Tim Duy's Fed Watch

Looking Backward to See the Future

Is this our future, brought back from the past? A contact referenced the last hike cycle via the FOMC statements from 2003-04 (emphasis added):

 October 28, 2003:

The Committee perceives that the upside and downside risks to the attainment of sustainable growth for the next few quarters are roughly equal. In contrast, the probability, though minor, of an unwelcome fall in inflation exceeds that of a rise in inflation from its already low level. The Committee judges that, on balance, the risk of inflation becoming undesirably low remains the predominant concern for the foreseeable future. In these circumstances, the Committee believes that policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period.

December 9, 2003:

 The Committee perceives that the upside and downside risks to the attainment of sustainable growth for the next few quarters are roughly equal. The probability of an unwelcome fall in inflation has diminished in recent months and now appears almost equal to that of a rise in inflation. However, with inflation quite low and resource use slack, the Committee believes that policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period.

January 28, 2004:

The Committee perceives that the upside and downside risks to the attainment of sustainable growth for the next few quarters are roughly equal. The probability of an unwelcome fall in inflation has diminished in recent months and now appears almost equal to that of a rise in inflation. With inflation quite low and resource use slack, the Committee believes that it can be patient in removing its policy accommodation.

 March 16, 2004:

The Committee perceives the upside and downside risks to the attainment of sustainable growth for the next few quarters are roughly equal. The probability of an unwelcome fall in inflation has diminished in recent months and now appears almost equal to that of a rise in inflation. With inflation quite low and resource use slack, the Committee believes that it can be patient in removing its policy accommodation.

May 4, 2004:

The Committee perceives the upside and downside risks to the attainment of sustainable growth for the next few quarters are roughly equal. Similarly, the risks to the goal of price stability have moved into balance. At this juncture, with inflation low and resource use slack, the Committee believes that policy accommodation can be removed at a pace that is likely to be measured.

June 30, 2004:

The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to raise its target for the federal funds rate by 25 basis points to 1-1/4 percent.

"Patient" lasted for two meetings before being replaced by "measured." This is fairly consistent with my expectations. My baseline scenario is that the Fed drops "considerable" entirely in January, retains "patient" in March, drops "patient" in April, and raise rates in June. In her press conference, Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen said:

There certainly has been no decision, you know, decision on the part of the Committee to move at a measured pace or to use language like that. I think quite a few people looking back on the use of that language in the--I can't remember if it was 12 or 16 meetings, where there were 25 basis point moves. We'd probably not like to repeat a sequence in which there was a measured pace and 25 basis point moves at every meeting. So I certainly don't want to encourage you to think that there will be a repeat of that.

If she really believes this, Yellen will not push to replace "patient" with "measured," but instead some more vague data-dependent type language.

Bottom Line: Assuming the data holds, maybe history will repeat itself. If it really is this easy, I have no idea what I will be writing about for the next six months.

Asked and Answered. Mostly.

Last week I had six questions for Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen. Here is my attempt to piece together the answers from her post-FOMC press conference:

Question 1:  If you want to know what the Fed is thinking at this point, a journalist needs to push Yellen on the secular stagnation issue at next week's press conference. Does she or the committee agree with Fischer?  And does she see any inconsistency with the SEP implied equilibrium Federal Funds rates and the current level of long bonds? 

Yellen, in answer to Peter Coke of Bloomberg Television:  "(The Committee) are optimistic that those conditions will lift. They see the longer-run normal level of interest rates as around 3-3/4 percent. So there's no view in the Committee that there is secular stagnation in the sense we won't eventually get back to pretty historically normal levels of interest rates."

Yellen, in answer to Robin Harding of the Financial Times: "There are a number of different factors that are bearing on the path of market interest rates. I think including global economic developments. It is often the case that when oil prices move down, and the dollar appreciates, that tends to put downward pressure on inflation compensation and on longer-term rates. We also have safe haven flows that may be affecting longer-term Treasury yields. So I can't tell you exactly what is driving market developments. But what I can say is that we are trying to communicate our thoughts as clearly as we can."

The Federal Reserve believes that the current level of long rates is an artifact of safe-haven flows, not an indication of secular stagnation. They must anticipate that the yield curve will not flatten further or invert when they begin raising rates. 

Question 2: I would like a journalist to press Yellen on her interpretation of the 5-year, 5-year forward breakeven measure of inflation expectations. Does she see this measure as important or too noisy to be used as a policy metric?  What is her preferred metric?

Yellen, in answer to Greg Ip of the Economist:  "Oh, and longer-dated expectations. Well I would say we refer to this in the statement as inflation compensation, rather than inflation expectations. The gap between the nominal yields on 10-year Treasuries for example. And TIPS have declined -- that's inflation compensation, and five-year, five-year forwards, as you've said, have also declined. That could reflect a change in inflation expectations. But it could also reflect changes in assessment of inflation risks. The risk premium that's necessary to compensate for inflation. That might especially have fallen if the probabilities attached to very high inflation have come down. And it can also reflect liquidity effects in markets and for example, it's sometimes the case that -- when there is a flight to safety, that flight tends to be concentrated in nominal Treasuries, and can also serve to compress that spread. So I think the jury is out about exactly how to interpret that downward move in inflation compensation. And we indicated that we are monitoring inflation developments carefully."

The Federal Reserve does not believe market-based measures of inflation expectations as indicative of actual inflation expectations. Watch surveys, Cleveland Fed-type measures, and actual inflation instead.

