ultimately, the securities held by the Fed will mature or will be sold back into the market. So the odds are high that the purchase programs that the Fed has undertaken in support of the recovery will end up reducing, not increasing, the federal debt, both through the interest earnings we send the Treasury and because a stronger economy tends to lead to higher tax revenues and reduced government spending (on unemployment benefits, for example).

Even though our activities are likely to result in a lower national debt over the long term, I sometimes hear the complaint that the Federal Reserve is enabling bad fiscal policy by keeping interest rates very low and thereby making it cheaper for the federal government to borrow. I find this argument unpersuasive. The responsibility for fiscal policy lies squarely with the Administration and the Congress. At the Federal Reserve, we implement policy to promote maximum employment and price stability, as the law under which we operate requires. Using monetary policy to try to influence the political debate on the budget would be highly inappropriate. For what it's worth, I think the strategy would also likely be ineffective: Suppose, notwithstanding our legal mandate, the Federal Reserve were to raise interest rates for the purpose of making it more expensive for the government to borrow. Such an action would substantially increase the deficit, not only because of higher interest rates, but also because the weaker recovery that would result from premature monetary tightening would further widen the gap between spending and revenues. Would such a step lead to better fiscal outcomes? It seems likely that a significant widening of the deficit--which would make the needed fiscal actions even more difficult and painful--would worsen rather than improve the prospects for a comprehensive fiscal solution.

I certainly don't underestimate the challenges that fiscal policymakers face. They must find ways to put the federal budget on a sustainable path, but not so abruptly as to endanger the economic recovery in the near term. In particular, the Congress and the Administration will soon have to address the so-called fiscal cliff, a combination of sharply higher taxes and reduced spending that is set to happen at the beginning of the year. According to the Congressional Budget Office and virtually all other experts, if that were allowed to occur, it would likely throw the economy back into recession. The Congress and the Administration will also have to raise the debt ceiling to prevent the Treasury from defaulting on its obligations, an outcome that would have extremely negative consequences for the country for years to come. Achieving these fiscal goals would be even more difficult if monetary policy were not helping support the economic recovery.

What Is the Risk that the Federal Reserve's Monetary Policy Will Lead to Inflation?
A third question, and an important one, is whether the Federal Reserve's monetary policy will lead to higher inflation down the road. In response, I will start by pointing out that the Federal Reserve's price stability record is excellent, and we are fully committed to maintaining it. Inflation has averaged close to 2 percent per year for several decades, and that's about where it is today. In particular, the low interest rate policies the Fed has been following for about five years now have not led to increased inflation. Moreover, according to a variety of measures, the public's expectations of inflation over the long run remain quite stable within the range that they have been for many years.

With monetary policy being so accommodative now, though, it is not unreasonable to ask whether we are sowing the seeds of future inflation. A related question I sometimes hear--which bears also on the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy, is this: By buying securities, are you "monetizing the debt"--printing money for the government to use--and will that inevitably lead to higher inflation? No, that's not what is happening, and that will not happen. Monetizing the debt means using money creation as a permanent source of financing for government spending. In contrast, we are acquiring Treasury securities on the open market and only on a temporary basis, with the goal of supporting the economic recovery through lower interest rates. At the appropriate time, the Federal Reserve will gradually sell these securities or let them mature, as needed, to return its balance sheet to a more normal size. Moreover, the way the Fed finances its securities purchases is by creating reserves in the banking system. Increased bank reserves held at the Fed don't necessarily translate into more money or cash in circulation, and, indeed, broad measures of the supply of money have not grown especially quickly, on balance, over the past few years.

For controlling inflation, the key question is whether the Federal Reserve has the policy tools to tighten monetary conditions at the appropriate time so as to prevent the emergence of inflationary pressures down the road. I'm confident that we have the necessary tools to withdraw policy accommodation when needed, and that we can do so in a way that allows us to shrink our balance sheet in a deliberate and orderly way. For example, the Fed can tighten policy, even if our balance sheet remains large, by increasing the interest rate we pay banks on reserve balances they deposit at the Fed. Because banks will not lend at rates lower than what they can earn at the Fed, such an action should serve to raise rates and tighten credit conditions more generally, preventing any tendency toward overheating in the economy.

