Tim Duy has his latest Fed Watch:
I was struck by the title of David Altig’s piece
The Savings Rate Increases – And That Ain’t Good,
as well as similar thoughts by
Kash at Angry Bear. What strikes me is
that I often see hand-wringing about the possibility of a rise in the savings
rate and the economic imbalances manifested in the current account deficit. In
my mind, these are two sides of the same coin – it is most likely that the
latter will improve in tandem with an increase in household saving, and that
means a fall in consumption growth. Fundamentally, the current account
represents an excess of broadly defined consumption over productive capacity,
and reducing economic imbalances implies bringing the former in line with the
latter. Of course, the speed of the adjustment process matters, as explained by
James Hamilton
here. But it is the process nonetheless.
Is this the perspective of Fed policy makers? I have suggested so in the
past, and I believe this is the story Greenspan is currently spinning. Some
relevant excerpts from his speech earlier this week:
If indeed this is the case, the implied increase over the past decade in
consumption expenditures financed by home equity extraction, rather than by
income and other assets, would account for much of the decline in the
personal saving rate since 1995….
…Nonetheless, it is difficult to dismiss the conclusion that a
significant amount of consumption is driven by capital gains on some
combination of both stocks and residences, with the latter being financed
predominantly by home equity extraction.
If so, leaving aside the effect of equity prices on consumption, should
mortgage interest rates rise or home affordability be further stretched,
home turnover and mortgage refinancing cash-outs would decline as would
equity extraction and, presumably, consumption expenditure growth. The
personal saving rate, accordingly, would rise.
Carrying the hypothesis further, imports of consumer goods would surely
decline as would those imported intermediate products that support them. And
one would assume that the U.S. trade and current account deficits would
shrink as well, all else being equal.
How significant and disruptive such adjustments turn out to be is an open
question. Nonetheless, as I have pointed out in previous commentary, their
economic effect will, to a large extent, depend on the flexibility inherent
in our economy. In a highly flexible economy, such as the United States,
shocks should be largely absorbed by changes in prices, interest rates, and
exchange rates, rather than by wrenching declines in output and employment,
a more likely outcome in a less flexible economy.
In this speech, Greenspan is detailing his view on the importance of home
equity extraction in fueling consumption growth and pushing the savings rate
into negative territory. But read carefully into what Greenspan is suggesting.
This is not the traditional view that households have fundamentally changed
their saving behavior as a result of increased wealth. Instead it is the more
subtle point that:
Because the personal saving rate is measured relative to personal
disposable income, any purchases financed with the proceeds of capital gains
will increase personal consumption expenditures but not income, and
therefore the measured saving rate will decline.
So here is my interpretation of Greenspan’s view: Suppose my (hypothetical)
household saves 10% of its income annually. Now suppose that I sell my house and
extract $10,000 in equity as cash to spend on a new sailboat. From my
perspective, I still save 10% of my income, but the Bureau of Economic Analysis
doesn’t agree. They count only my spending on the sailboat, but don’t recognize
the equity cash as income.
Should the housing market change in such away that reduces equity cash outs,
then consumption will fall and savings will rise. Savings doesn’t rise, however,
because I made a conscious decision to save more as my marginal propensity to
save out of current income is the same. Instead it rises because my non-income
resources have been constrained.
Why is such a subtle distinction important? Because it implies that Greenspan
believes that the savings rate can rise in the absence of significant drop in
household wealth from sliding home values. Traditionally, the story is that the
savings rate will rise in response to the wealth effect when the property bubble
(assuming it exists) pops. Greenspan is outlining another – and more benign –
path. All you need is the housing market to change in such a way that
refinancings and cash outs slow, not the bottom falling out. Moreover, even if
prices slide a bit, it won’t be a big blow to wealth anyway:
In summary, it is encouraging to find that, despite the rapid growth of
mortgage debt, only a small fraction of households across the country have
loan-to-value ratios greater than 90 percent. Thus, the vast majority of
homeowners have a sizable equity cushion with which to absorb a potential
decline in house prices. In addition, the LTVs for recent homebuyers appear
to be lower in those states that have experienced the most explosive run-up
in house prices and that, conceivably, could be at risk for the largest
price reversal. That said, the situation clearly will require our ongoing
scrutiny in the period ahead, lest more adverse trends emerge.