Question 3: Considering that recent updates of your optimal control framework now suggest that the normalization process should already be underway, how useful do you believe such a framework is for the conduct of monetary policy? What specific framework are you now using to dismiss the results of your previously preferred framework?

Yellen, in answer to Greg Ip of the Economist: "So you -- your first question is why is it that the committee sees unemployment as declining slightly below its estimate of the longer-run, natural rate? And I think in part, the reason for that is that inflation is running below our objective, and the committee wants to see inflation move back toward our objective over time. And a short period of a very slight under shoot of unemployment below the natural rate will facilitate slightly faster return of inflation to our objective. It is, I should say, a very small undershoot in a situation where there is great uncertainty about exactly what constitutes maximum employment, or a longer-run, normal rate of unemployment."

This is the general story of optimal control - hold unemployment below the natural rate to accelerate return to target inflation. Ignore any overshooting of inflation in such an analysis; Yellen was never really serious about that. Only thing preventing Fed from raising rates now is tweeking the optimal control results to account for still-high unemployment.

Question 4: St. Louis Federal Reserve President James Bullard has defined a specific metric to assess the Fed's current distance from its goals. What is your specific metric and by that metric how far is the Fed from it's goals?  What does this metric tell you about the likely timing of the first rate hike of this cycle?

Yellen, in answer to Binyamin Appelbaum of the New York Times: "And with respect to inflation -- and our forecast for inflation, and inflation expectations, let me start by saying I think it's important that monetary policy be forward-looking. The lags in monetary policy are long. And therefore the committee has to base its decisions on how to set the federal funds rate looking into the future. Theory is important, and theories that are consistent with historical evidence will be something that governs the thinking of many people around the table. Typically we have seen that as long as inflation expectations are well-anchored, that as the labor market recovers, we'll gradually see upward pressure on both wages and prices. And that inflation will tend to move back toward 2 percent. I think historically we have seen, as the economy strengthens and slack diminishes, that inflation does tend to gradually rise over time.  And as long -- you know, I just -- speaking for myself, that I will be looking for evidence that I think strengthens my confidence in that view, and you know, looking at the full range of data that bears on, whether or not that's a reasonable view of how events will unfold. But it's likely to be a decision that's based on forecasts and confidence in the forecast."

 No firm metrics. Raising rates is like pornography - we know it is time when we see it.

Question 5: Why is the Fed setting the stage for raising interest rates next year while inflation measures remain below target? What is the risk, exactly, of explicitly committing to a zero interest rate policy until inflation reaches at least your target?

Yellen, in answer to Greg Ip of the Economist: "But it's important to point out that the committee is not anticipating an over-shoot of its 2 percent inflation objective."

From the Fed's perspective, not an interesting question. Theory says monetary policymakers need to move ahead of seeing inflation at target. If inflation was actually at target, they would be behind the curve in this economic environment. Also refer to San Francisco Federal Reserve President John Williams, via the Wall Street Journal:

“There’s no question that core inflation will likely be below 2% when liftoff is appropriate,” Mr. Williams said.

You have to love that statement - only an economist could piece together a sentence with "no question" and "likely" in this context. In short, they have no intention of allowing inflation to drift above 2%. The 2% goal is a ceiling, not a target. They are perfectly happy tolerating modestly below-target inflation as long as unemployment is below 6%. If you thought that any mention of above-target inflation was anything more than an acknowledgement of potential forecast errors, you were wrong. As far as the Fed is concerned, 2% inflation was handed down by God. It's in the Bible. Look it up.

Question 6: High yield debt markets are currently under pressure from the decline in oil prices. Are you confident that macroprudential tools are sufficient to contain the damage to energy-related debt? If the damage cannot be contained and contagion to other markets spreads, what does this tell you about the ability to use low interest rate policy without engendering dangerous financial instabilities? 

Yellen, in answer to Greg Robb of MarketWatch:  "So I mean there is some--you're talking about in the United States exposure? I mean we have seen some impacts of lower oil prices on the spreads for high-yield bonds, where there's exposure to oil companies that may see distress or a decline in their earnings, and we have seen some increase in spreads on high-yield bonds more generally. I think for the banking system as a whole the exposure to oil, I'm not aware of significant issues there. This is the kind of thing that is part of risk management for banking organizations and the kind of thing they look at in stress tests. But the movements in oil prices have been very large, and undoubtedly unexpected.

We--in terms of leverage, and whether or not levered entities could be badly effected by movements in oil prices, leverage in the financial system in general is way down from the levels before the crisis. So it's not a major concern that there are levered entities that would be badly affected by this, but we'll have to watch carefully. There have been large and unexpected movements in oil prices."

I honestly think that Yellen was surprised the rest of us were worried about this. Don't worry, be happy -high yield energy debt problems are contained.

Bottom Line: Final result is data dependent, but nothing at the moment is dissuading the Fed from their intention to hike rates in the middle of 2015.

Quick FOMC Recap

Running short on time today....

Today's FOMC statement was a reminder that in normal times the Federal Reserve moves slowly and methodically. Policymakers were apparently concerned that removal of "considerable time" by itself would prove to be disruptive. Instead, they opted to both remove it and retain it:

Based on its current assessment, the Committee judges that it can be patient in beginning to normalize the stance of monetary policy. The Committee sees this guidance as consistent with its previous statement that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the 0 to 1/4 percent target range for the federal funds rate for a considerable time following the end of its asset purchase program in October, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and provided that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored.