Of course, having effective tools is one thing; using them in a timely way, neither too early nor too late, is another. Determining precisely the right time to "take away the punch bowl" is always a challenge for central bankers, but that is true whether they are using traditional or nontraditional policy tools. I can assure you that my colleagues and I will carefully consider how best to foster both of our mandated objectives, maximum employment and price stability, when the time comes to make these decisions.

How Does the Fed's Monetary Policy Affect Savers and Investors?
The concern about possible inflation is a concern about the future. One concern in the here and now is about the effect of low interest rates on savers and investors. My colleagues and I know that people who rely on investments that pay a fixed interest rate, such as certificates of deposit, are receiving very low returns, a situation that has involved significant hardship for some.

However, I would encourage you to remember that the current low levels of interest rates, while in the first instance a reflection of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy, are in a larger sense the result of the recent financial crisis, the worst shock to this nation's financial system since the 1930s. Interest rates are low throughout the developed world, except in countries experiencing fiscal crises, as central banks and other policymakers try to cope with continuing financial strains and weak economic conditions.

A second observation is that savers often wear many economic hats. Many savers are also homeowners; indeed, a family's home may be its most important financial asset. Many savers are working, or would like to be. Some savers own businesses, and--through pension funds and 401(k) accounts--they often own stocks and other assets. The crisis and recession have led to very low interest rates, it is true, but these events have also destroyed jobs, hamstrung economic growth, and led to sharp declines in the values of many homes and businesses. What can be done to address all of these concerns simultaneously? The best and most comprehensive solution is to find ways to a stronger economy. Only a strong economy can create higher asset values and sustainably good returns for savers. And only a strong economy will allow people who need jobs to find them. Without a job, it is difficult to save for retirement or to buy a home or to pay for an education, irrespective of the current level of interest rates.

The way for the Fed to support a return to a strong economy is by maintaining monetary accommodation, which requires low interest rates for a time. If, in contrast, the Fed were to raise rates now, before the economic recovery is fully entrenched, house prices might resume declines, the values of businesses large and small would drop, and, critically, unemployment would likely start to rise again. Such outcomes would ultimately not be good for savers or anyone else.

How Is the Federal Reserve Held Accountable in a Democratic Society?
I will turn, finally, to the question of how the Federal Reserve is held accountable in a democratic society.

The Federal Reserve was created by the Congress, now almost a century ago. In the Federal Reserve Act and subsequent legislation, the Congress laid out the central bank's goals and powers, and the Fed is responsible to the Congress for meeting its mandated objectives, including fostering maximum employment and price stability. At the same time, the Congress wisely designed the Federal Reserve to be insulated from short-term political pressures. For example, members of the Federal Reserve Board are appointed to staggered, 14-year terms, with the result that some members may serve through several Administrations. Research and practical experience have established that freeing the central bank from short-term political pressures leads to better monetary policy because it allows policymakers to focus on what is best for the economy in the longer run, independently of near-term electoral or partisan concerns. All of the members of the Federal Open Market Committee take this principle very seriously and strive always to make monetary policy decisions based solely on factual evidence and careful analysis.

It is important to keep politics out of monetary policy decisions, but it is equally important, in a democracy, for those decisions--and, indeed, all of the Federal Reserve's decisions and actions--to be undertaken in a strong framework of accountability and transparency. The American people have a right to know how the Federal Reserve is carrying out its responsibilities and how we are using taxpayer resources.

One of my principal objectives as Chairman has been to make monetary policy at the Federal Reserve as transparent as possible. We promote policy transparency in many ways. For example, the Federal Open Market Committee explains the reasons for its policy decisions in a statement released after each regularly scheduled meeting, and three weeks later we publish minutes with a detailed summary of the meeting discussion. The Committee also publishes quarterly economic projections with information about where we anticipate both policy and the economy will be headed over the next several years. I hold news conferences four times a year and testify often before congressional committees, including twice-yearly appearances that are specifically designated for the purpose of my presenting a comprehensive monetary policy report to the Congress. My colleagues and I frequently deliver speeches, such as this one, in towns and cities across the country.