Also note that under the Greenspan scenario, the current account deficit will
improve – again, two sides of the same coin.
I believe this all ties into how the Fed (or at least a Greenspan-helmed Fed)
believes the economy will evolve as the next year passes. To recap the story so
far, the Fed has shown concern that economic slack has evaporated, and, with
rising energy prices in the background, inflationary pressures are building. To
stem these pressures, they have tightened policy to reduce growth. They are not
targeting the housing market directly, but recognize that since housing has been
a driving force in the expansion, it will likely be the
recipient of the brunt of their policy efforts.
A cooling of the housing market, however, is not undesirable, and a major
decline in values is unlikely. After all, haven’t their critics complained that
excessively loose monetary policy caused a bubble to begin with? And, under the
Greenspan scenario, a housing slowdown is necessary to trigger a needed
rebalancing of economic activity. Moreover, with excess slack drying up, some
sector needs to pull back, especially with any sense of fiscal discipline long
gone.
Won’t a worried consumer upset this whole plan? I doubt the Fed is all that
focused on the consumer confidence numbers. First, they will discount numbers
that appear hurricane induced. The same holds for personal consumption spending.
Indeed, most of the decrease in August spending was a fall in auto sales. This
is just another chapter in the continuing story of Detroit’s woes, fundamentally
a structural problem and outside the Fed’s purview. Detroit’s profits rely on
cars that guzzle gas. Rising gas prices have soured consumers on those cars. The
Fed can cut rates to zero, but it won’t make more gas – it will only raise the
price of gas further.
Second, and more importantly, I doubt Greenspan & Co. believe that
consumption fluctuations fundamentally drive business cycles. Instead, Fed
policymakers will have their eyes glued on the investment numbers. And last
week’s
durable goods report for August likely eased any fears in that direction. I also suggest paying attention to a little reported figure in the
durable goods report, unfilled orders for nondefence, nonair capital goods:
With unfilled orders continuing to pile up, I can’t see the Fed panicking
about investment yet. The series last rolled over in September 2000 (the Fed had
paused in May, and did not ease until January 2001). And don’t forget today’s
ISM numbers, which
revealed a surge in manufacturing activity in September
– perhaps a precursor to another strong durable goods report.
But won’t higher interest rates sap firm’s ability to invest? This is the not
problem, according to Greenspan:
Softness in intended investment, however, is also part of the story. In
the United States, for example, capital expenditures have been restrained
for some time relative to the very substantial level of corporate cash flow.
That development likely reflects the business caution that was apparent in
the wake of the stock market decline and the corporate scandals
early this decade.
Plenty of cash to finance investment, just not enough commitment from firms.
The upshot it that the economy evolves in such a way that consumption slows,
savings rises, and, as long as investment spending continues to grow, we avoid a
recession.
I understand that this appears to be a very benign story, but note that it
is being spun by the man who is trying to trigger the whole series of events.
If Greenspan didn’t believe he was putting the economy on a course to glide into
sustainable growth (over time), he would signal a halt in rate hikes. No such
hope there.
Overall, I think it very possible that this path will result in slower
growth, especially in consumption spending, than people believe Greenspan or his
colleagues are comfortable with. This game is complicated by the increase in
energy costs,
which policymakers clearly view as an inflation threat
and are willing to sacrifice growth to ensure it remains a threat, not a reality.
But while this makes the game more risky, it is the game nonetheless.
[All Fed Watch Posts]
UPDATE (by Mark Thoma): Bloomberg's John M. Berry says rates are headed up.