If you thought they would drop "considerable time," they did. If you thought they would retain "considerable time," they did. Everyone's a winner with this statement.

Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen explained the change in language as necessary to shift away from the increasingly dated reference to the end of quantitative easing. In addition to the lower inflation and interest rate expectations in the Summary of Economic Projections, the statement was initially regarded as dovish. The press conference, however, was in my opinion anything but dovish.

During the presser, Yellen explained that "patience" was only likely guaranteed through the next "couple" of meetings, later clarified to be two. Hence, the April meeting is still on the table, although I still suspect that is too early. Yellen also said that a press conference was not required to raise rates; if necessary, they could always opt to have a presser even if one not scheduled. She dismissed falling market-based inflation expectations as reflecting inflation "compensation" rather than expectations. She dismissed the disinflationary impulse from oil, calling it transitory and drawing attention to the expected positive implications for US growth (much as she corrected described "noisy" inflation indicators earlier this year). She indicated that inflation did not need to return to target prior to raising rates, only that the Fed needed to be confident it would continue to trend toward target. She was very obviously unconcerned about the risk of contagion either via Russia or high yield energy debt - I think she almost seemed surprised anyone was worried about the latter. 

In short, Yellen dismissed virtually all of the reasons to expect the Federal Reserve to delay rate hikes past its expectation of mid-2015. They have their eyes set firmly on June. My sense is that they see the accelerating economy and combine that with, as Yellen mentioned, the long lags of monetary policy, and worry that it will not be long before they are behind the curve.

To be sure, it is easy to outline a scenario that derails the Fed's plans. The impact of the oil shock on core inflation may be more than expected. Or rising labor force participation stabilizes the unemployment rate and wage growth continues to move sideways. My guess is that if they see an acceleration in wage growth between now and June, a June hike is pretty much in the bag.

Bottom Line: Like it or not, believe it or not, the Fed is seriously looking at mid-2015 to begin the normalization process. And there is no guarantee that it will be a predictable series of modest rate hikes. As much as you think of the possibility that the hike is delayed, think also of the possibility of 1994.

IP, Russia

The string of solid US economic news continued with industrial production advancing 1.3% in November. Year-over-year growth (5.2%) is now comparable to the late-90's:

Meanwhile, the international fallout from the oil price drop continues. Russia is a classic emerging market crisis story. The decline in energy prices reveals a currency mismatch between assets and liabilities. The decline in oil dries up the dollars needed to support those liabilities, so the value of the ruble is bid down as market participants scramble for dollars. One suspects that capital flight from Russia only aggravates the problem; those oligarchs are seeing their fortunes whither. Currency plummets, aggravating the cycle. The sanctions were the beginning of this crisis, the oil price shock the culmination.

The Central Bank of Russia is forced into defending its currency via either depleting reserves or hiking interest rates. Both are losing games in a full blown crisis. The Central Bank of Russia has tried both, upping the ante by jacking up rates to 17% this afternoon, a hike of 650bp. That, however, is no guarantee of stability. Tight policy will crush the financial sector and the economy with it, triggering further net capital outflows that my guess will swamp the net inflows the rate hike was intended to create. Everything heads into free-fall until a new, lower equilibrium is established.

It is all appears really quite textbook. At this point, an IMF program would be on the horizon. But that's where the textbook changes. Hard to see the IMF just handing out a lifeline to an economy probably viewed by most as currently invading its neighbor (that's the point of the sanctions after all). And I am guessing that Russian Premier Vladimir Putin is not going to easily acquiesce to an IMF program in any event. At the moment, looks like Russia is toast. (Update: Arguably I am being a little pessimistic here. Joseph Cotterill points out that the rate hike falls well short of 1998.)

Venezuela is heading down the tubes as well, but that was always a given. Just a matter of time on that one.

Back at the Federal Reserve ranch, a fascinating experiment is underway. Have policymakers been successful in insulating the financial sector from these kinds of shocks? There will be losses, but will those losses cascade throughout the financial sector and into the real economy, or will they be contained? If the answer is containment, then interestingly Russia will lose a bargaining chip and the Fed's willingness to counter the potential risks of low interest rates with macroprudential policy will look like a sustainable policy mix. 

If, however, contagion takes hold, we will once again be revisiting regulatory policy. And if the proximate cause of the contagion is deemed high-yield energy sector debt, and the excessively low rates in high-yield in general is deemed a consequence of ZIRP, then the Fed will be pushed to rethink its faith in macroprudential policy. The Austrians would have plenty of grist to chew on.

Bottom Line:  All of this will be on the table at tomorrow's two-day FOMC meeting. The Fed will be forced to balance the US picture against the global shock. The primary argument to pull "considerable time" is the current US economic momentum. Furthermore, changing the language is not a policy change in any event; arguably, the language itself is already meaningless if the Fed is truly data dependent. In addition, policymakers may be wary to appear overly sensitive to financial markets. They may also be concerned that not eliminating the language will make the Fed appear less hawkish and more pessimistic than it is, thus risking disrupting financial markets at a later time if data suggests a rate hike is appropriate. The issue of "considerable time" however, is in my opinion, no longer of much interest. The macroprudential/regulatory experiment is far more important now.