The Federal Reserve is also very open about its finances and operations. The Federal Reserve Act requires the Federal Reserve to report annually on its operations and to publish its balance sheet weekly. Similarly, under the financial reform law enacted after the financial crisis, we publicly report in detail on our lending programs and securities purchases, including the identities of borrowers and counterparties, amounts lent or purchased, and other information, such as collateral accepted. In late 2010, we posted detailed information on our public website about more than 21,000 individual credit and other transactions conducted to stabilize markets during the financial crisis. And, just last Friday, we posted the first in an ongoing series of quarterly reports providing a great deal of information on individual discount window loans and securities transactions. The Federal Reserve's financial statement is audited by an independent, outside accounting firm, and an independent Inspector General has wide powers to review actions taken by the Board. Importantly, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has the ability to--and does--oversee the efficiency and integrity of all of our operations, including our financial controls and governance.

While the GAO has access to all aspects of the Fed's operations and is free to criticize or make recommendations, there is one important exception: monetary policymaking. In the 1970s, the Congress deliberately excluded monetary policy deliberations, decisions, and actions from the scope of GAO reviews. In doing so, the Congress carefully balanced the need for democratic accountability with the benefits that flow from keeping monetary policy free from short-term political pressures.

However, there have been recent proposals to expand the authority of the GAO over the Federal Reserve to include reviews of monetary policy decisions. Because the GAO is the investigative arm of the Congress and GAO reviews may be initiated at the request of members of the Congress, these reviews (or the prospect of reviews) of individual policy decisions could be seen, with good reason, as efforts to bring political pressure to bear on monetary policymakers. A perceived politicization of monetary policy would reduce public confidence in the ability of the Federal Reserve to make its policy decisions based strictly on what is good for the economy in the longer term. Balancing the need for accountability against the goal of insulating monetary policy from short-term political pressure is very important, and I believe that the Congress had it right in the 1970s when it explicitly chose to protect monetary policy decision making from the possibility of politically motivated reviews.

Conclusion
In conclusion, I will simply note that these past few years have been a difficult time for the nation and the economy. For its part, the Federal Reserve has also been tested by unprecedented challenges. As we approach next year's 100th anniversary of the signing of the Federal Reserve Act, however, I have great confidence in the institution. In particular, I would like to recognize the skill, professionalism, and dedication of the employees of the Federal Reserve System. They work tirelessly to serve the public interest and to promote prosperity for people and businesses across America. The Fed's policy choices can always be debated, but the quality and commitment of the Federal Reserve as a public institution is second to none, and I am proud to lead it.

Now that I've answered questions that I've posed to myself, I'd be happy to respond to yours.

---

1. The Fed has a number of ways to influence short-term rates; basically, they involve steps to affect the supply, and thus the cost, of short-term funding.

Practice Problem Set 1

Economics 470/570 
Winter 2014
Practice Problem Set 1

1. Describe the main function of financial markets. Explain how direct finance and indirect finance differ.

2. Suppose that there are 10 individuals, each with $10,000 in savings that they would like to lend, but only if there is little to no chance that they will lose their investment. Suppose there are also 10 different people who want to take out $10,000 loans. (a) Assuming an expected default rate of 10% and an interest rate on loans of 20%, use this example to show how pooling risk through financial intermediation can increase the efficiency of financial markets. (b) Assuming the default rate using financial intermediation is exactly 10%, what is the interest rate at which the return is 0%?

3. Suppose that there are 10 individuals, each with $10,000 in savings that they would like to lend. Suppose there another person who wants to take out a $100,000 loan. Use this example to show how pooling small deposits through financial intermediation can increase the efficiency of financial markets.

4. Suppose that there are 100 individuals, each with $1,000 in savings that they would like to lend. However, in any given year 20% of them will need the money for emergencies. Because of this possibility, and the dire consequences if they cannot access their money at such a time, none of them are unwilling to lend the money for long periods of time. Explain how financial intermediation can solve this problem of "borrowing short and lending long" and increase the efficiency of financial markets.

5. Besides pooling risk, pooling small deposits, and pooling over time, what else do financial intermediaries do to increase the efficiency of financial markets?

6. Briefly, what does the phrase “increase the efficiency of financial markets” mean?

7. What are the functions of money, i.e. why does money exist? Relative to a barter economy, what problems are overcome by the use of money?

8. To be useful as a medium of exchange, what properties should money have?

9. Describe the evolution of money from barter to fiat money. How did paper money arise?

10. How is money measured? Why is there more than one definition of the money supply? Are data on the money supply reliable?

