Tradeable Gas Rights
Martin Feldstein has a way to reduce gasoline consumption, tradeable gas rights:
Tradeable Gasoline Rights, by Martin Feldstein, Commentary, WSJ: The rapid rise in the price of gasoline has produced calls for tougher fuel economy standards on new cars and trucks. Although reduced gasoline consumption would be good for the environment and for national security, such a regulatory change would be a mistake. A far better approach would be a system of tradeable gasoline rights, or TGRs. These could be distributed in a way that actually raises the income of a majority of households while giving everyone an incentive to reduce gasoline consumption.
In a system of tradeable gasoline rights, the government would give each adult a TGR debit card. The gasoline pumps at service stations ... would be modified to read these new TGR debit cards... Buying a gallon of gasoline would require using up one tradeable gasoline right as well as paying money.
The government would decide how many gallons of gasoline should be consumed per year and would give out that total number of TGRs. In 2006, Americans will buy about 110 billion gallons of gasoline. To keep that total unchanged in 2007, the government would distribute 110 billion TGRs. To reduce total gasoline consumption by 5%, it would cut the number of TGRs to 104.5 billion.
The government could distribute TGRs to reflect geographic differences in driving patterns. ... Businesses that use trucks would also get TGRs.
A key feature of these gasoline rights is that they are tradeable. Individuals with more TGRs than they need could sell the excess, while those who want to use more gallons than their allocation would have to buy extra TGRs. The gasoline companies could act as clearing houses for these trades, using their gasoline pumps to sell TGRs in the same way that they sell gasoline or to buy TGRs in exchange for the cash needed to purchase gasoline. Other institutions like banks could also trade TGRs for cash. And individuals could of course buy and sell TGRs among themselves by letting others use their card.
The market price of a TGR would depend on the number of TGRs that the government distributed relative to the number of gallons that households would buy if there were no TGR system. The smaller the number of TGRs, the greater would be the price per TGR... The money price of gasoline would continue to reflect the world price of oil and the local cost of refining and distribution.
If the price of a TGR turned out to be 50 cents, an individual who buys an extra 20 gallons of gasoline would use up $10 worth of TGRs. If he avoids the purchase -- by driving less, driving at speeds that use less gas, or driving a more fuel-efficient car -- he could sell the 20 TGRs for $10.
The 50 cent price of the TGR would have the same incentive effect as a 50 cent gasoline tax. But while a gasoline tax lowers everyone's real income, the TGR system creates winners as well as losers. Someone who receives 800 TGRs for a year but only needs 500 would pocket $150 by selling his unwanted TGRs. But even such individuals would still face the right incentive: Every extra gallon consumed would reduce their net cash by 50 cents.
Advocates of a gasoline tax argue that it would produce extra revenue that could be used to reduce the budget deficit or to finance equally large cuts in personal taxes. ... [But] it is hard to believe that Congress would now respond to the public's unhappiness over high gasoline prices by enacting a gasoline tax that would raise the price even more.
That aversion to a higher gasoline tax is why tougher mileage standards for new cars is back on the legislative table. They would, however, do virtually nothing to lower the price of gasoline. And if individuals want to economize on gasoline by driving smaller or more fuel-efficient cars, they can do so now without government action. ...
Higher gas mileage standards would reduce gasoline demand in a very inefficient way by focusing exclusively on the rated mileage of new cars. Separate fuel efficiency standards for each type of vehicle -- one of the options now being considered -- would be even worse because it would provide no incentive to switch to more fuel-efficient cars.
Requiring higher mileage standards on new cars would do very little to reduce total gasoline consumption in the near term because each year's new cars are only about 10% of the total cars on the road. Unlike the system of TGRs that raises the effective cost per gallon, the new car standard would do nothing to change the behavior of owners of existing cars. But the TGR system would cause owners to economize on gasoline by driving fewer miles, driving at speeds that use less gasoline, using tires that improve miles per gallon, and servicing their engines to maintain fuel efficiency. And of course the higher effective cost of gasoline would also cause new car buyers to prefer more fuel-efficient vehicles.
In short, a system of tradeable gasoline rights would be better than either higher taxes or tougher new car regulations. That a majority of households could benefit from the TGR system while all households would have an increased incentive to economize on gasoline is both an economic and a political advantage. It would be an efficient way to reduce gasoline that Congress could actually pass.
Getting over my surprise at the Feldstein's call for government intervention in the marketplace, particularly for the government to set a national cap, I'm not fully convinced. Would the cap on gasoline usage be as easy to lift as the debt limit?
In addition, while this proposal does provide the correct incentive at the margin, I can envision an endless political fight over the allocation of credits. Should LA residents get more credits than NY or SF in the zero-sum allocation? Will cities or regions with more credits per person relative to average distance traveled see people moving in to take advantage of the chance to earn extra income? If I don't own a car, am I out of luck? Is it per person as in Feldstein's proposal, or will it be changed to per household? Do households with more kids get more coupons? Will rural residents get more credits? If so, how much more? Over time, will the credits per person be decided based upon political considerations rather than economics? This may well be better than other proposals in a lot of dimensions and I am not opposed to it, but unless I missed something on the allocation part, it doesn't seem so obvious that it would sail through congress. [Update: More at Brad Delong and Angry Bear]
Posted by Mark Thoma on Monday, June 5, 2006 at 12:54 AM in Economics, Oil, Policy, Politics, Regulation |
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