More Questions for Yellen

FOMC meeting this week. We all pretty much know the lay of the land. "Considerable time" is on the table, and whether it stays or goes is a close call. The existence of the press conference this week argues for the change over just waiting until January. Stupid reason, I know, but we are just playing the Fed's game here.  No real reason not to wait until January other than to keep a March rate hike in play, but only a few policymakers are seriously looking at March anyway.  Uncertainty regarding the financial market impact of the oil price drop and its subsequent impact on credit markets seems sufficient to stay the Fed's hand - but they may be hesitant to appear reactive to every dip in financial markets.  If the statement is changed, they will probably replace "considerable time" with the intention to be "patient" when considering the timing of the first rate hike.

They will be navigating some tricky currents when constructing the rest of the statement. The opening paragraph will need to acknowledge the improved data - the US economy clearly has some momentum. They will also acknowledge again the expected impact of energy prices on headline inflation, but emphasize the temporary nature of the impact and fairly stable survey-based expectations. This suggest another dismissal of market-based measures.

The Fed could argue that improving domestic indicators at a time of softening in the global economy leaves the risks to the outlook as nearly balanced. They can't both suggest that risks are weighted to the downside and pull the "considerable time" language. That would, I think, be just silly.  If they want to suggest there is a preponderance of downside risks, then they will leave in "considerable time." It will be interesting to see if they mention the external environment at all - we know from the minutes of the previous meeting that they were concerned about appearing overly pessimistic.  

I have previously suggested two questions for Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen at the post-FOMC press conference:

If you want to know what the Fed is thinking at this point, a journalist needs to push Yellen on the secular stagnation issue at next week's press conference. Does she or the committee agree with Fischer?  And does she see any inconsistency with the SEP implied equilibrium Federal Funds rates and the current level of long bonds? 

and

I would like a journalist to press Yellen on her interpretation of the 5-year, 5-year forward breakeven measure of inflation expectations. Does she see this measure as important or too noisy to be used as a policy metric?  What is her preferred metric?

Now I have four additional questions. The first refers to Yellen's previous endorsement of optimal control theory, which as stated in 2012 suggests the extension of zero rate policy well into 2015. Recent research from the Federal Reserve indicates that the same framework is now signaling that liftoff should occur in late 2014, suggesting that the Federal Reserve is now behind the curve. Did Yellen embrace this methodology only until it began to give results she did not like? The obvious question is thus:

Considering that recent updates of your optimal control framework now suggest that the normalization process should already be underway, how useful do you believe such a framework is for the conduct of monetary policy? What specific framework are you now using to dismiss the results of your previously preferred framework?

The second, arguably related, question refers to St. Louis Federal Reserve President James Bullard's argument that the Fed is very close to reaching its monetary policy goals:

Thus another question is:

St. Louis Federal Reserve President James Bullard has defined a specific metric to assess the Fed's current distance from its goals. What is your specific metric and by that metric how far is the Fed from it's goals?  What does this metric tell you about the likely timing of the first rate hike of this cycle?

A third question is obvious. Given current readings on inflation:

Why is the Fed setting the stage for raising interest rates next year while inflation measures remain below target? What is the risk, exactly, of explicitly committing to a zero interest rate policy until inflation reaches at least your target?

The fourth question addresses the potential financial instability related to oil price shock. Note that critics of Fed policy have posited that the low interest rate policy would encourage excessive risk taking in the reach for yield. High yield debt markets have come under particular scrutiny. The Fed has responded that they need to address any financial market instabilities first with macroprudential policy rather than tighter monetary policy. That approach is going to come under sharp criticism if the oil-related debt defaults cascade destructively throughout US financial markets. A natural question is thus:

High yield debt markets are currently under pressure from the decline in oil prices. Are you confident that macroprudential tools are sufficient to contain the damage to energy-related debt? If the damage cannot be contained and contagion to other markets spreads, what does this tell you about the ability to use low interest rate policy without engendering dangerous financial instabilities? 

If anyone uses these questions or variations thereof, feel free to give me some credit. Or at least when you speak of me, speak well.

Bottom Line: Odds are high that the Fed alters the statement to increase their policy flexibility next year. But even if they drop "considerable time," Yellen will emphasize via the press conference that this change does not mean a rate hike is imminent. She will emphasize that the timing and pace of rate hikes remains firmly data dependent. The current oil-related disruptions in financial markets loom like a dark cloud over a both the FOMC meeting and the generally improving US outlook.

Data Supportive of Fed Plans

Incoming data in the second half of this week continues to support the Federal Reserve's plans to begin normalizing policy in the middle of next year, with the removal of "considerable time" language next week a likely first step.

Retail sales for November were unquestionably strong and reveal an acceleration in the pace of core sales: 

You were right if you dimssed the early earnings on the holiday shopping season as useless noise.  Similarly, consumer confidence is pushing to pre-recession levels: 

And note this from Reuters:

"Expected wage gains rose to their highest level since 2008, and consumers voiced the most favorable buying attitudes in several decades," survey director Richard Curtin said in a statement.

As I have said before, nothing interesting happens until we get unemployment below 6%. Be prepared for a better equilibrium.

Even as the economic data improve, however, Wall Street remains on edge. Lower oil prices and the resulting impact on high yield bonds are resonating throughout credits markets while equity prices struggle. Despite warnings from Fed officials about the likely path of policy, long-dated US Treasury yields continue to remain under pressure. It is difficult to assess the impact on policy-making at this point. Fed officials will be torn between the market turmoil and expectations that lower energy prices will boost an already accelerating economy. And note that New York Federal Reserve President William Dudley was very dismissive of the idea that the Fed would respond to every financial market disruption as policy moved toward normalization:

Because financial market conditions affect economic activity only slowly over time, this suggests that we should look through short-term volatility and movements in financial markets.  We should not respond until we become convinced that the movements will likely, without action on our part, prove sufficiently persistent to conflict with achievement of our objectives.  Often, financial markets can be quite volatile and move a lot without disturbing underlying economic performance.  