11. How do nominal interest rates, ex-ante real interest rates, and ex-post real interest rates differ? Of the two real rates, which is the most important for understanding economic decisions?

Lecture 2 on Thursday 1/9/2014

Brief Outline of Topics Covered in Lecture 2

Chapter 2: An Overview of the Financial System (continued)

Structure and Functions of Financial Intermediaries

Example to illustrate functions

Chapter 3 What is Money?

Meaning of Money
Functions of Money

Medium of Exchange
Unit of Account
Store of Value

Evolution of the Payments System

Commodity Money
Partially backed paper money
Full backed paper money
Fiat Money

Measuring Money

The Federal Reserve’s Monetary Aggregates

How Reliable Are Money Data?

Chapter 4 Understanding Interest Rates [pages 81-84]

The Distinction between Real and Nominal Interest Rates

Nominal interest rates
Ex-ante real rates
Ex-post real rates

Chapter 12 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System [We may start this section, but we won't get too far if we do.]

Origins of the Federal Reserve System

• Distribute power to geographic regions, the public sector, the private sector, the business sector, and the financial sector

Formal Structure of the Federal Reserve System

• Federal Reserve Banks
• Member Banks
• Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
• Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
• The Federal Advisory Council (FAC)

Informal Structure of the Federal Reserve System

• How Power Has Been Centralized Over Time

Video

Material from class:

Extra Reading:

The stone money of Yap is an interesting case to consider when thinking about what money is and what role it plays in the economic and social affairs of a community. This article by Michael Bryan of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland describes the stone wheels of Yap, how they were obtained and used as gift markers both within and between tribes, and whether the stones fit the textbook definition of money:

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Island Money, by Michael F. Bryan: ...In this Commentary, I … consider… the unique and curious money of Yap, a small group of islands in the South Pacific. … For at least a few centuries leading up to today, the Yapese have used giant stone wheels called rai when executing certain exchanges. The stones are made from a shimmering limestone that is not indigenous to Yap, but quarried and shipped, primarily from the islands of Palau, 250 miles to the southwest. The size of the stones varies; some are as small as a few inches in diameter and weigh a couple of pounds, while others may reach a diameter of 12 feet and weigh thousands of pounds. A hole is carved into the middle of each stone so that it may be carried, either by coconut rope strung through the smaller pieces, or by wooden poles inserted into the larger stones. These great stones require the combined effort of many men to lift. Expeditions to acquire new stones were authorized by a chief who would retain all of the larger stones and two-fifths of the smaller ones, reportedly a fairly common distribution of production that served as a tax on the Yapese. In effect, the Yap chiefs acted as the island’s central bankers; they controlled the quantity of stones in circulation...

The quarrying and transport of rai was a substantial part of the Yapese economy. In 1882, British naturalist Jan S. Kubary reported seeing 400 Yapese men producing stones on the island of Palau for transport back to Yap. Given the population of the island at the time … more than 10 percent of the island’s adult male population was in the money-cutting business. Curiously, rai are not known to have any particular use other than as a representation of value. The stones were not functional, nor were they spiritually significant to their owners, and by most accounts, the stones have no obvious ornamental value to the Yapese. If it is true that Yap stones have no nonmonetary usefulness, they would be different from most “primitive” forms of money. Usually an item becomes a medium of exchange after its commodity value—sometimes called intrinsic worth—has been widely established...

Precisely how the value of each stone was determined is somewhat unclear. We know that size was at best only a rough approximation of worth and that stone values varied depending upon the cost or difficulty of bringing them to the island. For example, stones gotten at great peril, perhaps even loss of life, are valued most highly. Similarly, stones that were cut using shell tools and carried by canoes are more valuable than comparably sized stones that were quarried with the aid of iron tools and transported by large Western ships. The more valuable stones were given names, such as that of the chief for whom the stone was quarried or the canoe on which it was transported. Naming the stone may have secured its value since such identification would convey to all the costs associated with obtaining it...