Similarly, he has been dismissive of market-based measures of inflation expectations.

In assessing inflation expectations, I currently put more weight on survey-based measures of inflation expectations as opposed to market-based measures.  Survey-based measures have been generally stable, consistent with inflation expectations remaining well-anchored.  However, market-based measures, such as those based on breakeven inflation derived from the difference between yields on nominal versus Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS), have registered declines over the past few months, even on a 5-years forward basis.  Research done by my staff suggests that much of this decline in market-based measures of inflation compensation reflects a fall in the inflation risk premium—that is, what investors are willing to pay to protect themselves against inflation risk.  Adjusting for the fall in the inflation risk premium, inflation expectations appear to have declined much less than implied by TIPS inflation breakeven measures.   

Market participants believe the Fed leans heavily on the 5-year, 5-year forward inflation metric.  That measure is heading toward lows last seen on the eve of operation twist:

The Fed dares not defy this chart. Or do they?  Jim O'Sullivan at HFE accurately notes that the 5-year, 5-year forward breakeven has been inordinately driven by oil prices:

Why Fed prefers "survey based:" 5y5yf TIPS swing with oil even tho current infl irrelevant for pic.twitter.com/StxfsvubNh

— Jim O'Sullivan (@osullivanEcon) December 12, 2014

The Fed may be losing faith in these measures. As Dudley suggests, they may feel that such metrics are too simplistic, and find themselves favoring metrics like that offered by the Cleveland Fed that shows a firming of inflation expectations in recent months:

  Note also that the resilience of survey-based metrics of inflation expectations.  Back to Reuters and the confidence report:

The survey's one-year inflation expectation rose to 2.9 percent from 2.8 percent, while its five-year inflation outlook also rose to 2.9 percent from 2.6 percent last month.

And that leads me to my bottom line - another question for Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen at next week's post-FOMC press conference.

Bottom Line: I would like a journalist to press Yellen on her interpretation of the 5-year, 5-year forward breakeven measure of inflation expectations. Does she see this measure as important or too noisy to be used as a policy metric?  What is her preferred metric?

Challenging the Fed

Both Paul Krugman and Ryan Avent are pushing back on the Federal Reserve's apparent intent to raise rates in the middle of next year. Why is the Fed heading in this direction?  Krugman offers this explanation:

My guess — and it’s only that — is that they have, maybe without knowing it, been bludgeoned into submission by the constant attacks on easy money. Every day the financial press, many of the blogs, cable financial news, etc, are full of people warning that the Fed’s low-rate policy is distorting markets, building up inflationary pressure, endangering financials stability. Hard-money arguments, no matter how ludicrous, get respectful attention; condemnations of the Fed are constant. If I were a Fed official, I suspect that I would often find myself wishing that the bludgeoning would just stop, at least for a while — and perhaps begin looking for an opportunity to prove that I’m not an inflationary money-printer, that I can take away punchbowls too.

I don't think that the Fed is reacting to external criticism. What I think is that there are two basic views of the world. In one view, the post-2007 malaise is simply the hangover from a severe financial crisis. Time heals all wounds, including this one, and the recent data suggests such healing is underway. The alternative view is that the economy is suffering from secular secular stagnation similar although not to the same extreme as Japan. The latter view suggests the need for a very low or negative real interest rates to maintain full employment, the former view suggests a fairly significant normalization of monetary policy.

I believe that the consensus view on the Fed is the former, that the malaise is simply temporary ("a temporary inconvenience") and now ending. I think this is evident from the Summary of Economic Projections - the implied equilibrium Federal Funds rate is around 3.75%. Perhaps this is below what might have been perceived as normal ten years ago, but the difference could be attributed to slower potential growth rather than secluar stagnation.  

If you don't like that argument, then take the more explicit route. Gavin Davies did the intellectual legwork here so we don't have to, and catches Vice Chair Stanley Fischer saying that he doesn't believe the situation calls for protracted negative interest rates. In other words, he rejects the main monetary policy implication of the secular stagnation hypothesis.

And, I don't know if Krugman agrees, but I find it hard to believe that Fischer carries anything but extreme intellectual weight within the Fed. So I would hardly be surprised that the Fed would be moving in a direction he defined. One wonders where Fed Chair Janet Yellen's leadership is on this point?  That was always a risk of adding Fischer to the Board - that what might have seemed to be a dream team turned into a power struggle. 

This is not to say that I do not share Krugman's and Avent's concerns. I most certainly do. Fischer claims that markets do not believe the secular stagnation story either, but in my mind the flattening of the yield curve is a red flag that the Fed has less room to maneuver than implied by the SEP.  But maybe once the Fed actually starts hiking rates, market participants get the clue and the yield curve shifts up. I am not sure I am interested in taking that risk at this point, but no one is asking me to serve on the Federal Reserve Board.

One quibble with Krugman regarding his interpretation of the Phillips Curve:

Suppose the Fed waits too long. Well, inflation ticks up — probably not much, since the short-run Phillips curve looks very flat. And the Fed has the tools to rein the economy in. It would be annoying, unpleasant, and no doubt there would be Congressional hearings berating the Fed for debasing the dollar etc.. But not a really big problem.

Maybe two quibbles. First is that if you asked policymakers why the Phillips Curve was flat, I think they would say that nominal wages rigidities hold up the back end, while tighter policy holds down the front. In other words, the reason inflation does not accelerate at low unemployment rates is that the Fed tightens policy accordingly. Second, I think they equate "reigning the economy in" as triggering a recession. I think they find this more than unpleasant.

Bottom Line:  If you want to know what the Fed is thinking at this point, a journalist needs to push Yellen on the secular stagnation issue at next week's press conference. Does she or the committee agree with Fischer?  And does she see any inconsistency with the SEP implied equilibrium Federal Funds rates and the current level of long bonds? 

Fed Updates Ahead of FOMC Meeting

I have tended to think that there is a tendency to underestimate the potential for a more hawkish Fed.  From last week:

Dudley appears to be increasingly concerned that the evolution of financial conditions this year suggests the Fed needs to pursue a more aggressive policy stance or else risk a repeat of 04-07.  If this concern is being felt more generally within the Fed, it clearly puts a more hawkish bias to the Fed's reaction function. And, in my opinion, I think the risk of a more hawkish Federal Reserve is under-appreciated. Few are expecting a hawkish Federal Reserve, reasonably so given the path of policy since 2008. But I don't think the data are that far from a tipping point for the Federal Reserve. Of course, take that in the context of my general optimism.

I think policymakers have been falling in line with the idea of a mid-2015 rate hike, somewhat earlier than market expectations. In a great piece, Gavyn Davies concurs:

One of the most successful rules for investors in the past few years has been never to underestimate the innate dovishness of the Federal Reserve. Whenever there has been a scare that the Fed might move in a hawkish direction, this has quickly proven to be a mistake. Forward curves for short term interest rates have consistently moved “lower for longer”, and incoming economic data have always ensured that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has remained comfortable with this tendency.

In recent months, however, the markets may have become over confident about the Fed’s dovishness in the face of a large and persistent decline in the US unemployment rate...

...The controlling group may be shifting towards the median dot, rather than the dovish end of the spectrum. This may even include Ms Yellen herself, if the Stanley Fischer interview is any guide. Mr Fischer is universally regarded as an intellectual heavyweight, but he has said very little about his personal views on monetary policy since taking office last May. He is unlikely to have broken this silence without the knowledge and support of the Chair.

Davies summarizes Federal Reserve Vice Chair Stanley Fischer's recent interview and concludes that "Mr Fischer is building a high hurdle to any delay in lift-off beyond mid 2015." Many policymakers are ready and eager to normalize policy, and they see economic improvements as consistent with normalization. Just like they wanted out of the asset purchase business, they want out of the zero rate business, and they see fewer and fewer reasons why this isn't possible.

A small step to that rate hike is the removal of the "considerable time" language in the FOMC policy statement on the basis that too much improvement in labor markets has occurred to justify a certain position on zero interest rates. If the Fed is looking for flexibility and does not want to surprise market participants with an unexpectedly hawkish position next year, they will soon need to loosen up the language. Hence sometime soon "considerable time" will be replaced, perhaps with the term "patience."

Jon Hilsenrath at the Wall Street Journal puts us on alert that next week may be just that time:

Federal Reserve officials are seriously considering an important shift in tone at their policy meeting next week: dropping an assurance that short-term interest rates will stay near zero for a “considerable time” as they look more confidently toward rate increases around the middle of next year. 

Senior officials have hinted lately that they’re looking at dropping this closely watched interest-rate signal, which many market participants take as a sign rates won’t go up for at least six months. 

“It’s clearer that we’re closer to getting rid of that than we were a few months ago,” FedVice Chairman Stanley Fischer said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal last week. New York Fed President William Dudley has avoided using the “considerable time” phrase in recent speeches and instead said the Fed should be “patient” before raising rates.

I find this piece of logic, however, to be irritating:

Fed officials have several tactical issues to consider that could prompt them to shift their rate assurance now, while they’re still taking measure of the economy’s strength. Ms. Yellen has a news conference after the policy meeting ends Dec. 17 to explain the central bank’s decision. The Fed doesn’t have another news conference scheduled until March. If officials wait to change the words until then, the market could take it as a signal officials are pushing off planned rate increases until the second half of next year.

It is not Hilsenrath I am irritated with, it is the Fed.  It is fairly clear that the Fed has set expectations such that major policy moves can only be made in meetings with press conferences. It's the reason that June 2015 comes into focus for a rate hike - given the repeated warnings about the "middle of next year," March seems too early, and September too late. April and July are deemed not real policy meetings because they don't have press conferences. This really needs to end. The Fed needs to move to a press conference with every meeting.

If they feel they need a press conference to announce the end of the "considerable time" language, supporters of such a change will argue strongly for next week and probably win. It also opens up the possibility of a March hike, something the hawks would be keen on. Delaying the removal of "considerable time" to March would likely close off a June hike, but the moderates want to retain that option. I think both moderates and doves would be willing to wait until the January meeting, but that meeting has no press conference. So at this point I would be expecting that a change in the language next week is likely, and by the end of January is certain.

But make no mistake that I think that having to set policy by the timing of press conferences rather than the meetings is just stupid.

Finally, another line from Hilsenrath leaves me cautious:

At the same time, a stronger dollar and falling commodities prices—including the sharp decline in oil prices—are putting downward pressure on inflation.