Consider the case of the Irish American David O’Keefe from Savannah, Georgia, who, after being shipwrecked on Yap in the late nineteenth century, returned to the island with a sailing vessel and proceeded to import a large number of stones in return for a bounty of Yapese copra (coconut meat). The arrival of O’Keefe (and other Western traders) increased the number and size of the stones being brought back to the island, and by one accounting, Yap stones went from being “very rare” in 1840 to being plentiful—more than 13,000 were to be found on the island by 1929. No longer restricted by shell tools and canoes, the largest stones arriving grew from four feet in diameter to the colossal 12-foot stones that are now a part of monetary folklore. Yet the great infusion of stones did not inflate away their value. Since the stones of Captain O’Keefe were obviously more easily obtained, they traded on the island at an appropriately reduced value relative to the older stones gotten at much greater cost. In essence, O’Keefe and other Westerners were bringing in large numbers of “debased” stones that could easily be identified by the Yapese.

While it’s clear that the Yap stones have value for the Yapese, can the stones really be called money? The answer, of course, depends upon how you define money. If you rely on a standard textbook definition, you’d describe money in terms of its functions, for example, “Whatever is used as a medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value.” Certainly, Yap stones performed at least one of these functions quite well—they were an effective store of value (form of wealth). But every asset—from bonds to houses—stores value and is not necessarily labeled money.

To be called money, at least according to the textbook definition, an asset must serve two other functions. It must be a medium of exchange, meaning that it can be readily used either to purchase goods or to satisfy a debt, and it must be a unit of account, or something used as a measure of value. Yap stones were not the unit of account for the islands. Pricing goods and services in terms of the stones would probably have been difficult for the average islander. ... According to Paul Einzig, prices on the islands were set in terms of baskets of a food crop, taro, or cups of syrup, staples that would be easy for a typical islander to appreciate. Furthermore, there is some question whether Yap stones were commonly used as a medium of exchange. To be used in exchange, an item must possess certain characteristics—it must be storable, portable, recognizable, and divisible. Certainly, the stones were storable; they can still be found in abundance on Yap, and they have maintained their purchasing power reasonably well over time (particularly compared with other fiat monies, including dollars). And while it is sometimes claimed that Yap stones suffer as an exchange medium because they lack portability, this may not be completely accurate. In the case of the larger, more easily identified stones, physical possession is not necessary for the transfer of purchasing power. Those involved in the exchange need only communicate that purchasing power has been transferred…

But while storability and portability may not have limited the use of these stones as a medium of exchange, the other two characteristics—recognizability and divisibility—probably did. The stones were primarily used in exchanges between Yap islanders. … Yap historically did not have close cultural ties with any of its trading partners and trade with off-islanders was somewhat infrequent, the stones did not facilitate transactions on these occasions. When transacting with other islands, the Yapese used woven mats (a common exchange medium throughout the South Pacific), while trade with Westerners often involved an exchange of coconuts. Even on the island, the indivisibility of the stones necessitated the use of other items as media of exchange for most transactions. Most rai are highly valued: By one account, a stone of “three spans” (about 25 inches across) would have been sufficient in the early twentieth century to purchase 50 baskets of food or a full-sized pig, while a stone the size of a man would have been worth “many villages and plantations.” Obviously, these stones do not change hands very frequently, since expenditures of such magnitude are rare. For more ordinary transactions, the Yapese either used pearl shells or resorted to barter. Clearly the stones of Yap do not fit neatly within the textbook definition of money…

But … what role do the stones play and how is that role similar to that played by dollars?... [T]he stones, particularly the larger ones, acted as markers, changing hands in recognition of a “gift.” Stones were often merely held until the gift was reciprocated and the stone could be returned to its original owner. For example, islanders wishing to fish someone’s waters might do so by leaving a stone in recognition of the favor. After an appropriate number of fish were given to the owner of the fishing waters, the stone would simply be reclaimed. Occasionally a stone was “exchanged” when one tribe came to the aid of another, say for support against a rival tribe or in celebration of some event. But the stone would reside with the new tribe only until such time as aid of a similar value could be given in return. The stones, then, act as a memory of the contributions occurring between islanders. Anthropologists refer to this as a “gift economy,” where goods aren’t traded as much as they are given with the expectation of a comparable favor at some later date. So Yap stones serve as a memory of one’s contributions on the island. … But this raises an intriguing question. If the stones of Yap were merely markers and nothing more, why did the Yapese expend such great resources to carve them out of the mountains of Palau and carry them all the way back to their island? Wouldn’t any marker work just as well? It may be that the Yap chiefs did not have sufficient “credibility” to simply decree an object’s value. That is, the Yapese may have needed some assurance that the object on which value has been assigned could not be easily replicated for the mere benefit of the issuer...