I can certainly imagine that the stronger dollar is a consequence of stronger economic growth, which supports consumer prices. On the declining oil prices, I tend to view those as primarily supply side related and almost certainly a net positive for the US economy. Over the weekend Matt Busigin reminded us of this:

In April of 2011, Ben Bernanke was universally lambasted and lampooned for claiming that inflation, which was accelerating and running above 3%, was “transitory”. He used this view to justify loosening monetary policy. The next few months of CPI were not favourable to the Fed chairman’s views: it peaked at 3.8% (nearly double the implicit target at that point) in September of 2011, sparking a feverishly pitched cacophony of criticism that the Fed chair was out of touch, and tone-deaf in his theoretical ivory tower to the practical realities on the ground.

This, however, proved to be Bernanke’s finest hour. Yes, even more so than the extraordinary measures taken during the height of the credit crisis. His detractors then, of which there were still many, included people and institutions on the brink that needed the Fed to extend them a hand. In September of 2011, the chairman stood very much alone in his call for moderated inflation now that the acute disaster removed influential institutions and people from needing the Fed to act in order to survive....

...This is why Ben Bernanke’s 2011 triumph is relevant today. The same framework for understanding inflation through commodity prices and wages that successfully predicted the deceleration of inflation against the tidal wave of popular belief now finds itself in the inverse position: the expectations of inflation are very low, and despite low commodity prices, it expects inflation will accelerate...

You can read this for my similar take back in 2011. Rather than preventing inflation from returning to target, the oil price decline is likely to have the opposite impact and push inflation back to target. Hence the low-inflation argument for holding rates near zero will look weaker by June if not March.

Bottom Line: Fed is still positioning to begin normalizing rates in the middle of 2015. The data is less of an impediment with each passing day. The time to eliminate the "considerable period" language is fast approach. The press conference calendar argues for next week. Honestly, I hope they will skip this meeting in favor of the January meeting just to prove that every FOMC meeting is a live meeting. Alas, I think they believe they need the press conference to temper any adverse reactions from market participants. Finally, I am wary with the consensus view that the oil price decline in disinflationary. Open up to the possibility of the opposite. Look back to what you believed in 2011.

Economy Clearly Gaining Momentum

The November employment report came in ahead of expectations, with a monthly nfp gain of 321k and 44k of upward revisions to previous months. Job gains were spread throughout the major sectors of the economy. The 2014 acceleration in job growth is clearly evident:

The employment report in the context of indicators previously identified by Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen as important to watch:

Measures of underemployment are generally moving in the right direction. To be sure, the labor force participation rate remains in a general downward trend, but on this point I think you have to accept that demographic forces are driving the train. Year-over-year wage growth remains anemic although average wages gained 0.37% on the month. While this indicates that wage gains are not dead and gone forever, I would find it more impressive if these kinds of gains repeated themselves in the next few months. As I have said before, I think that will happen as unemployment rates fall further. I read nothing of importance into the unchanged unemployment rate for the month.

The tenor of this report harmonizes well with the song sung by recent data. Of course, data are inherently variable, and not every report will be as bright (or as dark) as the last. Nor would we expect a string of 300k+ gains in employment just yet. But I think any reasonable single extraction effort tells you that activity is on a firmer footing than it has been in years, and there is little reason to expect the improvements will reverse quickly. The US economy has momentum. Do not discount the value of that momentum.

Fixed income markets quickly discerned what this report means for the Fed - the risk is that rate hikes will come sooner than expected. At time of writing, the yield on the two-year bond gained 11bp, while the ten-year yield rose 9bp.  The Fed will be pleased by the upward though controlled gains at the longer end of the yield curve as they will associate those gains with modestly less financial accommodation. They may be less pleased that stocks keeps hitting record highs as it suggests that financial conditions are easing somewhat, thus perhaps necessitating a faster pace of rate hikes. Over the longer run, I remain wary of the flattening yield curve.

My guess is that the Fed will soon begin to believe that they stayed pessimistic on the recovery the year the recovery began to show significant signs of life. More on the Fed next week.

Bottom Line: A solid employment report. The risk that the first rate hike comes sooner than June continues to rise. 

Ahead of the November Employment Report

Data in the first week of December has told a generally bullish story for the US economy. The week began with an upbeat number from the ISM manufacturing index with solid underlying data:

While this was seemingly at odds with the Markit manufacturing index, I would say that both of these series (like consumer confidence) exhibit far too much variability to place too much weight on any one month of data. If I look at the ISM measure in context with other US manufacturing data, the overall view is one of steadily improving activity in the sector (note the estimated 17.1 million auto sales rate for November):

This also seems consistent with the anecdotal story told by the Beige Book:

Manufacturing activity generally advanced during the reporting period. The automotive and aerospace industries continued to be sources of strength. Steel production increased in Cleveland, Chicago, and San Francisco. Fabricated metal manufacturers in the Chicago and Dallas Districts noted widespread growth in orders. Dallas reported that domestic sales for plastics were strong, while demand for plastics was steady in Richmond and declined in Kansas City. Chemical manufacturers in the Boston District indicated that the falling price of oil relative to natural gas had made U.S. producers less competitive, because foreign chemical producers rely more heavily on oil for feedstock and production. St. Louis, Minneapolis, and Dallas reported that food production was little changed on balance, but production in Kansas City continued to decline. Chicago and Dallas indicated that shipments of construction materials increased. Manufacturers of heavy machinery in the Chicago District cited improvements in sales of construction machinery, but reported ongoing weak demand for agricultural and mining equipment. High-tech manufacturers in Boston, Dallas, and San Francisco noted steady growth in demand. Biotech revenue increased in the San Francisco District.

I would also add that the Beige Book had a decidedly optimistic tenor:

Reports from the twelve Federal Reserve Districts suggest that national economic activity continued to expand in October and November. A number of Districts also noted that contacts remained optimistic about the outlook for future economic activity. 

The ISM's service sector report was equally upbeat:

The ADP report fell somewhat short of expectations, but again this number is far too volatile to place much if any weight on a small miss. Or even a large miss, for that matter. Calculated Risk places the ADP number in context of other labor market indicators, concluding that:

There is always some randomness to the employment report.  The consensus forecast is pretty strong, but I'll take the over again (above 230,000).

I don't have much to add here. As I have said before, predicting the monthly nonfarm payroll change is a fool's errand, yet an errand we all undertake. I would pick 235k with an upside risk. More important is what happens to wage growth.  I expect that to pick up over the next six months, but would be surprised to see any large gain this month.  

Jon Hilsenrath at the Wall Street Journal reports that top Federal Reserve policymakers are not deterred in their plans for policy normalization:

In public appearances this week, Janet Yellen’s two top lieutenants sounded like individuals who want to start raising short-term interest rates in the months ahead, despite mounting uncertainties about growth abroad and associated downward pressure on commodities prices...

...“It is clear we are getting closer” to dropping an assurance that rates will stay low for a considerable time, he said. Mr. Fischer repeatedly emphasized his desire to get back to normal. “We almost got used to thinking that zero is the natural place for the interest rate. It is far from it,” he said.

In case there is any doubt about where top Fed officials are going with this, New York Fed president Bill Dudley said bluntly: “Market expectations that lift-off will occur around mid-2015 seem reasonable to me.” Like Mr. Fischer, Mr. Dudley sees the recent decline in oil prices as a net positive for the U.S., a net importer of energy which benefits from a lower cost of imported oil. 

I think the speech my New York Federal Reserve President William Dudley is a must read.  I have been repeatedly drawn to this paragraph (emphasis added):

First, when lift-off occurs, the pace of monetary policy normalization will depend, in part, on how financial market conditions react to the initial and subsequent tightening moves.  If the reaction is relatively large—think of the response of financial market conditions during the so-called “taper tantrum” during the spring and summer of 2013—then this would likely prompt a slower and more cautious approach.  In contrast, if the reaction were relatively small or even in the wrong direction, with financial market conditions easing—think of the response of long-term bond yields and the equity market as the asset purchase program was gradually phased out over the past year—then this would imply a more aggressive approach.  The key point is this:  We will pursue the monetary policy stance that best generates the set of financial market conditions most consistent with achievement of the FOMC’s dual mandate objectives.  This depends both on how financial market conditions respond to the Fed’s policy actions and on how the real economy responds to the changes in financial conditions.  

Long term yields have been drifting down since the "taper tantrum," flattening the yield curve significantly:

Dudley seems to be saying that he does not think that financial conditions should be easing, especially since he thinks he has been clear that the time to begin policy normalization is fast approaching. Robin Harding at the Financial Times sees the implications:

Although Mr Dudley does not say it, this argument could apply to the timing of rate rises as well as their pace. Markets have not reacted much to the prospect of Fed rate rises: the ten-year yield at 2.22 per cent is no higher than it was before the taper tantrum in summer 2013; the S&P 500 is up by 15 per cent on a year ago. Mr Dudley explicitly cites the low level of 10-year Treasury yields, saying they are presumably due, “in part, to the fact that long-term interest rates in Europe and Japan are much lower”.

If markets are not reacting to potential Fed rate rises then, by Mr Dudley’s logic, rate rises could need to come earlier as well as faster. The initial rate rise, in particular, could help the Fed to learn about the financial market response. That may help to explain why Mr Dudley is still in June 2015 for rate lift-off despite his dovish views.

Take this all in context of an earlier passage from the Dudley speech:

...during the 2004-07 period, the FOMC tightened monetary policy nearly continuously, raising the federal funds rate from 1 percent to 5.25 percent in 17 steps.  However, during this period, 10-year Treasury note yields did not rise much, credit spreads generally narrowed and U.S. equity price indices moved higher.  Moreover, the availability of mortgage credit eased, rather than tightened.  As a result, financial market conditions did not tighten.  

As a result, financial conditions remained quite loose, despite the large increase in the federal funds rate.  With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that either monetary policy should have been tightened more aggressively or macroprudential measures should have been implemented in order to tighten credit conditions in the overheated housing sector...

Dudley appears to be increasingly concerned that the evolution of financial conditions this year suggests the Fed needs to pursue a more aggressive policy stance or else risk a repeat of 04-07.  If this concern is being felt more generally within the Fed, it clearly puts a more hawkish bias to the Fed's reaction function. And, in my opinion, I think the risk of a more hawkish Federal Reserve is under-appreciated. Few are expecting a hawkish Federal Reserve, reasonably so given the path of policy since 2008. But I don't think the data are that far from a tipping point for the Federal Reserve. Of course, take that in the context of my general optimism.

A second point is that Dudley is not taking seriously the possibility that the flattening yields curve suggests the Fed has less room to move than policymakers think they do. This is something I worry about - if the Fed leans on the short end too much, they risk taking an expansion that should last another fours years to one that has just two more years left. But that might be a story for next December. 

 Bottom Line:  Generally positive US data leave the Fed on track for a rate hike in the middle of next year. I am inclined to believe that the risk is that rate hikes come sooner and faster than anticipated outweigh the risk of later and slower.