Lecture 1 on Tuesday 1/7/2014

Brief Outline of Topics Covered in Lecture 1

Chapter 1: Why Study Money, Banking, and Financial Markets?

Why Study Money and Monetary Policy?

Why Study Banking and Financial Institutions?

Why Study Financial Markets?

Chapter 2: An Overview of the Financial System (pgs 25-27, 36-41)

Direct versus Indirect Finance

Structure and Functions of Financial Markets

Structure and Functions of Financial Intermediaries

Example to illustrate functions

Chapter 3: What is Money?

Meaning of Money
Functions of Money

Medium of Exchange
Unit of Account
Store of Value

Video

Materials from class:

 

 

 

 

Extra Reading:

A Short History of American Money, From Fur to Fiat, by David Wolman, The Atlantic: What do animal pelts, tobacco, fake wampum, gold, and cotton-paper bank notes have in common? At one point or another, they've all stood for the same thing: U.S. currency.

Before independence, America's disparate colonial economies struggled with a very material financial hang-up: there just wasn't enough money to go around. Colonial governments attempted to solve this problem by using tobacco, nails, and animal pelts for currency, assigning them a set amount of shillings or pennies so that they could intermix with the existing system.

The most successful ad hoc currency was wampum, a particular kind of bead made from the shells of ocean critters. But eventually the value of this currency, like that of other alternative currencies of the day, was undermined by oversupply and counterfeiting. (That's right: counterfeit wampum. They were produced by dyeing like-shaped shells with berry juice, mimicking the purple color of the real thing.)

It was a crew of Puritans from Boston who first put their faith in paper. Initially, the Massachusetts Bay Colony tried to issue colonial coinage. The pieces themselves, struck in 1652, were made from a mash-up of poor-quality silver and were soon outlawed by the Brits. Less than a decade later the colonists tried again. They were forced to, really, because they owed money to the crown to help fund Britain's war against France, yet lacked any currency with which to pay up. They called the paper "bills of credit." The local government essentially said to the people: Here, just use this. It's real money. We'll sort out redeemability later.

There were endless debates, from prairie farmlands to the floor of Congress, about whether this paper was real money or just a smoke-and-mirrors scheme destined to end badly. ...[continue]...

Syllabus for Winter 2014

Course: Economics 470/570 Monetary Theory and Policy
Professor: Mark Thoma
Office/Hours: PLC 471 on T/Th 2:30 p.m.-3:30 p.m.
Phone/Email: (541) 346-4673, [email protected]
Web Page: http://pages.uoregon.edu/mthoma/

Text: Frederic S. Mishkin, The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets, 10th edition.

Prerequisites: Economics 313 and 320, or the equivalent.

GTF/Office/Hours/Email: Gulcan Cil, PLC 430, Th 9-10 am, [email protected].

Tests: There will be two midterms and a final. The midterms will be given on Thursday, January 30^th and Thursday, February 27^th, and the final will be given on Thursday, March 20^th from 1:00 p.m. – 3:00 p.m. The final is comprehensive.

Homework: Problem sets will be assigned periodically. These will not be graded, but exam questions will be based, in part, upon the problem sets.

Grading: The midterms are worth 25% each, and the final is worth 50%.  Grades will be assigned according to your relative standing in the class.

Students with Disabilities: If you have a documented disability and anticipate needing accommodations in this course, please make arrangements with me during the first week of the term. Please request that the counselor for students with disabilities (164 Oregon Hall) send me a letter verifying your disability.

Course Outline:

Introduction	Mishkin Text
Why Study Money, Banking, and Financial Markets?	Ch. 1
An Overview of the Financial System	Ch. 2
What is Money	Ch. 3
Understanding Interest Rates	Ch. 4,  pgs. 81-84
Central Banking and Monetary Policy
Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System	Ch. 13
The Money Supply Process	Ch. 14
Tools of Monetary Policy	Ch. 15
The Conduct of Monetary Policy	Ch. 16
Monetary Theory
Money Demand, the Quantity Theory,  and Inflation	Ch. 19
The IS Curve	Ch. 20
Monetary Policy and AD Curves	Ch. 21
The AS-AD Model	Ch. 22
Monetary Policy Theory	Ch. 23
The Role of Expectations in Monetary Policy	Ch. 24